OIF Strategic Decisionmaking

[SteveMetz]

Well, we don't know what they really thought but I've never seen any evidence that they didn't believe what they were saying publicly.

[Ken White]

However, I think that if one considers what was said publicly was in in a sense difficult to refute, that it wasenough to garner some support other than the Neocon approach (which I thin bush just used without necessarily signing on) that became the rationale along with the WMD bit which Wolfotwits later aknowledged had been a mistake and was overhyped.

I suspect that like any MBA, Bush looked for synergies in his strategery. Thus things like not committing heavily to Afghanistan but instead going elsewhere to disrupt AQ et.al. with an unexpected stroke (which became expected due to political problems, to wit, supporting Blair to keep him on side); attacking the Region the so-called terrorists came from (Saudia Arbia was out of the question, too much disruption of the world oil supply and we want China to have all the oil they need. Afghnanistan is not part of the ME so did not count); selecting a pariah state and removing an unpopular autocrat which would elicit less objection than most others; forestalling the move by Iraq to convert their oil sales to the Euro; the disruption of the French, German and Russian near monopolies in ME commerce (while mildly upsetting EU consolidation efforts at the time ongoing...); attacking a point in the ME which would offer geographic leverage over the rest of the area (and thus hopefully getting large bases in the MEfrom which to annoy the neighbors); the quixotic idea of planting 'democracy' in the ME and a host of other little things. Not least the message the US is nuts...

Also a lot of people wanted to get out of Northern and Southern Watch efforts, the Saudis wanted us out of their country so they could crack down on local dissidents and Kuwait and Doha etc. don't really offer enough basing area. A plus was getting in the knickers of France, Germany and Russia to the extent that when Baker visited them postwar with I'm sure interesting things in his attache case, he was able to 'persuade' them to forgive much Iraqi debt -- while letting them know we had other even more incriminating items.

Little of all that would sell well publicly, what did sell well enough was the allegation of a threat -- made little sense but the media isn't bright and it was good enough to get things started.

I've always believed Bush rushed the effort and did it the way he did because he believed had he not gotten a second term, his replacement would do nothing about AQ et.al. but make ineffectual slaps they way his four predecessors did and would do nothing about Saddam. Don't know but I suspect they truly believed the WMD bit to at least a driving extent.

It is interesting to ponder what might have occurred had we gone when first planned instead of delaying about six months to support Blair. That would have been before Saddam gave his two Russian Gen-gen 'advisers' gold medals and he had released all prisoners from jails, passed out weapons and set up his post invasion 'insurgency'...

[Schmedlap]

Little of all that would sell well publicly, what did sell well enough was the allegation of a threat -- made little sense but the media isn't bright and it was good enough to get things started.

Ain't that the truth. I remember watching Powell present the "evidence" at the UN. At the time, I was an over motivated LT itching for a fight in Iraq. But even I, after watching that, thought "that's it?" I was expecting an outcry over the lack of evidence. Instead, the media took it seriously. Media's role as watchdog = FAIL.

[SteveMetz]

Ken--I'm convinced that any planning Hussein did for a post-invasion insurgency was limited and ineffective. He was much more concerned that U.S. action would provoke another Shiite uprising. That was what he was configured to deal with.

I've never seen anything that indicates that there was a plan to invade six months earlier. But even if there had been, it wouldn't have mattered. The primary causes of the insurgency was Sunni Arab resistance to their loss of domination, and the desire of the transnational jihadist community to strike at the United States. Six months or six years in either direction would not have altered these conditions.

[MikeF]

I've never seen anything that indicates that there was a plan to invade six months earlier.

Dr. Metz,

I'd relook that. Here's what I remember.

In May 02, 3/3 ID deployed to Kuwait as part of the 4 month Operation Desert Spring Rotation (hanging out in the desert and driving our tanks). By August, our rotation was extended and rolled into the OEF campaign. We sent one platoon to Pakistan to train security forces. Obviously, some staff went with them and made sure they touched down in A'stan so they could get a combat patch . We were told that we would attack Iraq as early as November. At one point in October, we were given a 72-hour WARNO. Looking back, they may have been playing an OEF like attack with SF, SOF, and one heavy BCT. Obviously, that plan did not go into effect.

I was just a platoon leader at the time so it's possible what we heard was unfounded. Rumsfeld never called my red phone to ask advice. Regardless, it might be worth checking out.

v/r

Mike

[SteveMetz]

I have copies of the plans here in my office. There were contingency plans for a quick insertion if Hussein lit the Ramala oil fields or undertook some other act of aggression, but there was never any plan to launch the full invasion until some time in 2003. The final plan wasn't even approved until the summer of 2002, and the forces weren't in place to implement it until late in the year. Plus, the congressional resolution wasn't until autumn, so six month prior to the actual invasion would have been before that.

[Ken White]

Ken--I'm convinced that any planning Hussein did for a post-invasion insurgency was limited and ineffective...

Though I think our poor handling of the immediate post invasion activity contributed to the partial success of that limited plan and enhanced the effectiveness of what could have otherwise been a failed effort.

I've never seen anything that indicates that there was a plan to invade six months earlier. But even if there had been, it wouldn't have mattered. The primary causes of the insurgency was Sunni Arab resistance to their loss of domination, and the desire of the transnational jihadist community to strike at the United States. Six months or six years in either direction would not have altered these conditions.

I very much agree with the essential lack of difference because our post invasion actions would have been little different and the factors you cite would have been present regardless. There might have been a better outcome early on but it would've been slight...

As for the timing, look at the activation of the MSC sea lift fleet and the movements of 3d ID and the Marines.

Forgive my dumb error in stating "about six months." Using 'a couple of months' would have been more accurate; '...a few weeks' even better. I have this vague recollection of expecting it in December based on things (most relating to troop locations; and prior to January based on being the month being the anniversary Bush's January 2002 statement to CNN that "Regime change in Iraq is a goal of my administration") gleaned from open sources at the time. Not important enough to me to go digging; what happened is reality, all else is idle speculation IMO.

That was of course after the September '02 Resolution. My belief at the time was that the UN fiasco and overall delay were reluctantly undertaken and designed to support Blair. That delay was a minor problem in that it ran into the loss of Spanish support (prior to the election there) as well as a renege of Turkish agreement for the 4th ID insertion (prior to the election there).

Pesky things, elections...

[Schmedlap]

Well, we don't know what they really thought but I've never seen any evidence that they didn't believe what they were saying publicly.

On the other hand, it seems a bold assumption to think that they did believe what they were saying publicly. The purpose of public statements is not to defend the beliefs that motivate an undertaking. The purpose is to win support for the undertaking. Those are two entirely different things.

This is not a critique of your monograph or your rationale - just an observation from a cynic has found that politics is easier to predict when one coldly analyzes how incentives are aligned, ponders their likely second-order effects in light of recent trends, and ignores the rhetoric that is drafted for the largest target audiences.

[SteveMetz]

Yeah, there is always the problem when analyzing current policy that eventually information may emerge that proved the analysis was wrong. The only way I could adjust for that is by asking people who were inside the process for comments on drafts of the manuscript. Until then, I just have to assume things are what they appear to be.

I worked particularly hard on getting an insiders' review for the follow-on to this manuscript which looks at the decisionsmaking for what I call the strategic shift of 2007 (AKA "the surge"). That should be published the middle of next month. We're scheduling a media "roll out" event in DC on May 6 for both of the monographs. I'll post more information as it becomes available.