Afghanistan: Sealing the deal in the "build" phase?

[Schmedlap]

Okay, I'll try a different approach...

Is there anything wrong with the concept of shape-clear-hold? Is that much of the plan about right? Is that a necessary pre-condition for whatever it is that needs to be done?

[Dayuhan]

Increasing the role of local governance will come at the expense of national governance if it is not done correctly. Conversely, increasing the role and scope of national governance, in a region that has seen more local governance than anything else, has its own problems and issues.

Might be more accurate to say that an increased role for local governance should come at the expense of national governance, if it is done correctly. Unfortunately, this creates a situation where the national government is likely to actively oppose the development of effective local governance.

It seems to me that one of our great mistakes in the early stages in Afghanistan was the focus on creating a centralized, top-down government structure... and that we did this not because that kind of structure suited the Afghan populace, but because it suited us. In the process we created a Government that is not accountable to a rather distant citizenry, is primarily interested in self-preservation and personal gain, which cannot govern and is likely to pursue the personal interests of those who govern at the expense of the interests of the governed. Probably not an exaggeration to say we created a bit of a monster, which is more obstacle than asset at this point.

The question is to whom local governance should be accountable - to the local community or to the national government - and to whom they actually are accountable in practice. Realistically, local governance that serves communities is often not going to be in the interests of the central government, who would rather see local governance accountable to them... a very difficult conflict to resolve.

Is there anything wrong with the concept of shape-clear-hold? Is that much of the plan about right? Is that a necessary pre-condition for whatever it is that needs to be done?

Don't you have to clear before you can shape?

The theory seems fine as far as it goes, but unless we propose to govern Afghanistan, what do we do after "hold"? We haven't the resources to hold everything, and our natural impulse after clearing will be to move on and clear somewhere else. That's not altogether wrong, but it assumes that there is some entity with the capacity to govern that will come in and govern effectively in the interest of the community... and all too often there isn't.

[Schmedlap]

I was trying to avoid this becoming a catch-all thread of every problem under the sun in Afghanistan. Here is another attempt to narrow down the scope...

At the battalion level, in one given community, in the transition from the "hold" to the "build" phase, assume the following tasks are assigned to the battalion...
1) Conduct continuous area reconnaissance of populated area and surrounding terrain to prevent return of irreconcilable Taliban / warlords
2) Recruit and train a local ANP force
3) Identify damaged or missing critical infrastructure and begin necessary movements to repair or provide it
4) Identify - or facilitate the creation of - some administrative or governing body or individual agent who has the consent of the community to speak on their behalf to the unit responsible for the AO.

Are we capable of doing this? If so, have we demonstrated the ability to do this? If not, why are we unable to do this? Or do these tasks simply not even come close to resembling the mission that a battalion or similar element is given when going into a location like, say, Marjah?

[jmm99]

from Dayuhan
Don't you have to clear before you can shape?

Explanation earlier today by MikeF, Importance of Shape - a noted mover and shaper :

from MikeF
SHAPING THE ENVIRONMENT
1. Prepare a General Area Survey (HTTs, past opsums, past intsums, past data, current physical and human terrain).
2. Talk to the stakeholders past, present, and future.
3. Develop a Hypothesis on the problem definition.
4. Conduct Reconnaissance and Surveillance to test hypothesis.
5. Based on the collection of evidence (R&S), define your environment.
6. Develop your plan.
7. Conduct influence operations (propaganda, deception, and disruption operations) to set the conditions for clearance.

So, shape, clear & hold.

------------------------------
? to Schmedlap - How long do you "hold" ?

The timespan would seem to be a variable depending on whether you are an indigenous "holder" or a transient foreign occupier who is on a short timeline determined by its own politics.

Regards

Mike

[JPS]

Might be more accurate to say that an increased role for local governance should come at the expense of national governance, if it is done correctly. Unfortunately, this creates a situation where the national government is likely to actively oppose the development of effective local governance.

It seems to me that one of our great mistakes in the early stages in Afghanistan was the focus on creating a centralized, top-down government structure... and that we did this not because that kind of structure suited the Afghan populace, but because it suited us. In the process we created a Government that is not accountable to a rather distant citizenry, is primarily interested in self-preservation and personal gain, which cannot govern and is likely to pursue the personal interests of those who govern at the expense of the interests of the governed. Probably not an exaggeration to say we created a bit of a monster, which is more obstacle than asset at this point.

The question is to whom local governance should be accountable - to the local community or to the national government - and to whom they actually are accountable in practice. Realistically, local governance that serves communities is often not going to be in the interests of the central government, who would rather see local governance accountable to them... a very difficult conflict to resolve.

The contextual problem that one has with the local governance concept in Afghanistan is through whom will it be managed? With a history of tribalism, warlordism, etc. how can one reasonably go about creating effective local governance without setting the stage for the recreation of the same problems that that have plagued the region previously? The crystallized forms of local governance that we have seen previously have been more accountable to the leadership of the local governance apparatus itself rather than to either the local community or the national government. It certainly is a conundrum...

[Schmedlap]

How long do you "hold" ?

The timespan would seem to be a variable depending on whether you are an indigenous "holder" or a transient foreign occupier who is on a short timeline determined by its own politics.

I suspect that one would only wish to "hold" for as long as necessary in order to get on with "build." Or, put another way, "hold" for as little time as possible. And, just to be clear, I am asking strictly in the context of a tactical unit. I suspect their timeline has much more to do with their higher headquarters than with the big picture strategery.

[Entropy]

My sense is that we are capable of doing this for one community given enough time and resources and provided the community isn't too large for a single battalion.

The problem with the approach is that there are rarely the time and resources and a battalion will probably have responsibility for too large an area. Additionally, a community doesn't exist in a vacuum, and this battalion will need direct and indirect outside support. We can't possibly do this for every, or even most, communities.

I think these problems are compounded by local social, economic, cultural and political factors. For example, given similar resources and time, consider how a shape, clear, hold strategy would work in a Somali community compared to almost anywhere in Europe.

Edit: I just thought of the Balkans. Isn't that a case of "holding?" Tactically, "holding" can work, but the Balkans suggests it's would have to be indefinite.

I was trying to avoid this becoming a catch-all thread of every problem under the sun in Afghanistan. Here is another attempt to narrow down the scope...

At the battalion level, in one given community, in the transition from the "hold" to the "build" phase, assume the following tasks are assigned to the battalion...
1) Conduct continuous area reconnaissance of populated area and surrounding terrain to prevent return of irreconcilable Taliban / warlords
2) Recruit and train a local ANP force
3) Identify damaged or missing critical infrastructure and begin necessary movements to repair or provide it
4) Identify - or facilitate the creation of - some administrative or governing body or individual agent who has the consent of the community to speak on their behalf to the unit responsible for the AO.

Are we capable of doing this? If so, have we demonstrated the ability to do this? If not, why are we unable to do this? Or do these tasks simply not even come close to resembling the mission that a battalion or similar element is given when going into a location like, say, Marjah?

[jcustis]

The problem with the approach is that there are rarely the time and resources and a battalion will probably have responsibility for too large an area. Additionally, a community doesn't exist in a vacuum, and this battalion will need direct and indirect outside support. We can't possibly do this for every, or even most, communities.

Aye, and then the next community over wants what that favored community wants, and that leads to tension, and a sense of disenfranchisement in a way, perhaps? So then, does that tension become released via the laying of an IED?

This makes me ask if there are open sources that lay bare the reasons why cell members, or even the out-of-work man, lay IEDs there. I know they intend to kill us with them, but do the intend to achieve strategic victory, or do they have an appreciation for using them as a delaying tactic?

[Schmedlap]

The problem with the approach is that there are rarely the time and resources and a battalion will probably have responsibility for too large an area.

Just focusing on the resources piece, for now, is the problem that they do not exist or that we are not good at leveraging them?

[Steve the Planner]

Unfortunately, like the Battle of Marjah post (another town every six months), when you put it all together into The Big Picture, there is no Big Picture---just a lot of little stuff that amounts to nothing.

Kandahar, regrettably, is the real deal, so lets hope there is something more substantive than has been done so far. It is a very different thing when you move to larger population centers, and particularly Kandahar.

Fingers crossed.