Karzai gives up on Taliban talks
The BBC's headline and some appropriate quotes:
Quote:
Afghan President Hamid Karzai has said his government will no longer hold peace talks with the Taliban. He said the killing of Burhanuddin Rabbani had convinced him to focus on dialogue with Pakistan.
Mr Karzai, speaking to a group of religious leaders, said there were no partners for dialogue among the Taliban. It was not possible to find the Taliban leader, Mullah Omar, he added. "Where is he? We cannot find the Taliban Council. Where is it?" he said.
"A messenger comes disguised as a Taliban Council member and kills, and they neither confirm nor reject it. Therefore, we cannot talk to anyone but to Pakistan," Mr Karzai told the meeting.
"Who is the other side in the peace process? I do not have any other answer but to say Pakistan is the other side in the peace talks with us."
Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-15134128
Being unable to phone Mullah Omar is a potentially new factor, given the previous reported history of all Afghan power-brokers being able to call each other. Is this a spin-off from drone avoidance?
The road not taken: Abdul Haq and the Afghan solution
As we ponder where the Afghan roadmap is heading today it is fitting to look back before 9/11/2001 and the linked article looks at the late Abdul Haq's Afghan solution:http://www.spectator.co.uk/essays/al...ot-taken.thtml
From my faraway armchair I paused reading this:
Quote:
The West’s decision to work with (and pay) Afghan strongmen or warlords was flawed from the start. It revealed a complete failure to understand the desires and needs of the ordinary Afghans who would in the end determine the outcome of the war. Ordinary Afghans wanted justice, security, good governance involving the local leadership, and services. Instead, the West is perceived to have delivered an unwanted regime, visceral corruption and spiralling insecurity. By ignoring ordinary Afghans, the West drove many of them back to the Taleban.
The author is Lucy Morgan Edwards, a former political aviser to the EU ambassador in Kabul and author of 'The Afghan Solution: the Inside Story of Abdul Haq, the CIA and How Western Hubris Lost Afghanistan':http://lucymorganedwards.com/
Taliban paid £100 a month to stop fighting
A long press article, which includes pro & con views of the reconciliation programme:
Quote:
More than 2,700 insurgents have been reintegrated into mainstream Afghan society since October 2010, with 800 now described as “showing interest in leaving the Taliban”. Of those, about 90 are from Helmand...The reintegration policy has already produced some startling results. In northern Afghanistan, about 900 former Taliban have left the insurgency and violence has decreased by 30 per cent.
This quote has a wider application as it concerns the motivation to fight:
Quote:
Research had shown that many join the insurgency because of a grievance that is not addressed by central government. Some Afghan men turn to the Taliban for help. In Helmand, for example, the governor of the province believes that the insurgency could be reduced by 25 per cent if disputes over land rights could be resolved.
The contrary view:
Quote:
Hanif Atmar, a former interior minister, said last week: “Of around 30,000 insurgents, only eight per cent have reconciled so far — and 99 per cent of them are not from the south. “Frankly speaking, it does not work. The eight per cent that are reconciled, most of them are not genuine insurgents, particularly not from the regions that matter.”
Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worl...-fighting.html
AlQ and Taliban commanders seek Pakistani militants' help to fight US forces
An odd article in the Daily Telegraph, I say odd as it has no author or cited source, it opens with:
Quote:
Prominent al-Qaeda and Afghan Taliban fighters asked Pakistani militants in a pair of rare meetings to set aside their differences and step up support for the battle against US-led forces in Afghanistan, militant commanders said on Monday.
Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worl...ght-US-forces.
It's almost as if AQ & PTT have issued a press release.
I note the calls for unity, stopping factional violence and that the PTT should help more in Afghanistan - the small matter of which many expect ISI would echo, if not facilitate.
This could be posted on a Pakistani thread and of late I've posted contrary information on dissension between the Taliban and PTT. See Post 188: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...t=8689&page=10
Talking to the Taliban:an elusive peace in Afghanistan
An interesting Reuters article, hat tip to the Lowy Institute, in part reflective on the situation in Afghanistan and after reading a new book (due out on the 18th January 2012):http://blogs.reuters.com/pakistan/20...n-afghanistan/
Quote:
But what are we actually looking at here? A quick-fix settlement that could provide just about enough cover for war-weary western governments to pull their troops out before Afghanistan descends again into civil war? Or a serious process which might offer an enduring peace? Do we believe the Taliban are now more amenable to talks than they were before? Or rather that domestic political compulsions in the United States are driving it more rapidly towards the exit?
Let’s be clear. The idea the Taliban would be willing to negotiate some kind of power-sharing deal, and that talks could be helped by measures like the release of prisoners, has been around for a couple of years, if not longer. Moreover, a lasting settlement would require not just a deal with the Afghan Taliban led by Mullah Mohammed Omar, but also reconciliation among all the different actors inside Afghanistan as well as deep-rooted governance reform.
One hopes that the ISAF tactic of eliminating parts of the Taliban leadership in Afghanistan has considered this point:
Quote:
Arguably the chances of reaching a lasting settlement are less now than they were before the United States sent extra troops to Afghanistan in 2010 aiming to decisively turn the tide and force the Taliban to the negotiating table from a position of strength. Since then, the military campaign has splintered the Taliban, making it harder for its Pakistan-based leadership to bring younger and more radicalised fighters into an overall settlement.
The new book is:
Quote:
... by Kandahar-based researchers Alex Strick van Linschoten and Felix Kuehn could hardly be better timed. “An Enemy We Created, The Myth of the Taliban/Al Qaeda Merger in Afghanistan, 1970-2010” should be compulsory reading for anyone trying to separate reality from political spin. It is also an essential guide to what might yet be achieved through talks, and what might have been achieved had serious talks been held earlier.
Link to publisher's notice, with some impressive reviewers quoted:http://www.hurstpub.co.uk/BookDetails.aspx?BookId=661 and the book's website:http://www.anenemywecreated.com/An_E...d/Welcome.html
I know there is a long-running SWC thread 'Reconciliation and COIN in Afghanistan', but for now this deserves a new thread. For reference the thread is on:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=6048