A lot of folks keep telling me that Containment was Grand Strategy.
Living through the period and being a borderline adult when it began and assisting in small ways with its implementation for 45 years, I can only say that:
- Steve is right, there were divides between policy elites and the mass of the nation; rich and poor, the various armed forces, Congress and the WH, members of the punditocracy and political ideologies that were just as deep as they seem today -- the difference today is simply that we are less restrained in our speech to the point of egregious incivility and significantly improved and easier mass communication lets everyone know that.
We also seem to have not learned much history...
- Containment was not a strategy, it like the Monroe doctrine was a Policy that was generally followed when it suited (and was ignored when it did not) and a series of Strategies -- and stratagems -- were developed by all the eight Presidents who served while the policy was in being. Each mostly different; most, in hindsight, not as useful as many thought. ADDED: After some thought, I'd even say that some if not most of those strategies were really counterproductive.
Agree with you, Ken, on the first part
but disagree on the latter.
But first, a digression. There is not much agreement on what constitutes Grand Strategy. Steve Metz uses Barry Posen's definition which is not really different from a definition of foreign and security policy. Of course, Steve modifies the definition he has chosen to use toward the end of his book to bring in the "Ways and Means" - especially the latter. Some Grand Strategies are effective, some are not - just like military strategies and theater strategies. I see GS as how a state chooses to organize its resources (both tangible and intangible) and employ them to achieve its objectives in face of the objectives of others (which may or may not be threats). Usually, these are written as documents - the NSS is an attempt, imposed by Congress, to force the Executive to produce and puiblish a GS.
Containment was, indeed, a policy. Kennan's Long Telegram - later published as the X Article - was less than a strategy. It stated a goal in line with an assessment of the threat and argued that if the USSR's expansion were "contained" (a shorthand description of a "way"), the goal would be achieved. NSC 68 turned the policy into strategy and GS at that. It spelled out the ways and the means (resources) and served us well throughout the Cold War with some tweaking. Did it have to be written? Not in theory but in practice writing it out was necessary and functionally so to achieve an effective GS.
Cheers
JohnT
I think what you wrote was that Containment was a policy
and NSC 68 was one (or an -- or the -- I'm easy :D) ) implementing strategy. No quarrel with that. I'll also point out that, per your comment yesterday, the document contained no resource considerations...
However, it did constitute a strategy. BTW, remind me -- who authored that document? ;)
I further agree that it largely guided all elements of the USG from implementation in 1951 for about 20 years -- and that its principles were broadly followed for another 20.
However, I also suggest that a look at History will dispel any notion of great continuity within that 'strategy'. From the 'New Look' (NEC 162/2) to 'Flexible Response' (host of NSC Docs and AR 100-McNamara) to 'Sufficiency' to "Mikhail, I'll outspend you..." That latter policy (again with no resource considerations...) endorsed by my Wife... :rolleyes:
Thus my contention that Containment was not a strategy but a policy implemented by numerous strategies. Many of which did as much harm as good... :wry:
Our political system is inimical to 'Grand Strategy.' I submit that's why there is argument over whether there is such a thing. Some nations have them and use them; most democracies cannot due to changes of government.
Okay. However, I see I'll have to answer my own question.
State.
NSC 68 was written by the Policy Planning staff at State -- from whence internationally aimed strategies should appear.
It also short circuited the NSC, BoB and DoD, all of whom had different ideas. I think there's a very strong and good message in that...
The fact that Louis Johnson, far and away the worst and dumbest SecDef (worse than McNamara, Clifford, Aspin and the other two bad ones, Charlie Wilson and Tom Gates combined), was in the Pent-agony probably helped get it by the building...
As an aside of no relevance, I believe if you'll check, NSC 68 did not contain any real resource requirements but only broad estimates -- one reason Truman initially rejected it. Only after North Korea attacked the South did Truman decide to implement the directive -- and his spending on defense future programs immediately exceeded the NSC 68 estimates. That brings up two points -- other players can cause major strategy modifications and resource estimates will generally be low due to that fact.
Yeah. Same guy also decided to go to Viet Nam
No question both strategies helped the country out of the economic low...
At the time.
Of course,Ken, you are right
the Policy Planning Staff, led by Paul Nitze, wrote the thing. (Sorry I missed the essence of your question:o) Agree about Louis Johnson. But, in the 1948 - 50 period there was no NSC staff to speak of and the concept was that State was the lead agency. The PPS was an innovation of SECSTATE George C. Marshall that, IMO, he created to replicate a planning component of a military staff. Today, that is the J5 staff section at the JS and all GCCs. And the PPS has significantly atrophied.
DOD, in that time was NOT the 800 pound gorilla - it was 3 services trying to become a unified department and fighting it all theway. The JS, such as it was, was very small; OSD was largely non-existent. I could go on.
You are right that Truman intially rejected - rather did not approve - NSC 68 because it was weak on resourcing. But as the document evloved over the course of 1950 the resource components were added - and before the N Kor attack (for the most part). The question of whether Congress would have approved w/o the push from the N Kor is problematic at best.
NDU press has published NSC 68 (in all its interations to include Pres Tuman's public EO) with discussion and commentary icluding an intro by Nitze. It's available online.
Cheers
JohnT
I do seem to recall that...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
John T. Fishel
DOD, in that time was NOT the 800 pound gorilla - it was 3 services trying to become a unified department and fighting it all theway. The JS, such as it was, was very small; OSD was largely non-existent. I could go on.
Yep, sure do. Remember it well, didn't read about it. Still, they were a 400 to 500 pound Gorilla even then, resource allocation wise. Scattered all over DC and the suburbs, too. Even in the old Temps on the Mall.
Though I would have said four services trying every way they could to avoid becoming a unified Department. Pity they didn't win. Not only am I not a Goldwater-Nichols believer, I'm not a fan of DoD. The Service bureaucracies were bad enough without adding an upper layer. See DHS and the DNI for current versions... :D
This, OTOH:
Quote:
...and before the N Kor attack (for the most part).
Is not as I recall but it's really immaterial, I suppose... ;)
Since you're even older than I am
perhaps, i should defer to your memory.:wry:
Oh, I'm well aware of those backgrounds -- and far more on both
than is contained in the quotes or the Wiki articles. I'm also aware of the the fact that Washington elected to fight the British on their own terms and thus Von Steuben was beneficial -- and that Thayendanega was an Indian and they had difficulties with group discipline (but not, more importantly, with self discipline once they were pointed in the right direction). He sided with the British but that was as much due to American intransigence as his earlier relationships.
In any event, that allegory was not really aimed at the persons but at the fact that we adopted European models for many things we do and those were possibly not the best approach for a very independent people.
Way off thread here, to get back on, one could make the case that Indian Strategy was not good, as they sort of lost -- but when one considers the time period involved and the raw numbers on both sides, they really did quite well. My reason for mentioning the Von Steuben / Thayendanega contrast was to make the VonS / CvC link and the point that a lot of German ideas permeated the early US and not all were beneficial. OTOH, Thayendanega was as American as one could possibly be, he took care of his people and he was a smart and principled guy. I believe a happy medium between those two poles -- Europe / Indian -- would have better served us. However, we didn't go that route...
We for years have adopted European strategic concepts and patterns as well as a Eurocentric strategy and I agree with Bob's World that these patterns have not done us any favors.
And JMM has a good dissection of one reason this is possibly so.