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Thread: Crimes, War Crimes and the War on Terror

  1. #541
    Council Member davidbfpo's Avatar
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    Default Control Orders to go?

    The new UK government appears torn over whether to keep this option, which is effectively house arrest, albeit of varying intensity, e.g. no GPS capable tags. In opposition the Lib-Dems were against, plus several prominent Tories; this article is a good insight into the issue:http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisf...terrorism-laws

    A different columnist, from a conservative viewpoint, within a longer article adds his view:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/c...r-enemies.html

    Currently the UK has:
    only nine people are currently under them
    and seven have absconded abroad whilst under 'control'.
    davidbfpo

  2. #542
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    Default KSM Trial Not Likely,

    before either a civilian court (often a liberal-left fav) or a military commission (often a conservative-right fav), if the WP's sources are accurate.

    Opposition to U.S. trial likely to keep mastermind of 9/11 attacks in detention
    By Peter Finn and Anne E. Kornblut
    Washington Post Staff Writers
    Saturday, November 13, 2010; 12:38 AM

    Khalid Sheik Mohammed, the self-proclaimed mastermind of the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, will probably remain in military detention without trial for the foreseeable future, according to Obama administration officials.

    The administration has concluded that it cannot put Mohammed on trial in federal court because of the opposition of lawmakers in Congress and in New York. There is also little internal support for resurrecting a military prosecution at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The latter option would alienate liberal supporters.

    The administration asserts that it can hold Mohammed and other al-Qaeda operatives under the laws of war, a principle that has been upheld by the courts when Guantanamo Bay detainees have challenged their detention.

    The White House has made it clear that President Obama will ultimately make the decision, and a federal prosecution of Mohammed and four alleged co-conspirators has not been ruled out, senior officials said. Still, they acknowledge that a trial is unlikely to happen before the next presidential election and, even then, would require a different political environment. .....
    As previously noted by me, indefinite detention of KSM under military law, without criminal prosecution via either civilian or military trial, would not break JMM's heart.

    Jack Goldsmith was an early proponent of indefinite detention for such as KSM - going back to 2005, as we see in today's Lawfare article, The Goldsmith-Wittes-Posner Option Goes Live, by Benjamin Wittes:

    ..... (comments on WP story) ...

    If this comes about, it will be a significant vindication for a much-derided idea that Jack and I and Eric Posner-particularly Jack-have been advancing for some time. Way back in 2005, Jack and Eric wrote this oped in the Post, which begins:

    Everyone involved in the contentious negotiations between the White House and Congress over the proper form for military commissions seems to agree on at least one thing: that al-Qaeda and Taliban terrorists ought to be prosecuted. We think this assumption is wrong: Terrorist trials are both unnecessary and unwise.
    The oped concludes:

    Congress and the president are wasting political energy designing a trial system that will satisfy few and convict even fewer. They should instead focus on improving the military detention process, a tool that has the sanction of law and custom and that has proved itself more than adequate for wartime needs.
    More recently, Jack and I wrote this piece, arguing specifically against the consensus that the administration needed to bring KSM to trial:

    The Obama administration and its critics are locked in a standoff over whether to try Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and the other alleged Sept. 11 conspirators in a military commission or in federal court. Both sides are busily ignoring the obvious solution: Don’t bother trying them at all.

    Mohammed has already spent more than seven years in military detention. Both the Obama administration and the Republicans who object to trying him in federal court accept the legitimacy of such detention as a traditional incident of war for those in the command structure of al-Qaeda, and perhaps for associated forces as well. In general outline, so do the courts. Given these facts, the politically draining fight about civilian vs. military trials is not worth the costs. It also distracts from more important questions in the legal war against terrorism.
    And only a few weeks ago, Jack reiterated the point in an oped in the New York Times:

    THE Obama administration wants to show that federal courts can handle trials of Guantánamo Bay detainees, and had therefore placed high hopes in the prosecution of Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani, accused in the 1998 bombings of American embassies in East Africa. On Wednesday a federal judge, Lewis Kaplan of the United States District Court in Manhattan, made the government’s case much harder when he excluded the testimony of the government’s central witness because the government learned about the witness through interrogating Mr. Ghailani at a secret overseas prison run by the C.I.A.

    Some, mostly liberals and civil libertarians, applauded the ruling, saying it showed that the rule of law is being restored. But many conservatives denounced it as proof that high-level terrorists cannot reliably be prosecuted in civilian courts and should instead be tried by military commissions.

    The real lesson of the ruling, however, is that prosecution in either criminal court or a tribunal is the wrong approach. The administration should instead embrace what has been the main mechanism for terrorist incapacitation since 9/11: military detention without charge or trial.
    Currently, three separate legal arenas are in play, where the results will be determinative as to whether AQ and associated groups will be treated primarily under the Laws of War (kill or detain), or primarily under the Rule of Law (capture and trial):

    1. KSM and similar prosecutions, whether civilian court or military commission;

    2. Al-Awlaki and other direct action cases;

    3. Gitmo detention cases, where the DC Circuit is developing the indefinite detention doctrine under the 2001 AUMF informed by the Laws of War (LOAC).

    The early idealistic hopes of some in the Obama administration have clearly been dashed by harsh realities.

    Regards

    Mike

  3. #543
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    Default Ghalaini convicted - sorta

    From Lawfare, Ghailani Convicted on One Count, Acquitted on All Others, Wednesday, November 17, 2010, focusing on the statute which could bring him from 20 years to life:

    Ghailani was convicted of violating 18 USC 844(f)(3) and (n). Section 844(f) provides:

    (1) Whoever maliciously damages or destroys, or attempts to damage or destroy, by means of fire or an explosive, any building, vehicle, or other personal or real property in whole or in part owned or possessed by, or leased to, the United States, or any department or agency thereof, or any institution or organization receiving Federal financial assistance, shall be imprisoned for not less than 5 years and not more than 20 years, fined under this title, or both.

    (2) Whoever engages in conduct prohibited by this subsection, and as a result of such conduct, directly or proximately causes personal injury or creates a substantial risk of injury to any person, including any public safety officer performing duties, shall be imprisoned for not less than 7 years and not more than 40 years, fined under this title, or both.

    (3) Whoever engages in conduct prohibited by this subsection, and as a result of such conduct directly or proximately causes the death of any person, including any public safety officer performing duties, shall be subject to the death penalty, or imprisoned for not less than 20 years or for life, fined under this title, or both.
    Section 844(n) then applies conspiracy liability to this provision, but takes the death penalty off the table:

    Except as otherwise provided in this section, a person who conspires to commit any offense defined in this chapter shall be subject to the same penalties (other than the penalty of death) as the penalties prescribed for the offense the commission of which was the object of the conspiracy.
    I expect this result (since there were 280+ Not Guilty verdicts on the other counts) will put paid to future civilian criminal prosecutions of Gitmo detainees.

    Regards

    Mike

  4. #544
    Council Member AdamG's Avatar
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    Default

    Just to provide a Hellerian Catch-22 to the post above :

    (Context : military flight returning from Afghanistan)

    The TSA personnel at the airport seriously considered making us unload all of the baggage from the SECURE cargo hold to have it reinspected. Keep in mind, this cargo had been unpacked, inspected piece by piece by U.S. Customs officials, resealed and had bomb-sniffing dogs give it a one-hour run through. After two hours of sitting in this holding area, the TSA decided not to reinspect our Cargo–just to inspect us again: Soldiers on the way home from war, who had already been inspected, reinspected and kept in a SECURE holding area for 2 hours. Ok, whatever. So we lined up to go through security AGAIN.

    This is probably another good time to remind you all that all of us were carrying actual assault rifles, and some of us were also carrying pistols.

    So we’re in line, going through one at a time. One of our Soldiers had his Gerber multi-tool. TSA confiscated it. Kind of ridiculous, but it gets better. A few minutes later, a guy empties his pockets and has a pair of nail clippers. Nail clippers. TSA informs the Soldier that they’re going to confiscate his nail clippers.
    http://www.redstate.com/erick/2010/1...r-tsa-outrage/
    A scrimmage in a Border Station
    A canter down some dark defile
    Two thousand pounds of education
    Drops to a ten-rupee jezail


    http://i.imgur.com/IPT1uLH.jpg

  5. #545
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    Default G-Bay detainees: UK compensation decision

    In an amazing decision the UK government has decided to make an out of court settlement regarding the allegations of collusion in the torture of UK citizens and residents.

    Report:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/ukne...overnment.html

    Commentary:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worl...fy-us-all.html
    davidbfpo

  6. #546
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    Default The Seven Samarai - or "Innocent Lambs" ?

    No DC District habeas proceedings were decided for or against these seven Gitmo detainees; nor were any of them tried on criminal charges before either civilian courts or military commissions.

    At this point, looking back to why they were being held at Gitmo gives us a better perspective of each of them.

    ------------------------------------
    1. Binyam Mohamed - Wiki

    Mohamed was among the 60% of prisoners who participated in the tribunal hearings. A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for the tribunal of each detainee.

    Mohamed's memo accused him of the following:

    a. The detainee is associated with al Qaida or the Taliban.

    1. The detainee is ########## who lived in the United States from 1992 to 1994, and in London, United Kingdom, until he departed for Pakistan in 2001.

    2. The detainee arrived in Islamabad, Pakistan, in June 2001, and traveled to the al Faruq training camp in Afghanistan, to receive paramilitary training.

    3. At the al Faruq camp, the detainee received 40 days of training in light arms handling, explosives, and principles of topography.

    4. The detainee was taught to falsify documents, and received instruction from a senior al Qaida operative on how to encode telephone numbers before passing them to another individual.

    5. The detainee proposed, to senior-al Qaida leaders, the idea of attacking subway trains in the United States.

    6. The detainee was extracted from Afghanistan to Karachi, Pakistan, where he received explosives and remote-controlled-detonator training from an al Qaida operative.

    7. The detainee met with an al Qaida operative and was directed to travel to the United States to assist in terrorist operations.

    8. The detainee attempted to leave Pakistan for the United States but was detained and interrogated by Pakistani authorities, revealing his membership in al Qaida, the identities of Mujahidins he knew, and his plan to use a "dirty bomb" to carry out a terrorist attack in the United States.
    Although Binyam Mohammed did not attend his Tribunal, notes from one of the Personal Representative's meetings with him were published. According to that Personal Representative "BM" agreed that the first four allegations were true.

    "Detainee admitted items 3A1-4 on the UNCLASS summary of evidence, but stated he went for training to fight in Chechnya, which was not illegal. The detainee stated that the other items were rubbish or made under duress."
    ------------------------------------------------
    2. Bisher Al Rawi - Wiki

    Al Rawi was among the 60% of prisoners who participated in the tribunal hearings. A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for the tribunal of each detainee.

    Al Rawi's memo accused him of the following:

    1. The detainee is associated with al Qaida:

    2. The detainee provided harbor in London, United Kingdom to a known al Qaida fugitive named Abu Qatada.

    3. The detainee assisted Abu Qatada by locating an apartment where Abu Qatada hid from British authorities.

    4. Abu Qatada has strong links to senior al Qaida operatives and facilitated the travel of individuals to an al Qaida guesthouse located in Pakistan.

    5. Abu Qatada is a known al Qaida operative who was arrested in the United Kingdom as a danger to national security.

    6. In addition to helping Abu Qatada evade British authorities, the detainee transferred funds between branches of the Arab Bank at Abu Qatada’s direction in 1999 or 2000.

    7. In November 2002, the detainee was arrested in Gambia after arriving from the United Kingdom and was later transferred to U.S. custody in Bagram, Afghanistan.
    -----------------------------------------------------
    3. Jamil El Banna - Wiki

    El Banna was among the 60% of prisoners who participated in the tribunal hearings. A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for the tribunal of each detainee. The memo for his hearing lists the following allegations:

    a. The detainee is a member of al-Qaida:

    1. Abu Qutada is a known al-Qaida operative arrested in the United Kingdom as a danger to national security.

    2. Detainee visited Abu Qatada while Qatada was in hiding from the British police.

    3. Detainee has been indicted by a Spanish National High Court Judge for membership in a terrorist organization.

    4. Detainee was arrested in Gambia, while attempting to board an airplane with equipment that resembled a homemade electronic device.
    ----------------------------------------------------
    4. Richard Belmar - Wiki

    Belmar was among the 60% of prisoners who participated in the tribunal hearings. A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for the tribunal of each detainee. The memo for his hearing lists the following:

    a. The detainee is associated with the Taliban and al Qaida forces.

    1. The detainee is a citizen of the United Kingdom who traveled to Afghanistan to flee criminal prosecution and receive military training.

    2. The detainee traveled from the United Kingdom to Kandahar, Afghanistan around July 2001, via the United Arab Emirates and Pakistan.

    3. The detainee stayed at a house in Kabul, Afghanistan and received training in the assembling and disassembling of the AK47.

    4. The detainee traveled to a terrorist training camp around 21 July 2001.

    5. The detainee received basic weapons, war tactics, and navigation training at a terrorist training camp.

    6. The detainee conducted guard duty with a Kalishnikov rifle at the front gate of a terrorist training camp.

    7. The detainee was in contact with Usama Bin Laden while at a terrorist training camp.

    8. The detainee stated he had one opportunity to fight the Northern Alliance forces in Kabul, Afghanistan.

    9. The detainee was arrested by the Pakistani local authorities on 07 February 2002.

    10. The detainee swore a bayat (oath or promise) to Usama Bin Laden.
    -----------------------------------------------------
    5. Omar Deghayes - Wiki

    A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Omar Amer Deghayes's Combatant Status Review Tribunal, on 27 September 2004. The memo listed the following allegations against him:

    The detainee is a member of al Qaida and associated with the Taliban:

    1. The detainee traveled to Afghanistan with a fake passport.

    2. The detainee stayed at the guesthouse of a senior al Qaeda leader.

    3. The detainee is a member of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG).

    4. The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) is a terrorist organization.

    5. The detainee was filmed in an Islamic extremist training video.
    -----------------------------------------------------
    6. Moazzam Begg - Wiki

    Moazzam Begg was among the 60% of prisoners who chose to participate in tribunal hearings. A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for the tribunal of each detainee, listing the allegations that supported their detention as an "enemy combatant".

    Moazzam Begg's memo accused him of the following:

    a. The detainee:

    1. Is a member of al-Qaida and other affiliated terrorist organizations.

    2. Recruited individuals to attend al-Qaida run terrorist training camps in Afghanistan.

    3. Provided money and material support to al-Qaida terrorist training camps.

    4. Has received extensive training at al-Qaida-run terrorist training camps since 1993. He has been trained on the AK-47, rocket propelled grenades (RPGs), handguns, ambush theory, detection of land mines, and the manufacture of improvised grenades.

    5. Provided support to al-Qaida terrorists by providing shelter for their families while the al-Qaida members committed terrorist acts.

    b. The detainee:

    1. Engaged in hostile acts against the U.S. or its coalition Partners.

    2. Was armed and prepared to fight on the frontlines against US and allied forces alongside Taliban and al-Qaida fighters.

    3. Retreated to Tora Bora Afghanistan along with other Taliban and al-Qaida fighters.

    4. Engaged in these hostile actions while neither he nor his fellow fighters wore distinctive military emblems on their clothes, nor followed a typical chain of command.

    5. Provided support to Osama Bin Laden's al-Qaida terrorist network with full knowledge that Bin Laden had issued a declaration of war against the U.S., and that the al-Qaida network had committed numerous terrorist attacks against the U.S. and its citizens.
    -----------------------------------------------------
    7. Martin Mubanga - Wiki

    Mubanga's Summary of Evidence is not quoted in his Wiki; but the SoE is at the NYT Gitmo database.

    Gitmo Mubanga 01.jpg

    Sad that HMG felt compelled to settle.

    Regards

    Mike

  7. #547
    Council Member davidbfpo's Avatar
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    Default Control Orders Plus to go?

    In an unexpected - to me - move the Labour Party spokesman on home affairs has indicated a change over support for Control Orders and IMHO more significantly extended periods of pre-charge detention (currently 28 days). Which may enable the coalition government to overcome opposition.

    Links BBC:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-11804899 and Daily Telegraph:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/ukne...-suspects.html

    Note Ed Balls last sentences:
    I’m quite clear we must always strike a balance between protecting our country from the risks of terrorist attacks on the one hand, and preserving our democratic freedoms and fundamental liberties on the other: it should never be a case of one or the other.
    davidbfpo

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    Default Gitmo Update

    The DC habeas "front" has not had much visible activity since November. In the last two weeks, several developments worth noting have occured.

    In September 2010, Judge Walton denied the habeas petition of Toffiq Nasser Awad Al Bihani (his brother was the subject of earlier DC Circuit opinion adverse to his own habeas petition):

    IV. Conclusion

    As counsel for the petitioner candidly acknowledged at the merits hearing, "the most effective way to lie is to mix truth and falsehood." Hr'g Tr. at 214:16-18; see also Williamson, 512 U.S. at 599-600 (observing that "[o]ne of the most effective ways to lie is to mix falsehood with truth, especially truth that seems particularly persuasive because of its self-incuplatory nature"). The Court agrees and finds that the petitioner did just that his inculpatory admissions regarding his desire to prepare for jihad, that he received training at the al-Farouq training camp, and that he continued to associate himself with al-Qaeda operatives while going to and from various al-Qaeda-affiliated guesthouses-are credible, while his attempt to place "an innocuous gloss over these ... facts," Al Odah, 611 FJd at 15, by stating that he had no intention of engaging in jihad upon arriving in Afghanistan. and that he intended to travel back to Saudi Arabia or Yemen upon leaving al-Farouq, fails to have the ring of truth. Accordingly, from the testimony presented by the petitioner at the merits hearing, his declaration, and the stipulations agreed to in the Joint Pre-Trial Statement, the Court concludes that the government has provided more than enough evidence to satisfy its burden of establishing the lawfulness of the petitioner's detention under the AUMF. And, because the petitioner has failed to meet his burden of producing evidence sufficient to rebut the government's prima facie showing, the petitioner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus must be denied.
    Toffiq Al Bihani also appealed to the DC Circuit. On 7 Jan 2011, he and the DoJ filed a Joint Motion for Summary Affirmance, which reads in pertinent part (emphasis added):

    2. Mr. Al-Bihani does not challenge on appeal the factual findings of the district court, but seeks to argue that the district court applied an erroneous legal standard in upholding his detention. Mr. Al-Bihani contends that he did not participate actively and directly in hostilities against the United States, and did not intend to engage in hostile acts against the United States, in his view he cannot be lawfully detained under the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224 (2001), or the laws of armed conflict.

    3. The parties agree that Mr. Al-Bihani’s arguments on appeal are foreclosed by established circuit precedent. See, e.g., Al-Adahi v. Obama, 613 F.3d 1102, 1108 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. pet. pending, No. 10-487; Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 871 (D.C. Cir.), reh’g and reh’g en banc denied, 619 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. pet. pending, No. 10-7814.1 Because this Court’s decisions are controlling as to the issues Mr. Al-Bihani seeks to raise in this Court, the parties agree that to pursue this appeal would be futile.

    4. Mr. Al-Bihani joins this motion for summary affirmance in order to obtain a judgment of this Court allowing him to seek Supreme Court review of the district court’s decision in the most efficient manner possible and in recognition of the futility of pursuing a challenge in this Court to controlling authority.
    So, Mr. Al-Bihani and his counsel threw in the towel so far as the DC Circuit was concerned - leaving his hope with the Supreme Court (more on that at the end).

    A few days later, 11 Jan 2011, Judge Leon entered another habeas denial in the case of Abdul Razak Ali, an Algerian who also goes by the name Saeed Bakhouche. The findings were similar to those found in Al-Bihani:

    The Government contends that the petitioner was a member of Abu Zubaydah’s force that was reorganizing at a guesthouse in Faisalabad, Pakistan, and preparing for future operations against U.S. and Allied forces. In particular, the Government contends that the petitioner: (1) lived with Abu Zubaydah and a cadre of his lieutenants during a two week period; (2) previously traveled with Abu Zubaydah’s force through Afghanistan and ultimately fled with them through Afghanistan to Pakistan; and (3) took an English course (with an American accent) when he was staying at Abu Zubaydah’s guesthouse.

    Petitioner, not surprisingly, disagrees. Although he acknowledges being captured in the same guesthouse as Abu Zubaydah, he denies: (1) ever being in Afghanistan, let alone being with Abu Zubaydah’s force there; (2) ever taking an English course from Abu Zubaydah’s trainers at the guesthouse; and (3) ever being a member, permanent or otherwise, of Abu Zubaydah’s force. In essence, he claims that the Government has mistakenly identified him as a member of Abu Zubaydah’s force, who traveled with Abu Zubaydah in Afghanistan and fled with him to Pakistan before gathering at this particular guesthouse to start preparing for their next offensive against u.s. and Allied forces. Upon reviewing the Return, the Traverse, and the oral argument during the merits hearing, I disagree with the petitioner’s contention and conclude for the following reasons that the Government has more than adequately established that it is more likely than not that petitioner Bakhouche was, in fact, a member of Abu Zubaydah’s force and is therefore detainable under the AUMF.
    Judge Leon has been active since the beginning of the DC habeas cases (he was the trial judge in Boumediene).

    Thus, neither the DC Circuit nor DC District have been a source of much joy to detainees so far in 2011.

    -----------------------------------------
    What follows is a key decision.

    The most recent news (18 Jan 2011) comes from SCOTUS, which denied certiorari (without comment) in Al Adahi v. Obama, a key DC Circuit case mentioned above in the Al-Bihani quote, which leaves in place the DC Circuit opinion adverse to Al-Adahi.

    Here are the briefs filed in SCOTUS (Al-Adani and DoJ); the DC Circuit opinion reversing Judge Kessler; and Judge Kessler's DC District opinion (granting habeas).

    The Al-Adahi case and Judge Kessler's methodology in deciding cases have been discussed in a number of prior posts in this thread (here, here, here, here,, here).

    I've been critical of Judge Kessler's methodology employed in Al-Adahi and several others cases in which she allowed habeas. The DC Circuit opinion (reversing Judge Kessler) was, therefore, a victory in my eyes; and the SCOTUS denial of certiorari was frosting on the cake.

    Regards

    Mike
    Last edited by jmm99; 01-18-2011 at 07:11 PM.

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    Default Lawfare on Al-Adahi

    Ben Wittes has a piece (filed a few hours ago) on the SCOTUS denial of certiorari in Al-Adahi (emphasis added):

    Why the Al Adahi Cert Denial Matters
    by Benjamin Wittes
    ....
    The Supreme Court’s unwillingness to hear the case suggests a comfort level with letting the D.C. Circuit continue writing the rules of these habeas cases and a lack of interest in getting down and dirty with the nitty gritty of detention.

    If that lack of interest persists – as I suspect it will - the rules will continue to develop incrementally in undercovered cases like Al Adahi – cases that many in the press will ignore altogether or will consider as only one “point” on the so-called “scorecard” but which will actually define the lawful parameters of detention both at Guantanamo and. ultimately, elsewhere.

    And let’s be honest: the rules the D.C. Circuit will write, as Al Adahi shows, will be quite unfavorable to detainees. Will the human rights community continue to insist that “habeas works” – that the judiciary is the appropriate body to make detention policy – even when judges end up creating a detention system with rules this generous to the government?
    My only conplaint with Ben's piece is that he is conceding the "human rights community" to those who would only argue Al-Adahi's case.

    I also have a concern with human rights, but I am also aware of the need for appropriate degrees of freedom in military operational and security needs.

    In fact, I would contend that application of the Laws of War, as the so-called "human rights community" wishes (e.g., the transitory combatant who hides among the civilian population), results in less human rights for innocent civilians.

    I agree with Ben's reasons for finding Al-Adahi important:

    Among other things, it:

    raised serious questions as to whether the government needs to prove a habeas case by a preponderance of the evidence or whether a lesser showing might suffice;

    insisted that lower courts not assess each piece of government evidence in isolation from one another but consider the “conditional probability” of each piece of evidence’s contributing to the government’s burden of proof in light of the other established facts;

    suggested that false exculpatory statements by detainees should be treated as evidence in favor of detention;

    suggested that a detainee’s “voluntary decision to move to an al-Qaida guesthouse, a staging area for recruits heading for a military training camp, makes it more likely – indeed, very likely – that [he] was himself a recruit”; and

    treated the detainee’s attendance at an Al Qaeda training camp as ”to put it mildly – strong evidence that he was part of Al Qaida” and did not treat evidence that he left the camp as undermining that conclusion; in fact, the D.C. Circuit treated the detainee’s training as conclusive on its own.
    Regards

    Mike
    Last edited by jmm99; 01-18-2011 at 08:59 PM.

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    Default Gitmo habeas scorecard

    As of 16 Feb 2011, the scorecard (from Lawfare, GTMO Habeas Numbers Update) broke down as follows (my comments after each category):

    Uighur cases in which detention was deemed or conceded unlawful: 17
    These cases were unique to say the least - the earliest Gitmo cases to be disposed of (by consent).

    Petitioners’ district-court wins not appealed by the government, including cases in which the government’s initial appeal was later dismissed: 14
    Many of these were early cases where (1) the facts simply did not favor the USG (similar to the Uighurs), or (2) the factual findings (though contested) were against the USG, which for reasons known to itself decided against appeals (esp. in earlier cases). Thus, the early media coverage reached the conclusion (based on the Uighurs and early cases) that most all Gitmo detainees were unlawfully detained.

    Petitioners’ district-court wins pending at D.C. Circuit: 5
    Based on its more current track record, the USG will probably win most of these.

    Petitioners’ district-court wins resulting in a remand to district court, with remand still pending: 2
    The detainees' chances in these cases have diminished because each remand means a DC Circuit opinion at least in part favorable to the USG.

    Petitioners’ merits wins at D.C. Circuit: 0
    This statistic (and the associated USG wins at DCC) tell it all.

    Government’s district-court wins not appealed by the petitioner, including cases in which the petitioner’s initial appeal was later dismissed: 2
    The detainees, having nothing to lose, have appealed almost everything.

    Government’s district-court wins that will likely be appealed: 3
    See above.

    Government’s district-court wins pending at D.C. Circuit: 10
    Based on the more recent track record at DCC, these detainees should not count on reversals.

    Government’s district-court wins resulting in a remand to district court, with remand still pending: 1
    So far, the remands of USG wins have focused on clarification of lesser factual issues.

    Government’s merits wins at D.C. Circuit: 6
    So, at DCC, the scorecard is USG 6, Detainees 0.

    Post-Boumediene merits decisions in which cert. has been denied by SCOTUS: 1
    This cert denial resulted in a USG DCC win staying in place.

    Regards

    Mike
    Last edited by jmm99; 03-03-2011 at 07:51 PM.

  11. #551
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    Default UK: Most terror suspects not charged

    An indicator of how lawfare fares here; from the opening phrase:
    Only one in four people arrested in Britain on suspicion of terrorism in the last year was charged with a terror-related offence, figures show.
    Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-12567754

    I expect someone collects such data internationally, although I am sceptical that legal definitions, procedures and far more make comparisons difficult.
    davidbfpo

  12. #552
    Council Member davidbfpo's Avatar
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    Default UK Court of Appeal rules on torture claims

    A man convicted of serious terrorism offences in the UK who claimed the UK was complicit in his torture in Pakistan has lost his appeal.

    Rangzieb Ahmed, 34, from Greater Manchester, was convicted of membership of al-Qaeda and directing terrorism in December 2008.

    He alleged he was unlawfully held and beaten, and his conviction should be quashed because the UK was complicit.
    Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-12580780

    In a commentary on the judgement, in the conservative leaning weekly The Spectator:
    The judgment went much further. It said:

    ‘We should record that it was not possible to treat as an established law the concept of complicity in torture, which is an essential plank of the appellant’s case.’

    This is a seminal decision (and a rarity in that I imagine it will not remotely inconvenience the government). It means that passive receipt of intelligence perhaps gained through torture is not the same as complicity in torture.
    Link:http://www.spectator.co.uk/coffeehou...-torture.thtml

    Notice the difference between the allegations made by Binyam Mohammed of UK complicity in him being tortured, with a civil action and the government reaching an out of court settlement.
    davidbfpo

  13. #553
    Council Member davidbfpo's Avatar
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    Default The impact of prison

    Cross refer to the thread 'Terrorist Prisoners and Deradicalization' and this quote:
    Perhaps another surprising observation is that in the U.K. we have had over 400 al Qaeda-linked extremists convicted of terrorism-related offences since 2001. Approximately 300 of these people have been released already, and many have received relatively short sentences. Most of these people are on the streets in the U.K. One finding is that there does not seem to be any evidence of these people re-engaging in extremism or becoming involved in violence again. The re-conviction rate or the re-offending rate of these individuals is extremely low. It has surprised many people who assumed that if someone was radicalized, chiefly engaged in violence and had spent time in prison, they would still be dangerous when they came out. From most of them we see that prison represents a transition period where they move on to other issues and away from violence.
    Last edited by davidbfpo; 03-26-2011 at 12:44 PM.
    davidbfpo

  14. #554
    Council Member davidbfpo's Avatar
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    Default UK lawyers chatting

    A BBC Radio programme 'Unreliable Evidence':
    The first in a new series of Unreliable Evidence looks at the role of the law in preventing terrorism.

    The programme brings together the former Director of Public Prosecutions, Lord Macdonald who has just overseen the Government's review of its counter terrorism powers and Lord Carlile, who for the past ten years been the government's independent reviewer of terrorism legislation.

    They agree that the right balance has to be struck between security and the protection of civil liberties, but disagree about the extent to which this has been achieved.

    Both men have been able to see the intelligence information on which government anti-terrorism legislation has been based. Lord Carlile believes security measures such as control orders have averted terrorist attacks, while Lord Macdonald worries they have often prevented justice being done.

    Also taking part in the discussion is human rights barrister, Tim Owen QC, who has appeared in several leading cases relating to control orders and other anti-terrorism measures.

    They discuss the law relating to torture, deportation, stop and search powers and the new measures being brought in to replace the highly controversial control orders.
    Not sure how long the podcast will be available and unlike TV should be available beyond the UK. Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/iplayer/episode...nce_Terrorism/
    davidbfpo

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    Default The DC Circuit, Uthman ...

    and why detainees and their attorneys should be nervous about their prospects for success in future habeas hearings.

    Today, a D.C. Circuit panel (JJ. Garland, Griffith, & Kavanaugh; opinion by Brett Kavanaugh) reversed and remanded, with instructions to deny habeas on rehearing, the merits appeal of Uthman Abdul Rahim Mohammed Uthman. Judge Henry Kennedy’s April 2010 decision granted Uthman’s habeas petition.

    The DC Circuit's opinion reiterates three legal points which its decisions after April 2010 have emphasized:

    1. AUMF and detention duration:

    In response to al Qaeda’s attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001, Congress passed and President Bush signed the Authorization for Use of Military Force. The AUMF provides:

    That the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.
    Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224 (2001); see U.S. CONST. art. I. § 8. The AUMF, among other things, authorizes the Executive Branch to detain for the duration of hostilities those individuals who are part of al Qaeda or the Taliban. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004).
    2. Qualitative and Quantitative Proof Required:

    In decisions issued since the District Court’s judgment in this case, this Court has rejected “command structure” as the test for determining whether someone is part of al Qaeda. Our cases have held that the “determination of whether an individual is ‘part of’ al-Qaida ‘must be made on a case-by-case basis by using a functional rather than a formal approach and by focusing upon the actions of the individual in relation to the organization.’” Salahi v. Obama, 625 F.3d 745, 751-52 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (quoting Bensayah v. Obama, 610 F.3d 718, 725 (D.C. Cir. 2010)).
    ....
    Our cases have stated that the preponderance of the evidence standard is constitutionally sufficient and have left open whether a lower standard might be adequate to satisfy the Constitution’s requirements for wartime detention. See Al-Adahi v. Obama, 613 F.3d 1102, 1104-05 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Awad v. Obama, 608 F.3d 1, 11 & n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 878 & n.4. The preponderance of the evidence standard is equivalent to the “more likely than not” standard. See Concrete Pipe & Prods., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S. 602, 622 (1993); Al-Adahi, 613 F.3d at 1106.
    3. Considering the evidence as a whole:

    We do “not weigh each piece of evidence in isolation, but consider all of the evidence taken as a whole.” Al Odah, 611 F.3d at 15 (quoting Awad, 608 F.3d at 6-7); see also Al-Adahi, 613 F.3d at 1105-07.
    The key facts requiring a finding that Uthman was "a part of AQ" were:

    In analyzing whether Uthman more likely than not was part of al Qaeda, we consider the following facts, which were found by the District Court or are otherwise uncontested:

    - Uthman was captured in December 2001 in the vicinity of Tora Bora, an isolated, mountainous area where al Qaeda forces had gathered to fight the United States and its allies.

    - When captured, Uthman was traveling with a small group of men, two of whom were al Qaeda members and bodyguards for Osama bin Laden and one of whom was a Taliban fighter.

    - Leading up to his capture, Uthman’s journey began at a religious school in Yemen where al Qaeda had successfully recruited fighters. The two al Qaeda members and Osama bin Laden bodyguards who were later captured with Uthman, as well as the Taliban fighter captured with Uthman, also attended the Furqan Institute.

    - Uthman traveled to Afghanistan along a route used by al Qaeda recruits.

    - Uthman lied to hide the fact that someone else paid for his travel to Afghanistan.

    - While in Afghanistan, Uthman was seen at an al Qaeda guesthouse.

    - Uthman’s explanation of why he went to Afghanistan and why he was traveling in a small group that included al Qaeda members and a Taliban fighter near Tora Bora during the battle there involves a host of unlikely coincidences.
    The opinion discusses the legal points and factual findings in much more depth.

    Regards

    Mike

  16. #556
    Council Member AdamG's Avatar
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    Default

    40 Search Warrants Executed as FBI Goes After 'Anonymous'

    Police agencies worldwide are turning up the heat on a loosely organized group of WikiLeaks activists. On Thursday U.K. police arrested five people, and U.S. authorities said they'd executed more than 40 search warrants in the U.S. in connection with last month's Web-based attacks against companies that had severed ties with WikiLeaks.
    http://www.pcworld.com/businesscente...us.html?tk=out
    A scrimmage in a Border Station
    A canter down some dark defile
    Two thousand pounds of education
    Drops to a ten-rupee jezail


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  17. #557
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    Default

    SAN DIEGO -- One of the nation's largest military bases is reportedly under tighter security after three Middle Eastern men tried to enter without proper authorization.
    10News learned the three men -- 40-year-old Afghani Ahmad Rahmani Naeem, 41-year-old Iranian Vahik Petrossian and 27-year-old Iranian Sengekdi Norvik Avanosian -- attempted to get into Camp Pendleton last weekend under what was considered suspicious circumstances.
    http://www.10news.com/news/27377448/detail.html
    A scrimmage in a Border Station
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  18. #558
    Council Member davidbfpo's Avatar
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    Default Prevention: Anglo-US perspectives

    From ICSR's blogsite:
    Speaking yesterday at a conference organised by King’s College London’s ICSR, the Council on Foreign Relations, and Georgetown University’s Center for Peace and Security Studies, British Security Minister Baroness Pauline Neville Jones revealed core elements of the British government’s revised Prevent agenda.

    She announced that the new strategy would be broader than it currently is, “confront[ing] all forms of extremism, from the far left to the far right”. At the same time, it will focus “more narrowly… on violent extremism and the pathways that lead to [the] espousal of violence”.

    At the core of the new strategy will be “three I’s”: ideology, institutions, and individuals.
    Link:http://icsr.info/blog/British-Securi...Prevent-Agenda

    If this speech reflects HMG's decisions, which is a moot point, then in these straitened financial times the Prevent agenda (PVE) will IMHO be a declaratory policy only, with a few changes, fewer partners and little impact.

    There is a link to the CFR website: http://www.cfr.org/publication/by_type/video.html to the podcasts of four segments and I'm about to listen to Intelligence and Counter-Radicalization. Others are:
    Reaching Out” – Promoting Community Engagement, the speech A New Approach to Counter-Radicalization and Community Partnerships to Counter Violent Extremism.
    davidbfpo

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    Default SCOTUS denies cert in 3 more cases

    Yesterday, the Supreme Court briefly denied certiorari in 3 cases: Al Odah v. Obama (No. 10-439), Awad v. Obama (No. 10-736), and Al Bihani v. Obama (No. 10-7814). The effect is that the DC Circuit decisions (which were adverse to the detainees in all three cases) will stand - a clean sweep so far for the DOJ and USG position in this term of SCOTUS (4 denials of certiorari in the 4 cases so far decided).

    The two cases remaining are those of the Uighurs, which as frequent readers know are unique cases. They do, however, deal with the power of Federal judges to enforce release of detainees whose habeas petitions have been granted.

    Regards

    Mike

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    Default Another brick in the wall

    The DC Circuit rejected another detainee appeal from a District judge's denial of habeas corpus - unanimous opinion (a brief concurrence in treated elsewhere) in Esmail v Obama.

    The facts found by the two courts (District and Circuit), and the legal conclusions to be drawn, are becoming almost a matter of course - the opinion states that the facts compel the legal conclusions as a "matter of law":

    ... we review the ultimate issue of whether the detainee was “part of” al Qaeda .....

    First, Esmail, a Yemeni who traveled to Afghanistan in 1999, admits to having received weapons training at al Farouq, an al Qaeda training camp, for at least one month. Although he claims that he did not know until after he left that the camp was al Qaeda-run, the district court found this contention to be incredible, and Esmail offers us no basis to question that fact finding. See Awad v. Obama, 608 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“A finding is clearly erroneous when . . . the reviewing court . . . is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). We have observed that training at al Farouq or other al Qaeda training camps is compelling evidence that the trainee was part of al Qaeda. See Al-Adahi v. Obama, 613 F.3d 1102, 1109 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (suggesting, but not relying on, the proposition that such evidence would be sufficient on its own); see also Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 873 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2010). The length of Esmail’s training — at least a month — makes this particularly strong evidence. Cf. Al-Adahi, 613 F.3d at 1108 (noting that the detainee was at al Farouq for only seven to ten days).

    Second, Esmail admits to having studied at the al Qaeda-affiliated Institute for Islamic/Arabic Studies. Although the district court found this fact, on its own, not to be strong evidence, see Abdah v. Obama, 709 F. Supp. 2d 25, 44(D.D.C. 2010), it is relevant and, when viewed in light of the remainder of the evidence, makes it more likely that Esmail was “part of” al Qaeda. See Al-Adahi, 613 F.3d at 1105–09 (describing the importance of considering each fact in light of the remainder of the evidence).

    Third, although Esmail contests precisely where he was taken into custody by the Northern Alliance (he asserts it occurred in Jalalabad while the government argues it occurred in a village near Tora Bora, a cave complex in the mountains of Eastern Afghanistan), he does not contest that he passed through Tora Bora in December of 2001 or that when he was taken into Afghan custody, he was with two other men, both of whom had participated in the fighting and one of whom had been injured. Seeking to explain these movements, Esmail claims that after September 11, when he was in Kandahar, he wanted to return to Yemen, but rather than retrace the route he had taken from Yemen to Afghanistan in 1999, he headed north to Kabul, where he claims he planned to meet and marry a Pakistani friend’s sister. Once in Kabul, he adds, he was kidnapped from the street and taken to Tora Bora, where his kidnappers picked up two other men. The kidnappers then took the three of them to Jalalabad and sold them into Afghan custody. The district court, however, “was not persuaded by Esmail’s attempt to paint his decision to travel from Kandahar to Kabul after September 11 as innocent” and found his allegations of kidnapping “not logical.” Abdah, 709 F. Supp. 2d at 46–47; cf. Al-Adahi, 613 F.3d at 1107 (noting that a false explanation can provide further corroboration that a detainee is “part of” al Qaeda). Esmail has failed to show that this credibility determination was clearly erroneous.

    As we explained in Uthman v. Obama, Tora Bora was a “widely known . . . battleground between al Qaeda and the United States” and travel in that region in December 2001 “suggests that [the traveler] was affiliated with al Qaeda.” No. 10-5235, slip op. at 8 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 29, 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). In that case, we also found it “highly significant” that the detainee was “captured in the company of a Taliban fighter and two al Qaeda members and Osama bin Laden bodyguards,” id. at 9, and could “not credibly explain[] . . . how he found himself traveling with [that group],” id. at 14. Likewise, we find it “highly significant” that Esmail was captured along with two fighters, one of whom had been injured in the battle, and that Esmail has offered no credible explanation either of his decision to remain in Afghanistan after September 11 or of how he ended up traveling through Tora Bora with two Tora Bora battle participants.
    Regards

    Mike

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