How To Win

[Surferbeetle]

Bob,

That is one way of defining it to be sure, and you are not alone. Personally I find it much easier to grasp the true dynamics at work, and therefore the true solutions required to the problem, by looking at the military aspect as not some separate event, but as a capability that is brought into a much larger event when it rises to a level that the civil government can not handle by itself.

War is not just limited to the 'traditional military operations' which first come to mind, economic warfare, information warfare, tribal warfare, and many other types of warfare are also involved. Competition for resources takes many forms, not just overt physical violence. I too prefer the broader definition, but Wilf's point is a favored approach by many and perhaps by the majority...

Phased in as needed, phased out as not needed. Sometimes bringing warfighting capabilities, and other times bringing the vast civil capabilities inherent in the manpower, training, organization, and equipment capacity that the military has on hand and uncommitted when not warfighting. Civil capacity is by designed pretty much maxed out. The governmental "reserve" is really its active military force first for overseas engagement, and reserve component military force for domestic engagement.

I look at this differently. While in Mosul my casual survey of the number of coalition engineers who spoke Arabic, who had a social network optimized for the the AO, and who fully understood the location and nuances of the existing public works and utilities infrastructure convinced me that engaging the civil public works and utilities capacity was vital. Iraqi's had the knowledge and numbers needed to assess the situation, and develop a targeted plan which addressed the situation we found on the ground. From my perspective by effectively engaging the 'host nation' we are able to truly mass upon the problem...military CMO force numbers are insufficient.

To look at insurgency and its many related missions as "military operations focused on defeating the threat" does two very dangerous things in my mind:

1. It focuses a solution on a symptom of a problem vs the causes of the problem.

2. It lets the Civil government off the hook for their failure that brought us here in the first place.

By looking at support to a foreign country's insurgency as "COIN" does one very dangerous thing: It causes you to look at their war as your war, and then you beging to take over, and then your very presence expands the insurgency by adding a "resistance" component to the "revolutionary" or "separatist" movement you came to help with. By keeping our intervention in the context of FID, we can focus on repairing the breach between the failed government and the revolting populace.

Makes sense.

Regards,

Steve

[William F. Owen]

War is not just limited to the 'traditional military operations' which first come to mind, economic warfare, information warfare, tribal warfare, and many other types of warfare are also involved. Competition for resources takes many forms, not just overt physical violence. I too prefer the broader definition, but Wilf's point is a favored approach by many and perhaps by the majority...

...but that's not my point. War requires all forms of power, as war is political in nature. Even Neolithic, or wars between African/Native American tribes conforms to this norm.

Warfare (as opposed to war) is the domain of the military. There is no such thing as "Economic Warfare." There is merely the use of economic means to reduce the enemies capacity to conduct violence. That only becomes Warfare when you use military forces to execute it.

Sorry to sound pedantic or semantic, but words - Bob said - are important.

[Bob's World]

Bob,

I look at this differently. While in Mosul my casual survey of the number of coalition engineers who spoke Arabic, who had a social network optimized for the the AO, and who fully understood the location and nuances of the existing public works and utilities infrastructure convinced me that engaging the civil public works and utilities capacity was vital. Iraqi's had the knowledge and numbers needed to assess the situation, and develop a targeted plan which addressed the situation we found on the ground. From my perspective by effectively engaging the 'host nation' we are able to truly mass upon the problem...military CMO force numbers are insufficient.

Of course we did not go to Iraq to perform FID to assist the Government there to serve its populace more effectively. We invaded to destroy the government because we believed them to be a threat to America.

Then, finding ourselves possessed of a shattered nation with no governance of its own, and having a populace with no love for the invader, things started to get very complicated very fast.

First we declared war on the government of Iraq. Then, once that government was defeated, the Populace of Iraq declared war on the United States. Needless to say, this created one complex, dynamic mess that defies all easy models; and is a mix of several evolving models.

I am optimisitc that this unfortunate story will one day have an extremely positive ending to it; but even if it does, students of military history will be forced to study this little vignette for thousands of years to come. This will be due in part to the story of how it played out, but primarily to the unique location and transitory period between major historic eras that it will come to mark. Not the end of the United States; but the beginning of the end of the final residues of the Western Colonial system and classic application of the western model of sovereignty contained within the Treaty of Westphalia. The rise of popular power and competing entities to the state will mark the new era. My prediction.

I suspect the historic powers of the Middle East will re-emerge to dominate the region for the same reasons they did so for thousands of years prior to oil shifting the balance. Egypt, Iraq, Iran and Israel will all benefit from key terrain and enduring resources to be major players once again in the region.

Once we get our nose out of the oil trough long enough to look around and take a fresh longterm perspective I believe we will form new policies and priorities that puts in a better light with the majority of the populaces there.

[Surferbeetle]

Warfare (as opposed to war) is the domain of the military. There is no such thing as "Economic Warfare." There is merely the use of economic means to reduce the enemies capacity to conduct violence. That only becomes Warfare when you use military forces to execute it.

Sorry to sound pedantic or semantic, but words - Bob said - are important.

Wilf,

You are correct on the importance of definition's, and I do get a bit lazy with words from time to time, but a precise definition of 'warfare' seems to be an elusive one. I know it when I see it, but what I know may not be the same as what you know even though there are commonalities in our view.

When I model hydraulic situations I can discuss precisely the effects of pressure, temperature, friction, and elevation upon water (as an aside I'd hang onto the Golan as well ). When I model stocks I can less precisely discuss the effects of average costs, book value, currency fluctuations, dividends, upon price forecasts for specific stocks. We do not have this mathematical edifice for warfare and thus descriptions are much less precise.

I am outta time, so more on this subject later this weekend.

Best,

Steve

[Ken White]

Of course we did not go to Iraq to perform FID to assist the Government there to serve its populace more effectively. We invaded to destroy the government because we believed them to be a threat to America.

Then, finding ourselves possessed of a shattered nation with no governance of its own, and having a populace with no love for the invader, things started to get very complicated very fast.

pair of paragraphs raise a pair of questions.

Did we really invade because we thought the Iraqi regime was truly a threat -- or did we invade for another purpose and -- possibly foolishly -- use the potential of an Iraqi threat as public justification?

I think the answer to that question has a bearing on the discussion.

Re: the second quoted paragraph, totally correct observation but it does raise the question of why prior planning did not prevent poor performance on our part.

That may also have a bearing on your discussion.

The answers to those questions also tie with Wilf's earlier comment:

"If the US is trying to do FID, then changing the local governments policy is the task of the State Department and not the DoD. All military action has political and social consequences. The only thing currently lacking is the effective teaching of the enduring fact."

To which I'd add that the State Department ought to have a great deal more say BEFORE we get frisky as well as considerably more input during and after...

(and yes, I'm aware of the personalities involved in the case of invading Iraq --as well as Congress' ineptitude and State's own guided descent into oblivion with the connivance of an unthinking and venal Congress )

[Bob's World]

pair of paragraphs raise a pair of questions.

Did we really invade because we thought the Iraqi regime was truly a threat -- or did we invade for another purpose and -- possibly foolishly -- use the potential of an Iraqi threat as public justification?

I think the answer to that question has a bearing on the discussion.

Re: the second quoted paragraph, totally correct observation but it does raise the question of why prior planning did not prevent poor performance on our part.

That may also have a bearing on your discussion.

The answers to those questions also tie with Wilf's earlier comment:To which I'd add that the State Department ought to have a great deal more say BEFORE we get frisky as well as considerably more input during and after...

(and yes, I'm aware of the personalities involved in the case of invading Iraq --as well as Congress' ineptitude and State's own guided descent into oblivion with the connivance of an unthinking and venal Congress )

We see ourselves in a certain light, and continue to be surprised when others see us differently. I suspect the President truly believed that the Iraqi people would greet us with open arms. Perhaps if we would have gone in with a better plan designed to addressed longer term issues than the defeat of the Iraqi army they would have. We'll never know.

I'm reading a book currently on Afghanistan that points out a similiar window of opportunity lost at the point where the Taliban were defeated in Kandahar, and the various allies we coordinated with were jockying for power in that area. Better understanding of who these guys were, their relative histories with each other and the populace, etc would have been good info to make sure power ended up in the right hands. Book also makes the case that there was a security role for the Taliban to play as well that they were willing to take on.

The author implies US intrigue and intent to create chaos, but we really just aren't that sophisticated. Most of what she describes, while accurate, I suspect was due primarily to just not having all the info and having to take the word of the guys you're actually with. I think the agendas were mostly local.

To be fair though, that op went down very fast. But as we were discussing a few days ago, those "irrevocable choices" get made as to who you partner with, and sometimes they come back and haunt you. Real lesson is that this is complex business that goes way beyond military skills, and that the military must include a wide range of experts in their planning to ensure that they have shaped their operation properly, and created the right alliances, for the enduring stability that is sought.

[Ken White]

...I suspect the President truly believed that the Iraqi people would greet us with open arms.

Possibly true but the issue I raised was why we went. Going somewhere one is not wanted to remove a threat is one thing; going there to pose a threat is quite a different thing. That difference can significantly affect the debate in this thread.

Perhaps if we would have gone in with a better plan designed to addressed longer term issues than the defeat of the Iraqi army they would have. We'll never know.

True, we won't know -- shame DoD, JCS and the Army did not do a better job. Or did the game change early on? My suspicion is that it did but that's really irrelevant now. What happened after the invasion makes little difference to the discussion; I'm not sure that why we went is as unimportant.

The author implies US intrigue and intent to create chaos, but we really just aren't that sophisticated.Most of what she describes, while accurate, I suspect was due primarily to just not having all the info and having to take the word of the guys you're actually with. I think the agendas were mostly local.

We will have to disagree on that. While part of what you say is certainly accurate, we can be and are usually more sophisticated than we're generally credited. The soft bigotry of low expectations has its uses.

If one is going to be routinely accused of being stupidly evil, that can be used to good effect on occasion.

...the military must include a wide range of experts in their planning to ensure that they have shaped their operation properly, and created the right alliances, for the enduring stability that is sought.

I agree but will also point out that the policy makers, regardless of what they say, are not always seeking enduring stability...

[Surferbeetle]

Warfare (as opposed to war) is the domain of the military. There is no such thing as "Economic Warfare." There is merely the use of economic means to reduce the enemies capacity to conduct violence. That only becomes Warfare when you use military forces to execute it.

Sorry to sound pedantic or semantic, but words - Bob said - are important.

Does warfare consist of more than overt physical violence? Does Economic Warfare qualify as a component of warfare? What is warfare? Who is responsible for the definition?

First, I’d like to throw out some ideas to use to examine this question. These ideas include mapping & analysis (GIS), urban metabolism, differential diagnosis, indicators (metrics) & indicator populations, and monetary diplomacy.

Richard Florida in a thought-provoking piece in this months Atlantic entitled How the Crash Will Reshape America provides a series of interesting examples in the use of economic geography to map our self inflicted wound. He describes the concept of urban metabolism by which successful countries, mega-regions, cities, or boundary crossing places can be examined for their ability to convert various inputs into economic energy. He also discusses economic shifts from agricultural, to manufacturing based industrialization, to creative industrialization and where in America this is occurring.

(Added link: http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/20090...down-geography )

Jeffrey Sachs, in his book The End of Poverty, provides insights into the idea of using a differential diagnosis to assess the economic health of an area and to do something about it. He defines capital as consisting of Business Capital, Human Capital, Infrastructure, Natural Capital, Knowledge Capital, and Public Institutional Capital. His differential diagnosis checklist is presented as having seven components one of which includes poverty mapping, which as further described reflects an understanding of the uses of GIS and incorporates his definition of capital.

David Landes in his book The Wealth and Poverty of Nations, and Paul Kennedy in his book The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, both examine global economic bases of power & weakness and their myriad components across the centuries. William Gibson in his book Pattern Recognition tells a modern story about applied marketing, which provides insight into the gathering of metrics. Peter Bernstein, in his book Against the Gods The Remarkable Story of Risk covers applied mathematics through the ages. Max Boot, in his book The Savage Wars of Peace, provides a narrative and analysis of small wars and dollar diplomacy. The Cambridge Illustrated History of Warfare focuses upon the broad sweep of Western warfare.

All of these references are interesting reads and provide background to my thesis that warfare is defined as the competition for resources, it is multifaceted, and it is not limited to just overt violence. Warfare cannot be accurately described by just one thinker/examiner/researcher using one model (the parable of elephants & blind men always applies). Students and practitioners of warfare have a broadly scoped portfolio to master.

Clausewitz has been translated to say “destruction of the enemy forces is the overriding principle of war”. Being simple and concise this absolute briefs well, however it is a flawed analysis through its oversimplification of a complex world. How many times has history witnessed the destruction of a people due to warfare (in the absolute sense that Clausewitz implies here)? Clausewitz does, however come from a Germanic people famed for their skills in warfare and it is instructive to examine their transition from a reliance on overt violence to a reliance upon economics in the competition for resources. Mary Fullbrook’s book A Concise History of Germany, Kurt F. Reinhardt’s Germany: 2000 Years, and of course Wikipedia (I know, I know) will be my references for my brief flyby on Germany’s startling transition from warriors to applied economists.

The Roman Cornelius Tacitus (AD 54-120 or AD 55-116) wrote about the early tribal Germans in his book Germania. It is described as being slanted in favor of the barbarians and their idealized lifestyle. Weapons of choice were described as the framea (a short javelin), the francisca (hatchet), slings, and bow & arrow. Shields were used for defense. Tribal units were the Sippe (clan), the Hufe (hide – different lots of households), Hundertschaft (~100 households), and Stamm (tribe). Tribal feuds cost lives and were ultimately resolved in Weregeld (blood money), Fickle and independent Wodan was the HMFIC and it was all prophesied to end in blood and tears in the Ragnarok.

The massive Volkerwanderung (migrations) started before AD 375, resulted in profound societal upheavals upon the European Continent and set the stage for the ongoing and sometimes very bloody competition for resources seen in milestones such as AD 486 (Clovis defeats last Roman Governor in Gaul), AD 843 (Treaty of Verdun - division of Frankish Kingdom), 1517 (Martin Luther publishes 95 theses), 1525 (Albrecht von Hohenzollern joins the Protestant team), 1618 (Thirty Years War kicks off, food fights among Royalty, religious fights, peasant revolts due to economic downturn, etc.), 1648 (Peace of Westphalia), 1724-1804 (Immanuel Kant drops in for a visit), 1914 –1918 (WWI), 1941-1945 (WWII), and 1989 (Reunification).

Germany’s 2008 GDP is 2,897 billion USD (America 13,164 billion and Israel 140 billion for scale). Throughout it all: blood money, booty, bribes, indulgences, Reich taxes, loans, defaults, overseas economic exploration/exploitation, reparations costs, chemical & engineering mastery, and overt physical violence it is all about competition for resources and it is all warfare. Mapping & analysis (GIS), urban metabolism, differential diagnosis, indicators (metrics) & indicator populations, monetary diplomacy are tools to help see it more clearly however I say that in any analysis the parable of elephants & blind men always applies. Clausewitz does not have the definitive nor final word on warfare.

[Surferbeetle]

Of course we did not go to Iraq to perform FID to assist the Government there to serve its populace more effectively. We invaded to destroy the government because we believed them to be a threat to America.

No arguments with this. The old ‘this is the real deal and all the training I have done to date has led to this’ feeling was very strong for me while reading the op order before we left. The experience was reminiscent of my first jump at airborne school. On the ground however, as time passed things changed, and accomplishing the mission (to include the CA/CMO mission) required the ability to adapt and overcome well beyond what was originally envisioned.

Then, finding ourselves possessed of a shattered nation with no governance of its own, and having a populace with no love for the invader, things started to get very complicated very fast.

Respect and fear was very prevalent in the beginning of OIF 1. Much of the Hoi Polloi that I interacted with in my daily missions were cautiously looking forward to positive change. There was a glaring expectations mismatch however that bit us in the ass. Western TV projects power and almost god-like capability and this IO campaign had an effect. We did not meet these expectations (Ken brings an interesting point to consider about the intent behind this) and when became apparent to all that we would not meet these expectations, it all went downhill fast. The summer was the final straw, 125F +, no electricity, no water, small islands of transient security…it was much more dangerous than anything I had every done to date and taught me some interesting lessons about the human animal.

First we declared war on the government of Iraq. Then, once that government was defeated, the Populace of Iraq declared war on the United States. Needless to say, this created one complex, dynamic mess that defies all easy models; and is a mix of several evolving models.

Everybody has their own war experience, however my assessment was that we had a real chance to keep the lid on, in Mosul, at least. Disbanding of the Army and DeBathification were perceived as shoes to the face…failure to fix the electricity was a daily reminder to the populace and was perceived in many ways. The culture is oral/rumor based and perceptions quickly twisted in very Byzantine and strange fashion to this westerner.

I am optimistic that this unfortunate story will one day have an extremely positive ending to it; but even if it does, students of military history will be forced to study this little vignette for thousands of years to come. This will be due in part to the story of how it played out, but primarily to the unique location and transitory period between major historic eras that it will come to mark. Not the end of the United States; but the beginning of the end of the final residues of the Western Colonial system and classic application of the western model of sovereignty contained within the Treaty of Westphalia. The rise of popular power and competing entities to the state will mark the new era. My prediction.

You have marked the transition correctly in my opinion…

I suspect the historic powers of the Middle East will re-emerge to dominate the region for the same reasons they did so for thousands of years prior to oil shifting the balance. Egypt, Iraq, Iran and Israel will all benefit from key terrain and enduring resources to be major players once again in the region.

Once we get our nose out of the oil trough long enough to look around and take a fresh longterm perspective I believe we will form new policies and priorities that puts in a better light with the majority of the populaces there.

After all of this we are still cranking out monster SUV’s and undercharging for fuel…we truly need to get deadly serious about energy independence. This is the second time in my lifetime we have taken a shot to the pills on this subject (first time shame on…, second time…)

[Bill Moore]

Wilf, I'm not sure what economic warfare, irregular warfare, regular warfare, ultimately means, but you wrote that warfare was strictly the role of military, thus there is no such thing as economic warfare. That is a tough pill to swallow, and one of the reasons that I think too much reliance on Clausewitz as all knowing and all seeing can be counter productive. I'm an admirer of Clausewitz, not one of the many Clausewitz personality cult extremist members.

AQ said they were waging economic warfare upon us, and it started with the attack on the WTC with its severe economic impact, followed with the anticipated prolonged ground campaign that AQ believes is unwinnable by either side militarily, but in the end the conflict will destroy America's economy (and consequently the developed world's economy).

Understand you may not agree with the following, but I'm attempting to use the logic in the irregular warfare definition. If the definition of irregular warfare means that the population is the primary objective, then the primary objective of regular warfare must be the enemy's combat forces. If warfare is described by its primary objective, then it is logical to assume there good be something called economic warfare. I think we will find ourselves in agreement that this logic is flawed on many levels, but I think it equally unwise to dismiss the concept of economic warfare completely.

You also wrote FID only concurs when we provide military support to a host nation. That is factually flawed, because FID encompasses any support to a HN's Internal Development and Defense (IDAD) program to help ward off internal threats. It is a whole of government activity (as much as I hate that term). The military in some cases may not even play a role in it.

That brings me to my final point, one that should be debated. You wrote that Soldiers should not be used to solve social problems. IMHO it is this mindset that led to the initial failures we experienced in Afghanistan and Iraq, and it conflicts with the lessons of history. Mao's army focused on both, the U.S. Army focused on both during WWII (martial law in Germany and Japan, enabling a transfer to a successful government), etc. Failure to address the underlying political and social issues in a conflict will almost always result in failure, and the military is frequently the only organization with the capacity to do so.

[William F. Owen]

Wilf, I'm not sure what economic warfare, irregular warfare, regular warfare, ultimately means, but you wrote that warfare was strictly the role of military, thus there is no such thing as economic warfare. That is a tough pill to swallow, and one of the reasons that I think too much reliance on Clausewitz as all knowing and all seeing can be counter productive.

What I actually said was,

War requires all forms of power, as war is political in nature. Even Neolithic, or wars between African/Native American tribes conforms to this norm.

Warfare (as opposed to war) is the domain of the military. There is no such thing as "Economic Warfare." There is merely the use of economic means to reduce the enemies capacity to conduct violence. That only becomes Warfare when you use military forces to execute it.

So I differentiate between WAR and WARFARE. Warfare is violence, thus the domain of an armed force/military. All instruments of power (economic, cultural, social etc) are used to in war, but they don't do any killing.

Does economics matter in War/conflict? Yes, hugely! It funds warfare and all the instruments of power, but it does not commit violence.

[William F. Owen]

Does warfare consist of more than overt physical violence? Does Economic Warfare qualify as a component of warfare? What is warfare? Who is responsible for the definition?

Yes it does. War is the use of violence for political means. Violence is a qualifier, in the same way we differentiate between fraud and armed robbery.

Clausewitz has been translated to say “destruction of the enemy forces is the overriding principle of war”. Being simple and concise this absolute briefs well, however it is a flawed analysis through its oversimplification of a complex world.

I can't see how it is flawed. Remember the context of Clausewitz's main form of argument between, between war as it should be and war as it actually is. The analysis holds true, for any form of armed conflict. If all the insurgents in Iraq had been destroyed/defeated, the insurgency would have been defeated overnight. Could that happen in reality? No, of course not, but that does not undermine the basic principle of the force of arms. The primary use of armed force is to destroy/break the will of the enemy. If the enemy starves to death, it's because armed force stopped him getting any food.

The world CvC wrote in was just as complex and even perhaps more unpredictable than the one in which we live today.

As an aside, to yourself and Bill Moore I am only a reader or Clausewitz because I see no one else who is so consistently right, though far from perfect. EG: Mao read Clausewitz, and did nothing to contradict, or even improve upon him.

[Bob's World]

Wilf, I'm not sure what economic warfare, irregular warfare, regular warfare, ultimately means, but you wrote that warfare was strictly the role of military, thus there is no such thing as economic warfare. That is a tough pill to swallow, and one of the reasons that I think too much reliance on Clausewitz as all knowing and all seeing can be counter productive. I'm an admirer of Clausewitz, not one of the many Clausewitz personality cult extremist members.

AQ said they were waging economic warfare upon us, and it started with the attack on the WTC with its severe economic impact, followed with the anticipated prolonged ground campaign that AQ believes is unwinnable by either side militarily, but in the end the conflict will destroy America's economy (and consequently the developed world's economy).

Understand you may not agree with the following, but I'm attempting to use the logic in the irregular warfare definition. If the definition of irregular warfare means that the population is the primary objective, then the primary objective of regular warfare must be the enemy's combat forces. If warfare is described by its primary objective, then it is logical to assume there good be something called economic warfare. I think we will find ourselves in agreement that this logic is flawed on many levels, but I think it equally unwise to dismiss the concept of economic warfare completely.

You also wrote FID only concurs when we provide military support to a host nation. That is factually flawed, because FID encompasses any support to a HN's Internal Development and Defense (IDAD) program to help ward off internal threats. It is a whole of government activity (as much as I hate that term). The military in some cases may not even play a role in it.

That brings me to my final point, one that should be debated. You wrote that Soldiers should not be used to solve social problems. IMHO it is this mindset that led to the initial failures we experienced in Afghanistan and Iraq, and it conflicts with the lessons of history. Mao's army focused on both, the U.S. Army focused on both during WWII (martial law in Germany and Japan, enabling a transfer to a successful government), etc. Failure to address the underlying political and social issues in a conflict will almost always result in failure, and the military is frequently the only organization with the capacity to do so.

I get exactly what you are saying and agree. When I read Wilf's reply, it seems he is taking your comments in a slightly different context than what I believe you intended.

I see this often. SF guys all began life as conventional military men, and then by inclination, ability, training, and ultimately experience, develop into a "special operator," working in the fringes of war and warfare in a way much more connected to the people (populace in which engagement occurs, allies, enemies, etc); and therefore take an understanding of "Irregular" warfare that I think is often lost on those who remained in the "our military team vs there military team" world of conventional operations. Professionals separated by a common profession and language...

[Bill Moore]

Professionals separated by a common profession and language...

I feel like a 3 y/o kid because I want to keep asking why your quote above is true. Why don't they understand? Or am I missing the bigger picture? We're looking at the same problem set, but we see two different things entirely. Unfortunately there is a lot of truth in the statement that if you're a hammer, then everything looks like a nail.

[Ron Humphrey]

Has anyone else tried replacing the terms war and warfare as they are used so often here, and replaced them with conflict?

I did and in some ways most still came across with the same basics, some on the other hand did not. Perhaps there is something there but not quite sure yet


Many might say there's little difference between warring parties and conflicting agendas but for some reason it feels like therein might be found a delineation worth exploring.

Sounds like something C might have tried to point out.

[Ken White]

"Professionals separated by a common profession and language..."

Why don't they understand?

I don't think a lack of understanding is the problem. Bound to be for a few but the majority I believe understand; they just are not inclined to want to get enmeshed in other cultures to a great extent. How many guys do you know in SF who do not enthuse about performing FID or similar missions but want to go to the CIF?

Or am I missing the bigger picture? We're looking at the same problem set, but we see two different things entirely. Unfortunately there is a lot of truth in the statement that if you're a hammer, then everything looks like a nail.

That's part of it -- then again some people just don't like goat meat or rice. It's not so much that they do not understand -- just that THEY don't want to do it.

That's at least part of why there's an ongoing DA / SF disconnect. Been that way ever since the first SF was invented. Likely will be that way for our great Grandkids...

[Bill Moore]

Ken, you're right, most of the bubba's on point prefer DA, and some of our leaders prefer to refer to DA as a decisive IW operation, instead of a being a supporting operation. It goes back to human nature, I prefer DA to living with Jose from a comfort standpoint. Most foreign populations in developing countries have less than desirable living conditions when it comes to hygiene, food standards, disease, violence, etc., (although the cultures in SE Asia can be enjoyable). While SF may not like to live with Jose, they'll do it if ordered to do so, and do it better than most. If you give guys a choice they'll generally take the most comfortable option.

[slapout9]

Maybe there is no such thing as Economic Warfare but there are certainly such things as Economic weapons. Money is about the only substance that can have the same EFFECTS as Global Nuclear War...without the radiation problems. It can and has created conditions that have destroyed businesses, caused deaths, homelessness and joblessness just like war and certainly created an increase in crime. The fact that our western mindset wants to put a certain definition to a certain word or words does not make that definition a fact as opposed to an opinion. Further our enemies understand perfectly well what economic weapons can do.

[Surferbeetle]

Followed the not-so/well beaten trail through the brush towards a landnav point WWII British Minister of Economic Warfare Pretty sure that Ken's been here and gone...

[William F. Owen]

...and therefore take an understanding of "Irregular" warfare that I think is often lost on those who remained in the "our military team vs there military team" world of conventional operations. Professionals separated by a common profession and language...

Well luckily have a pretty good understanding of what some call "irregular warfare." - but yes language is a problem.

For example, I would try never to say "Irregular warfare," unless speaking to someone with whom I had little understanding of their operational references.