Reconciliation and COIN in Afghanistan

[jmm99]

is that I don't well tolerate people who attempt to twist my words[*] - as in this assertion:

So a constitution is a "mere piece of paper"? A Certificate for a million shares of Goggle is "mere paper" as well. President Obama's birth certificate is "mere paper."

Exactly what I said (specific to one and only one document) was:

The Astan Bonn Constitution is not the problem. It's a mere piece of paper which has no materiality to Astan governance.

Karzai does what Karzai does because he has power to do so enabled by the realities of the situation in Astan - he and his cronies can get away with and profit from corruption to the nth degree. I measure Karzai by his acts which are organic to him; and not by the process initiated in Bonn, Germany (the document itself was later enacted in Astan).

As to the Astan constitutions (plural), I've managed to look at them. In fact, I did a thread on them (+ Astan's diplomatic history, the status of the Northern Alliance and the Taliban, etc.), Defending Hamdan (a couple of dozen posts are material to this thread). As to "insurgency", Advanced Search (limited to JMM99) gives 166 hits; as to "civil + war", Advanced Search (limited to JMM99) gives 165 hits.

I'm not going to regurgitate that stuff. One can read it or not as one wishes, making up one's mind or non-mind in the process.

I'm not going to engage in a debate with you. Dayuhan can have that pleasure. You are, without a doubt, very articulate.

Regards

Mike

[*] In fact, I grew to despise and hate lawyers who were inveterate word twisters par excellance. Trials and appeals, where a third party renders the decision, were thus a great satisfaction because they usually gave me payback. But, retiring and getting away from the buzzards was the best of all.

[Bob's World]

Mike,

My point is that "Karzai acts as Karzai acts" within the legal context as framed by the Constitution we helped him and his Northern Alliance design and put in to effect. He does not act IAW the historic context of the culture and historic governance of the region. We saw central governance, increased democracy and modernity. The Northern Alliance saw a solidification of their patronage power, centralized control that disempowered the populace as well as any rising regional power brokers. We both saw exclusion of the return to legal power of those associated with the recently dispossessed Taliban.

There was little insurgency prior to this document going into effect, but it has grown ever since. Certain aspects are temporarily suppressed by the weight of our surge in a few places, but I doubt very much any changes made in that manner will stick. The problem will return to its natural state once the weight of our presence is removed.

My prediction is that the resistance aspect of the insurgency will actually die down as we continue to draw down; but that the revolutionary aspect will build up steam. GIRoA will either cut a deal, or they will face a push that will be bloody and likely cannot win.

Once the Taliban rise to power they will see the value of this constitution to legitimize their own dominion over the country, just as the Northern Alliance has. We will find ourselves in a tough spot, because suddenly the document we have lauded and protected for so long as it helped us serve our interests will become very problematic indeed as we see it works equally well to counter our interests. We outsmarted ourselves on this one.

So my point is simple. Perceptions of the sovereignty of governance for any of our partners is vitally important. We need to do a better job of promoting and respecting those perceptions. The nurturing of some aspect of democracy that allows a populace to have reasonable means to legally address their concerns with their government in the context of their own culture and history is vitally important as well. We need to nurture that most of all.

In Afghanistan our fixation on our tactical programs, our fears, and our perception of "what right looks like" lead us to positions that run very counter to both of those critical perceptions.

I am not the one "twisting words," our government is. I am merely pointing out the twist and attempting to explain why untwisting those words is so important. When we twist words such as "sovereignty" and "democracy" as the United States of America to serve our perceived interests, who have we become as a nation??

[davidbfpo]

After having little success playing it safe, the Afghan government is gambling on a risky new strategy to convince the Taliban that the road to peace runs through Kabul.

In recent months, scores of Taliban officials and rank-and-file have been freed from prisons in Afghanistan and neighboring Pakistan. Now, Afghanistan is upping the ante with the expected release of thousands more within its borders while pushing Islamabad to free some of the Islamist militant group's most dangerous characters.

The prisoner releases are seen as a signal of good faith from the administration of Afghan President Hamid Karzai, who is wary of peace efforts not led by Kabul but whose overtures for direct talks with the Taliban have been refused.

Link:http://www.rferl.org/content/afghani.../24822610.html

One US analyst, with time on the ground in Helmand, ends with:

The incentives do exist for them to talk about talking in a way to get concessions and cause friction between the Afghan government and the International Security Assistance Force and within the Afghan government...we cannot create these incentives for them to make a deal while we are leaving.

In the Good Friday Agreement (GFA) that led to a form of peace in Northern Ireland, the status of convicted prisoners was a critical issue and it became clear later an easing of parole leading to early release helped to gain the prisoners support for the GFA.

I fully accept Afghanistan is very different from Northern Ireland, but is such a mass release seemingly without condition wise?