Winning the War in Afghanistan

[MikeF]

However, I think it fails to take into account the ability of the Taliban and its motives, as well as the possible reaction of Pakistan and Iran. The GoA is experiencing a crisis of legitimacy at the moment in the international arena and a slow-motion destruction of said legitimacy in the eyes of the Afghan public. The withdrawal of foreign forces will mean in reality handing on-the-ground control over entire provinces of Afghanistan over to the Taliban and its allies. It is difficult to see how the GoA can survive in such a state.

Such a GoA would likely be forced to bandwagon support from what commanders it could bribe or manhandle to its side. Iran, and more importantly, the Pakistani military establishment, would seek out similar allies to entrench their own interests. Large segments of Pakistan's military appear to believe that Pakistan's interests are best served by aligning with the Taliban, the HiG, and the Haqqanis rather than the GoA.

The examples of El Salvador, the Philippines, and Colombia lack the troublesome neighbors that Afghanistan has, as well as the centrality to the jihadi universe that Afghanistan represents. All three states were also far more advanced and able than the GoA or the Afghan Army and Police are ever likely to be, even with American assistance.

Tequila,

Excellent points; however, we're probably going to face those issues regardless of the strategy we choose. We disrupted the balance of powers in SW Asia with our invasions in Iraq and Afghanistan. As the scientists say, for every action there is an equal reaction. I imagine we will see a lot of brinksmanship, deception, and coercion as different states seek hegemony.

We cannot copy/paste the Phillipines/ El Salv/ or Colombia solution into Afghanistan. We have to use METT-TC.

Slap- I've got my homework.

v/r

Mike

[slapout9]

David and everybody, here is the article/BLOG post from the SWJ Blog by Allsion Brown, pay attention to point number 8 about Intelligence, also the whole article on dealing with drugs in A'stan.

8. "DEA intelligence experts and a growing network of informants — something other U.S. agencies have been unable to duplicate — are now providing detailed "actionable" information; "target sets" that can be rapidly exploited in "capture-kill" missions." No other U.S. agencies are tasked this way so no other agency has duplicated DEA efforts. More interesting is DEA's past unwillingness to heed recommendations from "networks of informants" used by other agencies. The "hit the kingpins not the farmers" strategy was suggested as early as February 2004 Kenefick and Morgan in a think piece for USAID (and perhaps earlier from sources I do not know). The US has not pursued this strategy till now. The works of David Mansfield and his colleagues on lowering incentives to produce poppy are cited in previous posts on this site.

http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/200...l-oliver-nort/

MikeF, glad you could find it.

[jmm99]

A more in-depth look at AI and actual legal practice is found in this 200+ page thesis, Neural Networks for Legal Quantum Prediction, Andrew J. Terrett (LL.M. 1994, UBC) - leave it to a Brit at a Canadian school. Good survey of the field up to early 90s (so, a bit dated)

Much of this, from the legal practitioner's standpoint, is pattern recognition - some implicit, some explicit. I have a case (that's a pattern). Have I seen similar patterns; if so, find them. Compare patterns - which ones are closest ? How does my pattern differ; how is it the same ? How can I develop my pattern ?

I think the most important thing is not trying to cram down the at hand pattern into an existing pattern. Each case is a little different, even from existing patterns which are quite close. So, not a cookbook solution; but one that requires discernment - and a bit of artistry, even if you are primarily a technician as I am.

These same concepts may have some bearing on military and law enforcement solutions.

My bottom line is that, at least in law, there is no easy mechanical solution, where you can just check the boxes. Except, in easy cases; but lawyers do not get easy cases - those are resolved by the parties without need for much legal beagle input.

[Ken White]

JMM:

In any event, the targeted AQ mission is not a reason for substantial force projection in Astan - the belled cat requires only his own little litter box and a good supply of yummies.

I certainly believe that to be correct.

Bob's World:

So, I ask this august group, those who feel morally compelled to hold this piece of dirt at all costs when no enemy action fixes us to it, nor does any critical interest become exposed to enemy action if we withdraw to better ground, which, exactly, of these two ends do you think we can either achieve or enhance by this plan??

I've heard no one concerned with 'holding' any dirt except the COIN fetishists with their 'clear, hold and build' routine and that implies only temporary holding in the cleared state. I don't think anyone is wedded to the dirt. I'm pretty well convinced the bulk of the US Army would like nothing better than to say goodbye to Afghanistan.

You are correct that no enemy action fixes us to it -- but that elides the point that history indicates that potential enemy actions merit consideration. You seem to disagree. Do you believe that there will be no effect if we abruptly depart or that such affect will not create other problems?

You say no critical interest becomes exposed to enemy action if we withdraw. Define 'critical' and define 'enemy action.'

Withdraw to better ground? Where, precisely would that be?

You prefaced the above quoted question with this"

So, based on this I argued then that the GWOT was really over, that we had met the ends and that what we were engaged in now was really something very different and we needed to either identify it as such, or begin standing it down.

Two questions; While you have declared the GWOT over and the current Administration no longer uses the term; have all the actions put in play for that misnamed war ceased or should they cease. Note the underline, all...

If the answer to that question is no, then your solution is suspect at best and very premature at worst. Further, it would seem that we have in effect identified it as different -- in that the phrase is no longer used and the current Administration has said they propose to increase the Intelligence and Law Enforcement actions previously begun as a part of said misnamed war. It would also appear that we are in fact standing down the aspects of that 'war' you do not agree with -- just not doing it as rapidly as you seem to prefer.

You end that post with :

Physical Terrain in such warfare means nothing to the enemy, be it hill 875 outside Dak To; or an entire country such as Afghanistan. We need to focus on the populace...

That's what seems to be occurring; the emphasis on holding terrain is a phenomenon induced by nothing more that poor education and training; learned habits die hard. The solution to that problem lies in better education and training, strategic thought has nothing to do with it...

That, however, merely explains some of the tactical level terrain oriented actions. I have seen absolutely no indication at the operational or strategic level with any concern for terrain other than as a mechanism to provide security for the populace. Thus, I submit that the intent to remain in Afghanistan a bit longer is not terrain oriented but is in fact populace oriented and specifically is an attempt to obtain what you say you desire, their neutrality if not their support.

Back to JMM on compromise is considered surrender. Bad statement on my part -- and Fuchs properly called me on it. There is validity to the premise, however a more accurate statement is that compromise is seized upon by born hagglers as a sign of weakness and something that must or can be exploited. The counterpoint, of course is that one should be quite careful and aware of the adversary's possible perceptions and his potential counter actions. In some cases it may be desirable not to the logical thing but to do something that seems perverse. That can be particularly true in cross cultural conflicts and to the denizen of the ME and South Asia, a withdrawal is interpreted, rightly or wrongly as a potential weakness and is to be exploited in every possible way. One has to tailor operations to counter the specific opponent.

Bob's World again:

My vote is for smaller, more focused, less demands on our allies and less impact on the states and populaces where the action takes place... Then hand the mission to a small, well resourced team of quiet professionals and let them do their job.

That I agree with. My perception is that was planned all along and is getting worked up. What was also planned all along was a strategic disruption and a deterrent action. Those actions, had either been well stated by the political crowd and well executed by the US Army would have been over long ago. Due to errors of commission and omission by all the Armed Forces as well as the political heirarchy, it's off schedule. That simple. The basic plan is still being followed, it 'll just take a bit longer.

It takes a big man to admit ones mistakes and to start fresh; but usually such action draws far more respect than disdain. I think its ok to say "we made some decisions, that in retrospect probably weren't the best ones, and we need to readjust our position and policy here.

There's more to it than that; the many mistakes -- not all at the strategic level -- have put us in a position of having to do what we said we would do for very good reasons. It's one thing to say "we erred." it's quite another to say "We erred and we meant what we said at the time but now we no longer want to do that."

You can correctly say that's not the case -- but I'm pretty sure that's the way the rest of the world will see it. Not just the Afghans and Islam; the rest of the world. Surely someone intent on restoring American values and prestige cannot be advocating walking into that trap?

I think we win by taking a more moderate course in support of the Afghan government (whatever that may become) and its people. Rightsizing our 'dogged pursuit' efforts enables this as well.

So do I. Had we done a better job in Afghanistan, we wouldn't be having this discussion; we didn't so we're late in departing. I guess the difference is that we disagree on two things:

What, precisely, is such a moderate course at this time?

Are the 'quiet professionals' totally ready at this time to undertake that right sized pursuit?

The US Government seems to share my concerns...

[Bob's World]

I guess that is the $64K question.

I actually think the scope of the solutions begins to take care of itself once one re-scopes their Ends-Ways-Means.

Step one: Go back to our original Ends. Deny Sanctuary to AQ in Afghanistan.

Step two: Flush the "Ways" of "Hold-Clear-Build" that sets as success the production of a military that looks much like ours (what would Afghanistan possibly need such a force for? Haven't the Greek, British, Russian and American experiences all proven that such a force is the wrong one to deal with any threat arising from the populace, and that the populace itself if the perfect force for dealing with any foreign military that dare invade??) coupled with a government that looks much like ours.

Step three: Set a new "ways" that focuses on building a security force that is very much a Gendarmerie that can do semi-military and civil policing both.; couple this with a very focused, targeted by community program of identifying those failures of governance that are most important to these many pockets of populace and facilitating Afghan efforts to address the same.

Step four: Stop using Afghanistan as a base of operations to attack the populace of Pakistan, and tailor our man-hunting against AQSL to just be the actual AQSL. Take any intel bubba who shows a "7-degrees to Kevin Bacon" type of chart as to why we need to attack some totally unrelated organization to the nearest infantry squad and make him walk point for a month. This includes stopping our campaign against the Taliban and entering negotiations with the same. These guys aren't "terrorists" and they aren't AQ, they are nationalist insurgents, and as such they are part of the future of any Afghanistan that emerges from the current drama. Make them pony up and help.

Step five: Assess the AQ(UW)N that is networked across the region and determine which nodes are critical to enabling AQ's influence, and what mid-low level guys actually make those specific nodes function. Take those guys out and disrupt the network.

Step six: Wrap all of this in a cogent narrative that matches both our own national principles as well as our actions on the ground. Never let any of those things get out of line, and remember that the entire world is watching, and they judge us by what and how we do it, not by what we say.

Step seven: Stop calling Afghanistan and Iraq "wars." America is at peace. Did we say we were "a nation at war" in 1876 when Custer led his men into the valley of the Little Big Horn? Did we say we were "a nation at war" when Pershing quelled the Moro uprising in 1911? The list goes on. Peace is dirty business for us in the Military, we don't need to drag the entire nation into the muck with us. Bad form, and it causes us to exaggerate consequences. Implement "Full-Spectrum Deterrence" instead, which includes everything described above as part of keeping a lid on things. It also includes re-balanced deterrence against state threats around the world and various other quasi-state, non-state, and insurgent threats in a comprehensive scheme that never lets actions to achieve an effect on one get so out of balance that they provoke many others.


Ok, there's a start. I hammered that out alone in 10 minutes. I suspect a real staff could clean up the holes in short order.

This isn't rocket science, it is social science. Once we stop trying to control every outcome, things will begin to sort themselves out. We don't cut and run, we stay in appropriate numbers and roles to enable evolution. The world is a dynamic place right not. We can't stop it, but we have to get in there and paddle like hell to keep up with the flow of change.

Oh yeah, almost forgot. All of these steps must be done concurrently.

[Surferbeetle]

PS: For a view of how the legal system, judges & lawyers actually operate, take a look at "FROM LEGAL THEORIES TO NEURAL NETWORKS AND FUZZY REASONING" (only 11 pages).

A more in-depth look at AI and actual legal practice is found in this 200+ page thesis, Neural Networks for Legal Quantum Prediction, Andrew J. Terrett (LL.M. 1994, UBC) - leave it to a Brit at a Canadian school. Good survey of the field up to early 90s (so, a bit dated)

Mike,

Greatly appreciate the links to the papers...

Discovery Channel's Extreme Engineering: Hollands Barriers to the Sea is an interesting look at the large scale application of some of the underlying principles discussed in your links. Here's for one your reading files: ETL 1110-2-556, Risk-Based Analysis in Geotechnical Engineering for Support of Planning Studies.

Best,

Steve

[Ken White]

Step one: Go back to our original Ends. Deny Sanctuary to AQ in Afghanistan.

I do not think that was the original 'end.' I believe that 'end' was send a message that the hosting of purveyors on international terror attacks would draw a disproportionate response. It later was changed for reasons that are not yet clear as far as I know. If I'm correct, you're proceeding from the wrong premise. I am aware of what was said for public consumption, I'm also aware of the maneuvering over who was going to do what to who with respect to Afghanistan.

Um, I hate to say this but your ten minute effort shows some shortcomings that may take a while for the nation and DoD and all its organs -- and the Afghans --to digest. Doing what you suggest will take even longer than what we seem to be doing, I think. What I think we're trying to do BTW, doesn't seem to me to be that far removed from your approach.

Step two. I agree, What about the Afghans? What's their take -- I recall your concern that we not try to dictate to other nations and peoples

Step three. Comment above applies. Added questions: How long will it take to determine those problems and implement solutions; are the Afghans capable of doing this; if not do we assist them in so doing?

Step four. I'm not even slightly convinced that there are only two categories of opponents; AQ is one, the Talibs another -- but how many factions of Talibs are there. Those two do not address Haqqani (who is a nominal Talib only when it suits), Hekmatyr (who probably eats Talibs for breakfast) and their ilk -- or the drug smugglers among several others. I'm also not convinced that attacks within Pakistan are any more destabilizing than are the HVT hunts by some folks within Afghanistan that have hit specious targets and done excessive collateral damage. Do those cease also? As for dealing with the Talibs, I agree, I gather Karzai and others are trying to do that, that we and the British have also made overtures and that said Talibs, south Asian hagglers to a man, are playing hard to get -- as you know, it take two willing parties to deal...

Step five. I agree -- I thought that's what my Grandson in Law off the Hill was doing. That's what I'm pretty sure he he thought he was doing though he has said nothing (I may be old but I'm not unobservant). What do you think he was doing?

Step six. How do you propose to get rid of American politics? That's always been the long pole in your tent and you seem to discount it -- yet it impacts most of your goals. Not favorably, either...

Step seven. See response to Step six, that's at least part of the 'war' moniker, the politics of it all. Re your prior times questions; LINK, LINK. I agree with full spectrum deterrence. How long will it take to implement that as a national strategy? In the interim, my suspicion is that the kids over there getting shot at think they're in a war. I suspect that if you don't want to call it a war, they'll be tolerant and respectful but they'll snicker a bit when you aren't looking.

P.S

What do you do with NATO and the numerous others that we cajoled into coming to the Party with a promise to rebuild Afghanistan?

P.P.S

I did forget. Concurrently? By the USA? By DoD to include the Army and SOCOM? To include OGA? Oka-a-a-ay-y-y-.

[jmm99]

Hey Bob and Steve

I see this from BW:

[1] Ok, there's a start. [2] I hammered that out alone in 10 minutes. [3] I suspect a real staff could clean up the holes in short order.

and my surfing golden bug friend is trying to get me to learn some civil engineering using the probabilistic approach. That one will get a PM; and Steve, I did try a case involving some of the factors in the Corps study (after staying at a Holiday Inn Express).

As to Bob:

1. Yup, it is a start - seriously; and it presents a discussion framework, which is a positive thing (easy to shoot down a target; harder to build and set up the target).

2. I had a comment about "in 10 minutes" - tongue bitten.

3. I had a comment about "real staff" - tongue also bitten.

Read Steve's article - some holes can't be cleaned up in short order.

Anyway, your seven points look interesting to me. My cup runneth over.

In fact, my glass of Guinness is empty.

Cheers,

Mike

[Surferbeetle]

Armchair Operational/Tactical Level CAP/PRT Model assumptions:

1. Mr. Gates’ statement that we are staying in Afghanistan is accepted at face value.
2. Oil Spot theory is good…esoteric how many angels can dance on a pin models not so much...
3. Surferbeetle’s Grid Square will be replicated n times to cover however many grid squares in Afghanistan that we are to work in as per civilian strategy. Focus is limited to Economics, Security, and Governance all of which are pursued simultaneously.
4. ISAF inhabiting the grid square live on the economy, drink local water, and eat local food for the majority of their needs. (Ack!)
5. Reachback to civilian experts and single enterprise resource software (Oracle or SAP…who cares which) are mandated for all.

Security:

1. Marc & Anthro friends help to ID who’s in charge and FSO’s partner with GoA resident in Grid Square to cut some deals with local security elements.
2. Ken, his SF progeny, Slap (Police SME), Davidbfpo (Police SME), and Gendarmerie Experts partner with GoA resident in Grid Square to integrate and train local factions into a functional Gendarmerie.
3. Ken, his SF progeny, Slap (Police SME), Davidbfpo(Police SME), and Gendarmerie Experts partner with GoA resident in Grid Square so that local factions reduce local security incidents by 7% or more.

Economics:

1. Marc & Anthro friends help to ID who’s in charge and FSO’s partner with GoA resident in Grid Square to cut some deals with local economics elements.
2. Department of Ag types examine existing crop and livestock outputs for SB’s Grid Square and partner with GoA resident in Grid Square to help local farmers and sheep herders to improve output by 7% or more.
3. Dept of Commerce types examine existing business within SB’s Grid Square and partner with GoA resident in Grid Square to help local business folk to improve output by 7% or more.
4. Corps of Engineers types examine existing road, irrigation, drinking water, and wastewater infrastructure within SB’s Grid Square and partner with GoA resident in Grid Square to help locals to improve capacity by 7% or more.

Governance:

1. Marc & Anthro friends help to ID who’s in charge and FSO’s partner with GoA resident in Grid Square to cut some deals with local governance elements.
2. Form of local governance is what it is...
3. Mike and DOJ friends examine existing system within SB’s Grid Square and partner with GoA resident in Grid Square to help to improve capacity of existing governance.

Okay, time for more beer...

[Bob's World]

Hey, I didn't say I hadn't been thinking about this stuff since they handed me a copy of "Street Without Joy" to read at the Q-Course back in '89, but yeah, from the time I read Ken's post it took about 10 to hammer out the key points.

And Its not about how long COIN takes, COIN is a continuous process for every government, just as "insurgency" is a continuous process for every populace. It's the great dance...

Its about understanding what our role, not executing COIN, but conducting FID with a tailored effort to assist the Afghan COIN; while continuing to work the shadows to deal with AQ. Smaller force that understands we can not even appear to be occupiers, and that any Afghan solution we enable is better than any US solution we build for them.

[Dayuhan]

Populaces are rebelling in the middle east for a reason. That reason is not "ideology," it is not about religion, and it is not "because they hate us." It is about politics, and human nature, and man's natural tendency to prefer a hell of his own making than a paradise forced upon him by another.

I know we've been through this before elsewhere, but it's an important question: are "populaces in the Middle East" really rebelling? Which populaces? Who has had a paradise - or anything else for that matter - "forced on him by another"?

[slapout9]

Surferbeetle, Read the whole article. Slap would be hanging with the DEA and Allison Brown.

David and everybody, here is the article/BLOG post from the SWJ Blog by Allsion Brown, pay attention to point number 8 about Intelligence, also the whole article on dealing with drugs in A'stan.



http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/200...l-oliver-nort/

MikeF, glad you could find it.

[jmm99]

This took more than 10 minutes. I've tried to be constructive and positive.

---------------------------------------
Step One

from BW
Step one: Go back to our original Ends. Deny Sanctuary to AQ in Afghanistan.

That is a good idea; so, let us do precisely that.

Under the Authorization for Use of Military Force(AUMF), §2(a), 115 Stat. 224, note following 50 U. S. C.§1541 (2000 ed., Supp. V), the President is authorized “to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.”

This is a broad threat-centric mandate. It has not been updated. To date, no nation has been proved to fit the definition of a "nation" which "planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001". The direct participants in 9/11 can be fairly defined as AQ and its members who "planned, authorized, committed, or aided" those attacks. Indirect participation (that is, "aided"; as in financial assistence) extended to various organizations and persons - some known in open source, some not. Since the direct actors (the AQ "SMUs") died, the focus was on those AQ members who "planned, authorized" the attacks, as well as the "aiders".

The AUMF went on to include in its focus "those nations, organizations, or persons" which "harbored such organizations or persons". The Taliban of Mullah Omar (not a nation - as proved by many of my spilled bytes) was such an "organization" - and the good mullah is such a "person". That having been said, AQ (which I agree acts as a base to wage unconventional warfare via its own "SOF" units and via supported indigenous groups) is very much a transnational enterprise. It has been and is supported by any number of organizations and persons in any number of countries. Astan is not the only country within the scope of the AUMF.

The AUMF also looks to the future, stating clearly its purpose was "to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.” That lamguage would, of course, justify a conclusion that, AQ having left Astan (I believe that is presently factual - corrections accepted), steps could be taken to deny them future sanctuary in Astan. And, also in Canada, Mexico, the UK, Germany, Israel, etc.

Conclusion: "Step one", as stated, is not only a misconstruction of the AUMF; it would seriously limit the scope of the 2001 AUMF to one nation and one organization. As such, its error is similar to those who looked upon the Tonkin Gulf Resolution as being limited to Vietnam; whereas, its focus was on SE Asia, where the president was authorized to take appropriate action based upon the circunstances that ensued in that region. Of course, having a hunting license does not require an attempt to kill everything in the woods. The adverse results of the Iroquois' "Great Pursuit" of the Huron remnants (to the Iroquois and to the regions they devastated) is a lesson learned on point.

Also see comment to Step Seven.

-----------------------------------
Step Two

from BW
Step two: Flush the "Ways" of "Hold-Clear-Build" that sets as success the production of a military that looks much like ours (what would Afghanistan possibly need such a force for? Haven't the Greek, British, Russian and American experiences all proven that such a force is the wrong one to deal with any threat arising from the populace, and that the populace itself if the perfect force for dealing with any foreign military that dare invade??) coupled with a government that looks much like ours.

My comments here are very limited because this forum has a huge number of officers and SNCOs who have done COIN and FID in armed conflicts from Korea up to the present - and many have written about their experiences and those of others.

My suggestion is that the US and NATO (to say nothing of the Astan military and police) have limited capabilities in Astan. I concur with my UK friend David that those limited capabilities would be better applied in the "North". My geo-line was Hwy 1 (as mapped); David may have other thoughts - as may many others. The bottom line is that we have to focus COIN and FID within a limited geo-area; and take into account a limited timeframe (e.g., a presidential cycle ?).

-----------------------------------------
Step Three

from BW
Step three: Set a new "ways" that focuses on building a security force that is very much a Gendarmerie that can do semi-military and civil policing both.; couple this with a very focused, targeted by community program of identifying those failures of governance that are most important to these many pockets of populace and facilitating Afghan efforts to address the same.

I'm prejudiced in favor of gendarmerie in this situation. Astan's neighbors are too big for a conventional military force to be useful.

As to governance, Astan is totally FUBAR - have an article on my HD by a NG CPT which points out the many problems. E.g., two guys who have a property line dispute have no "judicial" recourse, except for our Taliban friends. A small - focus on local (village) - criminal and civil justice system (built on traditional Astan village justice) might be possible in secured areas.

It would not be pretty, but it might work.

A national criminal and civil justice system is presently (and for far in the future) a joke. What Astan has now is a national government on paper (nice org charts with names). So did Diem (one can read Thompson's book to find all about that - which was a lesser problem than Astan).

I'll thnk about that one - Rule of Law on a local level.

-----------------------------------------
Step Four

from BW
Step four: Stop using Afghanistan as a base of operations to attack the populace of Pakistan, and tailor our man-hunting against AQSL to just be the actual AQSL. Take any intel bubba who shows a "7-degrees to Kevin Bacon" type of chart as to why we need to attack some totally unrelated organization to the nearest infantry squad and make him walk point for a month. This includes stopping our campaign against the Taliban and entering negotiations with the same. These guys aren't "terrorists" and they aren't AQ, they are nationalist insurgents, and as such they are part of the future of any Afghanistan that emerges from the current drama. Make them pony up and help.

I'll attribute this semi-diatribe to ???; it does have some good points otherwise. IF, the Pashtuns (which include the Taliban) can be brought to the negotiating table. Our policy has not been to attack the "populace of Pakistan" (unless you know something I do not). We have targeted various Taliban faction leaders. Whether with or without Paki approval, I know not.

My take on negotiations has been stated:

(1) We (Coalition) force negotiations between the Astan govt (this will include Northern Alliance factions which are still very much alive); the Pashtuns (including a bunch of Taliban factions); and the Pakistanis. That is what coercive peace enforcement is all about (for those unacquainted, RTFM).

(2) We (Coalition) will not be a party to the negotiations - no point in losing credibility if they fail completely or folks don't like the result.

(3) We (Coalition) hire a Middleman (called a mediator), which probably should be a Muslim nation-state to understand the Islamic mediation process.

(4) If negotiations are DOA or fail within a reasonable time period, we leave - and make this clear from the beginning.

(5) The end time of our (Coalition) involvement hinges on the Interested Parties - a form of "self-determination", I suppose.

[jmm99]

continued

-----------------------------------------------
Step Five

from BW
Step five: Assess the AQ(UW)N that is networked across the region and determine which nodes are critical to enabling AQ's influence, and what mid-low level guys actually make those specific nodes function. Take those guys out and disrupt the network.

Yes. That's your business; I'd as soon not know about it at all - no PR stuff from the WH would be nice; but that would be dreaming.

All citizens should take responsibility for special ops (whether military or other agencies) even if they don't know the details. The idea is not to hang the operators out to dry if things go wrong - genuine rogues excepted.

---------------------------------------------------
Step Six

from BW
Step six: Wrap all of this in a cogent narrative that matches both our own national principles as well as our actions on the ground. Never let any of those things get out of line, and remember that the entire world is watching, and they judge us by what and how we do it, not by what we say.

Yes. A big information effort (less during the unveiling and more during the process) has to be mounted. Too bad that we no longer have USIA. Have a diagram on that (needs a little "photo-shooping").

-------------------------------------------------
Step Seven

from BW
Step seven: Stop calling Afghanistan and Iraq "wars." America is at peace. Did we say we were "a nation at war" in 1876 when Custer led his men into the valley of the Little Big Horn? Did we say we were "a nation at war" when Pershing quelled the Moro uprising in 1911? The list goes on. Peace is dirty business for us in the Military, we don't need to drag the entire nation into the muck with us. Bad form, and it causes us to exaggerate consequences. Implement "Full-Spectrum Deterrence" instead, which includes everything described above as part of keeping a lid on things. It also includes re-balanced deterrence against state threats around the world and various other quasi-state, non-state, and insurgent threats in a comprehensive scheme that never lets actions to achieve an effect on one get so out of balance that they provoke many others.

You are technically right that what we are doing is not a "war" under Hague (it is what used to be called MOOTW). It is an "armed conflict" under Geneva - at least as far as US courts are concerned - so far. If you take "armed conflict" out of the picture, using the "belled cat" against AQ (as you suggest and I agree) would be patently illegal. Please understand that and please be careful about legal terms.

From what I've observed in 60+ years, the military is the last party likely to create a muck party. All those "illegal" CIA ops were sanctioned by one president or the other. Our nation (us) have to stand up for the guys and gals who do the dirty work at NCA direction.

-------------------------------------------
Not the best memo I've written, but I'll stick with the general drift.

Hey Steve, you present a pretty good bulletpoint and it was done pretty quickly too - seriously.

Were you one of those "good staff officers" ?

[Surferbeetle]

Surferbeetle, Read the whole article. Slap would be hanging with the DEA and Allison Brown.

Slap,

Where-ever your comfortable and we could get er done...

Step Seven

You are technically right that what we are doing is not a "war" under Hague (it is what used to be called MOOTW). It is an "armed conflict" under Geneva - at least as far as US courts are concerned - so far. If you take "armed conflict" out of the picture, using the "belled cat" against AQ (as you suggest and I agree) would be patently illegal. Please understand that and please be careful about legal terms.

From what I've observed in 60+ years, the military is the last party likely to create a muck party. All those "illegal" CIA ops were sanctioned by one president or the other. Our nation (us) have to stand up for the guys and gals who do the dirty work at NCA direction.

Mike,

Your post on the 2007-2008 UNAMA Report was pretty interesting and I wonder if it feeds in here as well?

Hey Steve, you present a pretty good bulletpoint and it was done pretty quickly too - seriously.

Were you one of those "good staff officers" ?

The Army likes utility infielders and puts together a job map that one is expected to more or less follow if one wants to stay in...which is a long way of saying that yes I have been a staff puke and even enjoyed it team time was probably the best however...its usually far from the flagpole

[Bob's World]

I know we've been through this before elsewhere, but it's an important question: are "populaces in the Middle East" really rebelling? Which populaces? Who has had a paradise - or anything else for that matter - "forced on him by another"?

The same thing happened in SEA following WWII (different ideology applied, but ideology content is moot so long as it works, and Communism is what worked in that region)

Middle East populaces (and Eastern European) were held static by the Cold War policies of both sides throughout that competition, with the governance of each largely shaped by the respective outside power. The Soviets made the shocking decision to "just let it go" and not exert forced to hold it all together once the populaces revolted, so it went relatively peaceful. Plenty to still shake out there. In the Middle East, we did not roll back our (less direct, but still very much in place) system of controls as the Cold War ended and the populaces of the former Soviet Block were enjoying their new found freedoms. Friction and resistance has been building since. AQ is real, and their regional UW plan is very real, and all of the nationalist insurgent/subversive movements they enable and encourage are very real.

AQ's primary message is one of reduced Western influence over the region, and removal of these governments either put in power, shaped or sustained by the West; with the recognition that they must first work together to break the support of the West if they hope to be successful in their nationalist efforts.

All of this was immediately conflated and twisted by the West into an attack on us to destroy our security, economy and way of life (three top national interests). So our response, given that perspective is as natural as the response of the Middle Eastern populaces to AQ (though given the conditions that exist, if not Bin Laden, someone else, and if not AQ, some other organization).

Once we are able to gain a clearer perspective that recognizes that we had a role in shaping the current conditions, and we change our focus from one of trying to sustain those outdated conditions in the face of change, and instead work to help shape that change, we will be on our way to success.

[Bob's World]

I think if we sat down over a few beers clear up some of the gaps that are inherent to this type of communication.

We went to Afg. because we had to do something, and it was the logical place to go and do it. Keep to the original intent, and guard against mission creep. We also must guard very much against "intel creep" that works to make connections and compelling cases for waging similar operations all over the world. If we succumb to that logic, we will enable the building of a Caliphate through our actions far more effectively than AQ could ever do on its own. Look how we have motivated divergent bands of the Taliban to work together. A common threat breeds strange alliances. We do not want to become the glue that binds this thing together.

And to say we did not target the Pakistani populace is a far different thing than to not attack them. We would not fire missiles from drones into East LA neighborhoods to take out known drug houses. Clearly it would be outrageous to even consider it and anyone could reasonably foresee that there would be both innocent victims directly from the blast as well as a huge popular backlash, both within that community and within similar communities around the nation and even into other countries. We all know this, yet we do such things in someone else's country and rationalize that it is somehow different, or that the populace will "understand" because we are the good guys? This is the problem with intel-led operations. You get target fixation and lose perspective.

We need to grant the same rights of sovereignty to others that we demand for ourselves; and that is a concession we don't have to make (i.e., no state can force us to do it); but one that we must impose upon ourselves.

There is no greater application of power than restraint.

Shifting from a war footing to a deterrence footing enable this mindset. Act judiciously. Does anyone else remember the days when the use of deadly force by the military of the US against another was a very rare, and very big deal?? The bombing of Libya in the late 80's? Post Cold War we started down a very slippery slope indeed.

Ike was right, containing the Soviets was only half of the equation of our strategies of containment. The other half was to contain ourselves. This is the only half of the equation that is still valid, and yet it is the half that most were never even ever aware of in the first place. Ironic.

[Dayuhan]

The same thing happened in SEA following WWII (different ideology applied, but ideology content is moot so long as it works, and Communism is what worked in that region)

I'm not at all sure that it is the same thing.

In the Middle East, we did not roll back our (less direct, but still very much in place) system of controls as the Cold War ended and the populaces of the former Soviet Block were enjoying their new found freedoms. Friction and resistance has been building since. AQ is real, and their regional UW plan is very real, and all of the nationalist insurgent/subversive movements they enable and encourage are very real.

I'm not saying that AQ isn't real, it obviously is. I'm not at all sure it's an insurgency, and if it isn't, we do ourselves no favors by responding to it as if it is something it's not.

Where exactly do you see an American "system of controls" operating in thre Middle East? Where is there a populace in rebellion against a US-supported government? Where in the Middle East is AQ supporting a nationalist insurgent/subversive movement?

Iraq is an obvious answer, but of course our Iraq excursion, ill-timed and poorly managed though it was, did not create AQ. I wouldn't even say resistance to the US presence in Iraq or the US-supported government is enabled by AQ, more the other way around.

Is AQ a popular insurgency or a religious revival movement? It's an important question,, because those are very different things requiring very different responses.

Once we are able to gain a clearer perspective that recognizes that we had a role in shaping the current conditions, and we change our focus from one of trying to sustain those outdated conditions in the face of change, and instead work to help shape that change, we will be on our way to success.

We may have had some role in shaping current conditions, but so did many others, and we cannot undo the past. The idea of helping to shape change sounds rather appealing, but in reality our options are pretty limited and our efforts are as likely to inflame resentment as to alleviate it. What changes would you have us shape, and where?

[Bob's World]

I wrote a pretty nice reply, and then hit the wrong button while editing it, causing it to vaporize into cyber space....

But AQ is neither an insurgency nor a religious movement, and I explained why. Will re-attack on that later.

I googled US in the middle east and this article came to the top. I haven't seen it before, but agree with it completely. And it was written in 1991. This may help explain what I mean:

http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=1019

[Ken White]

I'm not at all sure that it is the same thing.

I'm positive that what happened in SEA after WW II is not the same thing that is occurring within some pockets of Islam today -- far from it and that's a dangerously flawed allegory that can lead to some bad misapprehensions.

I'm not saying that AQ isn't real, it obviously is. I'm not at all sure it's an insurgency, and if it isn't, we do ourselves no favors by responding to it as if it is something it's not.

True and we have not done the response well though my perception is that is improving as more realize the truth of what you and Bob's World say -- it is neither an insurgency nor a religious movement though it has facets of both.

We may have had some role in shaping current conditions, but so did many others, and we cannot undo the past. The idea of helping to shape change sounds rather appealing, but in reality our options are pretty limited and our efforts are as likely to inflame resentment as to alleviate it.

Critical point. I agree we had a role -- even agree with the thrust of the Cato piece Bob posted -- but we cannot undo the past, a past that was created, with respect to US actions by our political processes and our domestic politics as much as for any other reason. Bob wants to forget that and fix our political process, so in my view his desires and your very valid question:

What changes would you have us shape, and where?

have to start with fixing that political reality -- nothing he has said he wished to achieve will occur lacking that prerequisitie...