Studies on radicalization & comments

[Dayuhan]

The entire concept of "radicalization" is premised in the flawed construct that good citizens go bad due solely to outside influence. Prevention seems to have been focused at these bad outside influences.

So, a man who largely ignores his wife, fails to show her proper respect, or prioritizes her low in his life relative to other interests may well take the position that she was "radicalized" when she becomes infatuated with the attentions lauded upon her by someone who is also lending a sympathetic ear to her plight. But is it really the "fault" of the guy who lures her away, or is it the fault of the man who foolishly created the condtitions that contributed to the new guy's success?

"Prevent" is fine, but the majority of it must be turned internally under the harsh light of frank self-assessment. What can we change about our own behavior to prevent radicalization? Weight the effort there. Only minor and reasonable measures will then be needed for dealing with the efforts of others.

What if a man has a hundred wives... 90 are happy, 6 are mildly irritated, three hate his guts, and one shoots him in the head. On the basis of the numbers you might say he's not doing a bad job, but he's still been shot in the head.

What if a man has a million wives, or a billion?

There's a difference between the kind of radicalization that creates insurgents and the kind that creates terrorists. If the populace has risen against the government and is out in the streets saying it with bombs, then absolutely the government needs to look to its conduct. On the other hand, if a government that failed to infuriate small numbers of extremists at various ends of various political and religious spectra, it's probably doing something wrong. Timothy McVeigh hated the US Government badly enough to blow up a building... but if the US had the kind of government that he would have liked, far more people would have been alienated or infuriated.

You can't please everybody, and given the various extremes floating around it's almost impossible to do anything without making somebody angry enough to kill. There are people out there who want their governments to adopt blatantly racist policies, or to impose medieval religious restrictions, or tax the wealthy out of existence, or outlaw currency, or ban eating meat, etc, ad nauseam. Some of them want these things badly enough to kill. Does their violence mean the Government is remiss in not giving them what they want? Should we allow violent minorities to impose their will on larger numbers simply because they are violent?

When we deal with other countries, we often have to admit that there is little or nothing we can do to prevent radicalization, whether it is insurgent or terrorist in nature. We generally don't have the kind of influence that would make any difference. It's not just between a government and a populace, either... the various factions and sub-factions that compose any given populace need to be able to reach compromises on many issues, especially if the minimum demands of one group are seen by others as cause for rebellion.

[Bob's World]

Radicalization is a grossly overblown concept. It's part of the victim mentality that is so common among officials faced with insurgency, or even terrorist attacks.

Are some out there actually brainwashed, radicalized ? Certainly, but it is, I suspect, a very small percentage of those who engage in such acts.

Find the young Muslim British citizen, living in London who becomes engaged with such a group who also is very satisfied with how the government treats any group at home or abroad that he sees as "his people." I doubt you would find many, perhaps none.

I find this recent focus on "counter-radicalization" to be taking on a dangerous perspective that leads to tendencies to downplays the shortcomings of government by playing up the evil influence of the outsider conducting UW, or the insurgent leaders locally.

You see the same things in the illegal drug realm, with dealers painted as the source of evil and users as victims. This just doesn't match my experience in life or as a prosecutor. Same victim mentality and shifting of responsibility. Most Drug Dealers are businessmen who are willing to risk jail time and competitive violence in order to service the demand for the product.

Most groups conducting UW are the same. They have a product and they take it to where the demand is. Target demand, not supply for best effect, but to target demand requires first to come to grips with ones own problems, and Pols don't do that well (once in office).

[davidbfpo]

Bob's World in part stated:

The entire concept of "radicalization" is premised in the flawed construct that good citizens go bad due solely to outside influence. Prevention seems to have been focused at these bad outside influences.

Yes, I would agree the UK counter-radicalisation strategy is undermined IMHO by adherence to the concept of 'vulnerability' of the 'good citizens'. I am not sure why officialdom has taken this course, but I suspect that the previous Labour government did not want foriegn policy to be acknowledged as a factor. Something the Chilcot Inquiry on the Iraqi War has heard from retired officials.

I am also mindful that in the UK we focus on the 'vulnerable' and the "bad guys", without enough consideration of the vast majority of citizens and the majority of Muslims. We need to be wary of state actions that provoke this majority and cause them to shift allegiances, if only to a clear neutral "I see no evil" stance.

What is clear in the UK, since 2005, is the clear lack of public, political involvement and their reluctance to be engaged in the public debate of the issues that can contribute to radicalisation. All too often, usually aimed at the "silent majority", engagement has been by "hired hands" or "extremism entreprenurs", civil servants - who with few exceptions recite the official "line" and those in the "frontline".

So much so that for many, notably in the urban Muslim communities, 'Prevent' is a dirty word and best kept away from.

This may all be changing:http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2...lent-extremism

[Bob's World]

The best COIN is "prevent" and is performed by civil government in stable countries and communities around the world everyday. Those who neglect true prevent inevitably find themselves soon mired in "react," or what we generally see as classic insurgency and counterinsurgency.

Today's characterization of COIN as warfare steers us away from appreciating the day to day role of prevention that takes place during phase 0 "pre-insurgency" governance of a populace. It also tends to make us over-militarize COIN in both our thinking and our deeds.

David, I think if you change the perspective of what it is you are trying to prevent, and then broaden the aperture as to how to best achieve such prevention, you may well find a fresh appetite for the smartest COIN of all: Peacetime prevention through the delivery of good governance to the entire populace of a land. (and now in growing importance, fair treatment to the lands that populace hailed from as well)

[Dayuhan]

Are some out there actually brainwashed, radicalized ? Certainly, but it is, I suspect, a very small percentage of those who engage in such acts.

Find the young Muslim British citizen, living in London who becomes engaged with such a group who also is very satisfied with how the government treats any group at home or abroad that he sees as "his people." I doubt you would find many, perhaps none.

Brainwashed, no. Angry, yes, and angry young men will always be with us. You cannot prevent anger by giving everyone what they want and treating everyone as they wish to be treated, because the way some wish to be treated is not compatible with the way others wish to be treated.

In any event I think the whole COIN thing may be much blown out of hand, because aside from the insurgencies we've created, through our insistence on occupying countries and trying to create governments, we don't really have an insurgency problem. To me the answer to that problem is not to get really good at COIN, but to stop creating insurgencies by trying to tell others how they ought to be governed. A bit late for that in Iraq and Afghanistan, certainly, but what other insurgency is out there that the US need to concern itself with?

We always talk about the Middle East... how many countries in the Middle East are actually facing insurgencies? Not nebulous concepts like "pre insurgency" or "Phase 1 insurgency", which can be manipulated to postulate an insurgency almost anywhere in the developing world, but actual organized functioning insurgencies that pose a realistic threat to government?

[Rex Brynen]

We always talk about the Middle East... how many countries in the Middle East are actually facing insurgencies? Not nebulous concepts like "pre insurgency" or "Phase 1 insurgency", which can be manipulated to postulate an insurgency almost anywhere in the developing world, but actual organized functioning insurgencies that pose a realistic threat to government?

By almost any possible measure, the Middle East hasn't been unstable since the 1970s--indeed, its arguably the most stable part of the developing world.

No government in the region (not even Iraq or Yemen) faces a substantial current risk of being overthrown. A number do face security threats from violence due to localized ethno-religious-political rebellions (Yemen/Houthis, Iran/Jundallah, Turkey/Kurds) or Islamist terrorism (Iraq/AQI, Algeria/AQIM, others). However, none of these has the slightest chance of marching into the capital.

On that note, I would like to nominate a candidate for SWJ's "worst insurgent strategy of the month" award--the ambitious, but out-of-favour, Sheikh Khalid bin Saqr al-Qasimi of Ras al-Khaimeh (UAE):

The Israeli ambassador to London, Ron Prosor, has met Sheikh Khalid bin Saqr al-Qasimi, the exiled crown prince of Ras al-Khaimeh (RAK), who asked him to help with his campaign to oust the leadership of the northernmost state in the United Arab Emirates.

The meeting took place in London in March and has been followed by phone calls and wider assistance and advice, according to records of the relationship seen by the Guardian.

Khalid, who has been based in London and has hired a solicitor from Ickenham as his agent, is bidding to replace his ailing father, Sheikh Saqr, and half brother, Sheikh Saud, to take control of RAK....

Public stories of your flirtation with Israel do you so very much good in building street (or palace) credibility in the Arab world. As for Ickenham, its a real power-center of Middle East politics.

Full story at The Guardian.

[bourbon]

Talking to the Enemy by Scott Atran – review, by Jason Burke. The Observer, 24 October 2010.

Rather than being brainwashed by militant recruiters, terrorists tend to be ordinary people driven by their peer group, argues anthropologist Scott Atran

Audio: Book Event with Scott Atran. Center for Strategic and International Studies, Oct 21, 2010.

Book reception with Scott Atran, director of research at Anthropology National Center for Scientific Research in Paris, France, author of "Talking to the Enemy: Faith, Brotherhood, and the (Un)Making of Terrorists." This event was moderated by The Honorable Juan C. Zarate, Senior Adviser, CSIS Transnational Threats Project.

[Bob's World]

It is well to consider that behind the ideologies of "communisim" that U.S. foreign policy shifted to containing upon the fall of Nationalist China were always vast popular movements in the pursuit of liberty.

We had no need to contain the ideology, it died of its own unsustainability as a concept. Similarly, no amount of effort can contain a people committed to the idea of liberty.

Ironically enough, it was the pursuit of liberty by the people of Eastern Europe that put a fork in the Soviet Union (whose expansion was the original focus of containment prior to 1950) far more than any effort to contain Soviet ideology.

Today the nations of the Middle East may well be "stable" (much as the Soviet Union was stable...) but the forces of liberty are still at work, and are still far too powerful to be contained indefinitely. Is it a radical idea to risk individual death in the pursuit of nationalist liberty? Absolutely, but such "radicalism" was once admired by Americans, and similarly such radicals once admired America as well. The past sixty years of US commitment to containing such radical aspirations of liberty have put more than a little tarnish on our grand old liberty bell.

Someday (soon I hope) those who rant on about Islamism will be relegated to the same historic dust bin as Joe McCarthy and his ilk. It is simply far too easy to rationalize the compromise of one's national principles and ethos in the pursuit of idealistic agenda's to contain "ideas.". It is time for a return to Realpolitic, and to focus policies designed to advance national interests of the U.S. that do not require a policy commited to the idealistic suppression of the liberty of others.

The U.S. I know, while it has certainly supported and helped sustain many of the governments of the Middle East, does not stand for the principles employed to secure such stability. It is time to evolve.

Influence is emerging as the primary resource of national power in the globalized era. Containment of others expends influence far faster than it can be acquired. While the growing U.S. fiscal deficiet is extremely worrysome, it is the influence deficiet that may ultimately break us.

Becoming more focused on our roots as a nation, less willing to compromise our values in the name of a security that too often comes at the expense of the liberty of others, and learning to see past ideologies employed to pursue liberty as well as fear-mongering to suppress ideologies, are all esential to evolving to more effective Ways and Means of foreign policy.

[davidbfpo]

The BBC have this article supporting a File on Four radio documentary, on the unclear impact of Al-Shabab on the Somali community in the UK:

Jenny Cuffe investigates how British-based Somalis are being lured into fighting for the al-Qaeda-linked Islamists of al-Shabaab.

There have been consistent rumours that dozens, perhaps scores of British-based Somali men have travelled to Somalia to join the militant Islamist group which was banned by the British Government earlier this year.

File on 4 explores the techniques used by Al-Shabaab to persuade young members of the 250,000-strong British Somali community to sign up for Jihad in Somalia. Members of the close-knit and reticent British Somali community tell Jenny Cuffe of their fears that youngsters are being seduced through the internet and by shadowy recruiting sergeants for the Horn of Africa's most feared military force.

And the programme travels to the state of Minnesota to see how a vigorous FBI investigation and cooperation from the Somali community have laid-bare a pipeline which first lured, then transported young American Somalis to the training camps and battlefields of Somalia.

Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-11667690 and the File on Four podcast:http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b00vkxkc

I noted the references by US Customs to the issues around Khat being smuggled into the USA, via the UK originating from Kenya and the suspected fund raising for Al-Shabbab. Khat is not illegal in the UK, unlike the rest of the EU and USA.

[davidbfpo]

Too long a title to fit, hence the short opener. The full title is 'Online De-Radicalization? Countering Violent Extremist Narratives: Message, Messenger and Media Strategy', an article by Omar Ashour, in Perspectives on Terrorism.

Link:http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/...=144&Itemid=54

Taken from the summary:

..this article outlines a broad strategy for countering the narratives of violent extremists. It argues that an effective counter-narrative should be built on three pillars. The first is an effective comprehensive message that dismantles and counter-argues against every dimension of the extremist narrative, namely the theological, political, historical, instrumental and socio-psychological dimensions. The second pillar is the messengers. The article argues that for the first time in the history of Jihadism a “critical mass” of former militants, who rebelled not only against the current behaviour of their former colleagues but also against the ideology supporting it, has come into existence. This “critical mass” can constitute the core of credible messengers, especially the few de-radicalized individuals and groups that still maintain influence and respect among vulnerable communities. The third pillar is the dissemination and attraction strategy of the counter-narratives(s) which focuses on the role of the media.

[Bill Moore]

We refuse to convert to Islam as a nation (or in the West), and we refuse to implement Shari'a law, and we refuse to suppress our women, and we refuse to do a lot of things that we simply think our wrong headed ideas/beliefs.

John Smith is a loser (and it's obviously our fault) sitting in bumfudge, NY looking for meaning in life, and then he finds it finds on Anwar Awlaki's website and starts a dialouge with him, maybe attends a mosque that is relatively close. Ah he has found meaning and happiness now, and has decided to take his self actualization a step further by attempting a terrorist attack in a crowded mall over the weekend. He now knows if he dies conducting Jihad against the evil government that oppressed him all these years he'll get to go to paradise. I'm not how that is our fault due to our foreign policy, but apparently it is.

Most "terrorists" come from middle class or upper class families (fact), most terrorists have education beyond high school (fact), most terrorists come from secular or non-practicing families (fact).

Our approach to challenging terrorism? Economic development, build schools, and focus on secular education? I'm sure this is completely logical and a good use of our tax dollars, but I don't see it, maybe you can help me contect the dots?

The reality is there are narratives and ideologies that simply incompatible in the real world outside of academia. More education and economic development will not change their minds, the issue is neither, it is their beliefs. Obviously not every Muslim, nor even most, embrace the views of the extremists that desire to murder civilians to achieve their goals. Something about the radicalization process pushed them off the fence. They may have been sitting on the fence because of their perceptions of oppressive governments, etc., but there was a process that pulled them into the ranks of terrorism (not talking insurgents, although the two are frequently confused in SWJ). It is worth continuing to see is we can lessen that calling, and for those affected by the radical narrative, at least offer another view that may at a minimum put them back on the fence again. I readily admit most programs to date have been terrible failures.

However, it is time we move beyond the liberal self imposed view that we're too blame for a few men attacking the U.S. and murdering thousands of civilians, or attacking the public transportation systems in England and Spain and murdering hundreds of innocents. The blame is a belief system that is NOT compatible with the modern world.

[davidbfpo]

Hat tip to CLS alert (a consistently good daily news alert on CT issues) for an article in The Salon: 'The Muslim "radicalization" myth: Debunked. What Peter King missed this week: How the government should actually fight homegrown terrorism'.

Which summarises a longer report by the Brennan Centre and ends with:

If we're going to talk about radicalization, let's look at the evidence that's out there. Let's not rely on stereotypes or preconceived notions about what radicalization is and who is susceptible to becoming a terrorist. The empirical evidence that is available so far is directly in contradiction to the theories that have been put forward by the FBI and the NYPD. So we want to make sure that those theories -- that are unfounded and contradicted by the social science evidence -- are not being used to influence policy.

Link to The Salon article:http://www.salon.com/news/politics/w...tion_explained

Link to the Brennan Centre report:http://brennan.3cdn.net/3ff468de1211..._hwm6beu15.pdf

On my first, quick read I noted the emphasis on outwardly visible signs regarding the Muslim faith being taken as indicators of radicalisation; a good point IMHO and as Muslim police officers repeatedly have said to me rarely an indicator of political radicalisation.

Incidentally the Brennan Centre report is very critical of an earlier NYPD report, see posts 15 & 16 on this thread 'The Homegrown Threat':http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=3672

[davidbfpo]

A fairly standard article on the flight from Toronto, Canada of naturalised, if not born there Canadian-Somalis, except two women have fled:http://www.thestar.com/news/article/...ppeal-to-youth

One hopes that the two affected communities are in contact.

[davidbfpo]

A short commentary on the flow of those radicalised / radicalized to overseas training camps, which touches upon the special category status of white converts:http://raffaellopantucci.com/2011/05...te-mans-jihad/

[SWJ Blog]

The Process of Islamic Radicalization in Intra-State Conflict

Entry Excerpt:



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Read the full post and make any comments at the SWJ Blog.
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

[davidbfpo]

I rediscovered this 2002 article at the weekend and it is a good illustration of how violent extremists can be unknown to their families. The Greek terrorist group, November 17th, eluded capture for twenty-seven years and were unravelled after one bomber was unlucky.

Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worl...d-company.html

[davidbfpo]

An ICSR paper and from the flyer:

ICSR’s latest paper – ‘De-Radicalising Islamists: Programmes and Their Impact in Muslim Majority States’ – identifies key factors that make de-radicalisation and counter-radicalisation programmes more effective.

Written by Professor Hamed El Said, it examines the approaches of eight Muslim-majority states that have developed ‘soft’ strategies to counter and prevent jihadist radicalisation.

The study has found that the factors which contribute to the effectiveness of such programmes include:

• National consensus – Lack of popular and political support has denied Jordanian de-radicalisation efforts the social underpinning that contributes to their relative success in Saudi Arabia. In Yemen, initial support for de-radicalisation has ebbed away, while in Algeria it has remained relatively strong.

• Committed national leadership – Enthusiastic leadership by national governments can provide ‘soft’ counterterrorism policies with impetus; inject them with confidence; build trust in their purpose; and – in doing so – create and maintain the needed national consensus.

• Civil society – The engagement of civil society can provide new ideas and reinforce the state’s actions by empowering local communities and associations, especially those that are vulnerable and hard to reach for the government.

• Non-religious programming – Religious dialogue alone will not eliminate violent extremism. Programmes must not ignore the social, economic and political factors that contribute to radicalisation and consider them in their mix of programming.

• Cultural awareness – De-radicalisation programmes must be consistent with, and derive from, each country’s mores, culture, rules and regulations, and take account of what is acceptable and not acceptable in their societies.
El Said shows that each programme has different approaches and objectives – often depending on the nature of a particular society and the terrorist threat with which it has been faced:

• Countries like Morocco and Bangladesh, for example, have focused on countering and preventing further radicalisation, whereas Saudi-Arabia and Yemen have emphasised rehabilitating and counselling those who have become radicalised.

• Saudi Arabia has developed well-structured official programmes, while many others, including Jordan, have relied on individual and civil society based initiatives.

• Some countries, such as Egypt and Algeria, have gone through processes of collective de-radicalisation (whereby an entire group denounces violence), whereas others deal with individuals on a case by case basis.

This diversity in approaches, El Said argues, is one of the various programmes’ greatest sources of strength. However, this also makes it difficult to measure success and produce valid comparisons. One size, he concludes, does not fit all.

Link:http://icsr.info/paper/de-radicalisi...ajority-states

I wonder how well Western countries would fare if the key factors were applied?

[davidbfpo]

Hat tip to Randy Borum, a SWC Member, to a special issue of the 'Journal of Strategic Studies' on Rethinking Radicalisation, which is free to access:http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/

Economy of effort needed, Randy's introduction is on:
http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/vi...50&context=jss

[davidbfpo]

A rare IMHO article by an Indian commentator on radicalisation, which also looks briefly at Asian examples:http://www.sunday-guardian.com/analy...-of-deeper-rot

[davidbfpo]

Just found this EU-funded website, which has a reference section with, currently, 171 reports on counter-extremism:https://www.counterextremism.org/resources/?&page=1