Remove the man from office ASAP.
He's either lying to the public or an idiot who falls into the sunk costs fallacy in one of the worst topics imaginable for this classic mistake.
He's...
Type: Posts; User: Fuchs; Keyword(s):
Remove the man from office ASAP.
He's either lying to the public or an idiot who falls into the sunk costs fallacy in one of the worst topics imaginable for this classic mistake.
He's...
Let me contribute a (radio) chat-related thought:
German soldiers appeared rather ill-disciplined to West Allies in 1944 because of their constant yelling and chatting in combat.
It turned out...
Such a clearly incorrect description should not be used lightly.
They have a 19th century culture and partially late 20th century equipment.
Construction costs are one thing, maintenance and security costs another thing.
A tough winter can destroy a road, as can explosives. How many police stations and policemen are necessary to at least...
Many soldiers cannot locate the origin of single shots accurately because the hearing is not trained to interpret sonic booms properly. That's afaik why such sniper detection systems were in fashion...
I thought about press coverage, public/published opinion and such things for a while and the competence gap is really a problem because much can be misinterpreted (especially with pessimism).
On...
"ds"?
The Brits are in an alliance that covers many different terrains.
Many nations are not in alliances, and don't have much tank-friendly terrain.
Peru, for example.
The point was that his...
This depends on terrain, some nations cannot make good enough use of combined arms formations to justify their costs.
The French seem to have a good Africa interventions track record after they were done losing wars of independence in their colonies.
My guess:
Chinooks - not enough helos
Apaches - not enough crews
Let's call is a minor or limited victory; it was neither decisive nor total except in its defence of the status quo ante.
Can you elaborate on this?
A competent army is expected to be able to do that in a matter of an hour or two in mobile warfare.
Strange.
I was under the impression that the shadow governors of the Taleban had a core of loyal fighters in every season in order to deal with political opposition - and as bodyguards.
The mere...
I read it only superficially, but it seems as if the real topic is slow learning and arrogance - cultural defects, not tactical details.
I might be able to give some food for thought here:
...
You're getting creepy.
He simply seems to imply that the path to a changed behaviour of the military is to change the training.
Don Vandergriff is a relevant author in this context.
The problem here is that changes in...
It's more than that. There's likely a big turn in the marginal rate of return for additional occupation efforts.
In other words; you won't be able to achieve much more even with great ressources...
The tactical level is being overestimated.
Problems on the tactical level are embarrassing, but rarely decisive for the strategic level - and I'm quite sure that none of the tactical...
This sounds a bit like the AWG and also a bit like an idea of mine for fighting micromanagement.
That's the difference between the potential and the remaining repertoire. Sure, they could man lines, dig their own outposts, set up guns at valley entries, man permanent checkpoints, siege and storm...
I can tell you what's not working: Peace. It's war, therefore the casualties.
The qualitative, quantitative and material superiority of the Western forces is so great that the repertoire of their...
Come on, everything is complex. Ask neuroscientists. :D
Said recce by fire can at times be quite amusing. It was used early on to fool Leclerc Plts, for example. Their protection system popped...
We don't know how much cultural empathy was in play in the early invasions.
The need to adapt to local culture and win over locals is not something that officials from a high civilization in...