The Army Capstone Concept: the Army wants your comments

Hi Bill,

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Originally Posted by Bill Jakola

FM 5.0 seems to have assumptions of complexity, uncertainty, and continuous change. But let’s be clear; this appears as an acknowledgement of the nature of war and not a new aspect of war. War is war. Thus to say the operational environment is complex is not to say that war is more complex, it is just using the inherent complexity as an assumption to build doctrine.

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That might have to been the intention of the authors, however that intention is not clearly expressed or presented by using a progressive tense in their verbs - e.g. "is becoming more complex", etc.

With the exception of Wilf who, as we all know is in deep and intimate contact with the Platonic aeon of Ideal Forms (;)), most of us are unable to make pronouncements about the "nature" of anything. we can talk about "our experience" (individual, institutional, national) of war, but when we start talking about the "nature of war", all we are able to do is map our boundaries characteristics (if we can even do that!). Even if we could a) access the Ideal Form of "war" and were b) able to communicate, then we would still have to say "This is where the current thing we call 'war' differs from the Ideal".

Far better, IMHO, to forget about trying to talk about an Ideal Type and, instead, use doctrine as a way of defining "our" perceptions of the important characteristics of what we a) are doing and b) think we will have to do in the future. Saying that war have become increasingly complex is, in this case, rather silly; far better to say that "we" have to handle more considerations (i.e X, Y and Z) than we did in the past.

Cheers,

Marc

ps. This is in light of a general caveat - I'm reading a piece right now that is so conceptually flawed and poorly written that I'm not even sure if it is written in English. By contrast, FM 5.0 is an absolutely brilliant work.

pps. No, Rob, it's not the piece you sent me :D

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Originally Posted by Seerov

Media: I'm not sure the bombing of Dresden or Hamburg would possible today due to media influence. The Allies killed 200,000 people in 3 days (mostly all civilians). There's no way we could do that today. Do you think we could get away with bombing Tehran like we did Dresden or Tokyo?

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Sure you could if you had a significant justification for it. Posit a scenario where Iran puts a nuclear device on a ship and blows it up in New york harbour.

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Originally Posted by marct

Sure you could if you had a significant justification for it. Posit a scenario where Iran puts a nuclear device on a ship and blows it up in New york harbour.

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but it is far more likely that they would claim some separate radical group was responsible. We would likely respond with a "measured and proportional" strike using precision guided munitions on "media acceptable" targets. On the other hand, if they detonated a nuclear weapon against Israel, I wouldn’t bet against Tehran ceasing to exist.

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Originally Posted by marct

Hi Bill,



That might have to been the intention of the authors, however that intention is not clearly expressed or presented by using a progressive tense in their verbs - e.g. "is becoming more complex", etc.

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Marc,

I did not find that quote in FM 5.0.

Bill Jakola

Hi Bill,

The point being illustrated can also be made using the phrase "growing uncertainty", which is in the Foreward.

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Originally Posted by marct

Hi Bill,

The point being illustrated can also be made using the phrase "growing uncertainty", which is in the Foreward.

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Marc,

I don't mean to be pedantic but, uncertainty and complexity are different.

The use of growing uncertainty in the foreward seems to reflect the failure of our earlier assumptions like, if we build a force that can prevail in major combat operations then we will inherently have a force that can prevail in other types of operations; or that our technology will negate the fog of war.

Bill Jakola

Hi Bill,

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Originally Posted by Bill Jakola

I don't mean to be pedantic but, uncertainty and complexity are different.

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No worries ;). Yes, I know that they are different, but that wasn't my point. I probably should have spelled it out better, but what I was trying to say was that a change in focus, such as that put forward here and in other documents (such as the ACC etc.) which argues that factors X, Y and Z are changing (increasing, decreasing) is different from saying that those factors are part of the "nature" of something.

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Originally Posted by Bill Jakola

The use of growing uncertainty in the foreward seems to reflect the failure of our earlier assumptions like, if we build a force that can prevail in major combat operations then we will inherently have a force that can prevail in other types of operations; or that our technology will negate the fog of war.

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I'm still working through how many different meanings I can find for how "uncertainty" is used in FM 5.0 (3 different meanings so far ;)). Still and all, reflecting the "failure" of earlier assumptions certainly is one of the meanings I've seen in it. But were they "failures" at the time they were made, and is "uncertainty" now being used as a catch phrase for "drat, don't know what will happen :confused:?".

What I believe, and it's only a tentative hypothesis, happened was that the US military "got" "conventional" warfare down so well that everyone else said "nuts to this, we ain't playin' that game". The "failure of earlier assumptions" was, IMHO, a conflation of our old conceptualization of conventional warfare as "Warfare" (the Ideal Type). When our opponents said "nuts, we ain't playin' that game" and started to play another one instead, we were so locked into our mindset of "convention warfare" = "Warfare" (a logical error of confusing the specific with the general), that we started to look for convenient ways to say "Drat, we don't know what they are playing!" and glomed onto "complexity" and "uncertainty" because they are cool, hip and happening terms out of science (and they will sell to the politicians). As an indictaor of the plausibility of this, I would point to how GEN Van ripper was treated during Millennium Challenge.

I just did a search through FM 5.0, and do you realize that there is not a single reference to one of the most important concepts stemming from complexity science - emergence? as far as "uncertainty" is concerned, it is defined (1-7) as

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Uncertainty is what is not known about a given situation or a lack of understanding of how a situation may evolve. Effective leaders accept that they conduct military operations in operational environments that are inherently uncertain.

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Umm, that is way too limited and based solely on the perception of individuals. For example, an individual may be certain that X is Y and they may be totally wrong in that assumption. A truly effective leader also recognizes that they may well be mistaken in their assumptions about what is "true" - a point raised later on, but not included in the definition. The current definition places a "lack of understanding" only in the future....

Look, I'm getting exceedingly picky about implications of language and definitions, implications, etc. Probably over picky if truth be told :wry:. I know that one of the reasons I'm doing this is because I am dealing with a truly horrid piece of work right now (see my previous posts' pps), but another reason is that I "feel" (thumos or "gut knowledge") that this FM is setting people up to fail by trying to linearize a process that is inherently not linear. I need some time to figure out and be able to communicate where that "feeling" is coming from. Unfortunately, I am running ragged with other things (organizing a symposium, multiple concerts, writing, supervising theses, etc.) and I just haven't had the time to put that feeling into a coherent argument.

Cheers,

Marc

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Originally Posted by marct

Hi Bill,
No worries ;).

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Marc,

I agree, no worries; an office mate just suggested our admission of uncertainty reflects an understanding that we will never have a completely accurate view of our environemnt and should proceed on the basis where we constantly question our assumptions, and look to the potential point of failure.

I suggest it is like driving a car where we are quite confident of reaching our destination without incident; but, we remain vigilent and prepared to react in case something goes awry. It is more than just being reactive to the environment; it requires us to constantly envision what could go wrong and then prepare to prevent or overcome potential problems should they materialize.

Bill Jakola

P. S. My less than P.C. office mate just asked me to ask you if you knew the Olympic medal count totals. ;) no worries.

Hi Bill,

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Originally Posted by Bill Jakola

I agree, no worries; an office mate just suggested our admission of uncertainty reflects an understanding that we will never have a completely accurate view of our environemnt and should proceed on the basis where we constantly question our assumptions, and look to the potential point of failure.

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I think that a really good description, and I like the driving analogy.

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Originally Posted by Bill Jakola

P. S. My less than P.C. office mate just asked me to ask you if you knew the Olympic medal count totals. ;) no worries.

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Top 10 Medal Winners
Country G S B Total
UNITED STATES 9 15 13 37
GERMANY 10 13 7 30
CANADA 14 7 5 26
NORWAY 9 8 6 23
AUSTRIA 4 6 6 16
RUSSIA 3 5 7 15
SOUTH KOREA 6 6 2 14
CHINA 5 2 4 11
SWEDEN 5 2 4 11
FRANCE 2 3 6 11

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Originally Posted by marct

Hi Bill,



Top 10 Medal Winners
Country G S B Total
UNITED STATES 9 15 13 37
GERMANY 10 13 7 30
CANADA 14 7 5 26

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Marc,

You are too kind; I thought for sure you would mention hockey.

Bill Jakola

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Originally Posted by marct

Sure you could if you had a significant justification for it. Posit a scenario where Iran puts a nuclear device on a ship and blows it up in New york harbour.

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How come we didn't bomb Hanoi to the ground as we did Dresden or Tokyo?

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Originally Posted by Bill Jakola

You are too kind; I thought for sure you would mention hockey.

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Hey Bill, all part of the evil Canadian plot to make everyone think we are polite :D.

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Originally Posted by Seerov

How come we didn't bomb Hanoi to the ground as we did Dresden or Tokyo?

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Because the NVA (or their allies) hadn't hit a part of the US? Because the Soviets said "Do it and we'll hit back"? Honestly, I don't know the exact reasons why.

Both Dresden and Tokyo (and Hiroshima and Nagasaki) took place during an "existential" war. Or, to phrase that slightly differently, a war that actually hit civilian areas of the US. Given that most of the wars the US (and Canada - let's be fair about this) have been involved in have had really minimal, if any, damage to our homelands, actual strikes tend to bring out the, hmmm, possibly "vindictive" is the best word, in us.

I suspect that when we actually get hit, it being such an exception to our normal lives, we get truly PO'd to the point where we are willing to do things that we like to believe we wouldn't do under other circumstances. I'll note that, in democracies (or republics ;)), it is much easier to "sell" a massive strike when emotions are running high.

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Originally Posted by Seerov

How come we didn't bomb Hanoi to the ground as we did Dresden or Tokyo?

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Fear of Nuclear Retaliation. (And a heating up from Cold to Hot in Europe)

The U.S. has one policy for how we engage states that either have Nukes or are protected by states that have nukes; and a very different policy for how we engage those who don't.

Bill, thanks for that, and while not wishing to nit-pick,

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Originally Posted by Bill Jakola

“Unlike the Cold War era when threats were measurable and, to some degree, predictable Army forces today are likely to encounter conditions of greater ambiguity and uncertainty. Doctrine must be able to accommodate this wider variety of threats.”

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But Vietnam had clearly shown this to be a faulty assumption at the height of the Cold-War.

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FM 5.0 seems to have assumptions of complexity, uncertainty, and continuous change. But let’s be clear; this appears as an acknowledgement of the nature of war and not a new aspect of war. War is war. Thus to say the operational environment is complex is not to say that war is more complex, it is just using the inherent complexity as an assumption to build doctrine.

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Warfare is about the complex thing humans can do. That is my point. It always has been. It cannot become more complex. It always was.

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But today our competition includes a number of near peers and other organizations below the nation-state like al Qaeda or a drug cartel. The transparency comes in the form of the 24 hour news cycle and the explosion of information available to almost anyone on the internet.

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When was this not the case - as concerns non-nation threats?
24 hour news cycles merely effect the rate and frequency of reporting. NOT IT's NATURE!!
The sheer proliferation of differing messages makes them less relevant. The power of the information age is the faith based belief in it, by some and not something grounded in evidence.

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Originally Posted by marct

With the exception of Wilf who, as we all know is in deep and intimate contact with the Platonic aeon of Ideal Forms (;)), most of us are unable to make pronouncements about the "nature" of anything.

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Mate, more Aeon Flux than Platonic Ideal Forms!

Let me be clear. My thesis on THE NATURE of war and warfare, is that cannot become more complex, because they always were the almost always MOST COMPLEX things that human beings ever did.

....additionally I would suggest that the belief in complexity has created an erroneous understanding of the problem which continues to compound itself.

So let's provide doctrine with achievable aims, using simple and clear language, based strongly in evidence and very little in belief.

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Originally Posted by marct

"Design" is more of a power word than "plan"; it conveys more of a "God like" height :wry:.

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1. In the beginning there was chaos and the chaos was the infantry, for the infantry was alone.

2. And fear was with the infantry and they cried unto the Lord saying, "Lord, save us for we are afraid."

3. And the Lord heard their grunts and set some of the infantry on beasts of burden and these he called cavalry, and the cavalry became armor.

4. And when the Lord had seen what he had done, he laughed saying, "Well, you can't win them all."

5. The infantry and the armor again cried out to the Lord saying, "Lord, save us for we are afraid." And the Lord heard their cries and decided to end their weepings.

6. And the Lord said unto them, "Lo and behold, I send you a race of men noble in heart and spirit," and the Lord created the Gunners.

1. And when Moses returned to his people he found them all reading "FM-3" and "FM-5", and he was mightly displeased.

2. And Moses spoke to his people saying "You have to f**king kidding me, with this ####"

3. But the people cried, "We were lost and so sought comfort in the words of false profits. Verily we did know it was words of no meaning, and empty of content. Save us from this sophistry and confusion for it angers us, so are without purpose."

4. So Moses spoke to his people and said, "Go now, and get your Packs of Alice, and Framed Bergens, and fill them with the rocks you see around, then assemble back here within the passing of two minutes, for it will be a long night, with much pain and gnashing of teeth."

Amen.

Miserere mei, Deus, secundum magnum misericordiam tuam

If you prefer the prettied up, doctrinal version, it's here
and here

Hi Marc,

I think the discussion on the differences between uncertainty and complexity merits more discussion. What is the real basis for our claim? If complexity is the the quality of being intricate and compounded how does that really apply to us?

I think comparatively, perhaps to how we trained for many years in our relatively simple CTCs and other exercises, experiments, etc., war has provided an opportunity (to ground forces, or those serving on the ground) to see that it is complex by nature. The more the objectives and conditions include other actors - be they populations, combatants, governments, competitors, etc. the more "complex" it becomes.

However, I'm not sure, as you say, that this discovery is entirely useful at this point. What would be more useful is do detail out the possible contributors to what we believe may make it more complex, and how their interaction frustrates or impedes the realization of the objective(s) as part of the conditions. Then perhaps we can figure out how to address those aspects better through the various DOTMLPF processes.

Uncertainty is another matter though. What I think about uncertainty that is important to us is whether or not we will have to do something. That something is in relation to how we have defined the environment and those aspects or contributions that make it more complex and impede our achieving the objective. There is a political aspect to this I think, as some of those uncertain things are tasks which may have to be done, but may be things which military forces are not prepared to do, or in some cases perhaps should not do (or even cannot do). We need to address this by determining exactly what we think those tasks are and when we think they will have to be done, and then have a good discussion on whether or not we have the capability (ability to do them), the authority to do them, - and if they are things we cannot do ourselves - e.g. the objective is contingent upon someone else doing the tasks, we need to discuss how to mitigate it.

If we are going to default to the use of complexity and uncertainty that may be OK, but we need to narrow it down some and place it in context up front (the more the better) as it applies to military forces employed to achieve a political purpose. We need to be specific about what factors make this complex, and we need to name our poison with respect to uncertainty.

Best, Rob

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Originally Posted by Bill Jakola

I suggest it is like driving a car where we are quite confident of reaching our destination without incident; but, we remain vigilent and prepared to react in case something goes awry. It is more than just being reactive to the environment; it requires us to constantly envision what could go wrong and then prepare to prevent or overcome potential problems should they materialize.

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If this what exemplifies design, then my earlier comment about old wine seems dead on.

I would hope that a relook of our process would yield is something much more radical than this:
"We have to get from point A to point B. Let's load up the Strykers and drive to B. But be ready folks. We may encounter native raidng parties so let's prepare for actions on contact. And get our ISR assets out so we don't get ambushed. The bridge may be washed out so we'll have to bring an AVLB--or a Wolverine if we can beg one from higher--and be ready to take some alternative routes. Remember to ask for a continuous FMV feed from Cortps assets so we can decide what other routes might be availalble.
"Questions?
"WTF, we can't get Corps coverage?--then '2' you better make sure you figure out how we get FMV fed to us."

What in the "Design is like driving" example describes what needs to be done to ensure that the correct problem (getting from A to B) has been selected? What in the example demonstrates that the solution set most probable of success(drive there) has been chosen?

From FM 5-0 Final Draft

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3-40. In understanding the operational environment, the commander and staff focus on defining, analyzing, and synthesizing the characteristics of the operational variables. They do so in the context of the dynamic interactions and relationships among and between relevant operational variables and actors in the operational environment. Often, learning about the nature of the situation helps them to understand the groupings, relationships, or interactions among relevant actors and operational variables. This learning typically involves analysis of the operational variables while examining the dynamic interaction and relationships among the myriad other factors in the operational environment.

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Please can anyone tell me how to translate this? This is just one example of many many paragraphs that are essentially incomprehensible. The part where it says "learning helps them understand" beggars belief. Does this paragraph just say the studying something helps you understand it? :mad:

Have I missed the point?

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Originally Posted by William F. Owen

From FM 5-0 Final Draft



Please can anyone tell me how to translate this? This is just one example of many many paragraphs that are essentially incomprehensible. The part where it says "learning helps them understand" beggars belief. Does this paragraph just say the studying something helps you understand it? :mad:

Have I missed the point?

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"Seek first to understand, then to be understood."

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3-40. In understanding the operational environment, the commander and staff focus on defining, analyzing, and synthesizing the characteristics of the operational variables. They do so in the context of the dynamic interactions and relationships among and between relevant operational variables and actors in the operational environment. Often, learning about the nature of the situation helps them to understand the groupings, relationships, or interactions among relevant actors and operational variables. This learning typically involves analysis of the operational variables while examining the dynamic interaction and relationships among the myriad other factors in the operational environment.

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It would be useful to see an unclassified example. I have seen classified examples that were very helpful, and I suspect we can take a historical event (maybe the Vietnam conflict) to show how this framework could have helped decision makers understand the situation (the conflict, actors, and variables that are suspected to be related to the problem set).

The key is to facilitate constant learning, versus our typical approach of creating clear objectives to get to imaginary end states, which seldom works in the real world (I anticipate hoots and howls over this remark, bring it on). We get to transition states, then we should adjust based on our goals and understanding of the environment. I tend to side with the State Department's perception of DoD planning, which is that parts of it are essential, while other parts are largely a waste of time. DoS prefers to focus on the process of diplomacy to create desired change over time, while the military wants clear achievable objectives (artifical approach to eliminate ambiguity). Our two recent military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan are perfect examples where numerous variables have influenced the decision maker (not just enemy forces in the field), and the character of both wars changed over time, and we were slow to transition our approach (conventional, CT, counterinsurgency, peace enforcement, etc.) as the environment and objectives shifted.

Design can be useful, so I'm a supporter of the idea/theory; however, the our staffs are not organized to support this effort, so it is largely unachievable with our current structure. It gets back to the expression, "that nothing is too hard for the man who doesn't have to do it".

Wilf I suspect you'll make an argument that we have always done this, and perhaps to some degree you're correct, but something happened to the military starting in the late 80s and running through the 90s (the Vietnam reformist impact), where our doctrine largely dismissed the lessons of the past and attempting to "clearly" define military problems, and while giving lip service to whole of government, didn't really practice it.

More to follow, just wanted to throw out some lose thoughts.

Complexity in any system (regardless of that fecund garbage the military espouses) is when the tools and techniques of a system are attempted to be integrated. Regardless of requirements as more and more elements are added the ability to control variables within the system becomes nearly impossible. Complexity is different from chaos in the fact that inputs and "desired" outputs are known but the ability to control for the results desired in chaos are unknown.

Uncertainty is a trait of both chaos and complexity. Uncertainty is found in the lack of knowledge inherent in any system or set of relationships created by unknown variables. Whereas complexity is "created" in the system "uncertainty" is inherent in the fear, uncertainty, doubt, and trust of the system responses. Since any system that is complex will have unknown or transient responses uncertainty will be inherent. The more complex the system the more uncertainty inherent in the system.

Design is an attempt to mitigate complexity and find simple structures or patterns to control for uncertainty. Design can follow formulaic patterns or rule sets entering "planning" (also called engineering) or it can follow natural less than empirical strategies that may allow for "art" to be exposed. Another point is that design can exist outside of planning but be inclusive of planning. As an example an architect designs a building, but an engineer creates the plant-plans, and a manager the project plan. The design process is intent of the creator/originator and the plan is the execution on that intent.

Unfortunately this simplistic discussion does not give glimpses into how the words are often misused. In engineering the models or design are often about the intent/goals, and the planning process is but one of the elements in that process. However the words get used interchangeable to effect the levels of effort or control the inputs into each other.

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Originally Posted by Global Scout

Wilf I suspect you'll make an argument that we have always done this, and perhaps to some degree you're correct, but something happened to the military starting in the late 80s and running through the 90s (the Vietnam reformist impact), where our doctrine largely dismissed the lessons of the past and attempting to "clearly" define military problems, and while giving lip service to whole of government, didn't really practice it.

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Well actually I'm just asking myself how complicated inane language helps any of this? If I cannot be said clearly and simply, it has no military utility!

Wilf has a good point about the parlous state of Army-speak. It seems as though people have gotten so used to seeing PowerPoint slides with needlessly complex process diagrams that they influence they way guys think and express themselves.

The full version of "The Gesesis of the Field Artillery" can be read by clicking here. The author is unknown, it appears to date from the 1960s, and it is in the public domain.

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Originally Posted by William F. Owen

Well actually I'm just asking myself how complicated inane language helps any of this? If I cannot be said clearly and simply, it has no military utility!

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I've become used to ignore such parts and to only care about interesting parts of texts.

Few authors use a very dense style where every line is really important. Those who do usually write in a style that's rather difficult for the reader.


I have actually a hypothesis about all this blather in FMs. It may be a psychological trick, meant to address the subconsciousness.
Propaganda lies become powerful by repetition - maybe professional blather becomes effective by the sheer repetition of keywords?

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Originally Posted by William F. Owen

From FM 5-0 Final Draft:

3-40. In understanding the operational environment, the commander and staff focus on defining, analyzing, and synthesizing the characteristics of the operational variables. They do so in the context of the dynamic interactions and relationships among and between relevant operational variables and actors in the operational environment. Often, learning about the nature of the situation helps them to understand the groupings, relationships, or interactions among relevant actors and operational variables. This learning typically involves analysis of the operational variables while examining the dynamic interaction and relationships among the myriad other factors in the operational environment.

Please can anyone tell me how to translate this? This is just one example of many many paragraphs that are essentially incomprehensible. The part where it says "learning helps them understand" beggars belief. Does this paragraph just say the studying something helps you understand it? :mad:

Have I missed the point?

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Wilf, line by line:

• "Operational environment" is the Army's new term for battlespace
• "Operational variables" are PMESII-PT. They are analyzed at the operational/strategic level just as tactical level leaders/staff analyze the "mission variables": METT-TC. Many PMESII-PT variables are related to the ASCOPE acronym used with Civil Considerations in METT-TC:

http://usacac.army.mil/blog/blogs/co...plication.aspx

• "Actors in the operational environment" are the friendlies, enemies, neutral and not-so neutral civilians, civil-military, NGOs, etc.
• But you probably are correct that the final three sentences all relate to the same conceptual thought, which could be combined into a simpler:

"PMESII-PT analysis must involve learning about the personnel involved with each operational variable and how those variables and people relate to each other."

I actually like almost everything about the rewrite...except "design" which I don't understand.

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Originally Posted by selil

Complexity in any system (regardless of that fecund garbage the military espouses) is when the tools and techniques of a system are attempted to be integrated. Regardless of requirements as more and more elements are added the ability to control variables within the system becomes nearly impossible. Complexity is different from chaos in the fact that inputs and "desired" outputs are known but the ability to control for the results desired in chaos are unknown.

Uncertainty is a trait of both chaos and complexity. Uncertainty is found in the lack of knowledge inherent in any system or set of relationships created by unknown variables. Whereas complexity is "created" in the system "uncertainty" is inherent in the fear, uncertainty, doubt, and trust of the system responses. Since any system that is complex will have unknown or transient responses uncertainty will be inherent. The more complex the system the more uncertainty inherent in the system.

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I have great difficulty taking seriously anyone who criticizes military jargon and use of language...while simultaneously using words like "fecund.";)

Believe some are reading too much into the relationship between uncertainty and complexity. Believe "uncertainty" came about as the partly correct answer of anti-FCS leaders who correctly identified that sensors will never find all the enemy or his intentions. It is analogous to chess or football where both sides see all players on the board, yet one of two equal sides will lose, or a weaker side won't necessarily play by "established" rules. The unsuspected player on the sidelines will stick his foot out and trip the guy running for a touchdown...with no flag applicable.

But there is a major difference between not finding hunter-killer dismounts on complex terrain versus finding and dealing with massed armored forces in the year 2010. The anti-FCS leaders want to discount sensors, long-range fires, and air attack. Claims of uncertainly support the need for more close combat and more armor protecting against anti-armor weapons...despite the fact that those dying are being killed by IEDs, small arms, and RPGs used as massed artillery.

"Uncertainty" became the rallying cry used to reject the FCS idea that tactical/MI sensors and scouts are adequate to achieve perfect SU. It correctly identifies that even if possible, seeing the enemy isn't enough, especially if he hugs non-combatants, and does not play by the rules of "chess or football." Uncertainty correctly rejects Effects Based Operations where long range fires and air attack are sufficient...if the enemy stays massed and out in the open...and if we are willing to spend/rebuild under fire afterwards to repair EBO damage.

However what is forgotten in the Capstone Concept is that "uncertainty" applies equally to the logistician trying to deliver extra fuel supplies to an overly armored gas-guzzling force. Transportation and sustainment forces end up being ambushed en route...due to uncertainty. Uncertainty applies to the inter and intratheater sealift/airlift force that must get both the vehicles and supplies to theater and the ultimate user over the highly uncertain last operational and tactical miles. While we accept all kinds of anti-access unlikelihoods, we never seem to acknowledge that sealift may never arrive due to enemy intervention of scarce RO/ROs/Fast Sealift.

Fortunately, the expansion and up-armoring (double V-hull coming) of Stryker, remaining FCS spin outs, and continued testing of Stryker etc. networking advantages will salvage some of the "baby" of the rejected FCS bathwater...so all is not lost. Heavy BCTs will arrive eventually, and hopefully we will never find ourselves running out of fuel with "superior" armor as the Germans did in WWII, losing to lesser armored Americans/allies.

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Design is an attempt to mitigate complexity and find simple structures or patterns to control for uncertainty. Design can follow formulaic patterns or rule sets entering "planning" (also called engineering) or it can follow natural less than empirical strategies that may allow for "art" to be exposed. Another point is that design can exist outside of planning but be inclusive of planning. As an example an architect designs a building, but an engineer creates the plant-plans, and a manager the project plan. The design process is intent of the creator/originator and the plan is the execution on that intent.

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I hear you on the architectual versus engineering design. Architectual and military design may involve visualizing and describing space in a building or on the ground. But ability to do that does not guarantee ability to engineer/plan and more importantly execute the design. Aren't the days of the Howard Roark/Frank Lloyd Wright one-man-does-it-all design/engineering not feasible anymore than one staff member and commander doing it all in design or planning? Isn't it kind of egotistical to try to design it all alone, or rule with an iron my-way (plan)-or-highway authority in the CP?

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Unfortunately this simplistic discussion does not give glimpses into how the words are often misused. In engineering the models or design are often about the intent/goals, and the planning process is but one of the elements in that process. However the words get used interchangeable to effect the levels of effort or control the inputs into each other.

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Isn't it comparable to the automotive designer who draws and sculpts clay to look a certain way...then reality on the ground (engineering/enemy vote)distorts it to look much different in execution.

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Originally Posted by Cole

Isn't it comparable to the automotive designer who draws and sculpts clay to look a certain way...then reality on the ground (engineering/enemy vote)distorts it to look much different in execution.

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Simply yes.

The abandonment of simplicity (Frank Lloyd Wright buildings) for complexity (Toyota Camry drive by wire throttle) has led to disasters of implementation regardless of design. I know I'm mixing the two areas of consideration but the analogy should stick.

The issue IMHO is still that complexity begets uncertainty. Wilf has a good point on the inherent problems of making things more difficult than they should be... He almost is channelling Einstein in "things should be as simple as possible but no simpler".

The author's main problem was that he tried to say "employ operational design" and describe at the same time what operational design is.

As to examples, the major headquarters that has been employing this the longest is USSOCOM, and all of those products are quite intentionally unclassified.

The purpose of design is to promote understanding; but perfect understanding that is then locked up in a vault is not of much value. They don't lend themselves to publication very well though, as the design diagrams require a guide to lead one through them; and if a picture tells a 1000 words, a design diagram often tells 1000 stories.

I can't speak for others, but ours work best in small groups with 2-3 of the designers providing a short tag-team brief, followed by a much longer tag-team Q&A.

To simply hang the picture on the web, or to write up an explanation leaves most thinking "what's the big deal," or "I disagree." But most walk out of the tag-team presentations with fresh ideas and perspectives and a deeper understanding of the problem they face, and that is the point of the process.

The useful design produts that SOCOM designed are classified for good reason. What your talking about that is unclassified is SOCOM's visual version of the JOE inappropriately labeled design. it shows the convergence of trends and does trigger some interesting questions. The actual design prodcts facilitate a deeper understanding of a specific problem in depth and how it interacts with other systems and actors globally. It has nothing to do with Seliel or Cole's interpretation. Selil is focused on design from an engineer perspective, and Cole from a tactical perspective. Wilf agee the definition provided was useless. The real design products are manpower intensive, involve the interagency and a large commitment of the intell community, plus academia. Once developed a tactical unit can provide input based on their view of ground truth, but the initial product is not produced by 3 staff officers. It can be useful for some problem sets, but the wat it was presented clearly led to confusion which isn't useful.

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3-9. A commander‘s experience, knowledge, judgment, and intuition assume a crucial role in understanding complex, ill-structured problems. Together, they enhance the cognitive components of design, enhancing commanders‘ intuition while further enabling commanders to identify threats or opportunities long before others might.

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...and here we go again.
The first sentence is essentially says that being smart helps you solve problems. The second sentence then extrapolates that and that smart people will use "Design" better than dumb people?

I really am trying hard not to be a pedant, but this FM is one of the most badly written documents I have ever seen. The definition of Design takes 6 paragraphs, most of which spout rubbish. If anyone wants to leap in defend this, then let's hear it.

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2-1. Planning is the process by which commanders (and the staff, if available) translate the commander‘s visualization into a specific course of action for preparation and execution, focusing on the expected results (FM 3-0).

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OK, so primarily a way of translating a "visualisation," into action. So it's NOT a way of producing orders!
So :

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2-4. A product of planning is a plan or order—a directive for future action. Commanders issue plans and orders to subordinates to communicate their understanding of the situation and their visualization of an operation.

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Planning IS about producing orders. Really? Apparently the Plans and Orders "communicate their understanding of the situation and their visualization of an operation."
So we now have

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"The measure of a good plan is not whether execution transpires as planned, but whether the plan facilitates effective action in the face of unforeseen events. Good plans and orders foster initiative.

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GARBAGE! The measure of a good plan is if it works so achieving the desired end state via the plan! The execution does matter! That is why you do planning! Good plans tell you what to do and when to do it. Initiative is for when no plan exists, or the plan is inadequate or failing!

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Originally Posted by Global Scout

The useful design produts that SOCOM designed are classified for good reason. What your talking about that is unclassified is SOCOM's visual version of the JOE inappropriately labeled design. it shows the convergence of trends and does trigger some interesting questions. The actual design prodcts facilitate a deeper understanding of a specific problem in depth and how it interacts with other systems and actors globally. It has nothing to do with Seliel or Cole's interpretation. Selil is focused on design from an engineer perspective, and Cole from a tactical perspective. Wilf agee the definition provided was useless. The real design products are manpower intensive, involve the interagency and a large commitment of the intell community, plus academia. Once developed a tactical unit can provide input based on their view of ground truth, but the initial product is not produced by 3 staff officers. It can be useful for some problem sets, but the wat it was presented clearly led to confusion which isn't useful.

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But that's all news to me. Come see me in my office at the J56 Strategy Division when I get back from Afghanistan and we can discuss.

:D

I just read some of the excerpts from this manual to my NCOs and the one comment was "I think it was better when we had officers from the nobility who just treated us like peons instead of educated officers who try to make us look like peons...."

What ever happened to clarity and brevity in Staff Duties? I see mission statements that are whole paragraphs....

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Originally Posted by Infanteer

..."I think it was better when we had officers from the nobility who just treated us like peons instead of educated officers who try to make us look like peons...."

What ever happened to clarity and brevity in Staff Duties? I see mission statements that are whole paragraphs....

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The first is the well phrased sensing of many NCOs...

Those few -- but still too many -- today who are guilty of such efforts really ought to consider how their actions reflect on themselves. Condescension is not a military virtue.

Today's troops are capable of doing far more than many are willing to permit them to do. Among other things, that failing drives good people out (while fostering not so good people staying in) and is extremely wasteful.

On the brevity comment, spot on. Even more accurate on the clarity aspect. The production of any manual of over 100 pages should be immediately outlawed -- simply because the larger ones lose so much in translation...:rolleyes:

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Originally Posted by Ken White

On the brevity comment, spot on. Even more accurate on the clarity aspect. The production of any manual of over 100 pages should be immediately outlawed -- simply because the larger ones lose so much in translation...:rolleyes:

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B-- But Ken, are you saying that military service members aren't reading hundreds of pages of manuals every time they get a new position, are trained on a new piece of equipment, or have to carry out some task? That they just want to most important details, and don't need paragraphs of over-complicated gibberish? That said information should be easy to find?

Why, if what you're saying is true, then there's thousands and thousands of pages of manuals gathering dust that no one reads! That's patently absurd, sir!

Heretic! Furcifer! (Okay, that one was a little too far.)

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Originally Posted by Global Scout

The useful design produts that SOCOM designed are classified for good reason. What your talking about that is unclassified is SOCOM's visual version of the JOE inappropriately labeled design. it shows the convergence of trends and does trigger some interesting questions. The actual design prodcts facilitate a deeper understanding of a specific problem in depth and how it interacts with other systems and actors globally. It has nothing to do with Seliel or Cole's interpretation. Selil is focused on design from an engineer perspective, and Cole from a tactical perspective. Wilf agee the definition provided was useless. The real design products are manpower intensive, involve the interagency and a large commitment of the intell community, plus academia. Once developed a tactical unit can provide input based on their view of ground truth, but the initial product is not produced by 3 staff officers. It can be useful for some problem sets, but the wat it was presented clearly led to confusion which isn't useful.

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The way you have seen it is used in practice may differ from the way the TRADOC Operational Concept and now doctrine describe it, but Commander's Appreciation and Campaign Design indicates that Selil's description is pretty accurate...at least if you are going to use the term "design" when some other term might be more appropriate:

http://www.tradoc.army.mil/tpubs/pams/p525-5-500.pdf

The first chapter helped me understand design much better. Particularly liked this quote:

(3) Every ill-structured problem is essentially unique and novel. Historical analogies may provide useful insights—particularly on individual aspects of a larger problem—but the differences between even similar situations are profound and significant. The political goals at stake, stakeholders involved, cultural milieu, histories, and other dynamics will all be novel and unique to a particular situation.

Believe some miss the point that not every Soldier must read/study doctrine. But instructors/trainers at institutional level must study it to create lesson plans that are doctrinally-founded. Combat training centers O/Cs and other evaluators need some evaluation source based on more than opinion of how they did it in their particular unit under a unique commander/leader/staff officer, in a particular theater and year in theater, and a unique village, valley and ethnic/tribal mix when public opinion and the threat may have differed substantially.

In my solely academic perspective, the lesson plans we create are based on collective tasks which in turn are based on doctrine, task lists, and researched lessons learned. In our particular case, we used the FM 5-0 (and FM 3-0, & previous 5-0.1) "plan, prepare, execute, and assess continuously" as the outline for many lessons on multiple subjects...because it works and helps you not to forget something. That "operations process" and troop-leading procedures are probably most of what your typical NCO must understand where FM 5-0 is concerned.

I'm still not sure from the TRADOC Concept what planning products result from "Design." Suspect they exist in multiple formats and differ based on the nature of the ill-structured problem and command-designated courses of action that may change based on subject matter experts briefings. But as "Global Scout" indicates, many may be classified, many are probably unique to particular commanders, and most "Design" probably involves operational/strategic commanders and tactical units like SOF that have strategic influence.

Also believe many critical of the writing don't comprehend that it is often a team effort with multiple reviewers altering content to leave a hodgepodge of styles and substance by the time it is approved. It may not be pretty, but if it isn't done, you are left relying on opinions of how to do things based on historical experiences/perspectives of particular units/individuals that no longer apply.

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Originally Posted by Cole

Also believe many critical of the writing don't comprehend that it is often a team effort with multiple reviewers altering content to leave a hodgepodge of styles and substance by the time it is approved. It may not be pretty, but if it isn't done, you are left relying on opinions of how to do things based on historical experiences/perspectives of particular units/individuals that no longer apply.

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Hi Cole,

I hope the following isn't offensive, it's just my own biased observation of most military publications:

Option 1: Not writing a paragraph, or manual, and allowing for some ad-lib on the part of the target audience.

Option 2: Include confusingly worded, "hodgepodge of styles and substance" in publication.

Net Effect(Option 2) minus Net Effect(Option 1) = x thousands of dollars used for creating, publishing, and maintaining Option 2.

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Originally Posted by Cole

...Believe some miss the point that not every Soldier must read/study doctrine. But instructors/trainers at institutional level must study it to create lesson plans that are doctrinally-founded.

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True -- but those instructors also appreciate a little clarity and concise thought.

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Combat training centers O/Cs and other evaluators need some evaluation source based on more than opinion... and the threat may have differed substantially.

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That was equally true back in the days when clarity and brevity were not goals but requirements. People fighting wars with high tempo operations do not have time to sort out the chaff.

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Also believe many critical of the writing don't comprehend that it is often a team effort with multiple reviewers altering content to leave a hodgepodge of styles and substance by the time it is approved. It may not be pretty, but if it isn't done, you are left relying on opinions of how to do things based on historical experiences/perspectives of particular units/individuals that no longer apply.

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Nothing wrong with all that -- BUT someone, not a committee, needs to be responsible and make some hard editorial decisions. These are military doctrinal publications, not high school textbooks; fluff and 'gee whiz' stuff is unnecessary and can be inimical to the doctrine promulgated.

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Originally Posted by IntelTrooper

...Furcifer! (Okay, that one was a little too far.)

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was 51E. I had four MOS's, 11B5P, 11F5S, 11G5P, 19D5P -- all got rolled up into 11Z5P so they told me I had to pick another. I figured I'd done enough 51E stuff to qualify. So I picked the 51E and thus I guess that being furciferous isn't all that far out... :D

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Originally Posted by Infanteer

I just read some of the excerpts from this manual to my NCOs and the one comment was "I think it was better when we had officers from the nobility who just treated us like peons instead of educated officers who try to make us look like peons...."

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LOLOL - And at least the "nobility", and since you're from Canada, that means the colonial aristocracy crowd (ah, for the good old days...:rolleyes:), had the good sense to know when they should freakin' well shut up and let the troops get on with it :D.

Honestly, nothing PO's competent people as much as some pissant spewing buzzword diarrhea (if one wishes to be academically prissy about this, I would recommend the term "logorrhea"; it means the same thing ;)).

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Originally Posted by Infanteer

What ever happened to clarity and brevity in Staff Duties? I see mission statements that are whole paragraphs....

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Hunh, I'm reading a "document" right now that makes FM 5.0 look like a model of clarity, brevity, insight and nigh-on God touched brilliance. the term logorrhea is much on my mind of late..... :mad:

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Originally Posted by Ken White

was 51E. I had four MOS's, 11B5P, 11F5S, 11G5P, 19D5P -- all got rolled up into 11Z5P so they told me I had to pick another. I figured I'd done enough 51E stuff to qualify. So I picked the 51E and thus I guess that being furciferous isn't all that far out... :D

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Wow, lucky hit! I take it back then -- Furcifer! :D

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Originally Posted by IntelTrooper

Hi Cole,

I hope the following isn't offensive, it's just my own biased observation of most military publications:

Option 1: Not writing a paragraph, or manual, and allowing for some ad-lib on the part of the target audience.

Option 2: Include confusingly worded, "hodgepodge of styles and substance" in publication.

Net Effect(Option 2) minus Net Effect(Option 1) = x thousands of dollars used for creating, publishing, and maintaining Option 2.

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I totally agree with IntelTrooper

MichaelJayy your two post so far resemble those who add one-liners of no substance in order to establish a "post count" to be followed by spam PM to our members or spamming the threads. You have 24 hours to explain why you should not be banned from SWC.

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Originally Posted by Cole

Believe some are reading too much into the relationship between uncertainty and complexity. Believe "uncertainty" came about as the partly correct answer of anti-FCS leaders who correctly identified that sensors will never find all the enemy or his intentions....But there is a major difference between not finding hunter-killer dismounts on complex terrain versus finding and dealing with massed armored forces in the year 2010. The anti-FCS leaders want to discount sensors, long-range fires, and air attack. Claims of uncertainly support the need for more close combat and more armor protecting against anti-armor weapons...despite the fact that those dying are being killed by IEDs, small arms, and RPGs used as massed artillery... "Uncertainty" became the rallying cry used to reject the FCS idea that tactical/MI sensors and scouts are adequate to achieve perfect SU. It correctly identifies that even if possible, seeing the enemy isn't enough, especially if he hugs non-combatants, and does not play by the rules of "chess or football." Uncertainty correctly rejects Effects Based Operations where long range fires and air attack are sufficient...if the enemy stays massed and out in the open...and if we are willing to spend/rebuild under fire afterwards to repair EBO damage.

Fortunately, the expansion and up-armoring (double V-hull coming) of Stryker, remaining FCS spin outs, and continued testing of Stryker etc. networking advantages will salvage some of the "baby" of the rejected FCS bathwater...so all is not lost. Heavy BCTs will arrive eventually, and hopefully we will never find ourselves running out of fuel with "superior" armor as the Germans did in WWII, losing to lesser armored Americans/allies.

I hear you on the architectual versus engineering design. Architectual and military design may involve visualizing and describing space in a building or on the ground. But ability to do that does not guarantee ability to engineer/plan and more importantly execute the design. Aren't the days of the Howard Roark/Frank Lloyd Wright one-man-does-it-all design/engineering not feasible anymore than one staff member and commander doing it all in design or planning? Isn't it kind of egotistical to try to design it all alone, or rule with an iron my-way (plan)-or-highway authority in the CP?

Isn't it comparable to the automotive designer who draws and sculpts clay to look a certain way...then reality on the ground (engineering/enemy vote)distorts it to look much different in execution.

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Several unsolicited comments here.

1. I think that the argument against FCS - that it could not totally eliminate fog of war or friction - was a fallacious misinterpretation of what the TRADOC Battle Lab experiments were trying to do. BECAUSE they could not simulate network degradation and the fog of war well enough, the experimenters limited their scope to human factors questions. ASSUMING perfect intelligence (obviously false, but not invalid for the purpose of analysis), they examined issues like information overload and screen clutter. But no one with a clue would ever claim that perfect intelligence was achievable, irrespective of the depth of clutter, and all the physical impediments to sensor performance. The more much interesting question should have been - and to some extent was - how does one employ these additional sensing capabilities best to improve situational awareness and to tighten the OODA loop ? There was no need to ignore what we already knew about battle command. The ghost of White, Yale, and Manteuffel's 1970 book, Alternative to Armaggedon and its vignettes of Charlie Dare and Tex Goodspeed in the Automated TOC still ring true...but the young 'uns don't read old books.

2. Stand-off engagement has been a kind of debated non-debate within the Armor and Cavalry community for a long time. Another history lesson - the "lessons of the 1973 war" maintained the maximum range engagement was the way to go, while CALL and NTC - based on training battles - maintained just the opposite. For battalion and brigade commanders, the idea of fighting out past the 4000-5000 max limit of direct fire weapons was attractive - and the sensor technology made it possible to look out that far. Cometh Excaliber and the concept of Beyond Line of Sight Fires (we'll leave ghost of NLOS-LS aside out of respect for the dead) - and you now have weapons capable of participating in this battle. But the problem was that people both in and out of uniform did not understand that "deep battle" means using the ENTIRE depth of the battlespace - acronymism admitted - write in "entire depth of the operational environment" it it makes sense to you. The wrong assumption of the FCS BCT in defense was that there would be and could be no victory in a close fight. Why should anyone have accepted that myth ? But they did - on the same logic as we were debatting the proper positioning of break points at or around battlesight range in the active defense, loosely speaking. Same fallacy, same error in reasoning.

3. Personally, I cannot see either the promise or the outrage over the use of the term "effects based operations". Since EBO was supposed to have had a psychological as well as a physical component, I would presuppose that successful prosecution of psychological effects would be unpredictable, hard to achieve but also hard to measure. When you read Ralph Peters these days, it is all about breaking the enemy's will to fight before losing your own will to win. Can we accept that this element of Clausewitz's theory has yet to be revoked ?

4. Last point and I'm done. There was a time in the US Army when we were not afraid of structured concepts. Remember the "Architecture for the Future Army" ? Like so many other catchy slogans, that one had the normal 4-8 year shelf life - but the fact that we could even use words like that back then typifies an existential confidence that appears to have been lost - and the Army needs to get it back. We cannot prevent our military theorists from thinking pragmatically and teaching on the lines of pragmatic philosophy - we and they are all too American to do otherwise. But here is a quote from a real philosopher whose work reminds us of the danger of confusing the reductive methods of pragmatism with the actual order of being (you get that debate whenever anyone, normally a Myers-Briggs INTP type, hauls out the "O-word", trying to superimpose their logic on the Other).

http://voegelinview.com/ontological-...ic-speech.html