Afghanistan: Sealing the deal in the "build" phase?

[Schmedlap]

This is going to be a lot of questions, but here goes...

1. What is the approach that we are using in Afghanistan right now?
a) Shape-Clear-Hold-Build
b) Clear-Hold-Build-Transfer
c) Shape-Clear-Hold-Build-Transfer
d) Something else (please specify)

I've read or heard (a), (b), and (c) from fairly knowledgeable sources.

2. My impression is that we are dropping the ball in the "build" phase. If so, do you think this is due to (one or more of the following)?
a) Inability to establish local governance
b) Inability to establish a relationship between community and provincial/central government
c) Inability to provide basic services (security, water)
d) Something else

Finally, if you think we are dropping the ball in the "build" phase for one of the reasons above (or in a different phase) or for some other reasons, why do you think that is the case? And do you see any indication that we have figured out a better way?

Okay, that was a lot of questions, so to clarify more or less what I was hoping to get for feedback, I'll give my impression.

A: I see no indication that we have any short-term prospects to "transfer" any community because this requires that the host nation be able to at least provide security. One step back from that, it seems that, given our past tendency to "mow the grass", we're not able to seal the deal on the "build" phase either. The obstacles to that, as I see it, include one or more of the following:
a) locals lack the means to provide their own security
b) locals lack the incentive to not collude with the Taliban (either through poppy cultivation or fighting) once it returns because they have no other viable means of earning an income
c) locals distrust the central government and do not want to associate with it
d) locals do not want state legal codes imposed upon them at the expense of customary law
e) locals, even if they were acquiescent to state legal codes, are not yet ready to accept central gov't law due to the perception of corruption and lack of responsiveness.

As for indications that we are addressing/correcting any of these issues, I suppose we are attempting to stand up ANSF forces. One would hope they are local ANP to police their own locales, so that we have fewer incidents of ANP from outside the district coming in and partaking in boy-love Thursday festivities. Item (b) seems fairly difficult to overcome, given the lack of infrastructure, education, and security outside of the community (intra-community trade only goes so far). Item (c), one would think, is fairly hopeless given that bribes = 1/4 of GDP and Karzai's election was about as legitimate as Saddam's 2002 approval vote. Item (d) seems like it could be addressed, but I wonder if we're trying or have any plans to try. And item (e) seems a combination of (c) and (d).

Hopefully that's somewhat clearer than mud.

[jcustis]

a) Inability to establish local governance
b) Inability to establish a relationship between community and provincial/central government
c) Inability to provide basic services (security, water)
d) Something else

My own assumptions have been challenged these past few weeks, starting with a definition of what local governance is, in terms of a practical framework...put another way, what do Afghans think local governance should be doing for the people, as opposed to what we think it should be doing.

I think that you can't dissect local (or tribal for that matter) governance from essential services piece. But what if the people don't need the essential services that we are mobilized to provide, which run a whole range of things we may believe they need.

You're likely most right about dropping the ball in the build phase, but the problem is, we've built a ton of stuff already. Is it tied to the people in a way to be an incentive to get them over to our side?

[Schmedlap]

...put another way, what do Afghans think local governance should be doing for the people, as opposed to what we think it should be doing.

Well, governance is the process by which decisions are made and enforced. I would say the only way to answer the question of what they think governance is - is to sit back and observe. Unfortunately, while the locals will probably revert to customary law, the central government (and I suspect ISAF) will want them to adhere to state legal codes. My understanding is that the locals are not opposed to state legal code, but they simply have no faith in the current government's willingness to apply it fairly or consistently or in a responsive manner.

But what if the people don't need the essential services that we are mobilized to provide...

Perfect!

... the problem is, we've built a ton of stuff already. Is it tied to the people in a way to be an incentive to get them over to our side?

Well, I would assert that if we are giving them stuff in order to get them over to our side (other than for short-term tactical gains), then we were seriously misguided. We should be giving them stuff that gives them the tools to become self-governing and self-sufficient. If the central government is going to have a role in that, then it will someday need to be able to ensure security and access to the legal system in remote areas. To do that, it will need to collect tax revenue. Collecting taxes in distant villages will need to be worth the expense, so roads will need to be built to connect villages to Kabul. Villages will not pay taxes unless they view the government as halfway legitimate, so the police forces need to be acceptable and the legal service consistent with their values and beliefs - and the gov't will somehow need to shed its corrupt image. Villages will have no money with which to pay taxes unless they have a source of income. They will have no significant source of income other than poppy until some infrastructure is developed to facilitate something more than subsistence living or intra-district trade.

The only solution that I see to this is for the central government to be a money spigot for the foreseeable future (meaning lots of donor countries pony up aid indefinitely). As it turns out, the NSP has been a very efficient money spigot, but the development projects that it has performed have been a lot of nice gestures without any clear connection to the larger ISAF operation (I'm not aware of any coordination between NSP and ISAF - anyone else?). If ISAF could hand off the build phase to NSP, what with its money, years of experience, ability to communicate and organize, you'd think we could make something happen. Especially if NSP were allowed to do its thing under the cover of ISAF security and with assistance of ISAF logistics.

[jcustis]

Well, governance is the process by which decisions are made and enforced. I would say the only way to answer the question of what they think governance is - is to sit back and observe. Unfortunately, while the locals will probably revert to customary law, the central government (and I suspect ISAF) will want them to adhere to state legal codes. My understanding is that the locals are not opposed to state legal code, but they simply have no faith in the current government's willingness to apply it fairly or consistently or in a responsive manner.


Perfect!


Well, I would assert that if we are giving them stuff in order to get them over to our side (other than for short-term tactical gains), then we were seriously misguided. We should be giving them stuff that gives them the tools to become self-governing and self-sufficient. If the central government is going to have a role in that, then it will someday need to be able to ensure security and access to the legal system in remote areas. To do that, it will need to collect tax revenue. Collecting taxes in distant villages will need to be worth the expense, so roads will need to be built to connect villages to Kabul. Villages will not pay taxes unless they view the government as halfway legitimate, so the police forces need to be acceptable and the legal service consistent with their values and beliefs - and the gov't will somehow need to shed its corrupt image. Villages will have no money with which to pay taxes unless they have a source of income. They will have no significant source of income other than poppy until some infrastructure is developed to facilitate something more than subsistence living or intra-district trade.

The only solution that I see to this is for the central government to be a money spigot for the foreseeable future (meaning lots of donor countries pony up aid indefinitely). As it turns out, the NSP has been a very efficient money spigot, but the development projects that it has performed have been a lot of nice gestures without any clear connection to the larger ISAF operation (I'm not aware of any coordination between NSP and ISAF - anyone else?). If ISAF could hand off the build phase to NSP, what with its money, years of experience, ability to communicate and organize, you'd think we could make something happen. Especially if NSP were allowed to do its thing under the cover of ISAF security and with assistance of ISAF logistics.

Sounds solid, but like a plan we don't have patience for. And that is too bad.

[Entropy]

I think you've made a pretty good analysis; the missing element is local powerbrokers. In Helmand, for example, there is Mohammed Akhundzada, who was governor from 2001-2005 (his family is one of the most influential in the province). After the US (or UK, depending on who you ask) forced Karzai to fire him, he consistently undermined subsequent governors through a variety of means and wants to get the governorship back (he currently serves in the Parliament). He's done things like offer to "help" the governor maintain security using Akhundzada's private forces. I'm not sure there's much the US can do to either reign these powerbrokers in (especially since some of them are Karzai favorites) or weaken their influence.

[Schmedlap]

After the US (or UK, depending on who you ask) forced Karzai to fire him...

Do we know why?

[davidbfpo]

The first answer I found why Mohammed Akhundzada was removed as Governor is from Wikipedia:

Sher Mohammed was accused of links to drug smuggling. In 2005, nine tons of opium and heroin were discovered in his basement. He said the drugs had been planted by the British, whose army was providing security in Helmand Province as part of ISAF.[1] He was sacked by President Karzai under pressure from the United Kingdom [2].

Link:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sher_Mohammad_Akhundzada

He came to notice again, in November 2009, with this story: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worl...o-Taliban.html

Looks like the UK is the villain - in some people's eyes this time.

Curiously his surname does not appear in this late 2009 report on Kandahar, which I usually rely on and have posted before: http://www.understandingwar.org/file...r_Kandahar.pdfhttp://www.understandingwar.org/file...r_Kandahar.pdf

[Entropy]

Yes, my mistake, it was the British and the Dutch that pushed for Akhundzada to be fired. A lot of this is detailed in Giustozzi's "Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop" which I pulled out this morning to check those portions.

We should keep in mind that much of what's going on today has played out before. Akhundzada was one of several governors who were replaced as the coalition focus shifted to a "good governance" strategy, but that effort failed and the potential exists for that earlier failure to be repeated today. As Giustozzi puts it:

While the "better governance" project harvested few positive results due to an already compromised situation and the resistance of elements of the central government, the replacement of the old governors created a vacuum of power, as communities that had sided with the pro-Karzai strongmen were now unhappy and afraid of their forthcoming marginalisation or in any case of losing the privileges and positions they had acquired.

He goes on to note how Akhundzada and others used the local "power blocs" they'd built up to ensure subsequent governors would fail to bring "good governance." There are still "elements of the central government" that continue to pursue their own agendas which negatively impact stability in the provinces and undermine the ability of provincial governors to perform their jobs. Of course, I've long been against concentrating provincial power in governorships appointed from Kabul. This kind of centralization is, IMO, an enduring hindrance to effective provincial governance.

[MikeF]

From the conventional perspective, as far as phases of a counter-insurgency go in the lifecycle of a small war, Shape, Clear, Hold, Build, Transfer probably best defines what an external actor is trying to accomplish in supporting the host nation (SF community would take a different approach all together*). Simultaneously, the guerilla is attempting to shape, clear, hold, and build to replace the host nation in an effort to gain territory and overtime secure control. In other words, that's the rules of the game. Within this model, several decision points are reached if the insurgency is not quelled as introduced in various essays in SWJ:

1. Break Point- point at which the guerilla overtakes the gov't creating a denied area. (McCormick, NPS).

2. Tipping Point- point at which the local populace turns against the insurgency or actions/greivances of the shadow government outweigh those of the host nation. (Anbar, Maj Neil Smith, COL MacFarland).

3. Point of Intervention- External actor (US and coalition) act to retake denied area.

4. Transition Point- Point at which external actor regains control, population is effectively seperated from insurgency, and host nation is capable of retaking ownership for governance and security (A'stan RC-East, MAJ Nate Springer).

So what is build and when can we transition? The easy answer is that it depends, and it's based off METT-TC. The hard answer is that I don't know. Ultimately, this model is an untested theory, and we don't know if it will work.

Here's two remarks from guys much smarter than me that better describe the real issues in the equation.

From David Donovan's website (Once a Warrior King):

Q: Do your experiences in Vietnam speak to the counterinsurgency effort being made today in Iraq and Afghanistan?
A: Absolutely. Anyone having read OWK would have been able to anticipate the difficulties imposed by cultural and religious differences when a western country goes to war against a country in the east. They should have known that local corruption would be a cancer eating at the heart of any effort to rebuild or reconstitute such a country. They should also have known that westernized elites from those countries often over-promise the democratic tendencies of their more traditionalist countrymen. Also, the traditions of tribe or village over country are difficult for westerners to give credence to, yet they are a part of the experience discussed in OWK. On the other hand, for the soldiers, especially soldier-advisors, in the current conflicts, I hope the incidents, emotions, and methods mentioned in the book can be some sort of guide. What is now called “asymmetric war” is at its heart counterinsurgency. It is small-unit, in-the-bushes warfare conducted in an atmosphere where winning the approval, even the affection of locals is vital to success. OWK is the story of one such war in one village, but its application, I think, is much more general.

From SWC's own MarcT

Let me just make a short comment on the theoretician (social scientist) vs. practitioner (military) note. All too often, IMO, we (Anthropologists / Social Scientists) classify some entire range of action as “Bad”, so “obviously” we should have nothing to do with it. This shows up clearly in the lackm of debate and common understanding of what “Harm” means in a context of ethics. “Harm”, at least in the discursive tradition I grew up in, is not the same as “hurt”, and “critical analysis” should not be a synonym for “you hurt my feelings! Wah, wah wah!”.

I truly believe that many social scientists have lost that intimate connection both with lived reality and with a transcendent ideal that characterized Boaz. We seem to have forgotten that Boaz held “science” (actually, the Baconian ideal of a via negativa form of science) as a transcendent ideal, and that one of our “missions” as scientists and Anthropologists was to come as close to ultimate “truth” as we could, always knowing that we would fail. As scientists, at least according to my reading of Boaz, we were required to produce our best understanding of “Truth” based on what we actually observed and saw. A critical component of that lay in our own, personal development and throwing away of preconceptions. Like the military, we were supposed to take what we observed, analyze it, and come to our best “solution”; and, if that meant attacking an institution, a power broker, or whatever, we had a moral imperative to do so.

All of this is a round-about way of getting at your last comment: most of the military folks I know want to make people’s lives “better”. That may be based on screwed up assumptions of what “better” means, but I have only met one person who didn’t want to do so out of the hundreds of military folks I know.

In the end, we're testing how much we can help others. IMO, one can only help someone that asks or wants to be helped. Additionally, we have to really question whether or not we are qualified to help. Is our solution "better" than the status quo?

v/r

Mike

*Under FID and the traditional SF indirect model, they would not take control. Instead, the would only assist the Host Nation to conduct COIN.