Pakistani internal security (all themes and a merged thread)
The jihadi raid on Pakistan's GHQ prompted immediate discussion on our blog and others, complete with conspiracy theories (the army did it to prepare public opinion for the waziristan operatiion, the CIA did it to prepare the army opinion for the same, the jihadis did it, T.H..E.Y did it, and so on). I am posting my comment (posted in response to the theory that the army arranged this "show") and look forward to your comments.
Dr T,
I assume you are asking about the GHQ siege. I think the commando action sounds like it was capable and well executed. You are being cynical about why the suicide bomber did not blow himself up, but it is not impossible to kill a suicide bomber before he explodes. Commandos executing such a raid are always taking a risk, but there is always the chance of success. This is what they are trained to do. They can use stun grenades, which can disorient and stun the terrorists for a few moments. In that time, the commando sharpshooters have to shoot the terrorists without killing hostages. The first reaction of the terrorists is to fire back at the attackers, not to turn and start shooting hostages. Anyway, in our history, we have had good operations (this one and the one in lal masjid) and really bad screw-ups (the Pan Am hijacking in the eighties when the commandos seem to have killed more hostages than the hijackers managed to kill).
The bottom line is, even I find it hard to believe that anyone in the army would be as stupid as to have these martyrdom seekers attack their own GHQ. I think this was a bona-fide terrorist attack. Its a huge embarrassment for the army that they got into even the outer buildings of GHQ. Still, once they had been embarrassed, the army did take the risk of having the hostages killed and went for an early commando raid and as such raids go, they seem to have succeeded.
I think the more important thing is to notice that the person leading the terrorists is supposed to be the same SOB who attacked the Sri-lankan cricket team in April. Why was he still at large? renting houses, arranging white vans with army license plates, getting terrorists in place for a well planned raid? This is not a good reflection on the state of law enforcement and anti-terrorist operations in the country.
Also, this is old news for many of us, but worth pointing out that this jihadi terrorist, like all the others now being hunted or asked to go to Indian Kashmir ASAP, was initially trained by our own blessed intelligence agencies and their pet proxies. And he and his ilk are able to survive until today because parts of the jihadi infrastructure (supporters, sympathizers, financiers, facilitators) share space with "India-specific terrorists" and still do not face a situation where the entire network is under attack from the state. More important, the educated public in Pakistan is still confused about what is going on. The army's powerful psyops operation is very quick to manufacture outrage about Hussain Haqqani or Asif Zardari, but has not made a systematic effort to disown and attack the armed jihadis. Their patrons (like Hameed Gul and company) and bull#### artists like Ahmed Qureshi and Zaid Hamid are still being invited on the media to cloud the issue with conspiracy theories about Indian hand and American embassy staffers and their cars. This is a very serious handicap because it means that "moderate islamists" (a large constituency in educated Pakistan) and ordinarly Pakistanis in general are still not clear about who the enemy is. Without the cooperation of the general public, no anti-terrorist campaign can succeed.
Having said that, I would also add that I continue to believe that the longer term trend is clearly against the jihadis. There is just no way that the "settled areas" of Pakistan will opt for taliban style rule. The hardcore jihadi enterprise is not compatible with survival in the modern world and will eventually be confined to places like Waziristan and isolated small groups (the islamist equivalent of the Baader Meinhof gang and the Red brigades). All the above comments are part of the messy mechanism of getting from the age of Hameed Gul and General Mahmud to the age of co-existence with India and the modern world.
Omar
Better target selection (Part X of Y)
Omar,
I do not hold with many conspiracy theories and in this case find it hard to imagine even the most deluded Pakistani Army officer would do this thinking it helped the causes of the Army, even ISI.
Given the capabilities and intentions of the three groups forming the militant opposition (Pakistani Taleban, LeT and South Punjabi groups) such an attack is clearly possible. What I do wonder about is the selection of such a target, who choses them? The Lahore attack on the Sri Lankan cricket team shows a strategic, maybe tactical acumen not normally seen. On reflection after Mumbai, maybe we should have learnt they will attack for maximim imagery impact.
After the UN suicide bomber attack in Islamabad, reportedly by a Frontier Corps dressed individual, it is time for Pakistan and others to re-think their most vulnerable targets.
davidbfpo
Waziristan: campaigning in the past and soon?
A new Pakistani campaign in Waziristan is expected soon and has been subject of scattered comments on SWJ blog and within other threads.
There are lessons to learn from an Imperial (British Empire in India) campaign in this part of the FATA read thanks to the UK blogsite (again): http://defenceoftherealm.blogspot.co...re-before.html
There are links to other sources within and this appeared originally within the current Afghan campaigning thread: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...?t=8577&page=4 where similar points that lessons can be learnt have been made.
I do wonder whether the Pakistani military remember this too? Imperial history is still part of their tradition and army units have kept their old Imperial names, head dress and more (not the consumption of alcohol).
davidbfpo
The Faqir lost - a riposte
A reader of SWC has responded to my initial posting:
Quote:
I read the original article years ago and have now read this blog. The problem is, it's wrong.
The fact is that the Faqir was defeated. He could barely muster any men by the middle of 1939. During the war years, precisely the time
he could have taken advantage of Britain, he was unable to stir the Waziris to any resistance. Recruiting for the British Indian Army went exponential. The number of incidents against the British and the border units fell to practically nil from February 1941 until 1947 when the British left.
Hauner was simply inaccurate because he had not done the archival work. Trevor Warren wrote the best account, now sadly out of print.
The key point is that the Waziris, especially tribal elders, dissuaded young Waziris from joining the Faqir and his band. he was regarded as a troublemaker. Waziris had more sense than to take on the British on a permanent basis.
On these grounds, the Pakistan Army is NOT about to make the
same mistake at all, and history does not, contrary to popular mythology, repeat itself.
Waziristan, the Faqir of Ipi, and the Indian Army
A quick Google found some details of the Warren book:
Alan Warren. Waziristan, the Faqir of Ipi, and the Indian Army: The North West Frontier Revolt of 1936–37. New York: Oxford University Press. 2000. Pp. xxxii, 324. $29.95.
This is an account taken from official records of the 1930s' tribal insurgencies in the Waziristan region of India's northwest frontier. The Waziristan agencies were on the periphery of British India and had a population, by its close, of little more than two hundred thousand. The region was the scene, however, of the greatest military conflicts of the closing years of the Raj. Following the tribal insurgencies of 1919–1920 and 1936–1937, there was the heaviest concentration of troops and police per head of population anywhere on the subcontinent. It is therefore a little surprising that these events had received scant historical attention until the publication of this study.
Alan Warren unashamedly adopts the narrative style of military history and reveals a fine eye for detail as he meticulously pieces together British engagements in Waziristan. The greatest attention is devoted to the insurgency led by the Muslim holy man known as the Faqir of Ipi in 1936–1937. Although the tribal revolt was decisively crushed, a cat and mouse game continued between the Faqir and the British authorities throughout the remainder of their stay in India.
From: http://www.historycooperative.org/cg...6.4/br_26.html
Terrorist attacks in Pakistan
There were multiple terrorist attacks across Pakistan today. I posted the following comment on my email group this morning and thought it may be of interest to some people here:
I just spoke with some friends in Lahore and they (and according to them, "everyone in Lahore") were convinced that these attacks were carried out on American instructions. The argument was that the US wants Pakistan in turmoil so it can get them to launch an operation against the very people America is using to create turmoil so that those same people can be attacked by the Pak army..I know. My jaw dropped as well.
OR, its doing this to sell them weapons. or steal the nuclear bomb. Or build a gas pipeline. or raise Obama's poll numbers. or just because its America and America does evil things. or something, no one really knows for sure. I was also told that "the army has reported that some madressas in Rajanpur got funding in dollars. The conclusion is obvious"? Naturally, I was speechless. Ahmed Qureshi and Zaid Hamid have done their job all too well, the army apparently cannot now convince the people to fight the jihadis EVEN IF IT WANTED TO. Aap apney jaal mein Sayyad aa gaya...
No fiction writer could ever have written this and got away with it. Indeed, truth is stranger than fiction.
btw, does anyone have any information about who is funding Ahmed Qureshi and company? Is ISI still employing them or are they free-lance now? When the history of this time is written, the role played by professional gnerators of conspiracy theories will be studied and historians will wonder how so few could confuse so many for so long. (and of course, even the paranoid have enemies, so I am not saying ALL the conspiracy theories are incorrect).
The ruling elite (and their American and Saudi and now Chinese partners) has spent 50 years manipulating things from behind the scenes. By now, the trust level in society (in these matters) is so low, the army cannot fix its own mess. If I was not from Lahore, I would sit back with my bag of popcorn and my diet coke and watch this #### go down on live TV. But I cant. I am afraid that a situation worse than Algeria might be coming down the pike, and we are less prepared for it than the Algerians were. Some of the pathologies are similar (corrupt elite, unjust system, post-colonial schizophrenic culture, rebels who have picked a particularly vicious ideology to express their hatred of this awful elite) and some are even worse (no history of common liberation struggle, greater penetration of Saudi influence, partition and its unique pathologies, much larger population, more ungoverned areas, lack of credible political leadership). This is not looking good.
Pakistan has yet to mobilise
Stephen Tankel has added a trenchant comment on the situation in Pakistan: http://www.icsr.info/blog/Jumping-the-Shark and asks at the end:
Quote:
For starters, I'm curious if anyone out there knows of improvements or planned improvements in terms of a) better inter-agency intelligence sharing; b) increased funding and training for Pakistani police; or c) increasing capacity within intelligence agencies that are not the ISI.
I know there is a thread on the ANP, but I cannot immediately recall one on the police in Pakistan (although ISI do crop up irregularly - in a thread?).
Another day I shall search around for articles on the Pakistan police. There is a ICG report on: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=5737 (July 2008).
davibfpo
1 Attachment(s)
Pakistani analyst viewpoint
Attached is a short version of a paper written by a Pakistani civilian analyst, based in the USA, who has contributed on SWC before.
davidbfpo
Co-operation across the Durand Line?
Omerali asked:
Quote:
If its not totally classified, can anyone enlighten us about the current level of cooperation between the US/NATO and the Pakistani army?
I understand that the Western coalition have offered places on COIN training courses for mid-rank officers. Whether the Pakistani Army has resumed courses in the USA is unknown here; historically this was for senior officers.
IIRC the UK has not had Pakistani cadets at Sandhurst for a long time, although there is one Afghan there now.
The Frontier Corps has an external training mission, IIRC the US was working with the FC's SF unit months ago.
Much was made over a year plus ago that there was a tripartite commission between Afghanistan, Pakistan and the coalition - based in Kabul. Again IIRC there was an Islamabad-based aspect too.
There have been repeated comments that many of the drone attacks are a response to Pakistani requests and intelligence. Leaving aside that one Pakistani AFB is a drone base.
Given the often reported Pakistani Army anger at US interventions, visits and more one can only wonder at the reality of co-operation.
davidbfpo