I'm not talking about bin Laden's aspirations or his agenda. That needn't concern us. What does concern us is what has actually worked for him, the tactics and narratives that have actually produced results.
As for evidence, AQ's dramatic decline after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan is well documented, as is AQ's failure to generate any significant traction in his calls for action against the Saudi government. AQ has only succeeded in drawing support when they fight foreign military intervention: regardless of their aspirations, that's what actually sustains them.
This makes superficial sense, but it does not explain the evident reality that bin Laden's message has not in fact taken root in these countries. To the contrary, bin Laden has never gained significant leverage in efforts to overthrow Arab governments. He gets support and admiration when he fights the noble jihad against the invading infidel somewhere far away, but when he brings the message home it falls flat. Bin Laden's efforts to raise rebellion in places like Saudi Arabia have had little effect, not because the populace is satisfied but because they don't see him offering a viable alternative. The conservative clergy may support his efforts abroad but they don't want him messing in their pond domestically, they see him as a loose cannon and as competition. Even in the oil glut years of the mid to late 90s, when circumstances seemed ideal for AQ, they were unable to draw enough support to even think about effective action against the government. It just didn't work for them, and it wasn't just because of repression: we saw in Iran and we've seen elsewhere that if the populace buys the message repression can be overwhelmed. The populaces involved just didn't buy AQ's message.
Agreed, but events in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya have little or nothing to do with AQ. AQ didn't inspire them and there's little to no evidence that AQ is drawing any leverage from them.
AQ has tried to conduct UW against governments in the Middle East, but they've had very little success. Again, the only thing that's really worked for them is opposition to foreign military intervention their UW efforts against indigenous government have for the most part fallen pretty flat.
If one acts on the basis of unsupported assumption, one is almost certain to be burned.
In any event we cannot disempower AQ by ending despotism in the Middle East and Africa. We don't even know that ending despotism would disempower AQ, and we don't have the power to end despotism in any event. We do have the ability to remove AQ's most effective narrative from play by reducing our tendency toward sustained occupation of places where we've thought it necessary to intervene. We might also do well to assess proposed interventions a bit more carefully, since they are as likely to help our enemies as to harm them.