Sub conscious or unconscious...
Either way, Marc has hit on one of my two major disconnects with Bob's World's model. I knew and have said that I applauded his ideas and idealism but doubted the achievability. IOW, worthwhile thoughts but probably not reachable in the near term, the political process isn't ready for that. Still, nothing wrong with planting seeds and it is a decent goal...
There was another concern that I couldn't put my finger on immediately and, while I strongly suspected it was the good governance issue, I wasn't certain until one of Marc's comments crystallized it:
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As a result of these perceptual differences, he tends to exclude them and classify what I would consider to be much of the "normal" operations, as rogue and controllable, while I view them as predictable destabilizing agents.
Exactly. The world is full of destabilizing agents and most are predictable. Government is necessary, no question but it is also generally inefficient and can never be the ultimately reliable entity that many wish and most people, even if they wish it were not so, realize this. Thus government itself is a predictable destabilizing agent even though its nominal purpose is to provide stability. Governance OTOH is more inherently stabilizing but it also is less predictable and generally less capable of resisting destabilization.
Someone once mentioned that people in the west accrue money to influence power; those in the East accrue power to get money. Lot of truth in that, enough so that it becomes a predictable item but it can focus attention on the 'governance' issue rather than on the actual root -- criminality.
I believe there is a tendency to focus on governmental/governance milieus in the Intelligence arena for both the predictive and / or the 'fix' phases and thus misses other indicators, generally economic and very frequently criminally related, which are far more important as catalysts. Witness the problems in southern Thailand or Afghanistan, in both cases the even the touted religion and ideology motives really are secondary to power and thievery from that power. Or the smugglers of Anbar.
There is little question that poor governance allows an insurgency to develop and will contribute little to containing an insurgency. However, I tried to recall a single insurgency that really began due to poor governance.
Couldn't really think of one -- including the American Revolution -- but I'm sure there's one out there somewhere, probably obvious and I just missed it. Someone may be able to educate me...
Use my definition of Poor governance, not some measure of effective governance
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Originally Posted by
Ken White
Either way, Marc has hit on one of my two major disconnects with Bob's World's model. I knew and have said that I applauded his ideas and idealism but doubted the achievability. IOW, worthwhile thoughts but probably not reachable in the near term, the political process isn't ready for that. Still, nothing wrong with planting seeds and it is a decent goal...
There was another concern that I couldn't put my finger on immediately and, while I strongly suspected it was the good governance issue, I wasn't certain until one of Marc's comments crystallized it:Exactly. The world is full of destabilizing agents and most are predictable. Government is necessary, no question but it is also generally inefficient and can never be the ultimately reliable entity that many wish and most people, even if they wish it were not so, realize this. Thus government itself is a predictable destabilizing agent even though its nominal purpose is to provide stability. Governance OTOH is more inherently stabilizing but it also is less predictable and generally less capable of resisting destabilization.
Someone once mentioned that people in the west accrue money to influence power; those in the East accrue power to get money. Lot of truth in that, enough so that it becomes a predictable item but it can focus attention on the 'governance' issue rather than on the actual root -- criminality.
I believe there is a tendency to focus on governmental/governance milieus in the Intelligence arena for both the predictive and / or the 'fix' phases and thus misses other indicators, generally economic and very frequently criminally related, which are far more important as catalysts. Witness the problems in southern Thailand or Afghanistan, in both cases the even the touted religion and ideology motives really are secondary to power and thievery from that power. Or the smugglers of Anbar.
There is little question that poor governance allows an insurgency to develop and will contribute little to containing an insurgency. However, I tried to recall a single insurgency that really began due to poor governance.
Couldn't really think of one -- including the American Revolution -- but I'm sure there's one out there somewhere, probably obvious and I just missed it. Someone may be able to educate me...
All began with poor governance, none due to ineffective governance. I will expand later, but have defined on here a few times. Its a two step process:
1. The existence of some issue, real or perceived, that is so important to some distinct segment of the populace that they are willing to fight over it. Usually some issue high on Maslow's chart, that sparks "injustice" or "outrage" or "disrespect." Coupled with
2. The perception that there is no legitimate and certain means to address the same.
Governance itself may be extremely effective and trip this trigger; or extremely ineffective and not trip this trigger.
To use an American example
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Originally Posted by
Rex Brynen
The issue of legitimacy is a tricky one--how do we know it when we see it? Do populations accept political processes as "legitimate" on normative/cultural grounds, or is legitimacy also shaped by perceptions of the availability of alternatives, or lack thereof?
(On an unrelated side note, when I started teaching political science in Calgary I used to illustrate the concepts of authority and legitimacy by reference to why, on an empty road at 2am, we nonetheless stop at a traffic light. When I first used that example here in Montreal, my class burst into laughter. Few here would consider stopping at a red light if there was no other traffic around. :D)
Half of America was outraged by the Bush Administration; and similarly we will probably achieve half of America being outraged at the Obama administration; yet there is no risk of insurgency, why??
For me, I try to capture this in my second component of "poor governance." Every American believes with absolute certainty that the system will work. That no matter how much they disagree with the current office holders that they can vote and their vote will count, and that no matter what, in 8 years the President they despise will be gone. It is this confidence in the process that they have a legitimate (legal) means of redress that prevents them from taking illegal means.
It is a two step process. So one must seek to understand both the issues that give rise to this level of dissatisfaction, as well as the points of distrust or total lack of, process to address them. Good FID should work at then targeting both of these aspects of governmental failure to take away the casuation for insurrection and insurgency. BUT, we must also do so in a way that we do not assume a perceived role of inappropriate legitimacy ourselves over that same government, or we risk adding our names to the target list of the insurgency.
Leadership is like a Pez dispenser
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Originally Posted by
omarali50
I see too much emphasis on nation building, governance and whatnot and not enough on finding and killing the leadership of the enemy. The Afghan people can get by with very minimal governance (and will probably resent too much governance) but they are caught in the middle between two armies and are not sure which one is going to win. There is no concievable way of delivering "good governance" without changing the calculation of "who is winning". Show them that the US/ANA is winning (not "has won", just "winning") and most of the governance issues will disappear because local bosses will rule themselves as before and will side with the winning side. Actual governance will spread out slowly from the cities and it can take decades and that would still be OK. The real reason no one turns in the taliban is because no one is sure the US is likely to stay and win and nobody wants their head cut off for collaborating with the infidels after the infidels leave. On a related note, a successful regime does not have to deliver too much education and healthcare if it can deliver retribution for major crimes against the regime. Again, its not necessary to solve every attack. But the impression has to be established (over time) that attacks lead to determined and very PERSISTENT efforts to find out who came, where they came from, who harbored them, etc. Again, you dont need to be perfect, but you need to have a reputation for determined and tenacious enforcement, NOT wild and over the top punitive retribution...
There is always someone else to step up, and often they may be much more qualified than the guy you just took out of their way. Also, it tends to validate insurgent propaganda and expand their influence in the populace, particularly if you are sloppy in your engagement methods. Not saying there is no place for it, but I always recommend using a solid nodal analysis to ID the right guys to take out. Go to any HQ and you can take out 30 guys by date of rank with no negative effect on efficiency. Now, do an analysis of key nodes as to what makes that HQ function and take out the 30 guys who really make the place work, the IT guy, the comms guy, the one who keeps the power running, etc and you can shut it down. Work smarter. Just going after senior leaders is not smart targeting.
Did indeed. Good Paper, thanks, Rex.
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Originally Posted by
Rex Brynen
Two keepers:
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Lane, a superbly attentive historian of Venice, allowed specifically for the case of a government that generates protection rents for its merchants by deliberately attacking their competitors.
Smedley Butler would agree... :wry:
As would FDR and some current political types.
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First, popular resistance to war making and state making made a difference. When ordinary people resisted vigorously, authorities made concessions: guarantees of rights, representative institutions, courts of appeal. Those concessions, in their turn, constrained the later paths of war making and state making.
Still true, I believe but the process of buying compliance or acceptance ala A. Krupp certainly and regrettably works. To an extent. I look forward to seeing just how great an extent...
Thanks again.