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Originally Posted by
Red Rat
But the SF raised this issue themselves in 2002 which resulted in the raising of the SFSG. The SFSG are not SF, but operate in direct support of and under command of the SF.
Well I put it to you that when a given operation requires additional 'support' from non special forces then (in the context of Afghanistan) it ceases to be a 'special operation' commanded by the SAS (or what-have-you) and control should pass to the numerically predominant unit.
We finally got to this in operations into Zambia against dug-in conventionally trained ZIPRA units. Command passed to the unit which had supplied the most troops being the RLI and those SAS involved were under command. Now compare that to Op Barras where the A Coy 1 Para (120-140 men with attachments) made up the numbers with the 60 man SAS squadron. (Understandably because at the time there was virtually no combat experience in the Para company and the reported average age was 19)
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Which is what happens.
And with this we return to the problem of who other than the SAS to task for these ops. I have mentioned line infantry to illustrate a point but do acknowledge that there are two tiers involved here and that the Paras and the Royal Marines by virtue of their selection process place them at the head of the infantry list as first tier units being the obvious first choice for such tasks after the SAS (this said wondering why the SAS were considered for these non-recce and non-small team tasks in the first place).
I will say again (at the risk of touching a nerve) that the use of the SAS (special forces) to carry out otherwise pretty standard infantry raid operations is a barometer as to the declining operational ability of line infantry units in the British army. As long as the SAS are the only real option for these tasks it remains a poor reflection on the rest of the army.
Given that the Cold War period nonsense has been dropped from training (or should have been) I continue to wonder what these units do during the 18 months of 'real' soldiering between the 'distracting' tours in Afghanistan? Surely between guarding palaces and ceremonial duties and parades there is time to do some real training or is there no budget to fund anything other than merely going through the motions?
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No. Risk is not just risk to the soldiers carrying out the op, it is the impact of the op going right or wrong, the sensitivity of the operation, the sensitivity of the intelligence involved, the value of the target, the tempo of the operation and a multitude of other factors. Could other units do it if they had the competence arising from experience - quite possibly yes. But the other units are busy doing other things - not least of which is carrying out similar operations in size and complexity but against tactical level targets.
What ops are you talking about? Some the locally deployed units seem to be able to do themselves but others seem to need the SAS with 1 Para (SFSG) support.
We have turned full circle and back to unit operational capability and which units are capable of conducting certain types of operations. We get to another grey area now. A few years ago I suggested that for continuity purposes (for example) the Royal Marine Commandos (... note the word commando) be instructed to have a full strength commando (battalion) in Afghanistan (at all times) to be able to take on any commando type (specialized raiding tasks) as required. That's too simple a proposition and the Brits prefer to fiddle and fart around with short tours with long breaks with the subsequent serious negative operational outcomes.
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Rabbit hole alert. We've both decided to agree that short tours are bad in the context of this type of campaign, disagree in parts as to the vaidity for the rationale that got us to there (I agree on the charge of militarism, but few others), disagree in places on the impact of it and what can be done about it. :rolleyes:
Yes I know we can go on and on about this and I understand that for you to accept the catastrophic outcome of this approach on operational efficiency is difficult (to say the least) because that would indicate an acceptance that the Brit performance in Afghanistan has been sub-optimal (to say the least). Once again the ineptitude of Brit generals has been exposed and that I appreciate is humiliating and hard to bear.
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Hmm. Where is your evidence on this?
I'll show you mine, if you'll show me yours ;)
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In Helmand the evidence would tend to support the counter-proposition; the the Taleban are playing catch-up to ISAF at the tactical and operational level. They are heavily attrited, have comprehensively lost influence, lost control of ground, and their ability to prosecute successful attacks has declined markedly as well. We have now seen over 12 months of steady decline in violence in Helmand, no summer campaign season in the traditional sense and winter season which has seen ISAF move from consolidation to offence. Part of the reason that so few insurgents are being killed now is that there are far fewer of them left - attrition still plays a role in campaigning :D
No, the Taliban having absorbed the surge in troops into Helmand (from 9,500 to around 30,000) have reverted to type and are watching and planning and adapting (remember what Skeen wrote about them from experiences back then). When the 'poppy money' comes in this year being estimated at more than ever before they will be in a position to spend it wisely on operations producing the maximum psychological and propaganda effect (like the raid in Kabul and the Panjshir Valley attack). Remember they have the time.
Thanks to the surge and with pockets full of money (thanks to the acceptance of the Afghan drug trade as being beyond the ability of ISAF and hangers-on to control) the Taliban will have to learn to operate more cleverly and have pots of money to do just that. Good for them, not so good for Karzai and ISAF.
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Every corporal (section commander) will have 12 months operational experience, in Iraq or Afghanistan, every sergeant 24-36. In terms of frontline experience that is a level of experience comparable to the 8th Army in 1944 or the Chindits in 1945, or indeed 14th Army in early 1945 (by the end of the war experience levels had dropped considerably as the government insisted on releasing soldiers for UK leave if they had been away from the UK for 5 or more years - that gutted entire officer and SNCO cohorts). Again, where is the proof for the weakness in platoon operations?
Clutching at straws? I accept that having experienced NCOs in a platoon (with experienced officers at battalion level) looking after raw and inexperienced troops is way ahead of feeding in whole raw units into the field (read up on the Australian Forces on the Kokoda Track in New Guinea and the difference in performance between the 39th and 53rd battalions). I quote:
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“In August 1942 the 39th and 53rd Battalions of the Australian Militia, composed of 18 year old conscripts, collided with a Japanese brigade advancing south across Papua New Guinea’s Kokoda Trail. The 53rd battalion turned and ran. The 39th battalion, which a few weeks earlier had received an influx of experienced officers and NCO’s, stood its ground and over the next month fought the Japanese to a standstill. This action is regarded as a test in laboratory conditions of the impact of leadership on fighting performance.” - Serve to Lead
... so as I say having experienced NCOs is better than deploying the blind school (apologies to the PC police) but nowhere near what can be classed as a lean, mean, fighting machine which is quite frankly what the spin doctors at the MoD want the country and the world to believe is happening. Pretty sad really.
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As to jargon sorry. Many of the tasks done by the SF early on in Iraq were done because the field army lacked the training to do them, especially in the area of house assault. This was a standard skillset in the US Army but an SF skillset in the British Army (SF did it as it was regarded as a Counter-Terrorism skillset). Now, like the US Army, it is a basic skillset that we all do.
I wonder how many operational house assaults up to that point the SAS had done in combat up to that point? Or was it a case that the line-infantry had merely just gone through the motions during FIBUA (fighting in built up areas) training? And that out of the whole British Army at that time only a few hundred soldiers were considered capable of carrying out a house assault? So what, it should be asked, filled the year of these units if basic FIBUA training was not covered? I need to dig out my copy of the Brit Infantry Platoon in Battle and refresh myself on what is contained therein. I ask myself how long it would take to take sections through FIBUA house clearing training. Dangerous work, yes, rocket science, no.
What else I wonder (of what I would consider to be basic soldiering skills) are not being covered these days in section and platoon training? In my own experience because of constant operations we battled to find the time required for training in aspects we did not do everyday. With 18 months between tours the Brit Army has no excuses.
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But what are the SF doing that the line units aren't? In types of operation there is no difference that I can see.
Then why are the SAS still doing those types of operations?