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Old 03-22-2012   #1
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Join Date: Dec 2011
Location: Eugene, Oregon
Posts: 1
Default Analyzing the Iraq War Surge

This is my first council post. I am working on a Master's thesis that explores how and why the strategic shift of 2007 (to borrow a phrase from Dr. Steven Metz) occurred. The general gist of my research plan is that a cultural preference within the army for "big" wars blinded many to the adaptations required for success in Iraq. If you are a glutton for punishment take a look at my prospectus for more specifics. This research is based on my own experience as a young officer in 2005 that did what he was trained to do, which was mechanized high-intensity war, and didn't really accept counterinsurgency until I was facing the prospect of defeat as a member of one of the last surge units in 2007.

What I am looking for is: 1. general feedback on my research question, and
2. personal anecdotes from any soldiers out there (my research is admittedly army-centric) who may or may not have shared the confusion that I felt from 2004-2006 about our strategy and tactics in Iraq (I'm specifically comparing the Casey transition strategy - big FOBs and transition to ISF - and the Odierno/Petraeus surge strategy).

Many thanks,
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File Type: docx chastain, research prospectus, 18NOV11.docx (52.4 KB, 207 views)
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