Force Ratios (the old 3-to-1 rule)

[Fuchs]

The Soviets researched their experience form 43-45 and quantified a lot. Their conclusions pointed rather at a 6:1 ratio, and I don't remember older literature with focus on force ratios than 50's stuff right now.

The necessary ratio (usually a ceteris paribus thing) depends a lot depending on the mission and level anyway. A 1:1 ratio can suffice on the offence as demonstrated in 1940, whereas a 3:1 ratio can be insufficient.


I personally think that the culminating point distance is a more useful metric - and a badly neglected one.

[Ken White]

The necessary ratio (usually a ceteris paribus thing) depends a lot depending on the mission and level anyway...I personally think that the culminating point distance is a more useful metric - and a badly neglected one.

Distance is critical -- relative position, time, terrain and training, along with mission and distance are far more determinant than numbers. Ratios as low as .1:3 have been successful, as high as 6:1 not successful...

[Tom Odom]

Some citations for further research:

Combat Data and the 3:1 Rule
T. N. Dupuy
International Security
Vol. 14, No. 1 (Summer, 1989), pp. 195-201
(article consists of 7 pages)
Published by: The MIT Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2538771

Assessing the Conventional Balance: The 3:1 Rule and Its Critics
John J. Mearsheimer
International Security
Vol. 13, No. 4 (Spring, 1989), pp. 54-89
(article consists of 36 pages)
Published by: The MIT Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2538780

[SJPONeill]

Back in the Good Old Days (for me) of Knight Rider, Miami Vice, big hair and pastel clothing i.e. the early-mid 80s, as a young soldier we were taught the 3-1 ratio as applicable against a like opponent i.e. the classic Commonwealth section with 1 MG, and 7-9 riflemen (with semi-automatic rifles) ...so a rifle platoon should be able to successfully engage a rifle section, a company a platoon, etc etc...the reference material for this would have been one or some of the pubs in fine Aussie series The Manual of Land Warfare (MLW)...however...if the adversary was armed along the Soviet model where every soldier had an automatic weapon like an AK, the ratio was 10-1 especially if the adversary was in a defended position...

Going up to 10-1 may have been a simplification for young soldiers by simply increasing the level of engagement from platoon to company as I do recall that some instructors referred to this increase as a Soviet lesson so the 6-1 above may be quite correct...

Our network is down at the moment but I have most of these pubs in the library and will do some research once it is back up...

[Tukhachevskii]

Assessing the Conventional Balance: The 3:1 Rule and Its Critics
John J. Mearsheimer
International Security
Vol. 13, No. 4 (Spring, 1989), pp. 54-89
(article consists of 36 pages)
Published by: The MIT Press

The above paper is avaliable at a more friendly location (i.e., for free) here


Other works by Mearsheimer avaliable here

[Fuchs]

It's probably noteworthy that a different strain of thought about necessary ratios does not look at friendly / allied forces, but at friendly forces / frontage in kilometres.

This was often done in regard to breakthrough battles (guns/km, tanks/km, AT weapons/km) and there were also rules of thumb about acceptable frontages for battalions or brigades (of specific type, such as mechanized infantry) in various forms of combat (attack, defence, delay).

The latter seems to have been favoured for scenarios with unusual force densities (such as the Cold War when 26 NATO divisions were supposed to defend a 1,000 km front line - this took rather 50+ divisions in WW2).

[JMA]

The above paper is avaliable at a more friendly location (i.e., for free) here

Other works by Mearsheimer avaliable here

OK, having read the free copy I see where the problem lies. The 3:1 ratio should apply at platoon and company levels and less so further up the line. By the time you get to division it would not apply as the greater battlefield intelligence picture would dictate actions. If you have no battlefield intelligence then you would not know what you are up against to apply the ratio of three against, would you?

[Bob's World]

A planning factor. Paint by numbers. Something for the observer controllers to use to abuse you with at the AAR "Well, certainly your unit was successful, but we're concerned that you did not have a 3:1 ratio over all (though your may well have been 8:1 where you through your strength against a point of weakness while the bulk of your opponent's force sat idle eslewhere...)

[JMA]

A planning factor. Paint by numbers. Something for the observer controllers to use to abuse you with at the AAR "Well, certainly your unit was successful, but we're concerned that you did not have a 3:1 ratio over all (though your may well have been 8:1 where you through your strength against a point of weakness while the bulk of your opponent's force sat idle eslewhere...)

Yes in a peacetime army it could become a pain if misused in such a manner... but then who wants to be a soldier in peacetime?

[TAH]

Concepts like 3 to 1 ratios are only valid when comparing like or similar capabiity systems, weapons or units.

comparing the average WW2 infantry platoon armed with bolt-action rifles and a limited number of MGs to any of today's cutting edge infantry with magazine fed assault rifles, ICOM intra-squad comms, body armor etc will reveal that a straight comparison of numbers only is invalid. The concept of Relative Combat Power was an attempt by the US during the late 80s early 90s to address this issue. Sometimes it worked, sometimes it did not.