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Thread: Syria in 2017 (April-December)

  1. #421
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    CNN Trk ENG

    @CNNTURK_ENG
    BREAKING Dogan News Agency reports contact lost with Turkish military helicopter near Iraqi border, in #Şırnak near #Şenoba.

    Turkey: Army helicopter crashed in #Sirnak Province near the #Iraq|i border. #PKK claims that they have shot down the helicopter.

    Turkish Military confirms 13 dead in military helicopter crash near Iraqi border, in Şırnak Şenoba
    Last edited by OUTLAW 09; 05-31-2017 at 07:52 PM.

  2. #422
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    Default USAF Fought ISIS With the Wrong Bombs and Tactics For Months

    The War Zone at The Drive: http://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone...ics-for-months

    By Joseph Trevithick on May 31, 2017:

    No matter how well prepared a military is, it’s never easy to shift direction rapidly to respond to new threats. One U.S. Air Force briefing suggests Pentagon’s rush to counter ISIS in Iraq and Syria sent the service scrambling to find the right mix of tactics and weapons, with nearly 20 percent of its bombs failing to achieve the desired effect within the first four months of the bombing campaign and potentially contributing to an ongoing shortfall of certain bombs and missiles.

    On Aug. 7, 2014, the United States kicks off air strikes against the brutal terrorists in Iraq, beginning attacks on its members in neighboring Syria the following month. But between August and November 2014, the Air Force saw between 11 and 19 percent of weapons either not have the intended effect or not detonate entirely, according to a briefing Air Force Major Brian Baker gave at the National Defense Industry Association’s Precision Strike Annual Review in March 2017. At the time, Baker was one of the American representatives at the multi-national Air and Space Interoperability Council, which included individuals from all of the so-called “Five Eyes” countries – the United States, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom.

    The main reason for this was that the Air Force had initially shifted forces from Afghanistan, who had been primarily providing close air support and other counter-insurgency type missions, to the new fight in Iraq, he explained. By comparison, the situation in Iraq and Syria was “more similar to air interdiction – disguised as CAS [close air support].”

    In general, CAS is supposed to describe strikes on targets that are actively engaged with friendly forces on the ground. Interdiction refers to attacks on the enemy before they get to an actual battle. Baker’s description matches up with what a public affairs officer for Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve told me about aerial missions against ISIS all the way back in January 2015. At that time, there was some confusion in the official categorization of the missions.

    Iraqi or Kurdish troops and vetted Syrian rebels only needed to be “in proximity” to ISIS fighters – sometimes miles away – for the Air Force to count the strike CAS, the official acknowledged. “It is sometimes the case that sorties tasked for CAS may wind up supporting strikes that look more like interdiction, or vice versa.”

    Though perhaps a pedantic difference to many people, this confusion in roles had a direct impact on the kinds of weapons Air Force multi-role fighters, bombers, ground attack aircraft, and drones carried on each sortie. In his presentation, Baker identified three particular systems were major contributors to the early problems, the GBU-38(V)4/B and 5/B Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) bombs and the DSU-33/B proximity sensor.

    The two JDAM types are a GPS guidance kit attached to the BLU-126/B Low Collateral Damage Bomb (LCDB) and BLU-129/B Very Low Collateral Damage Bomb (VLCDB) respectively. These 500-pound class warheads both cause damage within a relatively small blast radius compared to full-power weapons. The DSU-33/B triggers the bomb’s fuze to air burst above the targets, showering them in shrapnel.

    Combining the DSU-33 and either the LCDB or VLCDB creates a munition that is precise, deadly against enemy personnel who are either entirely exposed or with no cover above, and safe enough for pilots to drop in relative proximity to friendly forces. In short, it’s a great option for supporting troops on the ground in the midst of a protracted firefight who might desperately need air support.

    But once engaged against ISIS, the Air Force found itself interdicting a “drastically different target set,” Baker noted. This included large structures, bridges, armored vehicles, and other hard targets, rather than just lightly armed insurgents in the open. Peppering these targets with a burst of fragments might rattle the occupants, but couldn’t incapacitate them or destroy their cover. If the proximity fuze had a delay in detecting an object or didn’t sense anything due to a low impact angle, the weapon might not go off at all. On top of that, the bombs wouldn’t have been useful at all for knocking out tanks, bridges, or tunnels.

    The Air Force had begun to respond to these problems by the end of 2014, most notably starting to use 2,000-pound class GBU-31/B JDAMs. These weapons often had the BLU-109/B penetrating warhead, which could break through the roof of a concrete building before exploding within for maximum damage. The service quickly decided to save weapons like the GBU-38(V)4/B and 5/B “for expected urban fights” such as the liberation of Fallujah and Mosul, Baker added.

    The Air Force appears to have resolved this initial mismatch, but the experience is likely to be a teachable moment. On top of that, the lessons learned may extend to procurement practices and broader planning for future conflicts. Though Baker does not implicitly make the connection in his brief, the problems he describes, including an existing inventory primarily structured around ongoing operations in Afghanistan and limited reserve stocks, could have been contributing factors to an ongoing bomb shortage.

    Notably, his presentation also pointed out that the fight against ISIS had seen a dramatic increase in the service’s use of GBU-39/B Small Diameter Bombs (SDB), a light 250-pound class GPS-guided glide bomb, as well as Hellfire missiles. These small weapons would have been again most useful against small groups of insurgents in the open, crew served weapons and other fighting emplacements, and light vehicles. The Air Force felt stockpiles of both munitions were “healthy” as of March 2014, but the campaign in Iraq and Syria put its inventory of both “on glide path to zero.”

    The F-15E Strike Eagle and F-16C Viper multi-role fighters can both carry the SDB. The service’s MQ-1 Predator and MQ-9 Reaper drones have historically been the main platforms for employing the Hellfire. In addition, Air Force Special Operations Command’s AC-130W Stinger II gunships, which have been spotted in action against ISIS, can launch both weapons.

    As of 2017, other types of GBU-38s, with standard high-explosive warheads, along with the GBU-31s and 1,000-pound class GBU-32/B JDAMs, continue to be the most common weapons the Air force employs in Iraq and Syria. U.S. aircraft have been routinely carrying the 500-pound GBU-12/B Paveway laser-guided bombs and GBU-58/B dual-mode Laser JDAM, as well. As of November 2016, American aviators – whether from the Air Force, Navy, or Marine Corps – had not dropped any more specialized JDAMs with BLU-118/B or BLU-121/B thermobaric or BLU-121/B deep-penetrating bunker busting warheads, though there is some indication these have since seen use during the Mosul offensive. However, with over 51,000 bombs and missiles expended in total by that point, the Pentagon was reportedly digging into war reserves in Europe and Asia to make up for the shortfall regardless.

    So, it’s not particularly surprising that the U.S. military’s proposed budget for the 2018 fiscal year includes a significant increase in spending on munitions. The Pentagon’s plan includes more than $874 million for more than 34,500 JDAM guidance kits, almost $714 million for over 7,600 Hellfires, and another approximately $504 million for more than 7,300 SDBs. In all, the full budget includes more than $16 billion in funds for missiles, bombs, and other ammunition.

    “For munitions…, we remain challenged by the pace of current operations,” Air Force Major General James Martin Jr, the service’s Assistant Deputy Secretary for Budget, told reporters during the proposal’s rollout on May 23, 2017. “Based on current demand…, we will put an emphasis on replenishing our weapons inventory.”

    With this in mind, the Air Force and the rest of the U.S. military will probably have to focus on just making sure there are enough munitions to continue its existing missions before moving on to see whether future purchases realistically take into account future crises.

  3. #423
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    French investigative weekly cites french intelligence saying Russian PMC OSM/Wagner has 1,500 men engaged in Syria

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    E. #Homs: fierce clashes btwn pro-Assad & #ISIS on Abbasiyah front S. of #Palmyra. IS claims SVBIED detonated, BMP + 2 bull. destr. w/ #ATGM

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    Confirmed by SOHR: Iraqi Hashd PMUs have withdrawn from the villages that they have captured yesterday from ISIS in Hasakah countryside

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    I will be backing out of posting here as I have been tracking Syria for a number of years and now with the full US tilt to Putin, Iran and the PKK......this support to a US named terrorist group PKK will place the US on a confrontation path that will in the end be far more damaging to the US that IS sitting in Raqqa has been...

    Never thought I would see the day that American FP fights with three US named terrorist groups against one terrorist group..."a tad of hypocrisy"....

    It will in the end literally drag the US into ME turmoil for the coming decades and what we see in the Trump WH is that YES they claim to want to limit Iran in both Iraq and Syria...but as long as Russia as Irans and Assads "protector" is in play and with the overt Trump support for Russia...nothing will actually occur in limiting Iran and thus nothing will change in Syria and the killing will just continue.....

    Russia has "won" their "political war against the US" and it is about time many in DC smell the coffee and see the "win" .....as it is in front of their noses and not hard to miss....

    Crowbat and myself have posted more than enough background materials to be able to judge the effectiveness of the Trump ME FP or lack thereof........and Trump owns this war no longer Obama WHAT many tend to forget....
    Last edited by OUTLAW 09; 06-02-2017 at 07:39 AM.

  7. #427
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    Default To OUTLAW 09 RE: Syria

    Quote Originally Posted by OUTLAW 09
    I will be backing out of posting here as I have been tracking Syria for a number of years and now with the full US tilt to Putin, Iran and the PKK...this support to a US named terrorist group PKK will place the US on a confrontation path that will in the end be far more damaging to the US that IS sitting in Raqqa has been...

    Never thought I would see the day that American FP fights with three US named terrorist groups against one terrorist group..."a tad of hypocrisy"...

    It will in the end literally drag the US into ME turmoil for the coming decades and what we see in the Trump WH is that YES they claim to want to limit Iran in both Iraq and Syria...but as long as Russia as Irans and Assads "protector" is in play and with the overt Trump support for Russia...nothing will actually occur in limiting Iran and thus nothing will change in Syria and the killing will just continue...

    Russia has "won" their "political war against the US" and it is about time many in DC smell the coffee and see the "win"...as it is in front of their noses and not hard to miss...

    CrowBat and myself have posted more than enough background materials to be able to judge the effectiveness of the Trump ME FP or lack thereof...and Trump owns this war no longer Obama WHAT many tend to forget...
    Your opinion is noted, however, much will depend upon the aftermath of the fall of Raqqa.

    In 2014, the United States partnered with Iraqi Shia militias that it had fought from 2006-2008, as well as Iranian special forces and intelligence services that it has fought intermittently in Lebanon, Iraq and elsewhere since the 1980s.

    The rather myopic Western focus on Al Qaeda and Daesh reminds me of the “Europe First” wartime focus of the Western democracies. Within the European Theater, whole countries were sacrificed to the Soviet Union from 1944 on, in order to concentrate on the most pressing threat: Germany. Thus, for tens of millions of Europeans, World War II continued for another half-century after the crowds in Times and Trafalgar Squares celebrated.

    Similarly, Al Qaeda and Daesh are considered the primary threats to the West, whereas the PKK is considered more of a Turkish-specific threat and Hezbollah an Israeli-specific threat.

    Your refrain about Trump enabling Khamenei is noted, however, I would counter that Trump’s predecessors, including Obama, Bush Jr., and indeed Reagan, were more amenable to Iranian objectives.

    Thus far, I would say that the current policy in the Middle East is a continuation of the previous administration’s, albeit with greater flexibility to respond to developments i.e. far less concern for Iranian sensitivities. Yet we are less than half a year in…

    As regards American “hypocrisy” over the PKK, I would put the burden of responsibility more on Turkey than the United States. After all, it was Turkey which decided early on that Kurdish autonomy in northern Syria was worse than Daesh’s expansion, and acted accordingly. Now that Turkey is facing blowback for its actions and inaction, you and CrowBat would have the campaign against Daesh halted for what? For the Free Syrian Army to take over the campaign, which it will not so long as Assad is in the field? For Operation Euphrates Shield to conquer Raqqa, which it currently cannot without defeating Assad and the YPG first?

    I suggest that you read the opinions of Kadercan, Stein, Natali and others, on how Erdogan worsened the mess he now finds himself in...

  8. #428
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    Russian servicemen of 2nd Tamanskaya Motor Rifle Division fighting in Syria
    https://informnapalm.org/en/servicem...ghting-syria/#

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    BREAKING
    The #AssadPutin air force bombs the #FSA's anti-#ISIS front in #Tafas.
    Reports of dead & wounded among civilians & rebels.

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    Assad SU22 shot down..pilot is confirmed dead....

    S. #Syria: #SyAF warplane downed today by #FSA in SE #Damascus province turned to be a Mig-23

  11. #431
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    I had posted this photo of a small Syrian boy who had been pulled from a Russian bombed building by SCD sitting in a western donated ambulance inside Aleppo..He is now with his family in Germany.....

    Dear #AssadPutin propaganda

    Greetings from Germany,

    ProAssad and Putin trolling still as active as ever....
    Attached Images Attached Images
    Last edited by OUTLAW 09; 06-05-2017 at 04:54 PM.

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    Default CSIS: Past Saudi-Qatari disagreements weakened Syrian rebels

    https://twitter.com/CSISMidEast/stat...79149525995521

    Selected excerpts from CSIS' October 2016 report:

    Qatar’s policy shift coincided with increasing levels of violence in Syria, which the UN Security Council, Russia, and Turkey all condemned. In the first week of August 2011, Kuwait, the GCC, and then Saudi Arabia followed suit, seeing
    the change in international opinion as the opportune time to join those publicly denouncing the Syrian regime. Qatar seized advantage of the growing international consensus on Syria and its temporary leadership of the Arab League to lead diplomatic offensives against Assad. After hosting a meeting of Syrian opposition figures, Qatar formulated a plan for Assad to hand power to a deputy, and then pushed forward a proposal to send Arab League monitors into Syria.

    The stage was set for a more dramatic GCC policy shift seeking to upend the status quo. In the summer of 2011 all apart from Oman enthusiastically embraced factions of the Syrian opposition, wagering that Assad would be the next Middle East leader to fall. However, Assad did not fall quickly, and GCC members’ apparent unity on Syria policy was short-lived.

    Initially, the greatest divide between the Gulf states emerged over the issue of which opposition groups to back. Different Gulf states’ sponsorship of opposition groups reflected their varying motives for toppling Assad.

    From 2011 to 2014, the principal split was between Qatar and Saudi Arabia, and this divide had a profound impact on the trajectory of the conflict. The Qatari-Turkish relationship, a relative constant throughout the conflict, solidified early when Qatar embraced the Syrian National Council (SNC) which was the first credible opposition umbrella group and one that Turkey helped create.

    Qatar nurtured its networks in the Muslim Brotherhood and funneled financial support through middlemen to make the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood one of the most powerful actors in the SNC. This policy troubled Qatar’s Gulf neighbors, which feared the Brotherhood’s rise in Egypt and elsewhere in the region. Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the UAE instead favored opposition groups considered to be more moderate, having fewer ties to salafi-jihadists. In doing so, they coordinated with Jordan and the United States more than with Turkey. One example of this coordination was the establishment of a joint military operations room in Jordan that hosted Jordanian, U.S., and Saudi officers.

    By the end of 2012, infighting among the Syrian rebels, largely fueled by competition for external funding, crippled the opposition’s effectiveness and prompted renewed international calls for unity. In a sign that the balance of power had started to shift away from Qatar’s Syrian allies, Brigadier General Salim Idriss emerged as chief of staff of the Free Syrian Army after days of debates in Istanbul. His promises to protect Syria’s minorities won him Western backing, and with Saudi Arabia and the UAE also agreeing to channel funding through him, there were hopes that the opposition would unite.

    However, private individuals from the Gulf, including many Qataris, continued to sponsor individual brigades Although there is no evidence that the Qatari state ever intended to fund extremist groups in Syria such as Jabhat
    al-Nusra or the Islamic State group (ISG), the gradual radicalization of opposition groups in 2013 meant that some of those that had formerly benefited from Qatari sponsorship joined extremist groups.

    In December 2013, for example, Saddam al-Jamal, a top Free Syrian Army commander in eastern Syria who reported having received Qatari support, announced his defection to the ISG. Saudi Arabia was beginning to realize that unity in Gulf policy on Syria was crucial to achieving its interests.

    As the Syrian conflict grew more overtly sectarian, tensions between Qatar and its Gulf neighbors increased, with reports circulating that Qatar was funding Ahrar al-Sham and other salafi-jihadi groups in Syria.

    Ahrar al-Sham is a militant salafi group that aims to replace Bashar al-Assad’s rule with an Islamist government, and has mainly operated in northern Syria throughout the conflict. In response, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the UAE withdrew their ambassadors from Qatar in March 2014.

    This move was partly motivated by the stated concerns for internal security within the Gulf, but it was also an attempt to coerce Qatar to change its policy in Syria. Saudi Arabia was beginning to realize that unity in Gulf policy on Syria was crucial to achieving its interests, since it did not consider its other allies to be pulling their weight.
    Last edited by Azor; 06-05-2017 at 08:58 PM.

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    Default U.S. forces strike pro-Assad forces in Syria again

    https://twitter.com/Oriana0214/statu...57407207706626

    JUST IN via @CENTCOM: US-led coalition today destroyed additional pro-Syrian regime forces inside de-confliction zone in southern Syria.
    Last edited by Azor; 06-06-2017 at 06:33 PM.

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    Iran|ian-backed militia in #Syria threatening to attack #US positions "if #Washington crossed red lines".

    Iran ups ante vs @CJTFOIR publishes alleged video of drone over #Tanaf #Syria says: "We can shoot you down anytime but we have pity on you"
    Last edited by OUTLAW 09; 06-07-2017 at 05:26 PM.

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    Wow...who would have though this..certainly not Trump nor his NSC and CENTCOM.....

    BREAKING: ANHA news agency now confirms Syrian government 'launched an attack' with heavy weapons on SDF south of Maskana, west of #Raqqa.

    Last night #SAA struck #SDF positions south of Maksana town with artillery fire

    If confirmed, the growing competition between US-backed and Iranian-backed forces for the control of eastern #Syria just escalated

    Several unconfirmed reports suggest a regime warplane struck Kurdish-led forces fighting #ISIS southwest of Tabqah #Syria

    Clashes reported between Kurdish Asayish forces and regime fighters in Hasakah #Syria
    Last edited by OUTLAW 09; 06-08-2017 at 09:27 AM.

  16. #436
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    Aleppo: #FSA shelling #YPG in northeastern #Aleppo last night.
    http://wikimapia.org/#lang=de&lat=36...9687&z=12&m=b#

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    Iranian proxies in Syria ratchet up rhetoric against US and threaten to hit American positions after 2 air strikes:
    http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mi...idUSKBN18Y17H#

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    Default The question now is how, not if, Qatar will change

    Hassan Hassan: http://www.thenational.ae/opinion/co...ll-change#full

    When the former emir of Qatar, Hamad bin Khalifa, handed over power to his son in June 2013, many in the Gulf hoped the transition would herald a new beginning for Qatar’s relationship with its neighbours. Since the Arab uprisings two years earlier, Doha had played an outsize role in changing the geopolitical map of the region to the detriment of its neighbours’ interests. It aligned itself with what seemed to be the primary benefactors of the new Arab world, namely the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamists.

    By the time Sheikh Tamim took over, the regional standing of Islamists appeared to be declining. The perception then was that the new emir was poised to lead a foreign policy transition too, away from the divisive ways of his father. Chatter in the Gulf suggested that Sheikh Tamim was close to the Saudi royal court before his ascent to power, unlike his father who captured power in a coup in 1995 and pursued a truculent policy to rival his larger neighbour.


    A test of the optimism came a week after he took office, with the removal of Mohammed Morsi, Egypt’s Islamist president. The rift between Qatar, on one hand, and Saudi Arabia and the UAE, on the other, deepened. For several months, Sheikh Tamim insisted that he wanted to keep the Qatari foreign policy in synch with that of its neighbours. The problem, the Saudis and Emiratis were told, was that the new emir could not reverse policies overnight.


    Attempts to settle differences behind closed doors failed. In March 2014, Riyadh, Abu Dhabi and Manama recalled their ambassadors from Doha in protest at what they described as policies that threatened regional stability. The public move was uncharacteristic of Gulf politics, and citizens and expatriates immediately realised, without necessarily knowing the details, that the feud must have been too deep for those countries to take such an action publicly.


    The four countries resumed talks and Qatar bowed down the following month to a set of demands. The demands included refraining from undermining another country’s security, interests and safety; reining in media outlets critical of the Gulf countries; cessation of support to the Muslim Brotherhood and the Houthis; putting an end to Qatar’s naturalisation of nationals of other Gulf countries. (Qatar was accused of providing Qatari citizenship, besides financial support, to Islamist oppositionists from other Gulf countries.)


    Qatar was given a three-month period to prove its compliance. Authorities there deported Islamist figures previously domiciled in Doha, and supposedly took steps to roll back its support for Islamists in Libya, Syria, Yemen and the Gulf. Youssef Al Qaradawi, a senior Egyptian cleric and the nominal spiritual leader of the Muslim Brotherhood, stopped giving Friday sermons for a few weeks. The row was visibly contained.


    Until Monday. The three Gulf states announced unprecedented measures against Qatar, severing diplomatic ties and shutting down all land, air and sea crossings. The rigorous action was accompanied by equally unprecedented media attacks: "Qatari opposition" called for Sheikh Tamim’s removal and the establishment of a "national accord government", no doubt an ironic echoing of calls made by Qatar’s proxies during the Arab uprisings.


    The rhetoric is more serious and damaging than the economic and diplomatic measures, as anyone familiar with Gulf politics will recognise.

    What happened between 2014 and Monday to warrant such action? Why now? There was no such thing as a spark. As described by an official familiar with the process, the situation escalated over time, specifically since January 2015, when King Salman took office. The new king subsequently inaugurated a new approach to engage Qatar.


    Riyadh reset its relations with Qatar, and began a dialogue to resolve all outstanding issues. The Saudis also pushed the more sceptical UAE to do the same, especially since the 2014 agreement led nowhere anyway. The new approach, according to the official, emboldened the Qataris, who felt the pressure was off to revert to old policies. The timing of the reset may have also indicated to Qatar that Riyadh was too stretched in Yemen, and preoccupied with the effort to counter Iran under the Trump presidency, to pick a fight with pro-Islamist Qatar.


    Tension was coming to a head for some time and what officials describe as "unacceptable behaviour" by Qatar increased recently. Whenever confronted, officials say, Qatar would deny and obfuscate. Media attacks emanating from Doha-funded outlets noticeably heightened in recent months. Riyadh, per the public statement, also accused the Qataris of supporting Shia Islamists in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia's eastern region.


    A combination of factors led the Gulf states to act against Qatar at this time. The American unease about Qatar’s role in the financing of extremist organisations in the Middle East, and the momentum of the Riyadh-Washington relationship, meant that if there was a time to attempt to change Qatar’s behaviour, it was now.

    Each of the Gulf states has its own reasons for escalating against Qatar, with the common denominator being the support of Shia and Sunni Islamists against their interests. For now, the Qatari emir’s immediate concern is to demonstrate strength before his people — as indicated by his ceremonial Ramadan iftar with Al Qaradawi on Monday. But Qatar’s priority will no doubt be to seek a de-escalation as soon as possible, while the Gulf powers are determined to change Doha’s behaviour. The question is how, not if, it will be changed.

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    Default On the "deal" for Daesh to evacuate Raqqa

    Russian sources today claim that the SDF is colluding with Daesh by forging an agreement where Daesh has safe passage to withdraw from Raqqa. Turkish sources have twisted that story to denounce the PKK/PYD as colluding with Daesh.

    Anadolu: http://aa.com.tr/en/europe/russia-sa...-raqqah/838402

    TASS: http://tass.com/defense/950769

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    Quote Originally Posted by Azor View Post
    Question is if the story is correct that Trump had a private series of discussions with KSA leaders when he sent all of his aides out of the room...

    We have seen this move before with Comey have we not??...SO what did Trump actually promise KSA for their moves on Qatar...weapons, money and or natural gas???? OR all three?

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