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Sorry, I should have been more clear.
The Saudis seem very happy to leave production where it is and enjoy these very good times.
For a country which claims that it can put out over 12 mbpd if they wish, they recently announced a cut-back to 9.4.
Furthermore, we have the oft-quoted statement from King Abdullah indicating that KSA is perfectly happy to "leave [at least some of] it in the ground" for their children.
Saudi oil reserve statistics / estimates have no value or credibility. Same for Kuwait.
Hi, Fuchs
We are on slightly different topics, which is fine....
I was responding to Misifus' point about mentality/mind-set re. production (which I interpreted to mean that no oil company would be content to sit back and enjoy the status quo).
Your point is about reserves.
I would not say that Saudi reserve estimates have no value or credibility: for all we know, they could turn out to be correct (just as they could turn out to have been greatly inflated).
But if your point is that Saudi claims are unproven (even suspect) then I certainly agree:
http://www.energybulletin.net/node/36458
The unproven-ness of the reserves is linked to the unproven-ness of their ability to ramp up production.
They were pretty much caught lying about their oil and thus there's no real reason to believe them in regard to their oil any more.
Furthermore:
Let's assume a hypothetical situation in which the Saudis basically run out of oil in 15 years. No rise in oil prices would motivate them to invest in more production. They could just as well enjoy their remaining 10-15 years instead of shortening that to 5-10 years.
Their entire society is patriarchalic to the extent of being similar to the mafia: Very much overall income goes to top and is then redistributed in exchange for loyalty.
Their society, their late, would collapse if they run out of oil, and they know it.
The survival of the Saudi society in its current form is being threatened by increased oil exports because they shorten the life expectancy of their society/state model.
They're thus in a target conflict between more revenues and longer survival.
It seems they merely want enough revenues for sustainment, and everything in excess is very low priority in comparison to delaying the inevitable.
The whole concept of reacting to oil prices is thus in their preference system perverted; they may decide to produce more when prices are low in order to meet their revenue target for sustainment, and reduce production when prices are high in order to avoid excess consumption of their finite wealth.
Replacing reserves and raising production are two very different things. There's always an incentive to find new reserves, though that incentive is much greater when prices are high. There isn't always an incentive to actually raise output, especially when raising output might depress prices. Restricting output to sustain high prices is not exactly unheard of in the oil world.Quote:
Originally Posted by Misifus
New drilling isn't all it takes to increase production. You have to drill, you have to pump the oil, you have to move the oil to market. Drilling new wells or increasing output per well doesn't do you any good if you haven't also invested in pipelines, loading terminals, and all the other infrastructure needed to move the product.
It's true that oil producers are always evaluating ways to expand reserves and production. During a period like the 87-99 glut, though, this process is likely to be generally neglected and pretty perfunctory, and the plans will need a lot of upgrading before they are ready to implement.
First a producer has to make a decision to increase production (again, distinct from increasing reserves). That means facing the questions of whether this price increase is going to last or whether it's a passing phenomenon, and again the glut mentality had a real impact on those decisions. Once the decision is made you have to evaluate huge numbers of very complex plans and proposals to decide exactly how you want to increase production. Then you have to break that down into projects and bids and actually get the work done. It doesn't happen overnight.
In 2008 Gulf production dropped even as prices soared, which was widely interpreted as evidence that the oil had run out. Of course the reality was much simpler. The production increases in 2006 and 2007 were not achieved by adding new capacity, they were achieved by running existing capacity at 100% 24/7/365 and tweaking everything possible to get a transient boost. You can only run an industrial process at 100% 24/7/365 for so long before stuff simply starts to break down, especially if it's been neglected during a 15 year glut. Production didn't fall because there was no oil to pump, it fell because the equipment could no longer keep pace, no matter how high the price went.
Since then the Gulf producers have spent a whole lot of money on increasing capacity. At one point the Saudis claimed they would raise capacity to 16mbpd. How much they've actually added we don't know, because they haven't run to capacity yet. Of course they have no intention of producing that much on a sustained basis... what they want is the very large political clout gained from holding effectively the world's only significant reserve capacity.
Certainly there's a lot of doubt over Saudi reserve estimates, but I've never heard anyone knowledgeable claim that actual production capacity at this point is being constrained by lack of reserves. There's real doubt over how many years they can sustain output, but at this point the constraint is infrastructure, not the amount of oil in place.Quote:
Originally Posted by Fuchs
Venezuela now claims reserves greater than those of Saudi Arabia... those claims are open to doubt of course, though some of the raised estimates source back to USGS, not the Venezuelan government or PDVSA. How much is technically or economically recoverable is questionable, though both technological and economic conditions are subject to change.
Rick...
The liquid fuel plateau seems largely a function of an equation that's been fairly static over the last decade. We have a few large producers with steady high output... Canada, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE, etc. There are political constraints in some of these (unfavorable investment climate in Russia, environmental regulation in Canada, etc) but they still sustain production. There are also mature areas where production is decreasing. In some (North Sea) this is a function of depletion. In others (Mexico, Indonesia) depletion is a factor but there are also major political constraints, typically nationalist investment policies that prevent effective exploration. There are also areas where production is increasing as new money comes in... Africa, Central Asia, Brazil etc.
The decliners and the gainers more or less cancel each other out, the steadies stay steady, hence a plateau.
There's potential for a shift in either direction. Political instability can knock one or more major producers out of the picture completely and could break the plateau on the downside. The upside jokers in the deck are Iraq, Iran, Venezuela, and Libya, all of which are producing far less than they can due to political, security, and/or investment constraints. If one or more of these sees a period of improved stability and better policy, there's potential for an increase sufficient to break the plateau on the upside.
PS: The miserable state of PDVSA is clear from this:
http://www.businessweek.com/news/201...-projects.html
Brent Crude is over $100/bbl and Venezuela is borrowing money.
My concern is less that an actual crisis will break the democratic edifice - though that's not impossible - but that people with a vested interest in breaking the democratic edifice will use the whipped-up fear of crisis as an excuse to dismantle the edifice.Quote:
Originally Posted by Rick M
Steve: I’ll respond in reverse order.
1. “My concern is less that an actual crisis will break the democratic edifice - though that's not impossible - but that people with a vested interest in breaking the democratic edifice will use the whipped-up fear of crisis as an excuse to dismantle the edifice.”
Steve: No quarrel.
It’s rather like the cause-of-peak argument: it may matter little which factors conspire to cause the result… it’s still a problem.
In the case of PO and/or the subversion of democratic institutions & processes, they could be very serious problems.
2. “We have a few large producers with steady high output... Canada, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE, etc.”
Please don’t put Canada in the same category as Russia & KSA. Don’t forget that we eastern Cdns import about 1 mbpd.
When we subtract that volume from our US exports we are hardly the “energy powerhouse” that our Prime Minister claims we are. As a net oil producer, we are certainly not in the top echelon.
If one factors in the amount of natural gas that is used to produce the oil sands oil which we export, the net factor is further reduced.
3. re KSA:
“There's real doubt over how many years they can sustain output, but at this point the constraint is infrastructure, not the amount of oil in place.”
From the standpoint of the rest of the world (and for Saudi finances) what matters is Saudi exports. I would argue that the limitation in that regard will not be Saudi infra nor reserves, but rather the surge in domestic demand.
In 2008, a Chatham House paper warned that the Saudi exports could start to decline before 2015 and that they could be effectively done as an exporter of significance before 2040:
http://www.chathamhouse.org/publicat...rs/view/108858
Last summer’s Jadwa paper expressed similar concerns:
http://www.emirates247.com/business/...07-20-1.408672
The issue of export decline is surely one of the more imminent aspects of PO: we can’t all be importers, and the list of major producers which are post-peak (presumably permanently) keeps growing, with no reversals (ie. new peak) that I am aware of.
Jeffrey Brown will speak on this issue at ASPO next week in Washington. There is no history of psychosis in his family....
Just because there is a curtailment of the rate being produced, does not mean that the effort to replace reserves goes on hiatus. So even when KSA is benefiting from high prices and is choking back wells, Saudi Aramco itself would still be looking for new reserves and still be drilling new wells. It's not like these oil companies are saying "oh let the good times roll and let's kick back now and relax."Quote:
Originally Posted by Rick M
Not always true. Reserve to Replacement ratio is a yardstick closely watched by analysts. It is an important yardstick regardless of pricing. To dismiss reserves replacement as a function of pricing or production curtailment connotes a lack of understanding of the true nature of the business. However, I am certain this is not the case with you.Quote:
Originally Posted by Dayuhan
The above is correct. In fact much of this was done with natural gas here in the USA during the 80's and 90's.Quote:
There isn't always an incentive to actually raise output, especially when raising output might depress prices. Restricting output to sustain high prices is not exactly unheard of in the oil world.
I'm not sure where you are getting that there was a glut from 87-99. Over that 22 year period drilling has been pretty intense globally. In fact that is the period of all of the deepwater advances - globally. It is also a period of significant investment by KSA (Saudi Aramco).Quote:
During a period like the 87-99 glut, though, this process is likely to be generally neglected and pretty perfunctory, and the plans will need a lot of upgrading before they are ready to implement.
Nope. What you say sounds logical, and I wish it really worked like that, but that's not really the way it works in oil companies. Have you even worked for an oil company? Are you currently in the business?Quote:
First a producer has to make a decision to increase production (again, distinct from increasing reserves). That means facing the questions of whether this price increase is going to last or whether it's a passing phenomenon, and again the glut mentality had a real impact on those decisions. Once the decision is made you have to evaluate huge numbers of very complex plans and proposals to decide exactly how you want to increase production. Then you have to break that down into projects and bids and actually get the work done. It doesn't happen overnight.
I'm not sure what Gulf you are talking about here. Gulf of Mexico (GOM) or the Gulf of Arabia (GOA). If you are referring to GOM the issue there was the hurricane damage. If you are referring to GOA no new capacity was needed.Quote:
In 2008 Gulf production dropped even as prices soared, which was widely interpreted as evidence that the oil had run out. Of course the reality was much simpler. The production increases in 2006 and 2007 were not achieved by adding new capacity, they were achieved by running existing capacity at 100% 24/7/365 and tweaking everything possible to get a transient boost. You can only run an industrial process at 100% 24/7/365 for so long before stuff simply starts to break down, especially if it's been neglected during a 15 year glut. Production didn't fall because there was no oil to pump, it fell because the equipment could no longer keep pace, no matter how high the price went.
That's immaterial. The mantra remains as a commandment for them as well as for any other oil company. Reserves must be replaced. That is the main mission operational mission of any oil company. Curtailment scenarios to take advantage of pricing are secondary.Quote:
Certainly there's a lot of doubt over Saudi reserve estimates, but I've never heard anyone knowledgeable claim that actual production capacity at this point is being constrained by lack of reserves.
I can assure you that just about everything coming out of Venezuela these days is a lie. Anything reliable coming out of PDVSA ceased on Thu April 11, 2002. I was over there when it happened.Quote:
Venezuela now claims reserves greater than those of Saudi Arabia... those claims are open to doubt of course, though some of the raised estimates source back to USGS, not the Venezuelan government or PDVSA. How much is technically or economically recoverable is questionable, though both technological and economic conditions are subject to change.
Nobody said that efforts to replace reserves goes on hiatus. The comments made quite specifically referred to production, not exploration.Quote:
Originally Posted by Misifus
Certainly the effort to seek out new reserves goes on all the time. Both experience and reason suggest that this effort receives a higher priority and a greater resource allocation when prices are high and demand is rising than it does during a glut period.
Three different levels of response to higher prices:
- Increase production with existing capacity (run the infrastructure harder)
- Increase capacity on existing reserves (build new infrastructure)
- Find and develop new reserves
The point I'm trying to make is that the initial response to a price spike is likely to be in the first category, until the producer is convinced that the price spike will be sustained. The large expenditures required to install new capacity - whether on existing or new reserves - will be delayed. The decision to invest will be delayed until the producer is convinced that the price rise is sustainable, and actual production will be delayed until that decision can be executed, often a substantial time.
What that means is that expecting immediate elasticity - higher prices inspiring a rapid rise in production - is generally not realistic. Failure of high prices to instantly summon up new production doesn't mean the oil isn't there, it means the elasticity is delayed, usually for reasons that are not that difficult to find, if we look for them.
Found reserves are considered production. Exploration departments don't own reserves, production departments do, and that's because production departments, uh...produce the oil. Production doesn't go on hiatus when prices are high, they are stressed to produce even more. What I am try to convey to you, or actually more for the audience is that there is no, "Hey! Let's kick back and relax now that prices are high." In fact it is quite the opposite in production departments.Quote:
Originally Posted by Dayuhan
No. I know you are using reason here. However, your frame of reference is off. The pace to replace reserves is fairly constant regardless of price. Think 'tortoise.' Exploration departments are not reactive like production departments. Exploration lead times are too long for that. Exploration departments have to continue the process regardless of current or forecasted pricing. Elasticity theory doesn't apply to exploration. Elasticity theory can apply to production (sometimes) which is more reactive. Think 'hare.'Quote:
Certainly the effort to seek out new reserves goes on all the time. Both experience and reason suggest that this effort receives a higher priority and a greater resource allocation when prices are high and demand is rising than it does during a glut period.
To make this more succinct. The time period in which a project goes from exploration to production, the swing in pricing could go from $60-$140 per barrel. The exploration train can't stop for this type of volatility. To do so would be suicide for the oil companies. Hence the mantra that I stated earlier - replace reserves.
Misifus,
1. “Found reserves are considered production.”
Pardon? Reserves are in the ground. Production is what’s passing through the pipes. Reserves are potential production (with varying degrees of probability).
2. “Exploration departments don't own reserves, production departments do, and that's because production departments, uh...produce the oil.”
Shell has its “Exploration and Production (E&P) business unit,” apparently a single entity.
Furthermore, in most countries companies don’t own reserves, they lease them.
3. “Production doesn't go on hiatus when prices are high, they are stressed to produce even more…. Exploration departments are not reactive like production departments. Exploration lead times are too long for that. Exploration departments have to continue the process regardless of current or forecasted pricing. Elasticity theory doesn't apply to exploration.”
These are sweeping generalizations, but they raise an interesting point which takes us back to the issue of PO:
If as you say, exploration efforts are non-stop & inelastic, and production goes all-out when prices are high, then how do you account for the fact that conventional crude production (ie. what flows out of pipes, not ‘found reserves’) has been flat for 7 years despite the obvious incentive of very high prices?
4. “I'm not sure where you are getting that there was a glut from 87-99. Over that 22 year period drilling has been pretty intense globally. In fact that is the period of all of the deepwater advances - globally. It is also a period of significant investment by KSA (Saudi Aramco).”
First, the period is 12/13 years, not 22.
Second, every point that you raise would lead to an increase in supply (ie. the glut that Dayuhan mentioned).
5. “Reserve to Replacement ratio is a yardstick closely watched by analysts. It is an important yardstick regardless of pricing. To dismiss reserves replacement as a function of pricing or production curtailment connotes a lack of understanding of the true nature of the business.”
The usual term is reserve replacement ratio (RRR). I don’t recall anyone dismissing it or failing to understand the "true nature" of the business (however that might be determined).
6. “Have you even worked for an oil company? Are you currently in the business?”
Perhaps you’d like to tell us about your own areas of expertise.
Rick M,
I am telling you how it is. Not how you want it to be. You simply display your ignorance by arguing with those who know and do, as opposed to those who watch and wish they knew. You apparently don't understand the industry jargon, nor how an oil company really works.
Production departments steward the reserves. Once an exploration department finds them, the exploitation of the reserves is passed over to a production department for development and further production. This can happen with as little as three wells drilled in a major field or find. Production then "owns" the reserves.Quote:
Originally Posted by Rick M
See above for item 1. Again you don't understand the industry vocabulary nor how a company works.Quote:
2. “Exploration departments don't own reserves, production departments do, and that's because production departments, uh...produce the oil.”
Shell has its “Exploration and Production (E&P) business unit,” apparently a single entity.
Furthermore, in most countries companies don’t own reserves, they lease them.
No these are not sweeping generalizations. These are statements of what specifically goes on. When prices are high, production operations are stressed to produce more oil from existing reservoirs. This is done in a variety of ways such as optimization of artificial lift, drilling of infill wells (not to be confused with exploration wells), doing uphole completions, stimulating existing completions, and doing a whole bunch of other things that you probably don't even have a clue about.Quote:
3. “Production doesn't go on hiatus when prices are high, they are stressed to produce even more…. Exploration departments are not reactive like production departments. Exploration lead times are too long for that. Exploration departments have to continue the process regardless of current or forecasted pricing. Elasticity theory doesn't apply to exploration.”
These are sweeping generalizations, but they raise an interesting point which takes us back to the issue of PO:
If as you say, exploration efforts are non-stop & inelastic, and production goes all-out when prices are high, then how do you account for the fact that conventional crude production (ie. what flows out of pipes, not ‘found reserves’) has been flat for 7 years despite the obvious incentive of very high prices?
Sorry, typo. I'll fix it if the editor hasn't timed us out yet. Nope, no glut. Prices went up overall in that time period (even if the trader speculation spikes are discounted). More demand for oil from developing economies like China & India.Quote:
4. “I'm not sure where you are getting that there was a glut from 87-99. Over that 22 year period drilling has been pretty intense globally. In fact that is the period of all of the deepwater advances - globally. It is also a period of significant investment by KSA (Saudi Aramco).”
First, the period is 12/13 years, not 22.
Second, every point that you raise would lead to an increase in supply (ie. the glut that Dayuhan mentioned).
I think it is pretty certain the you misunderstand the business. And again you don't understand the terminology of the industry. You are simply reading and passing along what you read and drawing conclusions from an incorrect frame of reference. "A fish does not know it is all wet simply because it has never been out of water." Think about that.Quote:
5. “Reserve to Replacement ratio is a yardstick closely watched by analysts. It is an important yardstick regardless of pricing. To dismiss reserves replacement as a function of pricing or production curtailment connotes a lack of understanding of the true nature of the business.”
The usual term is reserve replacement ratio (RRR). I don’t recall anyone dismissing it or failing to understand the "true nature" of the business (however that might be determined).
Okay. I'm an oil & gas expert with global experience in every major oil & gas producing region of the world except for former Soviet Bloc countries. However, this is the internet, so we could all be full of BS ;)Quote:
6. “Have you even worked for an oil company? Are you currently in the business?”
Perhaps you’d like to tell us about your own areas of expertise.
Instead of arguing with me. You should really be asking me questions about how the industry works so that your frame of reference gets set correctly.
Keep in mind that different companies from different continents might actually be different. ;)
Misifus,
You are the first O&G expert I've encountered who claimed that reserves (found or otherwise) ARE production.
You are also the first to display such arrogance (for which the O&G people I know would have little tolerance).
You forgot to answer answer my rather important question in #3: if your observations/understanding/mantras are correct, why have we not seen a surge in conventional oil production during the past 7 years?
re #4: "Prices went up overall in that time period [1987-99] (even if the trader speculation spikes are discounted)."
http://inflationdata.com/inflation/i...ices_table.asp
"You are simply reading and passing along what you read and drawing conclusions..."
True (as with the price history above): I have never claimed otherwise.
I conclude from the price history that inflation-adjusted oil prices dropped from $35 in 1987 to $16 in 1998 and that Misifus is incorrect on that point.
If you go back to the origin of this thread (and its counterpart at Armed Forces Journal), I wanted to present credible, sourced info on energy security issues (much of it from military analysts) to the audience at SWC and AFJ and I hoped to receive constructive feed-back on it.
Both audiences have displayed a good deal of interest in these timely issues and have offered countering/opposing (as well as supportive) info in a polite & constructive manner, which is no doubt appreciated by all who participate in these discussions.
This is correct. Of course there are many similarities largely because the process of finding and extracting is the same. Hence the organizations have to build themselves around these processes.Quote:
Originally Posted by Fuchs
You seem to be confusing the verb to produce with the entity within oil companies known as Production (a noun). This reflects your lack of understanding of how these companies work. Again, reserves are stewarded by production departments. As for your quip on arrogance, your posts since the start of this thread are laced with the arrogance of one who thinks he knows, while your writings indicate that you actually don't know, at least when read by someone in the industry. And actually other O&G people tolerate me very much, in fact you might be surprised to find that I am actually quite known in the business and that these companies retain me regularly to do real work for them and to advise them in just about every location in the world except for those places where I choose not to travel to. This includes majors, independents, and state-owned companies. Nevertheless, I can't just stand by and have ignorance be further propagated out there by Peak Oil'ers. The oil & gas industry suffers enough from bystanders, etc., who simply spew incorrect knowledge or misinterpret data and events. Easy for Peak Oil'ers to villainize the industry (even if they don't intend to) being that the emotional state of the population is that they would like gasoline to be "almost free." The mind can connect with the most simplest of concepts if it is not taxed too much. Unfortunately, Ockham's Razor does not always apply.Quote:
Originally Posted by Rick M
No, I did not forget. First I would have to get you to the basics of understanding the exploration and production process before taking you on to more advanced matters. However, you appear resistant to even the basics.Quote:
You forgot to answer answer my rather important question in #3: if your observations/understanding/mantras are correct, why have we not seen a surge in conventional oil production during the past 7 years?
Well good. At least you are coming to the realization that you are acting as nothing more than an input/output device. In other words, processing information out of journals and such. Again, pricing is not the driver that you think it is in the exploration process.Quote:
re #4: "Prices went up overall in that time period [1987-99] (even if the trader speculation spikes are discounted)."
http://inflationdata.com/inflation/i...ices_table.asp
"You are simply reading and passing along what you read and drawing conclusions..."
True (as with the price history above): I have never claimed otherwise.
I conclude from the price history that inflation-adjusted oil prices dropped from $35 in 1987 to $16 in 1998 and that Misifus is incorrect on that point.
No, it appears that your real agenda is to promote the Chicken Little psychosis. The energy security threat is that we as nation, or at least our government, has essentially capitulated on matters of oil & gas as "energy security." The threat is that we threaten our own oil & gas companies.Quote:
If you go back to the origin of this thread (and its counterpart at Armed Forces Journal), I wanted to present credible, sourced info on energy security issues (much of it from military analysts) to the audience at SWC and AFJ and I hoped to receive constructive feed-back on it.
I am here to help you understand with any questions that you may have about the industry. I have not heard you ask any questions. I have only heard you make proclamations. You should really start with a fundamental understanding of how the business works before trying to establish yourself as a "global thinker." I would extend this same advice to anybody studying at a war college as well.
I do know and associate with some O&G types and they're arrogant enough. :wry:Quote:
Originally Posted by Rick M
There are varying types of arrogance IMO. Brash is one, Quiet but persistent belief in infallibility or the rectitude of one's position is another and there others between those poles.Again, no expert but it strikes me that combination of wars, political troubles (notably in Iran and Venezuela), violence (Mexico, Nigeria...), cartels holding prices down and Brazil having unplanned difficulty drilling its offshore fields may all be contributors to that. I also suspect that 'Environmental' objection worldwide but particularly here in the US have played a significant part.Quote:
You forgot to answer answer my rather important question in #3: if your observations/understanding/mantras are correct, why have we not seen a surge in conventional oil production during the past 7 years?
That brings up an aside; I wonder how much of the opposition to the Keystone Pipeline is truly 'environmental' and how much is backed under the table by US oil interests trying to stall competition?While without O&G 'expertise,' I do have some knowledge of things militaire. Military 'analysts' tend to worst case everything in an excess of caution and a desire to avoid being proven wrong -- the career kiss of death -- so one is advised be skeptical, make that very skeptical, of such analyses...Quote:
If you go back to the origin of this thread (and its counterpart at Armed Forces Journal), I wanted to present credible, sourced info on energy security issues (much of it from military analysts) to the audience at SWC and AFJ and I hoped to receive constructive feed-back on it.
Not least by us observers -- however, I've noticed that field workers and academics have rather different definitions of polite. Neither IMO is wrong but they do differ. Add the fact that the field guys do not like to waste verbiage and they can be blunt. Bluntness in and of itself is not impolite, it is aimed, usually, at removing any ambiguities that can result from excessive politeness. Ambiguities are necessary in truly polite conversation in many circles but in a field environment conversational ambiguities can lead to misunderstandings and those can have sometimes fatal consequences and thus are to be scrupulously avoided. :wry:Quote:
Both audiences have displayed a good deal of interest in these timely issues and have offered countering/opposing (as well as supportive) info in a polite & constructive manner, which is no doubt appreciated by all who participate in these discussions.
I have enjoyed your posts for months and I enjoy Misifus' posts. I hope you both continue this dialogue. I learn from both of you.
You have either been on an oil rig or were a good NCO, or maybe even both :DQuote:
Originally Posted by Ken White
Thanks for your observations, Ken
Re. flat conventional crude production, I agree that the factors you mention play a role. But you did not mention other factors which seems to be just as probable: that we have been finding fewer giant & super-giant oilfields in recent decades, and we continue to draw heavily from oilfields which are in decline.
In other words, we may in fact be maxing-out on conventional oil production.
Re. military analysts, believing that our world faces a looming problem with its supply of liquid fuels can hardly be a popular/widely-supported position, including within the military. In some circles, PO is viewed as a cult, doomerism (even psychosis, etc) so one would think that there could be some risks in expressing support for PO concerns.
I would think that this is even more true within the O&G industry, where there may be significant career risks in expressing concerns over future supply. However, that has not stopped several industry insiders from doing so, to their credit.
I’m glad that you have enjoyed this thread (you were the first person to welcome me to SWC).