Size of the Platoon and Company

[Tukhachevskii]

Not sure if anyone has mentioned it already but an interesting bit of info regarding dissolving the section level of command in platoons which Wilf may find interesting (and probably already knows about) came my way recently. While reading a thesis written for the US Army Command and General Staff College (2005) by Maj. Peter Drake Jackson entitled “French Ground Force Organisational Development for Counter-Revolutionary Warfare between 1945 and 1962” I read on pp.89-90 that during the Algerian War the French Army in Africa reorganised its infantry battalions into what they called the North African Type 107 battalion (Bataillon D’Infanterie – Type Afrique du Nord dit “107”). It contained a HQ & HQ company, a weapons company with mortars, HMGs and Rcl rifles, four rifle companies with one light mortar in the HQ and four rifle platoons. So far so good.

Interestingly, each rifle platoon had a small HQ and six fire teams (one rocket launcher team, two LMG teams & three “rifle grenadier teams) which were flexibly combined to form two sections each of a flexible combination of the teams above depending on mission and commander’s preference (which see attached picture below). There were no formal sections or section levels of command. Later the fourth rifle company was disbanded and its personnel used to created a bn level Psyops cell and beef up the intel cell and the battalion weapons company. The 1958 Parachute Regiment rifle platoon had an identical structure.

I don’t suppose anyone has any further info?

Also, I would appreciate it if anyone (more than likely Wilf, but all are welcome) with access to a pdf version of Maj. W. N. R. Scotter, “Streamlining the Infantry Division”, Journal of the Royal United Services Institute (or Military Review, Vol. 34, 1954) would find it within themselves to pm me a copy. Apparently, he also broached the idea of platoons organised around five five-man teams although his actual focus was on dropping bde level HQs and organising divisions with seven battalion groups which probably had something to do with the lean post war years.

[Kiwigrunt]

Great find Tukhachevskii.

On a first skim:

Mentions from page 50 onwards the high infantry ratios (tooth to tail).

Page 53 shows that this ‘fireteam’ structure was introduced to mitigate a high loss in leaders by removing the section level of command. It does appear that to make this possible they shrunk the size of the platoons by having four per coy instead of three.

Page 56 is interesting with regard to perceived lack of firepower within these platoons against regulars versus guerrillas.

[GI Zhou]

I raise two points.

From memory, and please don't attack me if I am wrong, Liddell-Hart was an early proponent of the five squad/section/platoon/company/battalion. This was tried with Pentomic Division and was found short of leg infantry and other issues.

In British Empire Forces at the end of the First World War, in a section of 10 only 8 were supposed to go into combat to allow for reconstruction and one of the platoon officer's was to stay behind, as was part of the company HQ. Perhaps infantry and tank companies should be trained perhaps 20% over strength to allow for combat casualties, illness, courses, promotions etc. This would also save a lot of the NFG issues and keep companies combat viable for longer periods.

I do realise the issues for peacetime soldiering but if readiness is the issue....

[Ken White]

I raise two points.

From memory, and please don't attack me if I am wrong, Liddell-Hart was an early proponent of the five squad/section/platoon/company/battalion. This was tried with Pentomic Division and was found short of leg infantry and other issues.

Wasn't short at all, not with those big 252 man companies with four Rifle Platoons. The Battle Groups had plenty of grunts though overall, it was small by design (smaller nuke target). Recall it was never tried in combat. It disappeared in less than ten peacetime years because the US Army was not ready for it -- Old Colonels objected to commanding "big Battalions," most leaders could not develop the mental flexibility required for the concept to reach its potential and some of the equipment spent too many years in the development pipeline, the TO&E in fact changed before some of the equipment it specified was issued (and no on knew how to employ some of it...).

Perhaps infantry and tank companies should be trained perhaps 20% over strength to allow for combat casualties, illness, courses, promotions etc. This would also save a lot of the NFG issues and keep companies combat viable for longer periods.

I do realise the issues for peacetime soldiering but if readiness is the issue....

It isn't. Cost is...

Also, having been in units that deployed with almost that overstrength, it takes only a couple of months for that plus-up to dissipate -- as replacements in other units, special duty jobs, etc. Parkinson's law applies.

I'm firmly convinced I'd rather go to war with 10% understrength than one man over. Overstrengths flop about and end up not getting trained whereas if you have just enough or too few, you work at making sure all are as competent as you can make them. Gotta remember that 9 or 11 man rifle squad and that four tank platoon are designed so that at the end of a very bad day, you have three people and one tank occupying some ground or ready to fight through the night...

[Chris jM]

In British Empire Forces at the end of the First World War, in a section of 10 only 8 were supposed to go into combat to allow for reconstruction and one of the platoon officer's was to stay behind, as was part of the company HQ. Perhaps infantry and tank companies should be trained perhaps 20% over strength to allow for combat casualties, illness, courses, promotions etc. This would also save a lot of the NFG issues and keep companies combat viable for longer periods.

Opportunity cost, too. If you were a commander - say at the Bn level - would you prefer to see all your sub-units 20% over strength, or instead favour an entirely new sub-unit composed of those extra pers? I'd generally argue for the latter, and hope to reap the benefits of flexibility, dispersion and adaptability an extra sub unit gives me.

Besides, busy soldiers are happy soldiers and who'd want to make it too easy for them at the sharp end?

[William F. Owen]

Cannot download for now. The link is broken, but the organisation looks pretty sensible, - if update to 2010. The problem I have with the diagram as shown is no manpower numbers. You just cannot talk about any of this stuff sensibly unless given man power limits. As I keep saying it's not how big the Company or Battalion is. It is how do I best organise, train and equip 500 or 650 (pick any number) men.

GI Zhou
I am not aware of Liddell-Hart advocating 5 Company structures. I do have a copy of his 1926 "Future of Infantry" and it's not apparent in that -from memory - I will dig it out and look if I have time. However, if you do find something specific, please let me know.

[GI Zhou]

I found part of an internet reference/abstract but alas I gave my copies of RUSI Journal to my old univertsity many years ago. According to an abstract from iformaworld.com an article by N.C. Baird in the RUSI Journal Vol 99 Issue 595 August 1953 pp; 439-442 titled: 'Economy of Infantry-Some Thoughts of Improving Flexibility' is the quote:

to a company of four platoons (as opposed to five by Captain Liddell-Hart), a battalion of four companies and a support company (this agrees with Captain ...

I dug up the reference from Liddell-Hart when I was in the military and had access to defence libraries. Now I have to pay my local library for the privilege. Perhaps someone on the site has access to a copy of the journal?

[Tukhachevskii]

I have discovered another early advocate of the “Rifle Platoon group” that does away with the section/squad level of leadership. This interesting, and detailed, proposal was made by Major Alexander McColl who advocated what he called a Commando Square concept for the Infantry Battalion in an article entitled "The Infantry Battalion Revisted" in Military Review, April, 1975, No. 4 (scroll down to find the article). Note he emphasises fire team principles based upon the M16’s automatic capabilities (similar to Webb’s arguments but still sees a need for plt level LMGs), uses the SF squad idea as his starting point (much like Wilf) and note also the presence of 90mm rcl rifles for heavy direct fire (talk about HE protectors! IIRC Dragon was just a twinkle in some lab coat’s eye). Remarkably for the times (c. 1970s) Major McColl is also an early advocate of the “arms room” idea and configures his unit to be multi-mission capable inc. COIN; interesting given the contemporary troubles in SE Asia and our present troubles in the near east/south Asia (is Afghanistan South or “South Central” Asia?). Given that links to articles often do not work I’ll liberally sprinkle some excerpts below rather than attempt to summarise his arguments in my own quaint prose;

“Meet the Special Forces reconnaissance team (RT) in one of its more or less standard variations, otherwise sometimes known as a "commando squad." In Vietnam, the six-man RT proved to be a very versatile, efficient organization, as a practical matter the smallest infantry element that can operate effectively by itself. It was easier to control and hence more responsive and flexible than the standard 11-man rifle squad. Four RTs plus a couple of machineguns and a command element were found to make a very workable sort of rifle platoon. This is the germ of the first half of the commando square concept. The other half comes out of the rediscovery during the Vietnam War of the virtues of a "square" infantry battalion, one with four rifle companies. Among other things, this structure permits leaving one rifle company to secure the base camp or fire base while the other three go out and try the old two-up-and-one-back on the enemy. This structure also can be used to establish a mixed Active Army/Reserve component battalion with sundry advantages by way of cost-saving and improved training for the Reserve components (pp-52-52)”.

&

“...in units armed with M16s, we have wall-to-wall automatic weapons and a need to do many things in addition to "take and hold the high ground." For most types of operations, any size squad from six to 13 men can be made to work effectively, but the smaller squad is easier to control. An "all-square" battalion based on 11-man squads would have rifle companies with about 250 men and an overall strength of about 1300, which is a bit large. An all-square battalion based on six-man squads, however, comes out to a total size of a little under 900 people, about what we have now. Specifically, the proposed "commando square" battalion has the following structure:
• The basic element is a six-man RT or commando squad, armed with five M16s and one M203 (or M79 plus pistol).
• Square organization throughout -that is, four rifle squads per platoon, four rifle platoons per company and four rifle companies in the battalion.
• Limitation of the size and number of crew-served weapons and other equipment to assure a high degree of foot mobility.
• Multicapable [sic] organisation. In addition to the usual duties, the unit can be structured to provide long-range reconnaissance patrols (LRRPs), mounted commandos and a variety of other specialized functions.

Within the battalion, the rifle platoon has four rifle squads plus a weapons squad with two M60 machineguns and one 90mm recoilless rifle. The rifle company has the usual company headquarters, a mortar section with two 60mm mortars and four rifle platoons. Four such companies plus a headquarters and headquarters company constitute the battalion. HHC heavy weapons would include four 81mm mortars, six 75mm or 106mm recoilless rifles on 1/4-ton and eight scout vehicles with M60 machineguns. In off-road situations, the scout platoon dismounts, breaks out the tripods and becomes a heavy machinegun platoon. Conversely, all 1/4-tons in the battalion, except those carrying recoilless rifles, would be fitted with pedestal mounts for M60 machineguns or 90mm recoilless rifles for road security, urban counterinsurgency and mounted commando operations(pp.53-4)”.

&

“This concept envisages a battalion with the following, assets (radios and individual weapons not listed):
• Personnel: 44 officers (1 lieutenant colonel; 2 majors; 10 captains; 1 captain, Medical Corps; 30 lieutenants) ; 2 warrant officers, 173 non-commissioned officers, 667 enlisted men equalling 886 aggregate.
• Heavy Weapons: four 81mm mortars, eight 60mm mortars, six 75mm or 106mm recoilless rifles on 1/4-ton, sixteen 90mm recoilless rifles, forty M60 machineguns including eight on 1/4 -ton or tripod.
• Vehicles: forty-three 4 -ton including 14 with machinegun or recoilless rifle, twenty-three 1 1/4 or Gama Goat, fourteen 2 1/2-ton, ten 5-ton, five field ambulances, one 5-ton wrecker for a total of 96 wheeled vehicles
plus eight 1 1/2-ton and five water trailers.

Compared to the present battalion, commando square is about the same size, but strong in officers, strong in
riflemen (64 X 6 = 384 versus 27 X 11 = 297), machineguns and other direct- fire platoon weapons and wheeled vehicles. It is weak in mortars and heavy antitank weapons. This is the price of foot mobility. Within limits,
the mortar firepower is less a function of the number of tubes carried than of the amount of ammunition carried. A column of men on foot can carry only a certain overall weight and still move out. Structurally, in addition to its primary missions, the battalion is able to provide LRRPs and other six man teams for saturation patrols, support of civil authority, house searches, and so forth. It also has a number of machinegun vehicles for duty as street and road patrols, convoy escorts, and so on.

Other possible variations include:
• In a conventional, mid-intensity operation with limited off-road requirements such as Korea or Alaska,
substitute 81mm for 60mm mortars, 4.2-inch for 81mm mortars, and add one or two additional soldiers to each mortar squad.
• The battalion-level anti-tank weapon is the 75mm or 106mm recoilless rifle. The choice is a function of
the terrain and the tank threat and, possibly, of the availability of 75mm weapons and ammunition in the inventory. In a situation with an imminent tank threat, such as in Europe, Korea or the Middle East, the battalion would have to be reinforced with a TOW platoon and/or a platoon or more of tanks or M551 Sheridans in a tank-destroyer role.
• Conversely, for extended backcountry off-road operations where there was a minimum tank threat and
not much requirement for destroying fortifications, the 90mm recoilless rifles could be left behind and their crews used to provide additional eyes, ears and rifles, and to carry more ammunition for the machineguns.
• There is a mechanized version of commando square, but elaboration of this is outside the scope of this article. Otherwise, the concept applies to airborne, airmobile and armour battalions. Finally, the commando square organization lends itself to formation of mixed Active Army, Reserve component battalions. In such a unit, the Active Army element would be able to operate alone as a thin triangular battalion of 457 men, a light but viable combat organization(p. 54)”.

& finally,

“Other advantages for the commando square battalion, as compared to the
existing battalions, are:
• The smaller squad is inherently easier to control and, therefore, more efficient, flexible and responsive, and
easier to train.
• The square organisation provides greater flexibility of employment; we are no longer locked into two-up-and one- back as the only way of doing business.
• Real, built-in off-road foot mobility, admittedly at the cost of some loss of heavy weapons firepower but about twice the number of machineguns.
• Pre-planned, built-in capability to "beef up" or "slim down" the crew served weapons and other heavy items depending on the terrain and expected enemy threat.
• Capability to provide LRRPs, mounted commandos, road patrols and other specialized functions. These are substantial merits, making the commando square concept worthy of consideration and evaluation by the Army's force structure planners(p.55)”.

[GI Zhou]

The structure of the infantry company of the Chinese People’s Volunteers )People's Liberation Army) that crossed the Yalu in November 1950 had three platoons of infantry each of three squads of 12 men, a machine gun platoon with three belt-fed machine guns and a mortar platoon of two 60mm mortars.

The CPV units that faced the United States Marine Corps did not have the machine gun platoon and although the authorised strength was around 852 men for the battalion its actual strength was around 700 men. However there were belt fed machine guns available for use at the company level. After one assault the USMC captured 10 heavy machine guns, seven light machine guns, 12 Thompson sub-machine guns, 76 rifles, four pistols and 500 hand grenades. This shows that belt fed machine guns were pushed forward in an assault and were left after the repulse of the attack.

In October 1951 the PLA and CPV infantry company was reduced in size to three platoons and the 60 mm mortar squad. Each platoon had three squads of 12 men and the company strength was reduced from 190 to 151. This was based on the Soviet model, the result of losses sustained in Korea, plus the need to simplify administration. The previous light machine gun squad in the platoon was disbanded and the light machine guns became part of the three remaining rifle squads. With the influx of Soviet weapons the amount of automatic weapons was increased. The PLA and CPV infantry company was actually stronger in numbers and close-range firepower than its equivalent in the British Army.

The CPV quickly found that this structure was clearly insufficient against the firepower of the United Nations in Korea and the infantry company was again restructured, more in line with that prevailing at the start of the Korean War. The infantry company commander needed to bring his support weapons with him as a lack of communications equipment meant he could rarely obtain on call artillery support in the defence and none during the attack. The People’s Liberation Army and the Chinese People’s Volunteer infantry company now became a self-contained task force. It was also a notably ‘square organization’ compared to the Soviet triangular model. It was comprised of three rifle platoons, one machine gun platoon and one rocket (bazooka) platoon. Each platoon was still comprised of three squads of 12 men, and the company’s strength rose to 201. The battalion was now comprised of four rifle companies, one 82 mm mortar company, one heavy machine gun company, one recoilless rifle platoon and one communications platoon. The battalion at full strength had 1,068 officers and men. The 60mm mortars were removed as it was a defensive structure with landline communications to the rear enabling on-call fire support.

[Kiwigrunt]

I have discovered another early advocate of the “Rifle Platoon group” that does away with the section/squad level of leadership. This interesting, and detailed, proposal was made by Major Alexander McColl who advocated what he called a Commando Square concept for the Infantry Battalion ........

McGoll mentions the 6 man rifle squad a lot and lists all the advantages. Yet he doesn’t say anything about the size of the weapons squad with 2 x GPMG and one 90 mm kickless cannon. If his idea of keeping heavy weapons down in numbers because ammo needs to be man handled is anything to go by than I wonder how large this weapons squad needs to be. I could see the two GPMGs in a squad of perhaps six. But the cannon would need a squad of about six for itself I should think, if a useful amount of rounds needs to be carried. Unless of course he expects the rifle squads to carry the ammo in which case some of the advantages are lost again.

I too am starting to like the idea of square over triangular. Not sure if the NZ army still has four rifle companies per battalion now but we did when I was in about 10 years ago (Chris jM?). British air-landing battalions in WWII had four platoons per company and four companies per battalion. That gave 26 men per platoon with three seven man sections. This was however done to fit a full (smaller) platoon into a Horsa glider. I have never read any reference as to whether it was actually advantageous on the ground.

[GI Zhou]

McGoll mentions the 6 man rifle squad a lot and lists all the advantages. Yet he doesn’t say anything about the size of the weapons squad with 2 x GPMG and one 90 mm kickless cannon. If his idea of keeping heavy weapons down in numbers because ammo needs to be man handled is anything to go by than I wonder how large this weapons squad needs to be. I could see the two GPMGs in a squad of perhaps six. But the cannon would need a squad of about six for itself I should think, if a useful amount of rounds needs to be carried. Unless of course he expects the rifle squads to carry the ammo in which case some of the advantages are lost again.

In the 1962 Sino-Indian War a 57mm recoiless rifle team of eight men carried the gun and 17 rounds of ammunition. They were deployed one per company to destroy bunkers.

[William F. Owen]

In the 1962 Sino-Indian War a 57mm recoiless rifle team of eight men carried the gun and 17 rounds of ammunition. They were deployed one per company to destroy bunkers.

In about 1970, North Vietnamese DshK Platoons were observed to more than 30 men with only 2 guns. So basically each gun needed 15+ men to support it, in terms of carrying ammo.
....not much changes.

BTW, GI, apart from your somewhat odd inability to use the [QUOTES], I'm pretty impressed with some of the sources you keep digging up. Good stuff.

[Steve Blair]

BTW, GI, apart from your somewhat odd inability to use the [QUOTES], I'm pretty impressed with some of the sources you keep digging up. Good stuff.

This is EASILY fixed. GI, all you need to do is close your quoted text with a /QUOTE instead of just QUOTE.

[Firn]

It is rather interesting to see just how tradition, ressources, experience and reflections on the METT-T shaped the various concepts across time and space. All differ, but there are quite some similar approaches and results.

Take for example the German Raiding Skiparty:


21. SUGGESTED ORGANIZATION OF A RAIDING PARTY

a. Typical Organization

A typical organization for a raiding party consists of one
platoon, reinforced by one heavy mortar squad and one engineer
detachment. It is assumed, for purposes of illustration, that the
party will be gone for 2 days.

1 Platoon HQ of 11 (1 officer, 1 NCO, 4 massenger, 1 Medical NCO, 2 aids, 2 litter bearers)
3 Squads of 12 (1 NCO, 1 SIC, 3 MG-team, 3 sharpshooter, 1-2 grenadiers, 4-3 riflemen)
1 Mortar Squad of 13 (1 NCO, 1 range setter, 3-4 mortarteam, 4 sharpshooter, 4-3 riflemen)
1 Pioneer Detachment of 6 (1 NCO, 5 pioneers with SMG)

Advisable: Radio teams; Artillery and heavy weapons observer or liasion team on ski if their support is possible;

In this case the point of much ammunition for fewer weapon-systems gets stressed and stressed again beside the focus on shedding as much light as possible. Note that usually the German platoon had a 4 squads IIRC.


Firn

[GI Zhou]

It is rather interesting to see just how tradition, ressources, experience and reflections on the METT-T shaped the various concepts across time and space. All differ, but there are quite some similar approaches and results.

Take for example the German Raiding Skiparty:


21. SUGGESTED ORGANIZATION OF A RAIDING PARTY

a. Typical Organization

A typical organization for a raiding party consists of one
platoon, reinforced by one heavy mortar squad and one engineer
detachment. It is assumed, for purposes of illustration, that the
party will be gone for 2 days.

1 Platoon HQ of 11 (1 officer, 1 NCO, 4 massenger, 1 Medical NCO, 2 aids, 2 litter bearers)
3 Squads of 12 (1 NCO, 1 SIC, 3 MG-team, 3 sharpshooter, 1-2 grenadiers, 4-3 riflemen)
1 Mortar Squad of 13 (1 NCO, 1 range setter, 3-4 mortarteam, 4 sharpshooter, 4-3 riflemen)
1 Pioneer Detachment of 6 (1 NCO, 5 pioneers with SMG)

Advisable: Radio teams; Artillery and heavy weapons observer or liasion team on ski if their support is possible;

In this case the point of much ammunition for fewer weapon-systems gets stressed and stressed again beside the focus on shedding as much light as possible. Note that usually the German platoon had a 4 squads IIRC.


Firn

All that firepower just to enjoy some schnapps in the snow. The Germans really go all out when having a ski party.

If anyone wonders how I get such quirky stuff on the Chinese, I have spent ten years witing it for the GI Zhou Newsletter. Seven years of them form material I mostly translated by hand. I do have a substance addiction now.

[Kiwigrunt]

I do have a substance addiction now.

And you're the only one here!

[Compost]

This post proposes a rifle platoon organized and equipped for light infantry operations. It synthesizes many of the concepts discussed on threads such as Roles and Weapons with the Squad, Platoon Weapons, Redundancy in Small Unit Organization, Size of the Platoon and Company, Are Snipers and Recon Still Valid in Infantry Battalions? and Infantry Unit Tactics, Tasks, Weapons and Organization.

The proposed 38-man rifle platoon has two 2-man command teams: a main command team consisting of the PL LT plus rifleman/radio operator, and a backup command team consisting of the PL SGT plus rifleman/radio operator. The platoon also has a 2-man long-range team armed with a 60mm ‘hand-held’ mortar or less optimally a 40mm LV/MV MGL. That long-range team would usually be grouped with the backup command team.

When the platoon is at full strength the other 32 men are organized onto eight 4-man bricks each lead by a junior NCO. Four of the eight are rifle bricks with two 2-man rifle teams. The other four are weapon bricks: two with a 2-man LMG team and a 2-man MGL team, two with a 2-man LMG team and a 2-man recoilless rifle team. Commonly the bricks might be grouped as doubles to form two 8-man rifle squads and two 8-man weapon (MG & launcher) squads. An alternative arrangement would have four 8-man rifle-weapon squads each with a rifle brick and a weapon brick. Every member of the platoon has a personal radio and night vision equipment.

The main command team could be grouped or colocated with any squad. The backup command team - together usually with the bombardment team - would tend to be grouped with a weapon squad. However it is possible that a command team could be grouped with a brick rather than a squad.

That promotes two other main forms of organization. One would have two 8-man rifle squads and three ‘weapon’ squads in the form of an 8-man weapon squad, a 6-man squad consisting of a weapon brick plus the 2-man main command team, and an 8-man squad consisting of a weapon brick plus the 2-man long-range team and 2-man backup command team. Derived from that, the second would have two 12-man sections each with two rifle bricks and one weapon brick supported by a 6-man squad consisting of a weapon brick plus a 2-man command team, and an 8-man squad consisting of a weapon brick plus the 2-man long-range team and a 2-man command team.

For flexibility and cross-training in a full-strength platoon, each rifle brick might be variously grouped with any other rifle brick and/or any weapon brick. But if preferred a specific rifle brick could be associated with just one other rifle brick to form an 8-man rifle squad, or a 12-man section. It would be less practical to limit the combination of weapons bricks with one another and with rifle bricks. However, it is supposed that a platoon would employ only a subset of the possible groupings of its bricks.

If detachment, sickness, casualty or other cause reduced platoon strength below 38 then one or more bricks would be reduced to 3-man, with 8-man squads reduced to become as small as 6-man. Further loss of manpower would inevitably lead to a reduction in the number of bricks.

Weapons

Platoon weapons and ammunition are restricted to those currently in service with NATO and affiliated forces. The weapons of prime interest use are those which fire 9x19mm Parabellum, 5.56x45mm NATO, 7.62x51mm NATO, 12.7x99mm ammunition, 40x46mm and 40x51mm cartridge grenades, 60mm mortar bombs and 84mm Carl Gustav or 110/60 Pzf3 recoilless rifle rounds.

Other commonly issued munitions/weapons would include hand-thrown grenades, directional mines and single-shot RPGs. Such items are not listed below as the numbers carried would vary with the nature and duration of an operation.

There is also the question of auxiliary and backup weapons. The number-1 on a light mortar, MG or launcher (MGL or RCLR) commonly needs an auxiliary weapon in order to avoid any need for loan of another soldier’s rifle/carbine if the number-1 is away from his mortar/MG/launcher. A semi-auto pistol is inadequate for that purpose. The auxiliary weapon could be a 9mm compact SMG or possibly a 5.56mm carbine. Additionally any platoon member might optionally have - as a backup close-range weapon - a 9mm semi-automatic pistol or 9mm compact SMG. Any variation or supplemental issue of pistols or SMGs, UGLs, shotguns or shotgun attachments would require approval of company and battalion commander.

In the following summary asterisk (*) means weapon as approved or as determined by company and platoon commanders. Auxiliary weapons are included in the summary. Backup weapons are not included.

Command teams, mortar team
Main LT: 5.56 auto rifle/carbine & RO: 5.56 auto rifle/carbine w 40 UGL
Backup SGT: 5.56 auto rifle/carbine & RO: 5.56 auto rifle/carbine w 40 UGL.
Long-range team M1: 60mm CDO mortar (or 40 LV/MV MGL*) & 7.62 semi-auto rifle & M2: 7.62 SA semi-auto rifle w 40 UGL.

2 x MG/launcher brick
G1: 7.62 LMG (or 7.62 GPMG*) & 9 SMG* & G2: 7.62 semi-auto rifle
L1: 40 MGL & 9 SMG* & L2: 7.62 semi-auto rifle w 40 UGL.

2 x MG/launcher brick
G1: 7.62 LMG (or 7.62 GPMG*) & 9 SMG* & G2: 7.62 semi-auto rifle
L1: Medium Rcl. Rifle (else single-shot RPGs*) & 9 SMG* & L2: 7.62 semi-auto rifle.

4 x rifle brick
R1: 5.56 auto rifle & R2: 5.56 auto rifle/carbine w 40 UGL
R3: 5.56 auto rifle (or 7.62 LMG*) & R4: 5.56 auto rifle/carbine w 40 UGL.

The rifle platoon as above would have as standard issue: 1 x 60mm CDO mortar, 2 x 84mm CG or 110/60mm Pzf3 RCLR, 2 x 40mm LV/MV MGL, 4 x 7.62mm LMG (eg: Mark 48 or NG7), 10 x 7.62mm semi-auto rifle (inc 3 with 40 LV/MV UGL), 20 x 5.56 auto bullpup rifle/fwd-mag carbine (inc 10 with 40 LV/MV UGL), 8 x 9mm compact SMG (or 5.56mm auto carbines*), plus the following held in a company-level armoury: 1 x 40mm LV/MV MGL, 4 x 7.62mm GPMG (eg: HK121 or MAG58) and 4 tripods.

If operating in difficult terrain, the platoon might return one or more heavy weapons - 60mm mortar and/or recoilless rifles - to a company-level armory, and optionally draw an extra 40mm LV/MV MGL and more single-shot RPGs or RCLRs. At other times a platoon might optionally draw additional weapons such as an extra 40mm LV/MV MGL and/or up to 4 x 7.62mm GPMG (HK121 or MAG58), and 4 x tripods.

[Compost]

This post proposes a 164-man rifle company for light infantry operations. The company is intended to operate as part of a battalion that has three or four such rifle companies plus a Mortar and Fire Support company, a Service company and a HQ & Induction company.

Every rifle company can be expected to perform detached/semi-independant activities. Hence the proposed company has a fairly large 16-man HQ section, a 34-man weapons platoon and three 38-man rifle platoons (as outlined in Post 117). Every member of the company would have a personal radio and night vision equipment.

HQ Section
The 16-man HQ section has four 4-man bricks. Each brick is composed of two dissimilar 2-man teams.

Command brick:
Main team: MAJ & RO
Backup team: CAPT & RO

Intel brick:
Int team 1: LT & analyst/linguist
Int team 2: SGT & analyst (carry and operate a manpackable UAV when issued)

CSM brick:
CSM team: WO2 & RO/armourer
Medical/hygiene team: Medic 1 & Medic 2

CQMS brick:
CQMS team: SSGT & RO/clerk
Catering team: cook/storeman, storeman/2nd cook

The HQ section could when necessary be split in various ways to form a main/deployed HQ and a backup/logistic support HQ. The latter could for example be formed as a 4 to 6-man element consisting of the backup HQ team and up to half of the Int and CQMS bricks.

As determined/approved by the company commander, members of the HQ section would be armed with 7.62mm semi-auto rifles/carbines, 5.56mm auto rifles/carbines, 40mm UGLs plus 9mm compact SMGs and semi-auto pistols as auxiliary and backup weapons. Other weapons could include a 7.62mm LMG or GPMG and possibly a 40mm MGL.

Weapons Platoon
The 34-man weapons platoon has a 4-man HQ brick, an 18-man FO & Sniper section (3 x 6-man squads) and a 12-man Direct Support section (2 x 6-man squads). Typically the platoon's main command team would deploy with one of the FO & Sniper squads and the backup command team would deploy with the Direct Support section.

As directed by the company commander the FO & Sniper section or its component squads would be tasked in support of the company or one or more of its rifle platoons primarily for FO or sniping or for opportunistic FO and sniping. Alternatively as directed or as decided by the OIC Weapons Platoon, a FO & sniper squad could for close support be attached to a specific rifle platoon.

Command brick:
Main team: LT & RO/armourer (normally deployed with a FO & Sniper squad).
Backup team: SGT & RO/armourer (normally deployed with the Direct Support section).

FO & Sniper Section
3 x 6-man FO & Sniper squads.

Direct Support section:
2 x 6-man DS squads each with a Javelin LATGW system & missiles, or alternatively a tripod-mounted 40mm AGL.

The members of each FO & Sniper squad would have available personalised semi-auto and bolt-action rifles firing 5.56, 7.62 and 8.59mm match grade ammunition. Auxiliary and backup weapons would be 9mm compact SMGs and 9mm semi-auto pistols. Dependent upon the nature of an operation each squad could also deploy with a 7.62 or 8.59mm GPMG and/or a 40mm MGL.

The Direct Support section would be equipped with at least one 7.62mm LMG or GPMG. Individual weapons would include 7.62mm semi-auto rifles/carbines, 5.56mm auto rifles/carbines, 40mm UGLs plus 9mm compact SMGs and 9mm semi-auto pistols.

Note. The battalion Mortar and Fire Support Company is envisaged as having two or three 32-man platoons equipped with 81mm mortars, one 32-man platoon equipped with 60mm infantry mortars and a 40-man Direct Support platoon with three 12-man LATGW sections.

[Compost]

The utility of a 32-man (4 tube) mortar platoon has been criticized offline. It was strenuously suggested that a 40-man platoon with its own GPMGs is more capable of self-defence. Also that such applies especially when the platoon can be separated into 2-tube sections.

That’s a well informed argument. So my view now is that an infantry mortar platoon with four 81 or 60mm mortars should be about 40 strong and have also four GPMGs.

[Compost]

.... and have also four GPMGs in addition to its squad LMGs.