Terrorism in the USA:threat & response

[davidbfpo]

A controversial NYPD programem gathering information on the local and regional Muslim communities has been stopped; citing the Mayor:

a critical step forward in easing tensions between the police and the communities they serve, so that our cops and our citizens can help one another go after the real bad guys....

....a review of the unit – renamed the zone assessment unit in recent years – under the new police commissioner, William Bratton, found the same demographic information could be better collected through direct contact with community groups, officials said

Links:http://www.theguardian.com/world/201...disbanded-nypd
and a longer report (maybe behind a registrationw all):http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/16/ny...isbanded.html?

[davidbfpo]

Just found, this was published in January 2014 and originates from the New America’s National Security Program:

...shows the NSA’s bulk surveillance programs have had a negligible impact in preventing terrorism in the United States.....an in-depth analysis of 225 individuals recruited or inspired by al-Qaeda or like-minded groups, and charged with a terrorism-related crime since 9/11. It notes that the contribution of the NSA’s bulk surveillance programs to these cases was minimal compared to more traditional law enforcement methods, which initiated the majority of cases. The report also found that the collection of American phone metadata has had no discernible impact on preventing acts of terrorism and only the most marginal of impacts on preventing terrorism-related activity, such as fundraising.

Nice graphic which will not copy:http://natsec.newamerica.net/nsa/analysis

[davidbfpo]

Two useful articles today. Their focus is on the USA, although a number of aspects have a wider application.

A long piece in The New Yorker, with a title and sub-title:

The Whole Haystack; The N.S.A. claims it needs access to all our phone records. But is that the best way to catch a terrorist?

Link:http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/20...whole-haystack

taken from the opening passages:

Almost every major terrorist attack on Western soil in the past fifteen years has been committed by people who were already known to law enforcement....In each of these cases, the authorities were not wanting for data. What they failed to do was appreciate the significance of the data they already had.... He cited a statement by Alexander’s deputy that “there’s only really one example of a case where, but for the use of Section 215 bulk phone-records collection, terrorist activity was stopped.” “He’s right,” Alexander said.

The second FP essay has the title:

The Myth of the Terrorist Safe Haven; A pernicious and persistent theory that America’s enemies flourish in foreign sanctuaries -- and that only military means can rout them -- has led us abroad in search of monsters to destroy.

Link:http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/01/26/...st-safe-haven/

A taster from the penultimate paragraph:

..evidence of the true threat of terrorism to Americans suggests that a hotel room in Hoboken can be just as much a safe haven as a hut in Helmand — and more dangerous too, given the proximity to American targets.

[davidbfpo]

A short reply to the cited FP article (in the previous post) from Lawfare; which ends with:

..safe havens will continue to matter, and their threat is no myth.

Link:http://www.lawfareblog.com/2015/01/s...-still-matter/

[Bill Moore]

A short reply to the cited FP article (in the previous post) from Lawfare; which ends with:
Link:http://www.lawfareblog.com/2015/01/s...-still-matter/

Cody Poplin's attack on the safe haven myth article could have served as a corrective, but his own counter piece was equally flawed. I think the underlying problem is identifying our adversaries as terrorists, and how that paradigm limits our view of the various movements associated with al-Qaeda (directly or indirectly). I agree al-Qaeda did not need Afghanistan to plan and conduct 9/11, but on the other hand at that stage of the movement they did need a safe haven to organize their global network (now it is probably robust enough to survive without a designated safe haven, since there are adequate safe havens (smaller scale) in many large cities and remote areas around the world.

Cody cited the Management of Savagery

“The Management of Savagery,” which is currently the homework of aspiring jihadis of the Islamic State, suggests that groups must establish safe havens, or regions where they can administer savagery. Key factors for site selection include “the presence of geographical depth;” the weakness of the ruling regime and the weakness of the centralization of its power in the peripheries of the borders of its state;” and the prior “distribution of weapons in the region.” Based on this criteria, Naji suggests Pakistan, Nigeria, Libya, and Yemen are all suitable places from which to spark the fire of jihad, concluding: “Before its submission to the administration, the region of savagery will be in a situation resembling the situation of Afghanistan before the control of the Taliban, a region submitting to the law of the jungle in its primitive form, whose good people and even the wise among the evildoers yearn for someone to manage this savagery.”

Point taken, but they're not talking about planning external attacks from these locations, though they certainly can and do. They're talking about unconventional warfare where AQ as an external sponsor exploits (and creates) conditions to establish their base. If you read about the theory on "competitive control" it is clear that both the communists and al-Qaeda do this better than the U.S. We have a difficult time understanding why it works, since it runs counter to our deeply held worldview based on "The End of History."

Cody made several good points, but the biggest shortfall in his argument was what he didn't cover. Al-Qaeda wanted us to invade Afghanistan. We certainly fought better than they expected, and it could have the end game if we were successful in killing their senior leadership before the movement went global. Instead it became a quagmire where we ended up wasting billions of dollars while AQ expanded elsewhere. Al-Qaeda's current strategy (articulated years ago, but most recently in their latest version of Inspire) is to get the West to over extend.

I think the correct answer is somewhere between these two arguments. We can't afford to pursue ineffective COIN approaches to eliminate safe havens. This approach has reduced our focus on the larger strategic picture and narrowed it down to one geographical spot that we look at through the lens of counterterrorism instead of strategically. This approach is simply unsustainable, yet these safe havens can't be ignored. Cody is right they must addressed, but we need a new sustainable approach for doing so. To be more provocative, even if we invested another five years of surge level effort in Afghanistan and actually stabilized the country (we would have to assume an enduring fight along their border with Pakistan) so what? How many countries can we afford to do this in? While we compressed our strategic world view to a tactical problem centered on Afghanistan (once again the failure of the center of gravity concept), the rest of the world continued to evolve in ways not beneficial to U.S. interests. A few examples of other problems include, Russia's aggression in Ukraine, China's aggression in the South China Sea, and AQ expanding through much of the Middle East and North Africa.

We need to take two steps back and look at the larger picture and have a more informed discussion on feasibility and strategic risk. In some ways I think the authors' are talking past one another and could come to a mutual agreement if they were sitting at a table discussing it.

[AdamG]

ST. LOUIS — Six people, including three St. Louisans, are facing charges of providing support and resources to terrorists.

An indictment has been unsealed charging Ramiz Zijad Hodzic, 40, his wife, Sedina Unkic Hodzic, 35, and Armin Harcevic, 37, all of St. Louis County. Nihad Rosic, 26, of Utica, N.Y., Mediha Medy Salkicevic, 34, of Schiller Park, Ill., and Jasminka Ramic, 42, of Rockford, Ill., were also named in the indictment.

The United States attorney's office says all six suspects are natives of Bosnia who immigrated to the United States and are either naturalized citizens or have refugee or legal resident status.

http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/n...rism/23032923/

[davidbfpo]

A 10 pg article via Lawfare 'Analytics in Action at the New York City Police Department’s Counter-terrorism Bureau':http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-conten...2/Levine_5.pdf

he New York City Police Department’s Lower Manhattan Security Coordination Center integrates data from a variety of sources, including sensors (cameras, license plate readers, and environmental detectors) and records (arrests, complaints, summonses, 911 calls, etc.). Analyzing this data to inform decision making has required the development of several coordinated processes. These processes are leading to increased efficiency and effectiveness as well as improved situational awareness for senior leadership.