The Chinese were swarming in Korea in 1950 and 51...
A lot of folks have swarmed over the years. That article is not on the cutting edge of anything as a lot of folks pointed out above...
NOTE: Thread merged to preclude redundancy.
Obviously you're confusing
'recognizing an old tactic being used currently as something that should not be a surprise...' with 'Failure to recognize a tactic.'
The two are not the same thing. :eek:
You might also search the Threads here before criticizing. John Robb and Arquila, swarming and open source warfare, generational warfare or not, have all been cussed and discussed here a good many times over the last few years. Nothing you have posted to date is particularly revelatory or new to most here. It's not that we aren't aware, it is simply that we don't agree. That should be acceptable. :cool:
Well if we were to actually treat this as a theory being discussed
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Fuchs
The irritating thing about swarms is the manoeuvre à priori approach instead of manoeuvre à posteriori. This simply doesn't fit well to a new tactical fashion.
Why are swarms supposed to attack from multiple directions at once, again and again?
This adds predictability, synchronization challenges (high demand for communication) and includes multiple attacks on strong points (instead of only weak spots).
It made sense with sub wolfpacks, but it doesn't in general.
Why not all-round probing coupled with exploitation of opportunities instead? Too slow?
IMH Unedumacated Opine ion
Simplest answer to that is sorta what Ken said earlier in this thread in response to one of my posts
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Ken White
That's not to say that swarms won't work, just that the fates must be kind and the reliability of effective action is unlikely to be adequate to satisfy most commanders or politicians -- the human factor (on the part of the Swarmers, the Swarmees and their respective bosses... ).
Ill add to that that to me the probing you speak of vs. swarming in at least the full blown do it right kinda thing would be like the difference in a blind man finding the cracks through touch vs someone with sight seeking the signs of weathering which might lead to cracks.
Both very well could find,fix,and finish the key would be how to recognize which one you were doing and when.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Fuchs
Btw. I still don't think that swarming theory is nothing new. The stuff has been done at times, but swarming is NOT covered by orthodox military theory. Even corps-level military theory is at most about relatively few units/formations converging - and march divided, fight united isn't a good enough match. Even the termination of pockets is no good match.
There's nothing wrong with developing some new military theories even if there's almost no historical example. It's a good idea to develop theory first before testing something in practice. The mere thought about a new theory is a worthy exercise in a time of very outdated or very limited full out modern war experiences.
On the other hand I wouldn't call every terrorist attack with more than one strike in a time window of a few minutes "swarming".
The nothing new is true; however there is the context that no one ever has been where and in the circumstances of what they are now.(not exactly:D)
I might however be so bold as to suggest that a certain form of swarming in a somewhat germane to the discussion form has been seen recently in some of natures big blows.
Try comparing those oranges and pears
(Disasters / Wars)(recovery/response/prosecution,etc)
Consider the sources' (AKA authors') background
It may give one pause (not meant as an ad hominem).
NPS Vita information on Arquilla is here and very limited data for Ronfeldt at Rand is here.
Jan Breytenbach interview
From Firn's post (No.126)
Quote:
Jan Breytenbach has a number of interesting reviews of many actions and operations of the border war. He gives some good insight why units like the 32. Batallion were so successful in the smaller, guerilla and larger, more conventional phases of the war.
Firn found a lengthy interview in German alas in the Austrian Defence Forces publication: http://www.bmlv.gv.at/pdf_pool/omz/oemz2009_01.pdf
Whilst the main website has the option for an English version finding the publication in English eluded me: http://www.bmlv.gv.at
Jan Breytenbach's book on 32 Batt. has appeared before on SWC in late 2009:
'They Live By The Sword: 32 'Buffalo' Battalion - South Africa's Foreign Legion' by Col. Jan Breytenbach (Pub. Lemur 1990). A unit formed in 1975 from black Angolans, with South African (white) officers and NCOs. Formidable reputation as mainly COIN fighters and suggested as a non-US / non-Western example. Note Eben Barlow (Executive Outcomes) was an officer in them.
Few copies about if Amazon is correct: http://www.amazon.com/They-live-swor...9129763&sr=1-1 . Republished in 2003 as The Buffalo Soldiers: The Story of South Africa's 32 Battalion 1975-1993.
The unit's website; http://www.32battalion.net/index.htm
New Rules of War with Hanson & Arquilla
Uncommon Knowledge
Part 1
Part 2
Part 3
Part 4
Part 5
Foreign Policy: The New Rules of War
The visionary who first saw the age of "netwar" coming warns that the U.S. military is getting it wrong all over again. Here's his plan to make conflict cheaper, smaller, and smarter.
JOHN ARQUILLA
MARCH/APRIL 2010
Quote:
Every day, the U.S. military spends $1.75 billion, much of it on big ships, big guns, and big battalions that are not only not needed to win the wars of the present, but are sure to be the wrong approach to waging the wars of the future..........(Snip)
Swarming? Fuhgedaboutit...
... at least if you’re a well trained Aussie. Apart from the colloquial use of the term swarm (as opposed to the conceptual status it has acquired in the hands of some) the following comments may be of interest from “Taking Tactics From The Taliban: Tactical Principles For Commanders” from the Australian Army Journal, Vol. 6, No. 1, Autumn, 2009 ...
Quote:
The ‘swarm’ is the Taliban offensive tactic [my emphasis], usually employed against dismounted elements in the ‘green zone’ that remain static for too long (two to three hours) and defensive positions such as overwatch and patrol bases. Some warning of a swarm is often—but not always—provided by the exodus of local Afghans from the area some ten to twenty minutes prior to the attack and an increase in intelligence warning of an offensive. During a swarm, Taliban fighters will manoeuvre on two to four flanks using fire teams of three to six men armed with medium machine-guns and RPGs who attack simultaneously. This was a tactic with which CT Spear became very familiar and tactically equipped to confront. I developed my seventh tactical principle as a response to the Taliban fire pocket and swarm: dismounted patrols must always operate within mortar range.
CT Spear countered the Taliban’s major tactics with carefully planned tactics of its own. The team defeated the fire pocket by fighting into one side while suppressing the other firing points and then rolling them up from the flank. The Taliban fighters would occasionally withdraw to alternate firing points as the team advanced and the commander would then decide how far he wanted to pursue them given his existing boundaries and task.
The team used the same tactic to counter the swarm, although a platoon was unlikely to be able to handle a larger force on its own and such a confrontation would usually turn into a fully-fledged combat team engagement. The element in contact would go into, or remain in, all round defence and allow its JTAC or JFO to call in indirect fire and close air support to buy time for the combat team commander to manoeuvre his cavalry and infantry to support. My eighth and ninth principles supported this and carried the necessary corollaries: any force must contain at least three elements that can support one another while patrolling deep in the ‘greenzone’.
Dismounted sections must operate within 500 metres of one another and platoons within 1000 metres of one another, particularly if they are operating away from the protection of overwatch. Use of this tactic facilitated rapid offensive manoeuvre in support of an element in contact. In essence, we aimed to ‘swarm the swarm’ [my emphasis], in keeping with my tenth principle: fight the most likely course of action, but be postured for the most dangerous.(culled from pp.31-38)