I question whether the Bergen first goal
was really necessary as stated and further question whether that goal could ever be achieved by anyone other than Afghanistan and Pakistan.
I strongly believe a response to the attack was called for and that Afghanistan correctly was and should have been the area selected for that initial response. I also believe that another response was due the ME for years of provocations.
However, I do not agree that we thus had an obligation to 'fix' Afghanistan or the ME -- I have significant doubt that we or anyone else outside those regions can do that. That doubt does not trouble me. :cool:
I guess it all goes back to the alleged Powell to Bush so-called Pottery Barn rule, "You break it, you own it." As has been since pointed out, Pottery Barn has no such rule. Neither do Nations. Bush decided that Powell's doctrine was inapplicable; he should have also decided that his rule was equally unnecessary.
Unfortunately, they didn't ask me and we are where we are. The question now is what is to be done and my perception is still that the US -- and NATO -- have no agreed answer to that question. As someone said, involving NATO was a political master stroke which precipitated a strategic and operational mess.
They need to implement John T's planning cycle... :G
Ken, I suspected I would have OPSEC problems ..
with the young chimps after you sold me the Erector Set Bridge. Yup, one of them has gone missiing; and taken my playbook with him. I suspect he has avoided our winter snows and has gone south to Florida.
Why else would you write this ?
Quote:
I strongly believe a response to the attack was called for and that Afghanistan correctly was and should have been the area selected for that initial response. I also believe that another response was due the ME for years of provocations.
However, I do not agree that we thus had an obligation to 'fix' Afghanistan or the ME -- I have significant doubt that we or anyone else outside those regions can do that. That doubt does not trouble me.
I guess it all goes back to the alleged Powell to Bush so-called Pottery Barn rule, "You break it, you own it." As has been since pointed out, Pottery Barn has no such rule. Neither do Nations. Bush decided that Powell's doctrine was inapplicable; he should have also decided that his rule was equally unnecessary.
Unfortunately, they didn't ask me and we are where we are. The question now is what is to be done ....
Which is a long round-about way to say that I agree with you.
----------------------
Now, you (and everyone else) can disagree with me on a few thoughts I have:
1. Primary focus on Afghanistan is misplaced because it is only part of the "AQ among the Pashtuns" problem; and part of Afghanistan (the old Northern Alliance region) is not part of that problem.
2. The "AQ among the Pashtuns" problem is a trans-national (cross borders) problem. More Pashtuns live in Pakistan than in Afghanistan - as do more AQ since Tora Bora.
3. This problem is totally out of the book so far as "standard" COIN is concerned. The "book" there thinks in terms of a Host Nation (singular), which is assisted by another Nation (US) to control the sea in which the bad guys swim.
4. The analogous Host Nation in this case is Pashtunistan, which does not exist as we normally think of a nation state. It is not, in reality, anything close to a monolith. It is something akin to medieval France before the Crown consolidated, with multiple power centers. In Afghanistan, Mr. Karzai resembles the early kings of France who were surrounded by a ring of "castle keepers" protective against foreign invasiion, but many of whom were as or more powerful than the king. In Pashtunistan, there is not even that semblence of a central power structure other than the Taliban.
5. In formal nation-state terms, we have two Host Nations, Afghanistan and Pakistan, neither of which controls the sea in which we are interested. Application of the COIN "book", to the extent it can be applied here, would require both HNs to open the trans-national Pashtun region to us to perform COIN operations (assuming only for purposes of discussion, that we should be doing that); and also join in that effort with us.
6. While Afghanistan-Pakistan resembles Vietnam in its cross-border aspects (infiltration, etc.), it is quite different in most other respects. In Vietnam, the enemy was North Vietnam (the VC being the unconventional portion of the NVA, which also could be unconventional as suited); the Host Nation being South Vietnam; and we being caught between fighting an unconventional war on one hand and a conventional war on the other hand - a debate that still continues today.
7. The multiple Host Nation issue was avoided in Vietnam by the political decisions between 1958-1962 to remove Laos and Cambodia from our equation (they were not, of course, removed from Giap's equation). The 1964 election settled the issue of an aggressive roll-back strategy against North Vietnam and its "neutral" satellites Laos and Cambodia. What might be similar in Afghanistan-Pakistan is the existence of political constraints (albeit different from those in Vietnam), which could make a nullity of any comprehensive strategic plan before it gets on the ground.
8. Have there been counter-insurgency situations involving multiple Host Nations, where the target population (here, the Pashtuns) lived in both Host Nations and were a substantial population (here 42 million) ? My mind is presently blank on any such precedent.
9. The "AQ among the Pashtuns" problem is compounded by the existence of AQ-linked and AQ-leaning groups thoughout Pakistan, which like Afghanistan is very much a composite nation (Punjab, Sindh, Baluchistan and "Paki-Pashtunistan" being its major component parts).
10. Can anything resembling the COIN "book" help in this situation; or will application of what might well be sound COIN principles elsewhere cause us to take our eyes off the ball ? The ball here being the nightmare that AQ will obtain access to Pakistan's nuclear devices.
Agree with both the above.
JMM, I could quibble aout a comma here and there but essentially, I think you're correct. I'd only add that Afghanistan is not and has never been a COIN fight; there are insurgent aspects but it's far more complex than that and that it also consists of unconventional and conventional fights.
Sapperfitz 82 is on track I think. Right now our ratio is pretty favorable; one can never tell when such a ratio tips the opponents into a "We aren't getting anywhere with this..." mode. Some die hards will not tip but the majority may. Effectively, what he suggests is what we're doing. It lacks finesse but that doesn't mean it won't work. The flip side of that is how long the Congress and taxpayers will put up with us doing just what he suggests (and how long can the Army sustain it and at what rate).
The worst thing we could do is apply Iraqi lessons learned to Afghanistan; very different theaters, people, processes and potentials...
What's a word for 'theater' that starts with a 'p?' :D
React to contact is not a strategy
Quote:
Originally Posted by
sapperfitz82
But what if the end state is not a functioning state? What if the end state is a safe place to kill AQ in, preferably far from our shores and interests?
Given that most folks believe that this is not the kind of war that will end with a white flag and UBL handing over his scimitar, perhaps the best end-state is the one where we attrit them.
Seen from this perspective, the current war is working well. Our kill to casualty ratio is astronomical, the lasting negative affect of our strategy is confined to the countries we are in and the immediate surroundings, and we can exert pressure in the region from these bases (Astan and Iraq).
If this is the strategy, perhaps we should remove the DoS from the region entirely and just call it what it is. If AQ wants to fight, meet us in Astan, Iraq, where ever, and may the best man win.
It worked so well in Iraq (from this point of view) that they quit (apparently).
This is all just a WAG, but it makes me feel a little better about the guys at the top to think of it this way.
Playing global whack-a-mole is not the path to success. If we focus on one area then AQ central would shift their support to another franchise (i.e. AQ in the Mahgreb, Horn of Africa, etc.)
We follow because the govt will continue to react to contact. The govt and the population's attention will shift once the stories of growing AQ (or whoever's) influence in Whereisthatastan. In the end we further AQ's narrative because we come off as the bully.
Maybe I give to much credit to the enemy, but why would they fight when they can live to fight another day and further their message.
I agree with your subject line but I don't think that's what he meant.
I think he meant that, rightly or wrongly, we are in Afghanistan and Iraq whacking moles. We're doing that pretty well. We are not doing other things well in either place but we're doing okay on the whacking, the ratio is good so let's just keep whacking there.
He's aware, as are most of us here, that our efforts in the other areas you name and in many different parts of the world are better planned and executed than in those two theaters so I think he's just suggesting that we're doing okay if not great and we can keep doing that until someone comes up with a better idea.
A lot of folks here have said the same thing you said, "React to contact is not a strategy."
They have suggested that we should be initiating contacts instead of reacting. I agree but see three reasons why we aren't doing that.
First; we have not developed the equipment and transport mechanisms to allow stealthy ingress and egress even though the need has been known since 1979. I believe we have purposely not done that to preclude our initiating contact and the senior leadership in DoD (and Congress) has for many years tacitly supported that. Not an accusation of malfeasance, just of excess caution.
Secondly, we are trying to expand our SOF. I have no doubt that great pain will be taken to avoid dilution of quality. Having been around for the last big expansion, I also have no doubt that those efforts will not succeed and that quality will drop and this will offer further reasons for us to not initiate contact. Again, an excess of caution, not criminality.
Thirdly we have become a risk averse and litigation prone society; this has produced armed forces that are quite risk averse and very attuned to the legal niceties. I believe this and our very unwieldy bureaucracy will preclude our initiation of contact and keep us in the reactive mode.
So. What's your proposal to fix this, stop reacting to contacts -- and what's a coherent strategy?
1 Attachment(s)
Pashtuns - A Cross-Border People
I've always loved maps, since geography helps reality sense. This one (a clip and shoop from the OP article here) illustrates why a multi-HN approach has to be employed in dealing with the Pashtuns- if we do COIN by the "book", which doesn't quite cover this situation, anyway. So, why do it by the "book" ?
The old Northern Alliance region is fairly secure as a base of operations. What if the yellow-outlined Pashtun area were regarded as an ungoverned area (not part of any sovereignty) ? - like the white spaces on old 19th and 18th century maps.
What ? - heresy on the part of a lawyer trained in modern I Law and its obligatory nation-state concept. You have to admit that it would change the outlook, even viewed from the standpoint of the Operational Law Manual.
Anyway, this map is food for thinking. If there were no legal constraints (we simply "deem" them away - hell, it's a hypothetical), what would you do in the Pashtun area ?
You might also consider what the Paki-ISI did when it approached that area from the other side of its border. The ISI had advantages we do not have - one, same religion; two, many of them were Pashtuns.
1 Attachment(s)
Pakistan - A Composite Nation
Why Pakistanis should be nervous is the story of this map.
The major groups (Punjabis, 44.68% of the population; Pashtuns, 15.42%; Sindhis, 14.1%) amount to almost 3/4 of the total population. The two other major groups (another 15+%) are largely in the Sindh.
Quote:
from Wiki -
Seraiki
The Seraiki or Multani people are an ethnic group from the south-eastern areas of Pakistan, especially in the area of the former princely state of Bahawalpur and the districts of Sukkur, Larkana, Dadu, Sehwan, Sanghar, Nawabshah, Hyderabad, Sindh, Mirpurkhas, Multan, Rajanpur, Dera Ghazi Khan, MuzafarGarh, Layyah, Bhakkar, Mianwali, Dera Ismail Khan, Karachi. A significant number of Seraikis also reside in India, with most concentrated in the state of Punjab, Maharashtra and Gujarat. The Seraikis maintain that they have a separate language and culture, but their language is often viewed as a dialect of Sindhi or Punjabi. While the majority of Seraikis follow Islam, a few also follow Hinduism and Sikhism.
Quote:
from Wiki -
Muhajir
Muhajir is a diverse term used to describe the Muslim refugees who migrated to Pakistan after the independence in 1947. Traditionally meaning the Muslim refugees who migrated from regions other than the Punjab state of India at the time of Pakistan's independence, in recent years, the term has come to include refugees who've arrived from Burma, Bangladesh, Afghanistan, Iran, Somalia and Iran but for all intents, when the term Muhajir is used, it generally refers to the Muslim refugees from British India.
The term Muhajir itself is now gradually being replaced by the more politically acceptable term "Urdu Speaker" or "Urdu" because of its connotations. Even though 'Urdu speaking' term is still not the correct term to identify a group of people since many of these people claim Middle Eastern, Turkish, Afghan and Indian decent. Many can trace their family roots to the Middle East and Central Asia prior to migration to North and Central South Asia. Many of these claims cannot be verified. The one uniting factor for the people regardless of their origin/race is that their mother tongue is Urdu.
......
The majority of people who migrated after the independence were settled in the port city of Karachi in southern Sindh and in the cities of Hyderabad, Sukkur, Nawabshah and Mirpurkhas.
As well as the above, many Urdu-speakers settled in the cities of Punjab mainly in Lahore, Multan, Bahawalpur and Rawalpindi
Today, in Pakistan, 7.6% of the population, or around 12 million citizens identify themselves as 'Urdu-Speaking'. Of this number around 8 Million reside in Sindh and around 4 million reside in Punjab and Islamabad.
You can see why the ISI concentrated on turning Afghanistan into a buffer, finally using the Taliban as the vehicle. Their scheme worked fine, except for 9/11.
There have been so many good thoughts planted in this thread, I have to sit back and think about all of this.
PS: sapperfitz82 - you are preaching to this choir on the following:
Quote:
Our judicial system does not currently inspire confidence on the counterterror front.
The last few months of "pounding the War Crimes beat" are fully in agreement with you. Of the three options (convert, contain or kill), only the last seems applicable to hardcore AQ. Others may differ.
Defining the enemy and endstate.
Gian Gentile's op-ed is being discussed here, but his comment below seems relevant here.
Quote:
from Gentile article
There are other ways to define the problem, or center of gravity, in Afghanistan. If the "enemy" there is defined as Al Qaeda, then perhaps other policy, strategy and operational options might be considered. In this different conceptual formulation, perhaps a substantial American combat presence on the ground might not be necessary and instead the "enemy" might be dealt with by other means of military power, rather than large numbers of conventional combat forces trying to win hearts and minds.
Food for thought.
Haggling over the details
While the second part of your statement quoted above is correct, the first part is a supposition. I would agree that it is a logical one but one cannot know where a tipping point is for another. Afghans are far more pragmatic than many...
--Exactly, they can chose not to fight. Which is not victory for us or defeat for them. That is what makes this stuff so interesting.
Having said that, I believe if you'll review this thread and others -- always a good idea before jumping in -- on the topic you'll see that both Sapperfitz and I have previously complained of a lack of an achievable goal in Afghanistan and have done so on numerous occasions.
--Very true, but I can't link to all of your posts ;)
True.Easily said; harder done. You are talking about two eastern nations who have no history of strong government behaving in accordance with strong nation western norms. Not going to happen. You are not going to find a guy -- or even a group of guys -- in either nation that can do what you suggest.
--Government was a poor word choice because it implies a western solution. My "hollow slogan" comment was meant as a criticism of a western approach. My idea is to support what works in the region. If that is cronyism and warlordism, work with what is available. Idealism is a poor strategic foundation.
Thus we seem to be in agreement... :D[/QUOTE]
--Good, now we can solve the next problem:)
PS-evidently I can't figure out the multipe "quote option". Sorry for the ugly post.