Tentative Guidelines for building partner armies post conflict

[marct]

Hi Tom,

If by "fatally flawed" you mean Huntington's writing off or Latin and Orthodox civilization as distinct from, and generally inimical to, Western Civlization, I am inclined to agree with you. I think I know why he did it: Because with those two in our camp, and portrayed on a map, it looks like we are well poised to dominate the world for the next couple of thousand years, but without them, it looks as if we're on our last legs.

Oh, it's flawed at that level, too, but that wasn't what I meant. His entire thesis is based on a fatal flaw which, at it's root, is the association of a "civilization" with a genetic grouping. In reality, there are three fatal flaws in it. The first is that he doesn't understand genetics and uses "culture" (actually "civilization") as a proxy for it. The second is that he doesn't understand genetic variances and the interplay between genetic groupings and cultural groupings. The third fatal flaw is that he doesn't understand the relationship of culture as a selection criterion in natural selection.

Given those three flaws, I would have to chcracterize his exclusion of the Latin and Orthodox "civilizations" as a minor peccadillo .

Conversely, I don't know how one argues against the notion that, historically, conflict along civilizational lines among peers and near peers tend to be particularly intractable and bloody, since it usually is.

It's a theoretical distinction that flows from his flaws. Given his model, it's the only possible solution. However, his model cannot account for the rise of trans-civilizational actors or intra-civilizational ones either.

Hmmm, let's see: how would Huntington account for the rise of the Cosmos? What "civilization" would they be part of? (Note: for those who don't know what I'm talking about, this is a scenario that is playing out right now that Tom examines in some of his books)

At best, Huntington's model would have to assume that such groups were a) part of a "civilization" and b) were diasporic in some sense. He would have to model them, since he uses an organicist analogy for civilization, as an "infection" of some type (cf Mein Kampf, Book 1, Ch. 11 for an example of this).

Getting away from the flaws in Huntington's model for a minute, and back to your observation about peer and near peer competition, sure they happen and, you're quite right, only a twit would argue against that. Of course, "competition" doesn't necessarily mean conflict, it could be economic, it could be status oriented (think about the monumental architecture of the early Sumerian city states), etc. I'm not saying that it won't be conflict, just that that will not be a constant.

Furthermore, it is likely that in any long run of peer / near-peer competition, sets of "conventions" governing both competition and conflict will appear as a way of reducing the risk of total annihilation. A good example of this was the development of the Five Empires agreements (~1800 - 1300 bce) between some pretty different "civilizations who were all peers / near peers. On the flip side, sometimes they just end up annihilating one another...

I'm inclined to disagree that Latin states "cannot" become industrialized, in part because some of them seem to be, in part because some of them have been for some time, and in part because the opportunity is opening for them as the core west deindustrializes and shifts ever more to service. This is not to say that they will industrialize well, or honestly / without massive corruption, or efficiently, or anything along those lines. But, if you look at countries capable of building, say, tanks - not bad measures of industrialization - among the few countries that can, can because they have, are Brazil and Argentina. (Though, admittedly, the TAM was rather light and based on a German design.)

Tom, I've got to agree with Dayuhan here:

If dishonesty, corruption, and inefficiency - or to add a few, environmental devastation, sweatshop labor, union-busting, etc - are signs of not industrializing well, then I'm not sure anyone has ever industrialized well. All of these and more were present in abundance during the early stages of industrialization in the US and Europe, and in industrializing Asia.

Can they industrialize? Sure they can, that really isn't the question for me at least. For me, it's more a matter of how they industrialize, using what relational model. Britain (and the US) industrialized along a Robber Baron mode of relations which, in the case of Britain, had already been a cultural vector for several hundred years before the invention of the Watts engine (the Enclosure Movement). The key problem, at a social level, is how do you bring industrialists into a beneficial relationship with the rest of society? In Britain, they did it in part by creating new Peers of the Realm. and intermarriage with the great families. In the US, they did it by letting industrialists control large parts of the political process, although I don't think that option is as stable as the British one.

So, how is it being done in Brazil and Argentina?

Then there is the issue of capability vs. utility. Sure, both Brazil and Argentina can produce tanks, but should they? What are the social relations of their society likely to produce if large numbers of tanks become standard equipment?

[Tom Kratman]

Oh, it's flawed at that level, too, but that wasn't what I meant. His entire thesis is based on a fatal flaw which, at it's root, is the association of a "civilization" with a genetic grouping. In reality, there are three fatal flaws in it. The first is that he doesn't understand genetics and uses "culture" (actually "civilization") as a proxy for it. The second is that he doesn't understand genetic variances and the interplay between genetic groupings and cultural groupings. The third fatal flaw is that he doesn't understand the relationship of culture as a selection criterion in natural selection.

Except in the case of the Japanese, I'm not sure that's true, both your criticism and your characterization. I mean, he has to have been aware of blond, blue eyed Islamic Circassians, highly western Americans with epicanthic folds, bloody Magyars, and the like.

Given those three flaws, I would have to chcracterize his exclusion of the Latin and Orthodox "civilizations" as a minor peccadillo .

It's a theoretical distinction that flows from his flaws. Given his model, it's the only possible solution. However, his model cannot account for the rise of trans-civilizational actors or intra-civilizational ones either.

Hmmm, let's see: how would Huntington account for the rise of the Cosmos? What "civilization" would they be part of? (Note: for those who don't know what I'm talking about, this is a scenario that is playing out right now that Tom examines in some of his books)

Most are likely to know it under the term "Tranzis." Though I think my term, "Cosmos," is slightly more accurate, and less prone to mispronounciation. (Tranzis as in "band," not Tranzis as in Nazis.)

By and large, they're western with some token participants from other civilizations tacked on, mostly for reasons of Cosmo aesthetics. They're neither diasporic nor primarily from any other civilization. And, as I've said, somewhere or other, they're a disease not unlike AIDS.

At best, Huntington's model would have to assume that such groups were a) part of a "civilization" and b) were diasporic in some sense. He would have to model them, since he uses an organicist analogy for civilization, as an "infection" of some type (cf Mein Kampf, Book 1, Ch. 11 for an example of this).

Getting away from the flaws in Huntington's model for a minute, and back to your observation about peer and near peer competition, sure they happen and, you're quite right, only a twit would argue against that. Of course, "competition" doesn't necessarily mean conflict, it could be economic, it could be status oriented (think about the monumental architecture of the early Sumerian city states), etc. I'm not saying that it won't be conflict, just that that will not be a constant.

Well...no; exhaustion sets in. But something need not be constant to be more or less endless, which is, I think, Huntington's view.

Furthermore, it is likely that in any long run of peer / near-peer competition, sets of "conventions" governing both competition and conflict will appear as a way of reducing the risk of total annihilation. A good example of this was the development of the Five Empires agreements (~1800 - 1300 bce) between some pretty different "civilizations who were all peers / near peers. On the flip side, sometimes they just end up annihilating one another...

Tom, I've got to agree with Dayuhan here:

Can they industrialize? Sure they can, that really isn't the question for me at least. For me, it's more a matter of how they industrialize, using what relational model. Britain (and the US) industrialized along a Robber Baron mode of relations which, in the case of Britain, had already been a cultural vector for several hundred years before the invention of the Watts engine (the Enclosure Movement). The key problem, at a social level, is how do you bring industrialists into a beneficial relationship with the rest of society? In Britain, they did it in part by creating new Peers of the Realm. and intermarriage with the great families. In the US, they did it by letting industrialists control large parts of the political process, although I don't think that option is as stable as the British one.

So, how is it being done in Brazil and Argentina?

Then there is the issue of capability vs. utility. Sure, both Brazil and Argentina can produce tanks, but should they? What are the social relations of their society likely to produce if large numbers of tanks become standard equipment?

I used tanks, of course, as a measure of can, not should, and only in relation to the question of "can they industrialize?" which you seemed to be answering in the negative. Or did I misread you?

[Tom Kratman]

Okay, I have obviously NOT gotten the trick of interspersing with quotes. See the above.

[QUOTE=Tom Kratman;96660][QUOTE=marct;96646]Hi Tom,



Oh, it's flawed at that level, too, but that wasn't what I meant. His entire thesis is based on a fatal flaw which, at it's root, is the association of a "civilization" with a genetic grouping. In reality, there are three fatal flaws in it. The first is that he doesn't understand genetics and uses "culture" (actually "civilization") as a proxy for it. The second is that he doesn't understand genetic variances and the interplay between genetic groupings and cultural groupings. The third fatal flaw is that he doesn't understand the relationship of culture as a selection criterion in natural selection.[QUOTE=marct;96646]

Except in the case of the Japanese, I'm not sure that's true, both your criticism and your characterization. I mean, he has to have been aware of blond, blue eyed Islamic Circassians, highly western Americans with epicanthic folds, bloody Magyars, and the like.

[QUOTE=marct;96646]Given those three flaws, I would have to chcracterize his exclusion of the Latin and Orthodox "civilizations" as a minor peccadillo .



It's a theoretical distinction that flows from his flaws. Given his model, it's the only possible solution. However, his model cannot account for the rise of trans-civilizational actors or intra-civilizational ones either.

Hmmm, let's see: how would Huntington account for the rise of the Cosmos? What "civilization" would they be part of? (Note: for those who don't know what I'm talking about, this is a scenario that is playing out right now that Tom examines in some of his books)[QUOTE=marct;96646]

Most are likely to know it under the term "Tranzis." Though I think my term, "Cosmos," is slightly more accurate, and less prone to mispronounciation. (Tranzis as in "band," not Tranzis as in Nazis.)

By and large, they're western with some token participants from other civilizations tacked on, mostly for reasons of Cosmo aesthetics. They're neither diasporic nor primarily from any other civilization. And, as I've said, somewhere or other, they're a disease not unlike AIDS.

[QUOTE=marct;96646]At best, Huntington's model would have to assume that such groups were a) part of a "civilization" and b) were diasporic in some sense. He would have to model them, since he uses an organicist analogy for civilization, as an "infection" of some type (cf Mein Kampf, Book 1, Ch. 11 for an example of this).

Getting away from the flaws in Huntington's model for a minute, and back to your observation about peer and near peer competition, sure they happen and, you're quite right, only a twit would argue against that. Of course, "competition" doesn't necessarily mean conflict, it could be economic, it could be status oriented (think about the monumental architecture of the early Sumerian city states), etc. I'm not saying that it won't be conflict, just that that will not be a constant.

Well...no; exhaustion sets in. But something need not be constant to be more or less endless, which is, I think, Huntington's view.



I used tanks, of course, as a measure of can, not should, and only in relation to the question of "can they industrialize?" which you seemed to be answering in the negative. Or did I misread you?

[marct]

Well, it's all in the coding ! Sometimes, I just cheat and use wordpad....

[Dayuhan]

What are the social relations of their society likely to produce if large numbers of tanks become standard equipment?

I’d guess the production of tanks would have a fairly minor impact on social relations, given that the primary function of the tanks will probably be to roll down the boulevard on Independence Day (an excellent and laudable function for a tank and far superior to the intended one, IMO). If national pride demands tanks, better to manufacture them locally and keep some of the money in the country than buy them abroad…

His entire thesis is based on a fatal flaw which, at it's root, is the association of a "civilization" with a genetic grouping. In reality, there are three fatal flaws in it.

Only three? I stopped counting in the double digits, though I admit that I made little effort to synthesize. I always had a sneaking suspicion that he came up with a catchy title for a book and had to conjure up a theory to go with it. Stranger things have happened.

By and large, they're western with some token participants from other civilizations tacked on, mostly for reasons of Cosmo aesthetics. They're neither diasporic nor primarily from any other civilization. And, as I've said, somewhere or other, they're a disease not unlike AIDS.

That's scary. Because, you see, I met one once, and despite being loony she was cute, and one thing led to another, and does that mean...

Colin, the good news is that your thread has drawn a group of people who are eminently capable of constructive comment on the question you raised. The bad news is that instead of commenting on the question you raised, they're rambling off Brazilian industry, Huntington's flaws, and transnational regressions.

Hey, it's the Internet. Sic Bisquitas Disintegrat, as somebody said...

[Tom Kratman]

I’d guess the production of tanks would have a fairly minor impact on social relations, given that the primary function of the tanks will probably be to roll down the boulevard on Independence Day (an excellent and laudable function for a tank and far superior to the intended one, IMO). If national pride demands tanks, better to manufacture them locally and keep some of the money in the country than buy them abroad…



Only three? I stopped counting in the double digits, though I admit that I made little effort to synthesize. I always had a sneaking suspicion that he came up with a catchy title for a book and had to conjure up a theory to go with it. Stranger things have happened.



That's scary. Because, you see, I met one once, and despite being loony she was cute, and one thing led to another, and does that mean...

Colin, the good news is that your thread has drawn a group of people who are eminently capable of constructive comment on the question you raised. The bad news is that instead of commenting on the question you raised, they're rambling off Brazilian industry, Huntington's flaws, and transnational regressions.

Hey, it's the Internet. Sic Bisquitas Disintegrat, as somebody said...

Matter of fact, when a book comes to me, it comes in the form of a title first. Then the story more or less falls in on the title. No doubt the story was floating around in the back of my head prior to that, but subjectively it never appears that way.

And, sad to say, yes, you're going to die. The good news, however, is that you're most unlikely to die from your no doubt sordid little tryst with a Tranzi.

[John T. Fishel]

Huntington first published the article, then the book.

Marc, I'm afraid I don't see anything genetic in Huntington. My read is that he sees culture writ large as civilization. And it is between these big cultures that he sees conflict. Historically, his thesis holds up best along the Eurpean/Islamic fault line. It falls apart entirely when he argues that the Mediterranean sub-set of Western Culture is a different civilization that he calls Latin American. Then there is the argument that Victor Davis Hanson makes in Carnage and Culture that the really nasty wars are between various enemies from within Western culture - WWI and WWII. We can reject parts of hunington's thesis on grounds other than the genetic argument but it still retains a heuristic utility. (Haven't been able to use "heuristic" in a long time.)

Cheers

JohnT

[Tom Kratman]

Huntington first published the article, then the book.

Marc, I'm afraid I don't see anything genetic in Huntington. My read is that he sees culture writ large as civilization. And it is between these big cultures that he sees conflict. Historically, his thesis holds up best along the Eurpean/Islamic fault line. It falls apart entirely when he argues that the Mediterranean sub-set of Western Culture is a different civilization that he calls Latin American. Then there is the argument that Victor Davis Hanson makes in Carnage and Culture that the really nasty wars are between various enemies from within Western culture - WWI and WWII. We can reject parts of hunington's thesis on grounds other than the genetic argument but it still retains a heuristic utility. (Haven't been able to use "heuristic" in a long time.)

Cheers

JohnT

What's always (or, rather, since reading it) struck me most about Huntington's thesis, and supports it most, is how freaking _merciless_ cross civilizational wars are. Between Brits, French, and Germans we can have something like the spontaneous 1914 Christmas Truce. This never happened between the US Army and AmerInds, nor between us and the Japanese or VC/NVA or Norks or PLA. Instead, we had absolutely ruthless, murderous, merciless slaughter, with very few, if any, instances of humanity to lighten it. It springs, I think, from a lack of feeling, on both sides, that the other side is quite fully human, while the resentment of slaughter has the effect of causing war to go on long after it should be ended. Revenge and all.

[Tom Kratman]

I’d guess the production of tanks would have a fairly minor impact on social relations, given that the primary function of the tanks will probably be to roll down the boulevard on Independence Day (an excellent and laudable function for a tank and far superior to the intended one, IMO). If national pride demands tanks, better to manufacture them locally and keep some of the money in the country than buy them abroad…



...

Maybe, maybe not. I understand that Venezuela remanufactured its AMX-30fleet. Now the turrets can only traverse about 60 degrees. Who knows what they might have ended up with if they'd started from scratch...

[William F. Owen]

I’d guess the production of tanks would have a fairly minor impact on social relations, given that the primary function of the tanks will probably be to roll down the boulevard on Independence Day (an excellent and laudable function for a tank and far superior to the intended one, IMO). If national pride demands tanks, better to manufacture them locally and keep some of the money in the country than buy them abroad…

Tanks demand great skill to be employed successfully, both against regular and irregular enemies. It's not an argument about do we/don't we need tanks. It's far more about "do we have the skill and resources to make having them necessary?" Only very good armies can operate tanks successfully. - lots of very poor armies still have lots of tanks though.

[Tom Kratman]

Tanks demand great skill to be employed successfully, both against regular and irregular enemies. It's not an argument about do we/don't we need tanks. It's far more about "do we have the skill and resources to make having them necessary?" Only very good armies can operate tanks successfully. - lots of very poor armies still have lots of tanks though.

That's all true enough, but there are a number of sliding scales in there, as well as some objective factors. For example, a rebuilt and somewhat upgraded (thermals and ERA, maybe a new engine and trannie, possibly Drozhd or Arena or an equivalent if those can be supported by the platform..._and_ pan out) T-34/85 or M-4 (or Isherman see: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M50_Super_Sherman) is much more likely to be supportable by a Third World army than are any first line western, or Russian, for that matter, tanks. And likely to be about as useful. Some armies couldn't, of course, while others - on the margins, say - perhaps could. Even if they could maintain the more modern ones, though, the costs are often prohibitive. I'm not sure of the costs of running and maintaining an M-1, today. I do recall that it was over 50 dollars a mile, for Class IX alone...about 25 years ago.

Then there's the sliding factor of the enemy. A truly crappy enemy allows less skill and less innate instinct - likewise a less capable vehicle - than a truly good one. An irregular enemy, without heavy weapons, permits more than a regular one, with. (Though if that regular enemy's tank fleet is all deadlined...)

Roads, too, are an objective factor. The best tank crews in the world aren't worth much without a fleet of trucks and roads to supply them over, along with logisticians and maintenance types capable of managing them. Difficulty of maintaining them, too, counts, as well as societal discipline to keep the crews doing their part in that.

In short, it's a very complex, case by case, question.

[marct]

Hi Guys,

Roads, too, are an objective factor. The best tank crews in the world aren't worth much without a fleet of trucks and roads to supply them over, along with logisticians and maintenance types capable of managing them. Difficulty of maintaining them, too, counts, as well as societal discipline to keep the crews doing their part in that.

In short, it's a very complex, case by case, question.

As Tom says, it's very complex, and a lot of the effects are 2nd, 3rd and 4th order in the "civilian" area. Roads in and of themselves shift transportation patterns which cause changes in population settlement (think about how the Interstates effected the US). They also cause shifts in production, consumption and employment patterns which may or may not destabilize an area.

Fleets of trucks either have to be locally manufactured or imported (introducing more production changes) and, in any case, have to be both maintained (requiring changes in education structures) and fueled (with shifts in either production, distribution and/or importing and consequent changes in balance of payments).

Increased motorized transport also causes some rather odd changes in marriage patterns (increasing the mate selection hinterland), which has an effect on the strength of kinship ties and, in many cases, has eroded clan based societies via increasing selection pressures towards individualism. The converse can happen as well IFF ownership, maintenance and fueling are handled at the clan and para-clan level.

One other effect of introducing tanks into a country is to shift the balance of power, increasing the importance of those who control them in relation to those who don't. At the same time, especially when you have a clan or para-clan based society, you will see the development of mobile alternatives (Wilf's last article talks about this), so the gathering of tanks may or may not serve to further destabilize a society.

As Tom said, it's complex....

[Dayuhan]

Tanks demand great skill to be employed successfully, both against regular and irregular enemies. It's not an argument about do we/don't we need tanks. It's far more about "do we have the skill and resources to make having them necessary?" Only very good armies can operate tanks successfully. - lots of very poor armies still have lots of tanks though.

That's assuming they're intended to be used in combat. How much skill does it take to drive them down the boulevard on Independence Day? That may also explain the restricted movement on the Venezuelan rebuilds, poor Hugo may have worried that unrestricted movement might lead a crew to take a pop at him as they roll by the reviewing stand.

Items such as tanks in a 3rd world army are most often for show, though rolling them out in the streets during public disorders looks impressive.

Roads, too, are an objective factor. The best tank crews in the world aren't worth much without a fleet of trucks and roads to supply them over

Bridges too. Some years back I observed a number of M48s rusting in peace in the Philippine Army HQ. An officer explained that they'd never moved, as at the time they got them there weren't more than a dozen bridges in the country that could support one. There still wouldn't be many, especially in the areas where fighting takes place.

And, sad to say, yes, you're going to die. The good news, however, is that you're most unlikely to die from your no doubt sordid little tryst with a Tranzi.

Death be damned, I was afraid it was contagious, a fate far worse. I suppose even a limited capacity for rational thought would confer substantial immunity...

[John T. Fishel]

the spontaneous Christmas truce in WWI, Tom, and similar "truces" during the American Civil War, wars within the West have always been the most deadly. That raises the question of how we treat Japan during WWII. I would argue that it was, by then, a part of the West.

Cheers

JohnT

[Tom Kratman]

That's assuming they're intended to be used in combat. How much skill does it take to drive them down the boulevard on Independence Day? That may also explain the restricted movement on the Venezuelan rebuilds, poor Hugo may have worried that unrestricted movement might lead a crew to take a pop at him as they roll by the reviewing stand.

Items such as tanks in a 3rd world army are most often for show, though rolling them out in the streets during public disorders looks impressive.



Bridges too. Some years back I observed a number of M48s rusting in peace in the Philippine Army HQ. An officer explained that they'd never moved, as at the time they got them there weren't more than a dozen bridges in the country that could support one. There still wouldn't be many, especially in the areas where fighting takes place.



Death be damned, I was afraid it was contagious, a fate far worse. I suppose even a limited capacity for rational thought would confer substantial immunity...

Capacity for rational thought helps, but a) wann die putz steht, liegt die Sinn in die Erde and b) the male IQ drops, in the presence of a cute female, and in direct proportion to her cuteness.

In short, what were you _thinking_, man, taking a risk like that?