Haha...thanks Tom. It doesn't make us bad guys. It's just a fact that we had shortfalls. :D
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Haha...thanks Tom. It doesn't make us bad guys. It's just a fact that we had shortfalls. :D
that a generation of US political and military leaders had a number of shortfalls that adversely impacted your ability to do your jobs.
If the senior folks hadn't tried to drop FID and COIN by the wayside, you and everyone there would've had the training. They did drop it, you didn't get the training -- and that's not your fault; you did what you were trained to do and did it well. Any errors, as they say, accrue to the upper echelons.
Hopefully, the next generation will not repeat that mistake.
I'd also note that your OIF I experience and Schmedlap's OIF III experience were two different wars. Just as this one coming up will be different again.
Keep on pushing.
Please speak for yourself.
http://i2.photobucket.com/albums/y44...ndABN/82nd.gif
Some units were doing things differently than others.
MG Charles Swannack, All American 6Quote:
Operational Approach
The primary mission of the 82nd Airborne was to capture or kill those trying to kill U.S. soldiers. In order to achieve that goal, the division had to gain the support and assistance of local populations. In August 2003, the division received an average of twenty tips per week regarding insurgent activity. By March 2004, this figure had increased to 300 per week. Encouraging Iraqis to support the U.S. military is the key to achieving stability, and these figures show that U.S. forces have made significant headway. As little as one percent of the population is actually interested in attacking coalition forces. Most of the remaining 99 percent of Iraqis are on the fence; they are potential supporters of either the coalition or the insurgency. For the most part, it seems that they have supported the coalition because they want a better future for Iraq.
July 2004
Kid was with that patch for OIF II and they were doing things differently than their neighbors. Some things better, some not. Important thing is where we are now.
What occurred then with various units doesn't change the fact that the senior leadership of the Army, to a lesser extent the Marines and to a greater extent, the body politic that is the US Guvmint screwed the pooch post 1990; even post 1972 -- Munich was a wake up call, the Nixon directed commission on terrorism accurately predicted the future -- and no one of any import paid attention to it. Lick on all of 'em. There were other over the years; all ignored while we prepared for a conflict that wasn't going to come. :mad:
Important thing is that we not do that again. Business as usual is not going to cut it.
Okay, I'll wade in. This is the sort of stuff where we got ourselves behind the bow wave.
From April to November 2004, I argue that we were not practising COIN. People may have thought that, but heck, we didn't even have an insurgency then :wry:.
We were practising SASO. SASO/SOSO and COIN are two different constructs, and this is where our doctrine, training, and execution failed us during our effort to OODA on just what hit us. That is why I use the analogy of one hand trying to find our ass. The other hand was trying to soothe the bruise from the whacking we were ABOUT TO GET.
MSG, I am b no means trying to play down the actions of you and your men. But reality is reality. For the fragile months following 3d Bn, 4th Marines' destruction of Saddam's likeness, we were not practising COIN in the classical, current, or any, sense.
I am having a hard time finding the doctrinal definition, but what is the joint description of a TCP anyway? And is there a different one for VCP?
Bingo. Dead on. My "Hearts and Minds" missions were to get co-operation in rebuilding because that was the right thing to do, not to deny support to the "insurgents". Some of us low ranking grunts had that hair on the back of the neck feeling that the "dead enders" were not just going to go away, but no-one knew for sure, myself included. Of course, a few better decisions from the top, like not criminalizing the entire Baath party and disbanding the Iraqi Army then SASO may have been enough.
Reed
AFAIK TCPs and VCP are identicle
jcustis:
I sincerely admire your candor and transparency. I am sure your unit did everything in their power to adapt to the situation with courage and professionalism.
In May 2003 the 2nd BCT 82nd Airborne Division occupied battlespace in the southern districts of Baghdad known collectively as Al Rashid. There was no government, no infrastructure and no manual for setting up a government while fighting FRLs, religious extremists, criminal gangs, and foreign terrorists.
2nd BCT was spread out with 14 combat outposts not including temporary platoon patrol bases. Mind you, we had none of the sexy ISR equipment or digital bandwidth today’s modular BCTs enjoy. We had no RSTA Squadron, no STB, and no CPOF or real-time digital COP.
COL Kurt Fuller tells Karl Zinsmeister in Dawn Over Baghdad that this was the first time in history when US forces have participated in large scale urban fighting while simultaneously rebuilding the area being contested.
In the period of May-Dec 2003, 2nd BCT conducted more than 500 raids, searched more than 25,000 houses, captured more than 2,200 suspected insurgents, set in motion $17 million worth of building projects, repaired 320 schools and 24 medical clinics, and established 15 NACs (neighborhood advisory councils) across the city.
The paratroopers accomplished this while engaging in 130 fire fights, 39 mortar attacks, 25 ambushes, 41 RPG assaults, and 140 IEDs.
Today’s pacification of Baghdad is frequently referred to as the “lowest incidence of SIGACTs since February 2004". That’s the month we left.
2nd BCT’s TTP included dismounted foot patrolling, night Ops, religious leader engagement, combined patrols with the embryonic ISF (then known as the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps), and what is recognized today as the forerunner of clear-hold-build.
Not saying we were all that and a bag of chips, but the TTP and accomplishments I’ve described here are certainly not far from the doctrine described in FM 3-24.
Airborne/Air Assault units had extensive training in this type of warfare for years. What we didn't have was the cultural awareness or experience in governance that was needed. That was all made up on the fly.
Sorry for boasting, I'm just damned lucky to have been a part of such a great bunch leaders and paratroopers.
My unit sure as heck wasn't doing COIN. My CO scolded me after conducting am ambush on Canal Street in late June 2003 because, as he put it, "the war is over." Once again, that was in late June. How did he get such a skewed view of the war? By sitting with his fellow CO's indoors, on a couch, drinking soda, watching VCD's, and swapping war stories while the insurgency gathered steam all around them. Being a hard-headed, loud-mouthed, ignorant SOB helped, too. I won't shame the otherwise proud history of the unit by naming it, but I can say with a lot of confidence that from at least Brigade on down, nobody knew WTF they were doing and none of them were too eager to leave their TOCs and try to figure it out. I'm pretty sure the Division knew what they were doing though. They were setting up a Burger King and MWR facility at the airport. Amenities are the water that the fobbit fish swims in. They started pumping it in early.