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Thread: Arab armies in 'Small Wars' and the 'Arab Spring' (merged thread)

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  1. #1
    Council Member davidbfpo's Avatar
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    There is a good short review of the Algerian military's response to the Arab Spring by Michael Willis, alas behind the FP registration / pay wall. Then I found this alternative 'Algeria Three Years After the Arab Spring' by the German Marshall Fund of the US and the second chapter is worth reading.

    Link:http://www.gmfus.org/wp-content/blog..._Jan14_web.pdf
    Last edited by davidbfpo; 04-10-2017 at 04:57 PM. Reason: Copied to the Algeria thread today.
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    Council Member CrowBat's Avatar
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    A very interesting file, no doubt. Still, I can't but criticise the description of how the Algerian authorities and military handled the In Amenas affair.

    While spending plenty of time with description of BelkMoktar's intentions, this account provides absolutely no details about his planning, nor about how much he managed to realize (or not at all). Considering that Algerian authorities actually have no problem to provide such info, that one of USN's EP-3s from Sigonella was nearby, and that an FBI team inspected the site once this affair was over - this is quite surprising.

    Namely, BelMoktar wanted to capture a bus full of foreign workers as hostages (including the Boss of the BP), destroy a part of the industrial complex - which, BTW, is some 100 square kilometres in size - in order to attract attention of security services and fire-fighters, and then, once the military and fire-fighters would enter the complex, blow up the entire complex in order to cause a maximum of destruction of casualties.

    The first part of the plan was spoiled by Gendarmes that escorted the bus. They identified attackers on time and opened fire. Sure, and sadly, two passengers (one Briton and one Algerian) were killed by Jihadists (and two Gendarmes injured too), but BelMoktar didn't manage to capture the bus and had to rush into the complex with empty hands.

    The guards at the main (and only) gate recognized what is going on and sounded alert; control centre shut down the entire production, and started evacuation. Means, part 2 of the plan was spoiled too.

    Now, the Jihadists killed the guard who sounded alert and managed to enter the place and started planting bombs around the complex. They also managed to capture a number of foreign and Algerian workers. However, by that time no less but 600 Algerians and 134 foreigners (out of some 800 employees) were evacuated. Means: the third part of the plan was spoiled too.

    It was only then that BelMoktar began babbling about French ops in Mali and Algerian support for the same - and he did so while trying to open negotiations with Algerian authorities.

    This is making it instantly clear that the story about the authorities not negotiating with BelMoktar being a hogwash. They did. Otherwise, the Jihadists wouldn't get a number of 4x4 vehicles from authorities, the following night, and wouldn't be able to load these with hostages and try to escape.

    The security services went into action when that column drove out of the complex - and then because they realized that the cars in question contained only a part of Jihadists and their hostages: this made it obvious that those remaining inside the complex have decided to blow themselves and their hostages up. And in such cases, ladies and gentlemen, there is simply no other solution but 'assault the place'. That was when Mi-24s became involved. They set two vehicles on fire, while the third was detonated by one of occupants and set on fire. This is where most of hostages were killed.

    Meanwhile, the Jihadists that remained inside the complex have started to liquidate hostages. However, Beech 1900s have blocked most of explosive vests the Jihadists installed on hostages, and thus only one of these was killed.

    In summary, the Algerians killed 32 Jihadists, and captured four or five alive (not only 3; although this might be a figure released by the authorities 'for public consumption'). About 40 hostages were killed too (including Algerian workers, not only foreigners). Eight ANP troops were WIA. BelMoktar's gang has left behind a significant arsenal, including two mortars, at least two RPG-7 launchers, several dozens of mines, about two dozens of machine guns, over 50 hand grenades etc.
    Last edited by davidbfpo; 04-10-2017 at 04:57 PM. Reason: Copied to the Algeria thread today.

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    Council Member davidbfpo's Avatar
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    Default Moderator at work

    I have just merged the two threads Arab Armies and the Arab Spring, with 12,307 views; and How effective have Arab Armies been at Small Wars? with 15,911 views.

    The thread has been renamed accordingly.

    Since 2014 commentary on Arab Armies appear in many threads, notably on the conflicts in Iraq, Syria and the Yemen.
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    Council Member davidbfpo's Avatar
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    Default Arab Armies and their States: A Troubled Relationship

    A new book from Hurst & Co (London) entitled 'Guardians of the Arab State: When Militaries Intervene in Politics, from Iraq to Mauritania' by Florence Gaub.

    From the publishers email notice:
    Guardians of the Arab State explains clearly and concisely how and why military organisations become involved in politics across the Middle East and North Africa, identifying four key factors: a high degree of organisational capacity, clear institutional interest, a forgiving population and weak civilian control.

    Looking at numerous case studies ranging from Iraq to Mauritania, the book finds that these factors are common to all Arab countries to have experienced coups in the last century. It also finds that the opposite is true in cases like Jordan, where strong civilian control and the absence of capacity, interest, or a positive public image made coup attempts futile. Gaub convincingly argues that the reasons are structural rather than cultural, thereby proving a counter-narrative to conventional explanations which look at Arab coups along religious or historical lines.

    In essence, the questions addressed in this groundbreaking book lead back to issues of weak statehood, legitimacy, and resource constraints — all problems the Arab world has struggled with since independence. It picks up where previous literature on Middle Eastern military forces dropped the debate, and provides an updated and insightful glimpse into the soul of Arab armies.

    Link:http://us2.campaign-archive2.com/?u=...6&e=80d42c7c0a

    It is not for me, too many books await reading. If you register there is free global P&P. No, I am not on a commission.


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