Two Articles on CAS and COIN, from Armed Forces Journal.
"Updating Close Air Support," by LT. COL PAUL DARLING AND LT. JUSTIN LAWLOR.
Quote:
When Army Gen. Stanley McChrystal took command of Afghanistan, one of his first orders severely restricted the use of fixed-wing strike assets in support of combat operations. The newly appointed commander of the International Security Assistance Force, Gen. David Petraeus, has been reluctant to change the order.
The order received much criticism, with many complaining that restricting strike assets posed too great a danger to soldiers on the ground. The order, however, reflected an unspoken reality, namely that the doctrine, structure and airframes currently used for close-air support (CAS) are fundamentally flawed and are an expensive and ineffective framework for counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. Our current CAS structure is hampering our mission in Afghanistan and reflects a reversal of lessons learned not only by U.S. forces in Vietnam but also by countries around the world engaged in COIN for the past 40 years.
How did we get to the point where the one area where we have unquestioned dominance is deliberately neutered to the point of irrelevance? It wasn’t easy, but fixing it can be. We can not only dominate the air, but effectively use it to our advantage as long as the military acknowledges our current failures, uses an analysis of our successful past and encourages an effort by all service branches to adjust to a post-Cold War environment. We can fight better, cheaper and more effectively only when we understand where we are and from where we came.
"Reality Check," by MAJ. AARON W. CLARK AND LT. COL. J. BRAD REEVES.
Quote:
Misperceptions about close-air support (CAS) continue to plague the relationship between ground and air forces. CAS is a mission area where myth and reality often coexist.
The article by Lt. Col. Paul Darling and Lt. Justin Lawlor is a striking example of this mix. The authors claim that CAS doctrine and operational practices have not evolved sufficiently to meet today’s needs, especially in Afghanistan. Their assertion is unsupportable, and the mischaracterizations in the article do a disservice to the coalition forces putting their lives on the line every day using these highly evolved procedures. Contrary to points made in the article, joint CAS doctrine has changed dramatically since the Cold War, and especially since the first operations in Afghanistan in 2001. Command and control structures, tactics and systems have all undergone major adaptations that were either misrepresented or missed entirely in the article, leading to flawed prescriptions. We intend to set the record straight.
The "counterpoint" is hopeless, but I thought that it served as a useful illustration of the points that LTC Darling and Lt. Lawlor made.
I have no problem with the bulk of your comments
and agree that the Darling-Lawlor article is quite parochial and has some flaws while the Clark-Reeves article is not "hopeless" IMO (and I'm unsure why it was so tagged...). I further agree the Army can get rather dumb on the subject of CAS. However, in defense of that Army attitude you note, I would submit three points for your consideration.
- The strong USAF push for centralized control of ALL air in a theater. Yes, that's a Viet Nam legacy and Momyer didn't do the AF any favors but Horner also tried to do it Desert Shield / Desert Storm and Dave Deptula has his ideas (and not just on UAV control or ownership). While the underlying logic is understood and accepted, it is but one approach and needs can vary by theater and war. While the single manager idea is efficient, it may not always be the most effective employment and the very significant downside is that a message of an excessive control fetish is sent...
- The USAF has -- deserved or not -- a reputation as an organization (with acknowledgement that there are individuals and units that do not subscribe to the organizational models) for being excessively safety conscious, avoiding extreme low level CAS (pods not withstanding; the issue is attitude, not altitude... :wry:) and generally not favoring CAS as important to the service. This translates into a perception that it is as a mission not given adequate priority. Clark and Reeves address that issue and acknowledge the USAF could do more to eliminate that perception. Their comment about AGOS (I thought it was now JAGOG :confused:) is noted but that does not affect the vast majority of Army people who do not go to Nellis or the clones at Ramstein and Sill.
Part of the problem is shown here:
Quote:
Air Force Doctrine: Air Force Manual 1-1, Mar 92, Volume 1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force, outlines the Air Force's framework for understanding how to apply CAS. Understanding the Air Force doctrine will greatly enhance our CAS operations. This doctrine states: "Close air support is the application of aerospace forces in support of the land component commander's objectives.... Close air support produces the most focused and briefest effects of any force application mission; consequently, close air support rarely creates campaign-level effects. Although close air support is the least efficient application of aerospace forces, at times, it may be the most critical by ensuring the success and survival of surface forces. " (emphasis added /kw)
My emphasis is to illustrate that, as we know, people tend to take away from the written word exactly what they wish to take away. The psychological impact of those words is beyond this non-psychologist but I bet it does little good for USAF internal 'support' of CAS...
- This attitude of distrust of the USAF by the Army is a result of the two foregoing items and is further evinced by the fact that the USAF did over several years for various reasons related to AF funding priorities attempt to get rid of the A-10. That bird was designed and optimized for CAS, it does it better than any other (with the possible exception of the SU-25) and it has the GAU-8 which makes the M61 truly look like the minigun you erroneously called it ( ;) -- sorry 'bout that, too good to pass up... ). Recent improvements to make A-10Cs a bird to be reckoned with but it is a fact that many fighter jocks originally (and allegedly still) vociferously objected to flying the 'mud mover' and that had Desert Storm not come along, the USAF probably would have gotten rid of all of them. Though the 95+ % OR rate did look good to Congress. :D
The issue is that the USAF had a dedicated CAS bird, that the service wanted to discard it and the perception thus arose that they wished to second rate the mission. To say that an F-16 can do the job of an A-10 'as well or better' simply does not pass the basic credibility test and the USAF lost cred in the process over the years.
None of this intended as AF bashing -- I'm a Grunt who supports and has a vague understanding of air dominance (or air superiority...) and appreciation for the fact that in several wars, I got strafed and bombed only very seldom and a long time ago. Rather it is intended to illustrate that much the nominal "outright hatred many in the Army seem to feel towards the USAF" has a basis in demonstrated or perceived USAF attitudes and parochiality as well as in Army parochiality and stupidity [NOTE to Army persons: I use the word "stupidity" advisedly because parochiality is stupid; unwillingness to use the skills and knowledges of others to enhance ones own capability is stupid and the US Army is king of the 'not invented by me' syndrome].
Ignorance plays a strong role on both sides...
Thoughts from a CAS Pilot
A friend of mine pointed me to this thread of comments with respect to CAS in Afghanistan. I have read and re-read this group of comments, and decided, probably unwisely, to add my own. I flew close air support for most of my 25+ years in the AF, and no one knows better than my Hog brothers and I that this was not THE AF mission. Having said that, the AF has come along way in the last several years. I would sumbit that the AF has moved towards the Army more than the Army has moved towards the AF.
With respect to the threads, I agree that the Darling article was trying to point out issues with CAS, and suggest the LAAR as a solution. However, many of the facts in the article are clearly wrong. Calling a rebuttal of the incorrect facts "hopeless", is something that I would expect to see at the UN with the Iranian President speaking, and not here on a blog where we hopefully deal in facts not emotion. CAS doctrine, TTP, manning, communications, weapons, and equippment have all changed since drastically since the cold war--for the better! The lack of change was the premiss for the Darling article. If the LAAR is a solution, then supporting it with the correct facts is the way to get it.
I value LtCol Darling's opinion, however, I suspect he was not a MVR Cdr, or he would have had a TACP available at least down to BN level. If he was part of a PRT or other non maneuver unit, then he would not have had a TACP. This is the wide area security issue the Army is struggling with right now. Right or wrong, the AF agreed to functionally align TACPs and JTACs with the units the Army asked them to--the manuever units. The Joint Force is making an effort to make more Joint Fires available to Army units at lower echelons, but this remains an issue, especially for units that do not technically own AOs as per Army doctrine. Since 2005 the intent has been to train JFOs to pick up the slack for the units that do not have TACPs.
The idea that 2000 JFOs is not that important when there were zero JFOs six years ago, may be part of the problem. A collective effort by the insitutional Army and Air Force created this new joint capability from scratch. Unfortunately JFO usage has been inconsistant across the force as this new capability hit the theater. If the deployed Army believes the JFOs are not important, then they will not be employed.
As for the LAAR, it has the potential to be part of the solution, just like JFO, TACP-CASS, Rover, Predator, Reaper, PSS-SOF, and training more Army youngsters in CAS without a Qualified JTAC.
I will be the first to say the AF needs to conitinue to focus on supporting the Army, particularly in AFG. Having flown A-10s in combat, including operation Anaconda, I have also seen first hand how these journal wars distort what happens in the AO. I have yet to meet a soldier who was on the floor of the Sha-E-Kot who has a negative thing to say about the A-10 performance during Anaconda (to my face), yet in the post event journal wars the AF was risk averse, would not go below 10K, etc. If the AF guys have thin skin about incorrect facts in journals, it is not without precidence.
I read Ken White's post with interest. Ken has obvisouly been around the block and I agreed with most of what he said. He was correct when he pointed out that cold war CAS doctrine stated that CAS was the least efficient use of airpower. In a target rich environment with thousands of enemy tanks, it made sense to presume that CAS would slow down the targetting process used in the classic AirLand Battle Doctrine because each flight would have to get a nine-line and clearance. When compared to an interdiction mission focused on massed enemy forces, CAS was probably less efficient.
Personally, I never liked the way that sounded because it gave the impression that it was a math problem and not a mission to save soldiers on the ground. In any case, when the fixed piece battles of the Cold War went away AF doctrine changed. Since 2003 AIr Force Doctrine Document (AFDD (1)) says this.
Quote:
"CAS can provide a tremendous tactical advantage when supporting
ground forces. Although in isolation it rarely achieves campaign-level
objectives, at times it may be the more critical mission due to its contribution
to campaign objectives. CAS should be planned to prepare the conditions
for success or reinforce successful attacks of surface forces. CAS can
halt attacks, help create breakthroughs, cover retreats, and guard flanks.
To be most effective, however, CAS should be used at decisive points in a
battle and should normally be massed to apply concentrated combat power
and saturate defenses." (AFDD 1, 17 Nov 2003, p 45)
If the AF Doctrine of 1992 is still driving the Army perception of the service, then the AF does not have a CAS problem, but a PR issue.
I suspect that my thoughts will not change the negative opinion's of those who have made up their minds about the AF, CAS, and the percieved lack of support to the Army. For those who are undecided, know that there are thousands of airmen who train hard every day with the sole purpose of supporting our brothers in the Army.
El Cid, thanks for the post and the doctrinal update.
Good to know the change in wording occurred. As you say, at the time the item I quoted was written, it made sense. While logically agreeing with its premise, my fear was that it, like a lot of 'doctrine,' could be misinterpreted or misused.
FWIW, One of my sons just finished his recent fourth tour in his second war as a leader of Grunts and he has nothing but high praise for the AF, JTACs and JFOs -- and he is particularly in love with the Hog, says it is hands down the bird most appreciated and is tied with or ahead of the Apache in the eyes of most. He puts the British Harriers way up there as well but goes to great lengths to say they all do good work. :cool:
I like to remind people that both Iraq and Afghanistan are relatively benign combat environments, that air superiority is really, really, nice -- but is emphatically not guaranteed. In a major war against a near peer opponent folks are likely to notice different things and have a quite different attitude. :wry:
Great catch this:
Quote:
I value LtCol Darling's opinion, however, I suspect he was not a MVR Cdr, or he would have had a TACP available at least down to BN level.
I missed that -- but then, I'm old. I did read the blurb on the AFJ Article:""Lt. Col Paul Darling is an infantry officer serving with the Alaska Army National Guard. He recently served as the provincial lead mentor with the Afghan National Police in Zabul, Afghanistan"" but had forgotten it when I read of the lack of FAC prob... :D
I think you're probably correct that the bulk of the USAF has moved closer to the Army while the far larger Army has not reciprocated too well; part of that problem is, IMO, unrealistic expectations (and lack of knowledge...) about what air can and cannot do. That is IMO the Army's fault. Sometimes being the biggest kid on the block means you tend to ignore all the other kids. That's usually not smart. :rolleyes:
The aforementioned Son, BTW has called in and successfully employed USAF/USN CAS without a FAC, JTAC or JFO. As have I. What is written is not what is war...
South Africa companies developing the Ahrlac
While not directly related to our DoD pursuit of a "COIN" a/c capability, this fella looked interesting: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000...143821174.html
Quote:
Two South African companies are attempting to elbow their way into the global defense market with an unusual new aircraft developed on home soil.
Paramount Group and Aerosud Holdings Ltd. on Tuesday will unveil the Ahrlac, a compact plane that they say merges the capabilities of a drone, an attack helicopter and surveillance aircraft.
"There's nothing like it in the marketplace," says Paul Potgieter, managing director of closely held Aerosud.
The Ahrlac—short for Advanced High Performance Reconnaissance Light Aircraft—aims to fill a niche left by less-versatile and more-expensive rivals. Most countries on the continent rely on modified cargo planes or turboprop fighters for surveillance work, but the Ahrlac is a multipurpose alternative that's marketed for perform military and civilian reconnaissance. It will cater to African governments involved in combat, peacekeeping and humanitarian work, he says.
http://si.wsj.net/public/resources/i...0926174210.jpg
More at the link.
Light Strike Aircraft - Question de Jour
Given that the US DoD is currently undergoing death by a thousand cuts and also given that the USAF has just announced a $355 million contract for the Afghan Air force Light Strike aircraft to the Super Tucano, (http://www.defense.gov/Contracts/Con...ontractID=4695) what are the chances that the USAF would cancel said contract if ISAF (NATO++++) passed around the hat to fund another aircraft of the same gendre, with adequate supply chain and training support? Let’s face it, this will probably blow out to 0.5billion, which is not an insubstantial amount in the current climate? I note also that Hawker-Beechcraft is challenging this contract as it's AT6 lost out, will that stall the procurement in anyway? ( http://www.flightglobal.com/news/art...-6-bid-365163/ )
an OA-X for effective and efficient CAS
Latest issue of Armed Forces Journal has an interesting article on CAS and logistics by COL Michael Pietrucha. [ http://armedforcesjournal.com/2012/02/8792325 ]
1 Attachment(s)
A COIN proposal using a turbo prop in pusher configuration
The Stavatti proposal got my thinking cap going and I propose the aircraft The structure is graphite/kevlar/spectra composite. The armour is a spectra compressed UHMW/carbide composite rated for 50 cal at 200 m
The gun and 70mm rockets are laser targeted. Brimstone is fire and forget. Pars 3 LR can target both tanks and helos. Maverick is for targeting fortified positions, bridges and other targets requiring the larger warhead.
The regimen is to attack ground targets from 1500-5000 m, which is beyond the range of most ground fire.
The plane's cockpit, electrical and piping conduits, and engine are armoured. Fuel tanks are self sealing.
The plane uses the APS-30 recoil operated gun. Mags are in the fuselage, guns in the wing root fairings.
Engine drives a contra rotating prop 10 ft dia.
Wings have slats and two component fowler flaps. Airfoil is a NASA natural laminar flow airfoil as developed by Hitachi for their business jet offering. This combo develops a lift coefficient of 4 at 20 degrees angle of attack.
Plane is designed to take off at 60 knots at Max Gross and land at 40 knots, light.
Plane is meant to use 30X113 gun ammo, 70 mm rockets, as commonly used by helos, with the addition of Brimstone, Pars, and Maverick, to
permit use as a Front Line aircraft attached at brigade level, operating just behind the artillery positions.
shown in the attached Jpegs.
The stats are as follows (lb):
___________________Take Off__________Landing
Fuel------------------------------3,854.4____________771
Engine---PW 127G------------1150____________1150
Airframe_____________2000 ___________2000
Armour___________ ___2000 ____________2000
2 - ASP-30 suto cannon____228.80___________229
30mm 600 rds __________590.75___________ _59.
38 - 70mm AIPKWS _____1330______________ 0
6 - Brimstone missile______642______________0
2 - AIM 9X______________376 _____________0
6 - Pars 3 LR____________660______________0
2 - AGM 65 Maverick_____1090____________0
Pilot _________________ 200_____________200
Ejection Seat ___________120 _____________120
_____________________14,242__________ 6,526
PW 127G TurboProp HP 2920 MTOW 14250
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Aspects of the proposed COIN aircraft.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
carl
Goprisko:
I have a few questions.
Will the pusher propeller really work out? I can't think of a single aircraft design with a single pusher propeller that was truly successful except some sport designs. I read that an insurmountable disadvantage is that the prop has to operate in constantly disturbed air. Are the advantages of that configuration really worth it?
Will a laminar flow airfoil be work if the aircraft is going to be operating at low levels? In North America in the summer the leading edge will be fouled, horribly fouled, by smashed bugs, sometimes in just a few minutes.
Why just one seat, why not two? Perhaps an aircraft like this would be used for simply scouting out areas as much as anything else. Two pairs of eyes are a lot better for that.
All that being said, it would great from just an intellectual point of view to see something like this built. I get tired of reading about the latest delay in the F-35.
To improve airflow into the propellor please note that only the rudder lies ahead of it, the stabilizer is above it, and the wing is well ahead of it. Ever hear
of the B-36? Had 6 pusher propellors. Was the largest aircraft fully operational, the largest was the Spruce Goose.
The prop proposed is a contra-rotating one 10 ft in diameter with a 6 blade prop ahead of a 5 blade one, to minimize vibration.
Pusher propellors are actually more efficient than tractor propellors, and this one is operating behind a fuselage that is extremely fair and has minimal cross section.
The NASA natural laminar flow airfoil proposed was thoroughly investigated by Hitachi at speeds from 80-600 knots and at reynolds numbers from 3 million up. so yes it will operate effectively at low altitudes and at speeds between 40-500 knots.
Please also note that unlike the Stavatti Proposal, MTOW is held to no more than 5 X HP or 12,900 lbs. This provides the sort of performance inherent in the Thunder Mustang, with an engine that does not suffer from performance losses with altitude, the PW127G
One seat vs two, to keep MTOW low, with the pilot using a heads up display, in a fully automated airplane. Remember, that this cockpit is armoured against 50 cal so this pilot adds nearly 1500 lbs to MTOW when armour, ejection seat, oxygen system, and pilot are included.
Composite construction provides an extremely smooth, low drag skin, contributing greatly to performance.
The intended use of this aircraft is attack and destruction of ground targets found by the pilot, identified by a CAS observer elsewhere, or identified by ground forces. To do this job, this aircraft must have direct radio communication with friendly forces below, direct communication with whoever is supplying CAS, whether a L-19 bird dog, an officer attached to ground forces, or another aircraft, and direct communication with G-2(intelligence) at battalion or regimental level, (whomever this plane is attached to.
To minimize friendly fire incidents, this aircraft uses a combination of high definition RADAR and laser target designation, virtually identical to that used by attack helos.
However, the maintenance effort necessary to keep this aircraft operating is a fraction of that needed to maintain a helo,
Please also note that low level operations, in helos are no longer performed due to the prohibitive amount of maintenance necessary to repair ground fire, and airframe damage, from evasive maneuvering.
To fulfill it's role, this aircraft is not part of the airforce. If a Marine Aircraft, it is attached to an expeditionary force commander, if an Army Aircraft, it is attached to Brigade or a Batallion Commander, and those commanders organize logistics for it, prepare bases for it, and provide ground personnel to service and arm it.
The airforce provides air supremacy via aircraft such as the F-16/F15 at altitudes above 10,000 ft..
The airforce conducts strategic bombing campaigns against infrastructure, behind enemy lines, it no longer conducts bombing runs at the tactical level.
This change will incorporate the lessons learned from the WWII performance of the RAF in France following the Normandy Invasion.
Like the USAF, the RAF focused development on air superiority aircraft, and refused to support the design and implementation of a purpose built ground attack aircraft.
In counterpoint, the US Army Aircorps produced several competing ground attack designs, the most successful of which was the P-47 Thunderbolt, and it was the US Army which broke out first from the Normandy Beach head, despite inferior tanks, and less field experience fighting the Germans.
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3 Attachment(s)
Douglas XP-42 vs Proposal
Please compare the Douglas XP-42 to the proposal. Note several important
differences, as follows:
1. The proposal's propellor circle lies above the bottom of the fuselage, while that of the XP-42 extends 20% below the bottom of the fuselage.
2. The propellor of the proposal is much closer to the trailing edge of the
wing than that in the XP-42/
3. The distance between the aft landing gear and the propellor is much shorter in the proposal than in the XP-42.
4. The departure angle from the main gear to the prop is much greater in the proposal than in either the Stavatti SM-27 or the XP*42, 20 degrees in
fact, to permit landings at high angles of attack
5. The ventral rudder is fixed, for yaw stability only, and is there to protect the prop in the event of high angle of incidence landings.
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The SM-28 COIN proposal...`
Further enquiry into the aerodynamics of fighter aircraft brings up significant changes needed.
1. the Ogive nose shown, can and should be shortened, as it is a supersonic nose, and this aircraft will not exceed 0.7 Mach.
2. Work at Northrop on the F-20 program showed that the nose should be
elliptical with the major(long), axis being horizontal. to improve directional stability and reduce the size of vertical stabilizer needed.
3. The SAAB Viggen showed that the canard eliminated down forces from the horizontal stabilizer, improving lift at all speeds by 10%, so the proposal should have the rear stab deleted to minimize drag.
4. Work on various projects has shown that roll control can be effected by using the rudder and canard in concert, provided the Canard is "flying" that is fully rotatable, and provided the two sides can be rotated together in the same direction, or in opposite directions, as directed by the flight comnputer. This means the ailerons can be dispensed with, infavor of spoilers, and the entire leading edge of the wing given over to a slot, and the entire trailing edge given over to fowler two component flaps. This would greatly improve short field performance.
5. The gun placement shown, is a vast improvement over that on the A-10, given a much simpler mechanism, a rate of fire nearly equal that of the M230 chain gun, due to no spin up time, and mounting of two cannon means 1 second bursts of 16 rounds, vs the A-10's 30. Gun placement so the magazine is on the centerline, above the wing, means improved protection from ground fire, no CG changes consequential to gun use, and simplified reloading.
6. The dorsal inlet for the PW 126 G eliminates FOD and was proved on the UK test aircraft nearly 50 years ago.
7. A nearly 6' long landing gear leg on all gear provides improved ground clearance to enable rough field operations, and the wider stance of the revised main gear placement, provides great cross wind handling during landings. This coupled with a low landing speed of 40 knots empty, means cross runway landings, similar to those routinely performed by twin otters, will be the norm, and thus cross wind landings are un-necessary.
8. Carriage of rockets,missiles, and bombs externally, means simplified armouring, simplified launching of ordinance.
9. Location of external stores hardpoints so as to eliminate CG changes during release of weapons, simplifies design of the rudder and canard, eliminates yaw due to firing, and reduces pilot workload.
10. I am seriously looking into changing the rudder into two rudders canted 40 degrees, to reduce RADAR signature, improve roll control using the rudder, and reduce drag, via elimination of the aft norizontal stabilizer.
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Bull in a China Shop? Attack Aviation and the COIN Battlefield
Bull in a China Shop? Attack Aviation and the COIN Battlefield
Entry Excerpt:
--------
Read the full post and make any comments at the SWJ Blog.
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.
Coin Aircraft Flight Envelopes
Quote:
Originally Posted by
luckyroll
I'm guessing you like the Thunderbolt 2. The problem with the T-bolt 2 is that it has no turning radius= very poor manuverability compared to prop craft and can only hold a slow pattern for a few seconds before you have to dip back into the engines and give the stick a little tug. Atleast this is what my sisters boyfriend tells me. He flies Hornets in the Corps, but was a Hog (t-bolt 2) pilot before that.
He also said that at those low speeds it was insanely rough and that hard jolting would sometimes cause the 30mm to jam. He said the feel is similar to flying a commercial jet at very low speeds and altitudes. But, he said it almost impossible to tear it apart with heavy fire, or, anything else for that matter( thanks to carbon fibre covered ceramic spawl plates). He said he's seen many of them get hit with SAM's in the stubs and still land. He said he has even belly landed one and it was back up and flying a few days later... didn't hurt it at all. That says ALOT for any jet powered craft. In that aspect that plane lives up to it's namesake.
I like'em alot! Probably my favorite jet pack, but the not turning thing would make me sick. But, it is a flying tank and is designed to do exactly what it does, included in that is the fact that it has little manuverability. That is so you don't overshoot or, have to dip to keep your point of aim on a target when your coming in on top of it. This is what I'm told about that aircraft and it seems to make sense. He even said that turboprop "bug bashers" are better for serving alot of the roles that the A-10 serves and more. I called and asked him just to see what he said, but, this is only one opinion of one pilot. But, aside from the fact that you can't hardly take an A-10 down, I think a turboprop is just as good in it's own right.
But the idea of recip engine "horse fly" planes was a little silly now that I think about it in terms of the US armed forces. Where in the hell would they get AvGas and why would they want to deal with that?! Although to me it still makes sense for the private sec.
Cliff and others seem married to the above aircraft. I'm not. I think that modern computerized flight characterization programs can assist the design of a STOL, turbo-prop COIN aircraft with flight characteristics superior to the A-10. My submission is one such aircraft.
A modern ground attack aircraft would take advantage of improvements in lightweight armour. Would simplify the gun system as I proposed. Would keep the hp to MTOW ratio at 5 or less to improve climb, shorten takeoff run, improve dash, and keep cruise in the 300-400 knot range.
A modern ground attack aircraft would use slats and compound full span fowler flaps to reduce landing speed (empty) to 40 knots, and takeoff speed to 60 knots at MTOW. Roll control would be via the canard, spoilers, and the elevator. Both a canard and elevator would be present to maximize maneuverability, including a very tight turning radius at combat speeds, which are expected to be 100-200 knots.
A bubble canopy with the pilot seated erect and high, so he can maintain situational awareness, which is armoured, is specified.
The engine and prop are aft to open the nose for refueling probe, LASER target designator, and RADAR target designator.
The gun is relocated from the chin to the wing root where the magazine is better protected from ground fire, and close to the CG so using ordinance does not change trim. Two recoil operated guns are specified to simplify maintenance, improve reliability, and maintain acceptable firing rate. Further the gun is no longer expected to KO tanks, the brimstone and Pars missiles deal with MBTs, while the gun deals with APCs, trucks, troop concentrations, and helos. 75mm Guided Rockets are in the inventory to deal with Light Tanks, pill boxes, and other suitable targets.
The emphasis is on precision targeting using LASER and RADAR for all weather capability.
The key components of the airframe and cockpit are armoured to improve survivability.
MTOW is kept at 15,000 # max at 3000 Hp.
Landing Gear legs are long to provide ground clearance essential for fast re-arming between missions, and at a forward base.
30X113 ammo is specified for the gun because that ammo is used by other batallion level aircraft, (helos), and because recoil is much less.
In short, the A-10 has proved itself a very useful aircraft, as did the AD1 Skyraider, the P-47 thunderbolt, and the F6F Wildcat. But time moves on, advances in technologies have been made, and it is time to field a successor.
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Air Power in Small Wars: three new sources
Hat tip to a "lurker" for three previously unknown resources on air power, which will add to the large thread 'Aviation in COIN (merged thread)'. Two from the RAF and one by an academic with their support.
Two from the RAF Historical Branch, first 'The RAF, Small Wars and Insurgencies in the Middle East 1918-1939', pub. 2011, 100 pgs. The focus is on 'Air Control':http://airpowerstudies.co.uk/sitebui...OINBooklet.pdf
Then 'The RAF, Small Wars and Insurgencies: Later Colonial Operations, 1945-1975', pub. 2011, 164 pgs:http://airpowerstudies.co.uk/sitebui...AFAHBCOIN2.pdf
Third is a 2009 edited volume 'Air Power, Insurgency and the War on Terror', with fourteen chapters, 155 pgs and covers several specific campaign threads here: Nicaragua, Yemen (Aden), Greece and the Soviets in Afghanistan. Note the editor has released it online:http://www.joelhayward.org/Hayward%2...0Book%20A5.pdf
Jet fuel comes at a price
Hat tip to WoTR for this article 'Logistical fratricide the cost of fast jet tacair measured in purple-hearts' and I think it fits here! Why? This is a clue:
Quote:
... the heavy use of fuel in Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom can be directly tied to casualties incurred by ground operations required to get the fuel to U.S. bases, particularly airbases.
Link:http://warontherocks.com/2016/11/log...purple-hearts/
Two interesting passages, which I don't recall spotting before:
Quote:
In Afghanistan, one U.S. serviceman or contract civilian was killed or wounded for every 24 sixteen-truck fuel convoys, and that number
was one per every 38.5 convoys in Iraq.
...between 2001 and 2010 a whopping 39 percent of the total
killed in action of U.K. uniformed personnel and contractors (over 190) was related to resupply efforts.
Back to Basics in New Mexico
Hat tip to WoTR for this fascinating article as the USAF holds an experiment with real 'Light Attack' aircraft, all commercially developed. One jet and three turbo-props. It ends with:
Quote:
It’s easy to demand programs that are faster, better, and cheaper — making those attributes real is problematic. Nevertheless, it is possible, and we are out to prove it. Experimentation is a sensible and cost-effective measure; expect to see more of it.
Link:https://warontherocks.com/2017/08/ba...riment-begins/
A-29 Super Tucano – A Force Multiplier in COIN
A-29 Super Tucano – A Force Multiplier in COIN
Entry Excerpt:
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Aviation in COIN (merged thread)
Props: Small Planes for Small Wars
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