Effects based planning or operations requires an encyclopedic grasp of the operating environment, the systems extant within that environment, and of human psychology as expressed individually and in crowds. It also requires a pretty sensitive BS detector. This is why, despite being a 'simple' concept, it doesn't work.Originally Posted by Bill Moore
I spent two years as Chief, Current Plans at a NATO Corps HQ which then went for a year in Afghanistan. EBO (or in Eurospeak, EBAO) was the mechanism by which that headquarters tried to make its plans. I struggled to work with it and through it, and to explain the concept to furrow-browed senior leaders.
I stand by my statement that only a minority of military planners and staff are capable of using effects-based thinking effectively - that is, in a way that can actually produce relevent, practical, well-crafted plans. I base that on three years experience at the corps/theater planning level. It's not that we were stupid - we were all, as you say, intelligent problem solvers. We simply didn't have the background, time, or opportunity to do the deep research needed. And, yes, some of us didn't have the philosophical bent required to avoid EBO's pitfalls.
By the way, I completely agree that EBO made the headquarters more bureaucratic. It's another reason to abandon it as an organizing theme: it feeds our predilection for chartology and brute-force analysis. MOE, MOP, second-and-third order effect matrices, sub-effects, sub-sub-effects, action/effect links, undesired effects charts, etc. Worse than IPB.
Found this article on EBO and EBS (Effectsbased Strategy) written by an Australian. It includes a definition of EBO, one of the most complete I have seen.....but the same definition shows how incredibly complex any type of EBO would become.
http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchr...5/lazarus.html
My apologies for being unclear as to who I was directing the "mumbo-jumbo" at - it was intended at the writers of the more forward leaning EBO writers - I was not characterizing your post in that manner.I am not a positivist and I do not as a general rule subscribe to or spout forth "mumbo-jumbo". (snip valuable amplifying discussion)
In general, as I understand it, the philosophical bent that it must be proven that something is opaque to science is a positivist one. Your criticism that "...the fact that the original paper does nothing to identify (or reference to some work that does) war as a class of chaotic and complex systems that are ultimately unpredictable. War MAY be unknowable, but it isn't being pedantic to argue that no one has even come close to proving this." appears an example. The statement "war is unpredictable" can only be falsified by demonstrating that is predicable. This leads to a number of logical problems. Working from the statement "war is predictable" is logically preferable from the standpoint of falsification. The point is not to establish a connection to positivism or not, but to promote an appeal to demonstrate what CAN be done, not what can't - which leads to the fallacy of negative proof.
To argue that the statement "because war is chaotic and complex it is unknowable is wrong" because there are examples of other chaotic and complex systems that have useful predictability horizons is to ascribe characteristics of a subset of "chaotic and complex systems" to ALL of them. Yes there are examples of chaotic and complex systems that are to some extent predictable, but there are also examples that are not (a Conway's game of life matrix, or a Lorentz waterwheel, or the outcome of a sporting game for that manner) using the same logic I can declare that war is unpredictable.I am pointing out that the paper informs us that because war is chaotic complex it is unknowable. As I said this statement is wrong...some chaotic and complex systems can be predicted.
I prefer to err on the side of assuming that war is unpredictable until it is demonstrated otherwise. Which EBO as yet to come anywhere near doing.
That is not to say that "effects-based thinking" (of the sort espoused in "Commanders Appreciation and Campaign Design") can't be useful. I just believe that a technique needs to PROVE ITS USEFULNESS not be accepted until proven false.
That an atlas can get us from A to B lacking all sorts of important details obviously means it is not "an absolutely accurate map of our planet". Getting from A to B is not an example of a complex problem. To the extent that solving a problem requires an arbitrarily accurate representation of the earth's surface, an atlas is not useful. If these characteristics are initial conditions to a typical complex problem, then the "predictability horizon" will be dependent on how accurate they are. The example was not to suggest an "absolutely accurate map" is required for all problems, but that those that are complex require arbitrarily accurate initial conditions (and relational functions) to achieve an arbitrary predictability horizon. And we don't know the relationship between the two...
I think that if you believe that "The earth itself is the only absolutely accurate map of our planet" then you are obviously finding it difficult to rationalise what an atlas is: a simplified version of earth, lacking in all sorts of important details, which may allow us to get from A to B.
That does not bode well for useful predictability from an Atlas.
As you say, some models are useful, and so I say that the jury is still out on EBO and that the prosecution have made a poor case against the defendant
This is where we fundamentally disagree - experimentation must be performed that attempts to falsify the statement "EBO is useful" not "prove it" or falsify the statement "EBO is NOT useful. Unlike a trial where a defendant is assumed innocent until proven guilty, science assumes skepticism and looks to falsify positive statements (assuming you accept Popper's criticism of positivism's demand of verificationism). Having been involved in a lot of the experimentation surrounding EBO, I have to say that Gen Mattis is looking at the results of SEVERAL "trials" and the defendant has yet to definitively prove its usefulness, and the biggest problems have revolved around the notions of "predictability" that it has increasingly espoused.
"EBO thinking" confuses the things I had tried to seperate in my initial discussion - the framework of "Effects-based thinking" - which I would characterize not as simply "think before you act" - but "consider carefully the results of your actions - in as complete a context as you can - before acting." And that is something that successful commanders have always done - just to a lesser or greater extent intuitively, rather than by design and education.EBO thinking, its fundaments, are to think before you act. EBO has been poorly represented in its US-implemented form and (typically in the USA inter-service melee) been over-sold in order to win funding. So my real fear here - and the inspiration for my original response - is that EBO-thinking will become an anathema in the US - any bright, forward-thinking soldier that has career aspirations will want nothing to do with it.
EBO has collected a cart-load of baggage that has reduced its usefulness. This baggage needs to be stripped away and the concept "returned to its roots" in order for it to become the useful tool I believe it can ultimately become. Part of that baggage in my mind has to do with the manner in which it was connected with "chaotic and complex systems" that were bad science, bad logic, and misunderstood much of what complexity science teaches us. Mostly that we have become expert at reductionist analysis taking things apart to understand them - but that is only half the toolset - we need to get as expert as holistic synthesis - understanding why things become "more than the sum of their parts".
We are in violent agreement that throwing the baby out with the bathwater would be a tragic mistake.
"All models are wrong, but some are useful"
-George E.P. Box
And the EBO beat (debate) goes on....
Colonel David Gurney (USMC Ret.), Editor of Joint Force Quarterly and Director of National Defense University Press, has again kindly permitted SWJ to post a Point - Counterpoint that will appear in the January 2009 issue of JFQ.
First up; from SWJ, this 14 August 2009 memo by General James Mattis, Commander of U.S. Joint Forces Command.
This brings us to January's JFQ Point - Counterpoint in reaction to General Mattis's memo. First, from Lieutenant General Paul K. Van Riper, USMC, (ret.) - EBO: There Was No Baby in the Bathwater.Attached are my thoughts and Commander’s guidance regarding Effects Based Operations (EBO). The paper is designed to provide the JFCOM staff with clear guidance and a new direction on how EBO will be addressed in joint doctrine and used in joint training, concept development, and experimentation. I am convinced that the various interpretations of EBO have caused confusion throughout the joint force and amongst our multinational partners that we must correct. It is my view that EBO has been misapplied and overextended to the point that it actually hinders rather than helps joint operations.
U.S. Air Force Colonels Paul M. Carpenter and William F. Andrews take issue in Effects Based Operations - Combat Proven.We should not be surprised that one of our most combat-seasoned and professionally informed leaders, General James Mattis, USMC, who commands U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), recently issued a memorandum that calls for an end to the effects-based operations (EBO) nonsense that has permeated much of the American defense community for the past 6 years. Nor should we be surprised that other leaders with similar operational experience promptly applauded General Mattis’ actions. They all saw effects based operations as a vacuous concept that has slowly but surely undermined professional military thought and operational planning. One can only hope that the general’s action, coupled with a similar effort by U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command in 2007,will halt the U.S. military’s decade-and-a-half decline in conceptual thinking.
The current issue of the U.S. Army War College’s Parameters also reprints the General Mattis memo in article format with a counter by Tomislav Z. Ruby entitled Effects-based Operations: More Important Than Ever.The USJFCOM directive to “turn off” EBO concepts is not well advised. Although the command has vigorously pursued development of EBO concepts, over time efforts have rendered a valuable joint concept unusable by promising unattainable predictability and by linking it to the highly deterministic computer-based modeling of ONA and SoSA. Instead of pursuing a constructive approach by separating useful and proven aspects of EBO and recommending improvements, USJFCOM has prescribed the consumption of a fatal poison. General Mattis declares that “the term effects-based is fundamentally flawed... and goes against the very nature of war.”
We disagree. EBO is combat proven; it was the basis for the success of the Operation Desert Storm air campaign and Operation Allied Force. A very successful wartime concept is sound and remains an effective tool for commanders. It is valuable for commanders to better understand cause and effect - to better relate objectives to the tasks that forces perform in the operational environment. While there are problems associated with how EBO has been implemented by some organizations, they can be easily adjusted. As a military, we must understand the value of EBO, address concerns in its implementation, and establish a way ahead to gain the benefits and avoid the potential pitfalls of the concept.
Whether effects-based operations (EBO) and the effects-based approach to planning have led to negative warfighting results is a topic well worth our collective time and study. In fact, it is a healthy activity of any defense institution to question and evaluate its doctrine, policy, and procedures. The current debate on EBO brought about by General James N. Mattis’s memorandum to US Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) directing the elimination of the term from the command’s vocabulary has not put the issue to rest. Quite to the contrary, the Mattis memo reinvigorated the debate, and this article aims at being part of that debate. Effects-based operations are not dead. No one individual can kill a concept, and this concept has staying power. When the underlying rationale for General Mattis’s decision is analyzed, one can see that EBO as a concept for planning will be around for some time.
EBO is anything it wants to be
As Van Riper says, there was no baby!
EBO is shape shifter concept that always stays just out of reach, and alters in the face of criticism. Success are, in hindsight, chalked up to EBO, and failures were "poorly done" EBO.
EBO endures because it's many and varying definitions are so general and so non-specific, that anything good can be attributed to it, and anything bad can be denied as being part of it. It abuses history in the same way Manoeuvre Warfare, and 4GW do.
That to me, indicates that it's real utility is to promote agendas, secure budgets and make reputations. It's no good for the practitioner.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
The impassioned defense of the Baby is as flawed
as the kid...
Sayeth Defenders:Neither of which accomplished much until folks went in on the ground thus 'success' is a highly relative term...We disagree. EBO is combat proven; it was the basis for the success of the Operation Desert Storm air campaign and Operation Allied Force.Heh. Good luck with that search.The importance of this principle is particularly relevant to ongoing operations in Iraq, where General David Petraeus declared the Iraqi people as the “key terrain.” Our actions are seeking lasting changes in their behavior.This from the service that demands control off all air assets in theater and issues Air Tasking Orders. Sorry, their statements are beyond counter intuitive.Practically made for mission-type orders, EBO is not locked to any specific level of conflict and may be used by commanders at any level . . . Mission-type orders are essentially an application of EBO at the tactical level.Nothing revisionist about it; even the USAF has acknowledged many times that air effort alone is not enough and USAF bombing campaign assessments have found shortfalls.... the revisionist “slap” at the value of precision aerial attack is oddly out of place . . . If “precision fires alone” are judged by USJFCOM to have been “ineffective” in 1991, 1999, and 2003, we must wonder what standard is used to make this provocative judgment.
I suspect the standard for the judgments revolves around the fact that troops moving into Kuwait in 1991 found most of Saddam's men and equipment demoralized but still largely intact and functional; Post war assessments in Kosovo showed the USAF and its coalition partners had bombed a large number of decoys and missed a large number of real vehicles plus little changed until the KLA went in on the ground...
The effort in 2003 combined the flaws of both earlier wars -- and compounded the failure to deliver by being called "Shock and Awe." Embarrassing.
I'll also echo what Wilf said...
Amen to that. I'll further that by saying that nearly all strategic planning outside the tactical realm equals philosophy and is every bit as improvable and untestable as philosophy in any other realm is. If it had merit, it could be tested and it can not. It can't even use the standby of previous "strategic" constructs like maneuver warfare and use historic patterns.
Reed
A good point here and there, but I'm not buying
What the heck does this mean? Comments like this support GEN Mattis's claim that EBO is too vague and complex to be of value, or as Owen wrote above, EBO tends to alter in concept everytime it is challenged in order to remain unassailable, so its supporters can contiinue to operate under the pretense of scientific method.The key is to not abandon the EBO concept. The key is to ensure that effects-based operations are properly planned and executed and that the effects are measured within the decision cycle of current operations.
Here I can agree with the author about the failure of intuition, but I suspect strongly he is wrong in his attempt to associate the surge with EBO. Securing the populace has been a principle of counterinsurgency for several decades, so how can he claim it was the result of an insight derived from using the EBO conceptual approach? All he demonstrated was that a Commander's intuition can be incorrect. That isn't exactly a novel idea.When Generals Casey, Abizaid, and Pace were asked by the White House in 2006 about the prospects for a “surge,” none believed it would work. Their core belief was that there were already too many soldiers on the ground in Baghdad and that to add more would only add to the number of deaths.12 The commander’s intuition that General Mattis says we need to rely on resulted in a strategy based on killing as many insurgents as possible rather than providing security for the Iraqi people. If not for America’s civilian leadership pushing the military, then the Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) would either still be playing “whack-a-mole” or possibly even failing by now. All because there was no understanding of what the desired strategic effects in Iraq were or how to design a campaign that would permit the parties to plan backward in an effort to achieve them.
His argument also collapses when it is examined closer, because the failed "whack-a-mole" approach he is talking about, was a result of the EBO process. EBO advocates attempted to frame the enemy problem as a system with key nodes (HVIs) that should be targeted, which in turn will supposedly collapse the system . This proved to be a bunch of rubish..
Why is it a move away? The services were doing effective targeting prior to Desert Storm. The OSS taught the French Underground how to target using the acronym CARVER (english, CRAVER in French), which was nodal analysis of rail systems, electric power, and other simple systems that were easily analyzed using a scientific method. It isn't new, the only thing new is the failed attempt to attempt to transfer this method to complex adaptive systems that are unpredictable. When we can accomplish the mission with a surgical strike we will, when we can't we will use a more holistic approach.The elimination of EBO, SoSA, etc., would be a definitive step backward for America’s military and its move away from mass to technological and qualitative superiority.
Additionally, the author's statement the paragraph prior to this one where he claims EBO supported the surge. Which one is it? The reality is it was EBO and SoSA like thinking that led to the failed strategy during the initial phases of the OIF COIN fight (the whack-a-mole phase). It just so happens that sometimes more boots on the ground is the most efficient method, because it may smoother the fire before it explodes. I took EBO classes and the process did not facilitate that type of thinking and complexity, instead it guides you down the path of system and nodal analysis (if you tickle node Y you get result X), and any attempt to claim otherwise is an attempt to twist EBO into something it is not. If there was a baby in the bathwater, then the baby was this works for simple systems (railroads, electric power, factories, etc.), but again not for more complex problems.
Sticking with the author's example, I don't see how he can defend it using EBO. If I'm not mistaken, most of the civilian casualties (due to coalition forces) in Afghanistan are due to NATO air strikes. I'm not blaming air power for this, because most bombs are not dropped without permission of the ground commander, but my point is qualitative technological superority isn't always the best answer. War is nasty, tough, hard and unpredictable, so mistakes will always be made by all participants. If the author's argument is we should do a better job of planning, he is right. If his argument is that EBO is the key to doing so, then I remain skeptical.The EBO concept was developed to prevent misanalyzing and attacking centers of gravity that do not lead to the attainment of objectives. The US military cannot continue to analyze the enemy with the same shortsighted and unimaginative results when “popular support for the insurgency” or “the enemy population” are his centers of gravity.
There are no easy answers, and the continued search for nodes that we can surgically target with our advanced technology to disrupt enemy so-called systems will simply continue to provide the illusion of progress. We have been doing this in Afghanistan and situation continues to deteriorate. This isn't because we're not using EBO, rather it is because we are using some EBO like methods. The reality is that to actually defeat the enemy you still have to wage a war of attrition to push the enemy and populace to the tipping point. This involves taking and holding terrain (human terrain is part of that equation), and it involves killing/capturing or turning the combatants (not just the leadership). EBO does not facilitate the development of campaign plans and holistic objectives, it is a simple targeting tool that has been taken way out of context. EBO, whether by design or default, attempts to frame complex problems into systems, subsystems, and nodes that can be effectively targeted and predictably influenced, which has proven to be false time and time again.
As Ken stated, "good luck with this one". Please tell me where we had long term success usng the military to change a foreign culture's behavior? If this is what EBO advocates are defining as mission success (a military objective), then we should pack our bags and go home now. How can be so blind as not to see this as an offensive operation that will offend those we are allegedly attempting to help? Are we now Conquestor missionaries?The importance of this principle is particularly relevant to ongoing operations in Iraq, where General David Petraeus declared the Iraqi people as the “key terrain.” Our actions are seeking lasting changes in their behavior.
EBO thinking has been used for years on the war on drugs with less than desirable "effects". We can't even change the behavior of criminals and the market for illegal drugs, yet we're (the military) going to change cultures that have been in existance for hundreds of years?
The Operational Design Doctrine (draft) that the author attacks as simple minded thinking, is actually a much better attempt to provide a framework to address complex problems.
Last edited by Bill Moore; 11-23-2008 at 09:26 AM. Reason: Clarify
Better decision making...
Judgment, experience, and capability allow operators to effectively use tools. An Artisan and an Amateur who use the same tool set will nonetheless most certainly produce different outcomes.
Commanders must understand the Principles of War and have appropriate judgment, experience, and capability in order to successfully apply management tools. Effects Based Operations Methods are sets of management tools, which enable a Commander bring to bear the predictive power of systems analysis and applied mathematics to the chaos of warfare.
Since EBO Methods are no longer approved, one could search for case studies which demonstrate the cost/benefits of using non-EBO systems analysis and applied mathematics techniques to analyze chaotic situations which are similar to our situation.
Operations Research Analysis is a field, which affords many of its practioner’s a wage above that of the US median wage.
Median annual earnings of operations research analysts were $64,650 in May 2006. The middle 50 percent earned between $48,820 and $85,760. The lowest 10 percent had earnings of less than $38,760, while the highest 10 percent earned more than $108,290. Median annual earnings of operations research analysts working in management, scientific, and technical consulting services were $69,870.OR case study which includes small firms.“Operations research” and “management science” are terms that are used interchangeably to describe the discipline of using advanced analytical techniques to make better decisions and to solve problems. The procedures of operations research were first formalized by the military. They have been used in wartime to effectively deploy radar, search for enemy submarines, and get supplies to where they are most needed. In peacetime and in private enterprises, operations research is used in planning business ventures and analyzing options by using statistical analysis, data and computer modeling, linear programming, and other mathematical techniques.
How Operations Research Drives Success at P&G (Large firm case study)
Can we or should we train our staffs on the use of new (to many of us anyway) management tools in order to support our Commanders? Let us consider what the deep thinkers are saying.
"As Schlesinger said, we must again embrace eggheads and ideas – and the Minerva Consortia can move us in that direction."
Last edited by Surferbeetle; 11-27-2008 at 08:35 AM.
Sapere Aude
It is still a broken tool
Surferbettle I applaude your continuing attempts to integrate science and its ever emerging theories into our planning and operational processes, but I still argue we already used the scientific approach prior to EBO when and where it was applicable. Obviously some were better than others, and I suspect there was a lot of unnecessary wasted effort in previous conflicts, but I don't think EBO is the silver bullet that will address those shortfalls. Of course many shortfalls were only visible in hindsight, and we should keep that in mind. The EBO approach works (as did previous targeting methodologies) when it is applied to relatively simple systems that are predictable, but it is an educated guess at best when it is applied to complex adaptive systems; therefore, it is not a scientific method. I support continued research in this area. We have no idea what will be possible in the future, but EBO theory is not ready "today" for prime time and should not be part of our doctrine.
A couple of interesting articles/studies that support many of the naysayer arguments:
http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/pub.../feature6.html
http://www.securitychallenges.org.au...dKilcullen.pdfAs noted above, the goal of EBO is to force the opponent to make choices that are consciously limited by the structure of a campaign. While this is true of all operations, the distinction between the assumptions of EBO and classic military campaigns is the degree of certainty associated with the limitations of those choices. A brilliant campaigner like Napoleon or Lee might be able, through his own intuition or genius, have the insight to lead his opponent about by the nose; EBO claims a scientific-like process for generating similar outcomes, reliably and in a replicable fashion.
Choice, however, is a matter of human judgement and interpretation. The complexity of any human society stems from the fact that even in the most repressive systems, there is a level of freedom in every human choice. Even the most totalitarian system has never been able to completely reduce human choice to a short list of politically acceptable options. Despite draconian punishments, all political systems have dissidents and criminals. Illiteracy, ignorance, and madness itself also impacts on the choices individuals make and further complicates any model attempting to predict human behaviour. Indeed, the very distinctions between any of these categories are themselves suffused with uncertain political and moral judgements and individualistic interpretations of right and wrong.
Mechanical causality makes three assumptions:
- same causes have the same effects;
- there is an equivalence between the force of the cause and that of its effect; and
- the cause must precede the effect.20
On occassion I use an EBO like model to help define problems and solutions, but I still agree with GEN Mattis' assertion that EBO has done more harm than good for the reasons previously posted.On present trends, it seems probable that EBO will remain at best a worthy
aspiration. The pluralistic nature of Western democracies, including that of
Australia, limits the coherence and unity of an effects-based approach to
strategy. Moreover, Clausewitz’s trinity of chance, uncertainty and friction
continues to characterise war and will make anticipation of even the firstorder
consequences of military action highly conjectural. Interaction between
personalities and events means that any given military action may have
totally unpredictable effects on different actors. In addition, a systems
approach to warfare does not guarantee that second- and third-order
consequences of actions can be predicted, let alone managed. Clausewitz
was right when he argued that the best outcome that a military force could
achieve was to disarm an enemy. The use of force will continue to be an
imperfect instrument of persuasion, while coercion is likely to be unpredictable in its moral impact on an enemy. Uniformed professionals
should strive for the achievement of positive effects from their military
actions while working hard to minimise negative outcomes. Developing a
capacity to be more discriminating in the use of armed force is perhaps the
closest that Australian military practitioners can hope to come to the ideal of
executing effects-based operations.
Concur, but the tools and taxonomies have existed for about 100 years. EBO is not a tool. It is a series of assumptions about the nature of conflict. How would a Brigade Commander in WW1, have used EBO?
I can't see how the so called "Principles of War" bear on this argument. They are sets of arbitrary and generally definition free opinionsCommanders must understand the Principles of War and have appropriate judgment, experience, and capability in order to successfully apply management tools. Effects Based Operations Methods are sets of management tools, which enable a Commander bring to bear the predictive power of systems analysis and applied mathematics to the chaos of warfare.
EBO is not a management tool. If it was, it would be called EBMT. It's proposed as methodology for the conduct of operations, thus it's name.
We don't have to search. We were pretty good at operations in WW1 and 2. I would submit that for pure effectiveness, the British Army of late 1918, has never been matched in scale or complexity. My main question is why do we want to tinker and fiddle with this stuff when were are:Since EBO Methods are no longer approved, one could search for case studies which demonstrate the cost/benefits of using non-EBO systems analysis and applied mathematics techniques to analyze chaotic situations which are similar to our situation.
a.) No good at it.
b.) We have done it successfully before.
IIRC a US Division could conduct an attack in less than 24 hours of receipt from orders from Corps with the majority of Div planning staffs, that usually had less than 2 years training. We don't need new management tools. We need to study history, and make use of what we learn. - not pander to technology and concepts.Can we or should we train our staffs on the use of new (to many of us anyway) management tools in order to support our Commanders
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Mental agility....
A successful fighter is mentally agile. Coalition Forces are currently engaged in a complex fight, which requires mental agility. A Mixed Martial Arts match is an adequate analogy. The standing and ground phases of a match require different techniques, and most importantly, the judgment, experience, and capability to appropriately apply them in order to win. There is no fixed recipe for success and it is very much a stochastic process.
Quote from Bill:
A good Commander, and perhaps a lucky one as well, has a multidisciplinary staff beyond that of the traditional 1, 2, 3, and 4 functions. By welcoming to his staff the historians, the scientists, and the mathematicians he avails himself to a variety of techniques, which can be applied at appropriate times in the fight. A good Commander learns from success and failure.On occassion I use an EBO like model to help define problems and solutions, but I still agree with GEN Mattis' assertion that EBO has done more harm than good for the reasons previously posted.
The World War I battles in and around Asiago Italy were notable for innovative techniques. As the winter snows closed in upon our brother soldiers fighting well above the treeline an innovator decided to dig tunnels in the mountains in order to garrison his men and prevent losses associated with avalanches. Another innovator decided to dig tunnels under the garrisoned men, pack them with explosives, and detonate them. Today’s ridgelines along the battlefield of Asiago still bear witness to what occurred there. If you get the opportunity to walk the battlefield you still have to watch for live ordnance…
Quote from William:
Warfare techniques, tactics, and procedures continually evolve out of necessity. Those who do not adapt to this evolutionary process, or are unlucky, die.We don't have to search. We were pretty good at operations in WW1 and 2. I would submit that for pure effectiveness, the British Army of late 1918, has never been matched in scale or complexity. My main question is why do we want to tinker and fiddle with this stuff when were are:
a.) No good at it.
b.) We have done it successfully before.
Deliberately and decisively massing ones appropriate forces (men, UAV’s, botnets, etc.) at decisive times and places upon the battlefield usually requires a deep understanding of how to achieve and apply unity of command (aka the successful application of appropriate management techniques) . Pre or Post computer world the Principles of War will never lose their functionality or relevance.
Sapere Aude
Well, yeah, but...
That is totally true -- and the successful fighter must apply HIS mental agility and knowledge to be successful. Some people are mathematically inclined. Some are not...
Proponents of EBO are mathematically inclined and seem determined to place that straitjacket around some intuitive tacticians. While they mean well, all they manage to do is constrain the sharp intuitive leader and blunt his abilities.
Many think war is a science -- it is not; it has great human variability thus the practice is an art, not a science.True -- but not proof of the net desirability of EBO as a concept.A good Commander, and perhaps a lucky one as well, has a multidisciplinary staff beyond that of the traditional 1, 2, 3, and 4 functions. By welcoming to his staff the historians, the scientists, and the mathematicians he avails himself to a variety of techniques, which can be applied at appropriate times in the fight. A good Commander learns from success and failure.True again. Did the second innovator use a mathematical model to determine such a scheme would work or was, as is far more likely, it merely an intuitive process on his part?The World War I battles in and around Asiago... Another innovator decided to dig tunnels under the garrisoned men, pack them with explosives, and detonate them.Did Hannibal know this? Nathan Bedford Forrest? Bill Slim?Deliberately and decisively massing ones appropriate forces (men, UAV’s, botnets, etc.) at decisive times and places upon the battlefield usually requires a deep understanding of how to achieve and apply unity of command (aka the successful application of appropriate management techniques)...
On the other hand, William C. Westmoreland was a Harvard MBA.
Point of all that is that there is no one size fits all; people differ and will use what works for them -- and that ought to be okay. I have watched several iterations of mathematically driven 'solutions' to military planning and operations foisted off on the system; all have failed. No reason to quit experimenting -- it IS a reason to not attempt to impose the latest fad as THE solution.
Fascinating discussion - also because it nicely illustrates a) the faddish and formulaic thinking that has become so dominant in our defense organizations AND b) its continued theoretical isolation from the other 'scientific' disciplines. I wish I could say this is a predominantly US pathology, but alas it is not. Many NATO-countries (and even non-NATO ones), with much broader and better access to US doctrinal thinking than ever before (courtesy of NATO, JFCOM liaisons, MPAT, the Internet in general), routinely pick up various new buzz-words and then frantically try to work some version (imitation?) of it into their doctrines. ("damn, we had just written our EBO-doctrine, and now it's apparently 'out' and SOD is 'in' ")
A number of us at TNO (the main Dutch research and technology organization - www.tno.nl - with about 1200 defense scientists) have been struggling with some issues surrounding Complex Adaptive Systems in a number of different projects. These range from more 'theoretical' ones (work on new more adaptive C2 concepts; planning under deep uncertainty, a benchmark study on EB(A)O, some CAS modeling efforts, a little piece now on SOD) to more practical ones (we have rotating in-theater operational analysts supporting the Commander of Dutch Task Force Uruzgan in the South of Afghanistan with, among other things, effects measurement).
For what it's worth - here are some of my personal idiosyncratic take-aways from this work:
- the most useful literature on this for ME personally has been non-military. Chief among those were the following two - essentially sweeping, erudite AND accessible literature reviews of recent thinking in a number of disciplines, which can be used as a stepping stone to the voluminous underlying - and referenced! - material:
- Eric Beinhocker's The Origin of Wealth. Evolution Complexity and the Radical Remaking of Economics (I'd make the chapter on Strategy required reading at our military academies)
- Philip Ball's Critical Mass. How One Thing Leads to Another (Being an Inquiry into the interplay of chance and necessity in the way that human culture, customs, institutions, cooperation and conflict arise)
The few useful references (again IMHO) to this in the defence realm include first and foremost Anne-Marie Grisogono and her team at DSTO in Australia, but also a select few others at various defense research organizations doing serious work on complexity and its implications on operational planning
- The implications of our better understanding of complexity (and the analytical AND practical humility it imposes) are still underestimated in the defense world. This is especially the case for operational planning, which is currently based on heroically simplistic, linear assumptions (i.e. concepts such as course of center of gravity, action, objectives, end-state, etc.) that will have to be rethought. Parts of the EBO-debate have proven useful from this point of view (and the postings of pvebber have been spot-on here from my point of view); others have not (indeed the unjustifiable urge to put the cart in front of the horse by starting to 'model' everything
- The USEFUL bits of the EBO-debate have been hijacked (and now even - temporarily probably - eclipsed) by some fairly mundane stovepipe-games within the US military. While Gen Mattis (for whom I have a LOT of respect, also having supported his Multiple Futures Effort at ACT in NATO) had some excellent points in his Aug 08 memo, stifling the debate was the last thing he should have done. In the REAL spirit of CD&E (another term that has been bastardized almost beyond recognition by (part of) the M&S mafia), or if you prefer 'probing actions' (Grisogono) or a 'bushy' (too bad that word sounds so much like a famous contemporary politician
strategic tree (Beinhocker) - he should have made his point but stimulated further initiatives on this. To give another example - SOD's post-modernist roots are a bit to sophist for my taste, but the way Naveh and his disciples apply it _I_ certainly find worth exploring further (as part of a bushy doctrinal tree).
- It will take a while before the radical implications of these new insights will take root in our defense organizations. Officers who 'understand' wicked problems because of their real-life operational experiences do GET this. They KNOW, for instance, the the OPP is broken and has to get fixed. Give them another 5-10 years and they'll be calling the shots. I fear that in our defense research establishments it will take longer to break the hegemony of the OR/engineering crowd (as a point of disclosure - I myself come from the TRULY most dismal clan of all scientists - I'm a political scientist, who - to add insult to injury - is even a recovering Sovietologist who spent 10 years at RAND
). I observe an interesting emerging clash between that OR/engineering crowd and the sprinklings of say evolutionary biologists who DO get complexity who are being hired now. But the incentive structure of our research institutions is too much geared towards the 'tame', merely complicated problems; and until we get some reallocation of resources and serious retooling and widening of skill-sets, change is unlikely to come from there.
Did I mention these are PERSONAL views?
There's an ocean of deep uncertainty out there (out there in our current and future operations, out there in our future strategic environment) AND some islands of relative certainty (some in our territorial waters, as pvebber pointed out - within the 'predictable' horizon; but ALSO in the deep ocean itself - e.g. much of what pertains to the many remnants of industrial-age armed forces that will stay with us for some time to come). So we have to find ways to merge the still useful parts of what I like to call 'plan and pray' with new, more adaptive, emergent, 'sense and respond' planning schemes.
Would love to hear comments on this - as I will be finishing the paper I'm doing on it before the end of the year!
Cheers!
-Stephan
Why anyone has taken SOD seriously is a mystery to me. In fact I have yet to find anyone who can explain the ideas to me, without descending into semantic waffle and mostly poor English. Naveh's book is hugely confusing and contains substantial inaccuracies and un-supported opinions. The SOD work books that I have, are also either dressed up statements of the obvious or old wine in new bottles.
If you have some other insight, please share.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
I'll tell you SOD is gaining traction here @ SAMS - The Booz Allen Hamilton crowd has retained Naveh and are promoting his ideas to the Army - translating them from Hebrew.
The one brief on SOD I have seen was incomprehensible to me. Something to do with focusing on understanding the environment before understanding the enemy.
I still think it's flavor of the week, but it seems to have "buzz" in the SAMS/Plans crowd.
Agree completely that SOD documentation is probably more understandable if on LSD. I took a week of training stone cold sober, and walked away scratching my head. Naveh thought I was untrainable, and Huba Wass De Czega, understood my frustration, and had plenty of his own. He took my frustration personal as his inability to educate me. As I assured him, my confusion was not his fault.
That said, there is goodness within this, you just have to dig too hard to find it as it is currently written.
In Naveh's defense, this guy is a genius, who is thinking in one language, about concepts that he studied in another language, that he is now trying to communicate to us in a third language. Add to that the fact that he has been thinking about this stuff for years, things that are intuitive to him at this point are completely new concepts to the students.
I really put the onus on the Booz team to be the ones who must translate these concepts into terms that everyone can understand. Naveh resists this, but the managers really need to control the "talent," and take charge of packaging this, or they risk becoming irrelevant as the doctrine writers grow frustrated and shift their focus to what is captured in Commander's Appreciation and Campaign Design instead. Best world is to glean from both.
Another factor that makes SOD difficult is that Naveh is adamant that it not be constrained by, or condensed to a process. But the fact is, that as a planner, if this does not in someway inform the process it is of no practical value.
That said, two major commands have managed to employ this to good effect. ARCENT and USSOCOM. These products have freed planners from a total threat-centric intel analysis and given them a fresh, holistic view of the environment that identifies connections that are otherwise missed, and with a new set of priorities on what is truly important to achieving the desired ends (vs what is considered the most dangerous or most likely "threat" that must be defeated or defended against). The intel guys still get their say, it just now has some perspective to weigh it against.
Last edited by Bob's World; 12-12-2008 at 03:40 PM.
Bob,
Good summary. I am prepared to be convinced by it, heck, would love to be convinced by it.
But if it's that hard to understand and that non-intuitive, how valuable will it ever be? It's the same problem I have wth my colleague's center-of gravity analysis methodlogy - if it's so hard to "get" then how useful is it? I'm not saying every process has to be simple if the results are worth it, but I wonder how much value there is in complexity.
Reminds me of some of the "Boydism" from a previous thread here where the Boydites say you had to have attended one of Boyd's week-long indoctrinations to become a disciple.
The idea that we must understand the environment and how the environment shapes our operations is a good one - moving from being completely enemy centric in our analysis also has beneifts. We at the COIN center have been advocating holistic appreciation of the environment for a few years now.
SOD still confounds me. I suspect those things which I don't understand and yet 'smart' people say is great - EBO was the last one of these.
Last edited by Cavguy; 12-12-2008 at 03:57 PM.
I don't know if Naveh is a genius. His book is extremely difficult to read and understand. Significant parts of what I understand I disagree with. Also, Hebrew is not that hard to translate to English. Hebrew is a very simple and clear language. BS in Hebrew comes out as BS in English. There are nuances, but no more than Russian and German.
If SOD can't be simply explained and articulated and then turned into effective action, with simple training, then it's purpose is to make money and reputation, and not to help the majority of practitioners.
Having seen the intellectual flaws and fraud behind EBO and Manoeuvre Warfare, and having read what I have of SOD, I do not assume SOD to be any different. I may be wrong, but as I see no need for SOD, I am not really inclined to revisit it.
Last edited by William F. Owen; 12-12-2008 at 03:54 PM.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Essentially, it appears that you are saying
SOD EBO. Is that a fair assessment?
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