Tentative Guidelines for building partner armies post conflict

[Tom Kratman]

Tanks demand great skill to be employed successfully, both against regular and irregular enemies. It's not an argument about do we/don't we need tanks. It's far more about "do we have the skill and resources to make having them necessary?" Only very good armies can operate tanks successfully. - lots of very poor armies still have lots of tanks though.

That's all true enough, but there are a number of sliding scales in there, as well as some objective factors. For example, a rebuilt and somewhat upgraded (thermals and ERA, maybe a new engine and trannie, possibly Drozhd or Arena or an equivalent if those can be supported by the platform..._and_ pan out) T-34/85 or M-4 (or Isherman see: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M50_Super_Sherman) is much more likely to be supportable by a Third World army than are any first line western, or Russian, for that matter, tanks. And likely to be about as useful. Some armies couldn't, of course, while others - on the margins, say - perhaps could. Even if they could maintain the more modern ones, though, the costs are often prohibitive. I'm not sure of the costs of running and maintaining an M-1, today. I do recall that it was over 50 dollars a mile, for Class IX alone...about 25 years ago.

Then there's the sliding factor of the enemy. A truly crappy enemy allows less skill and less innate instinct - likewise a less capable vehicle - than a truly good one. An irregular enemy, without heavy weapons, permits more than a regular one, with. (Though if that regular enemy's tank fleet is all deadlined...)

Roads, too, are an objective factor. The best tank crews in the world aren't worth much without a fleet of trucks and roads to supply them over, along with logisticians and maintenance types capable of managing them. Difficulty of maintaining them, too, counts, as well as societal discipline to keep the crews doing their part in that.

In short, it's a very complex, case by case, question.

[marct]

Hi Guys,

Roads, too, are an objective factor. The best tank crews in the world aren't worth much without a fleet of trucks and roads to supply them over, along with logisticians and maintenance types capable of managing them. Difficulty of maintaining them, too, counts, as well as societal discipline to keep the crews doing their part in that.

In short, it's a very complex, case by case, question.

As Tom says, it's very complex, and a lot of the effects are 2nd, 3rd and 4th order in the "civilian" area. Roads in and of themselves shift transportation patterns which cause changes in population settlement (think about how the Interstates effected the US). They also cause shifts in production, consumption and employment patterns which may or may not destabilize an area.

Fleets of trucks either have to be locally manufactured or imported (introducing more production changes) and, in any case, have to be both maintained (requiring changes in education structures) and fueled (with shifts in either production, distribution and/or importing and consequent changes in balance of payments).

Increased motorized transport also causes some rather odd changes in marriage patterns (increasing the mate selection hinterland), which has an effect on the strength of kinship ties and, in many cases, has eroded clan based societies via increasing selection pressures towards individualism. The converse can happen as well IFF ownership, maintenance and fueling are handled at the clan and para-clan level.

One other effect of introducing tanks into a country is to shift the balance of power, increasing the importance of those who control them in relation to those who don't. At the same time, especially when you have a clan or para-clan based society, you will see the development of mobile alternatives (Wilf's last article talks about this), so the gathering of tanks may or may not serve to further destabilize a society.

As Tom said, it's complex....

[Dayuhan]

Fleets of trucks either have to be locally manufactured or imported (introducing more production changes) and, in any case, have to be both maintained (requiring changes in education structures) and fueled (with shifts in either production, distribution and/or importing and consequent changes in balance of payments).

Increased motorized transport also causes some rather odd changes in marriage patterns (increasing the mate selection hinterland), which has an effect on the strength of kinship ties and, in many cases, has eroded clan based societies via increasing selection pressures towards individualism. The converse can happen as well IFF ownership, maintenance and fueling are handled at the clan and para-clan level.

All of this seems less a consequence of the manufacture of tanks than a general consequence of industrialization. Of course the consequences of industrialization are numerous and profound and not universally seen as beneficial, but industrialization is still something virtually all non-industrialized cultures desire... except of course those afflicted by pastoral utopianism, an aberration largely overlapping Tranzi-ism. Of course very few pastoral utopianists, if any, come from non-industrialized cultures.

Capacity for rational thought helps, but a) wann die putz steht, liegt die Sinn in die Erde and b) the male IQ drops, in the presence of a cute female, and in direct proportion to her cuteness.

In short, what were you _thinking_, man, taking a risk like that?

Thinking??? As you said, wann die putz steht...

Rational thought may not prevent exposure, but it does seem to protect against infection... to date I've yet to show symptoms. Occasionally we dodge a bullet.

PS: Question for the German speakers, taking digression to the extreme: why the #@!! is it "die putz" instead of "der putz". I mean, if ever anything was masculine....

[Tom Kratman]

All of this seems less a consequence of the manufacture of tanks than a general consequence of industrialization. Of course the consequences of industrialization are numerous and profound and not universally seen as beneficial, but industrialization is still something virtually all non-industrialized cultures desire... except of course those afflicted by pastoral utopianism, an aberration largely overlapping Tranzi-ism. Of course very few pastoral utopianists, if any, come from non-industrialized cultures.



Thinking??? As you said, wann die putz steht...

Rational thought may not prevent exposure, but it does seem to protect against infection... to date I've yet to show symptoms. Occasionally we dodge a bullet.

PS: Question for the German speakers, taking digression to the extreme: why the #@!! is it "die putz" instead of "der putz". I mean, if ever anything was masculine....

Because it's one or another dialect of Yiddish, not German. That, or I just got the gender wrong, in Yiddish. Or, it could be rapidly encroaching, premature senility, and where I read it was right, but I remembered wrong. Or it could be that Yiddish has only one definite article for the plural, di or die, and putz is, in context, a collective plural. Or it could be...

To hell with it, you knew what I meant.

[marct]

Hi Dayuhan,

All of this seems less a consequence of the manufacture of tanks than a general consequence of industrialization. Of course the consequences of industrialization are numerous and profound and not universally seen as beneficial, but industrialization is still something virtually all non-industrialized cultures desire... except of course those afflicted by pastoral utopianism, an aberration largely overlapping Tranzi-ism. Of course very few pastoral utopianists, if any, come from non-industrialized cultures.

Hmmm, actually, it's not a consequence of industrialization per se but, rather, a consequence of a certain type of industrialization that has been pushed for the past 80 years or so. It is quite possible to industrialize and have mass transport capabilities that do not rely on fleets of trucks: canal systems and rail systems being the two main alternatives.

Personally, what I find fascinating is the process of technological leap frogging that goes on in some places, Brunei being one example. I'm wondering if we aren't likely to see such a thing happen in terms of transportation as well (it's mainly in communications technologies right now).

Back to the motorization stuff again...

One of the things about tanks, as opposed to, say, armed Toyota trucks, is the maintenance requirements both for the tanks themselves and for the road system. It's quite possible to have a national road system that is primarily dirt tracks (assuming no major rainy season) for pickups, but that does play hell with tanks (again, going back to the interstate system and, also, the German Autobahn).

I'm not saying that all countries which get tanks will do this. All I am saying is that if they get tanks and try and do things most efficiently, they will have a number of social consequences that may not be optimal for security and stability.

[M-A Lagrange]

Just for information, in DRC, Kabila governmet has been capale to sent tanks from Kinshasa to Goma (nearly 2000 Km). For those who know the place it's kind of tour de force as there is less than 400 km of proper road in the country. It did take several month, mainly because that's the time it takes to build a track in forest... And they did loose at least 1 which felt in a river.
The same with South Sudan. Tanks are coming from Kenya. And the road from Kenya to Juba is chaotic at the best.

So tanks in no road countries may be done...

[John T. Fishel]

Tom, I think that our disagreement on Japan's position in the West during WWII is more a matter of degree than kind. To my way of thinking, the Meiji Restoration was Japan's conscious decision to become a Western Power. They adopted the forms of British constitutional monarchy with the Diet having real power; the Royal Navy tradition, and (less certain of this) the Prussian army. They, of course, also picked up some of the failings of their models (eg the Diet functioned more like the Kaiser's Reichstag than the Mother of Parliaments). But the Japanese also sought to preserve their cultural heritage and make use of it in purely Japanese ways to secure power in the new system for old elites. Hence Shinto and the cult of Emperor worship.

Germany, of course, voted itself out of a modern democratic state into a modern totalitarian dictatorship. France was sufferring coup attempts as late as the early 1960s and the 5th Republic was born out of a "coup" in 1958. Although these (and other similar cases) may not be hallmarks of modernity, they are examples of recent history of the West and all would be comprehensible to Japanes political and military leaders of the 1930s.

Cheers

JohnT

[Tom Kratman]

Tom, I think that our disagreement on Japan's position in the West during WWII is more a matter of degree than kind. To my way of thinking, the Meiji Restoration was Japan's conscious decision to become a Western Power. They adopted the forms of British constitutional monarchy with the Diet having real power; the Royal Navy tradition, and (less certain of this) the Prussian army. They, of course, also picked up some of the failings of their models (eg the Diet functioned more like the Kaiser's Reichstag than the Mother of Parliaments). But the Japanese also sought to preserve their cultural heritage and make use of it in purely Japanese ways to secure power in the new system for old elites. Hence Shinto and the cult of Emperor worship.

Germany, of course, voted itself out of a modern democratic state into a modern totalitarian dictatorship. France was sufferring coup attempts as late as the early 1960s and the 5th Republic was born out of a "coup" in 1958. Although these (and other similar cases) may not be hallmarks of modernity, they are examples of recent history of the West and all would be comprehensible to Japanes political and military leaders of the 1930s.

Cheers

JohnT

I think we're talking apples and oranges here. Was Japan part of the largely western system of nation states? Clearly, but that's political, not cultural. Were they trying to become a modern industrialized state? Still clearly, but that's economic, not cultural (though it may have eventually had, because it has eventually had, cultural implications. Course, there was that intervening event...)

But when we, or Huntington, are talking about the ferocity, ruthlessness, bloodiness, and intractability of wars along cultural fault lines, we're not talking either politics or economics, but the way people look at each other, across cultures. And neither we nor they, at the bleeding edge, saw the other as quite human, and worthy of human consideration. And there, in both cause and effect, Huntington's model suits the Pacific War to a T.

[William F. Owen]

Back to the motorization stuff again...

One of the things about tanks, as opposed to, say, armed Toyota trucks, is the maintenance requirements both for the tanks themselves and for the road system. It's quite possible to have a national road system that is primarily dirt tracks (assuming no major rainy season) for pickups, but that does play hell with tanks (again, going back to the interstate system and, also, the German Autobahn).

The real point about any country wanting to "own tanks" or any relatively complicated peace of military technology is the flow down effects of cost. Any bunch of clowns can buy some tanks and drive them around.
Tanks are part of combined arms, which is still the most demanding form of land warfare on the plant both in terms of investment and skill.

The point being that if you take the automotive and high weight debt out of the combined arms equation, you still have some pretty good capability, where even just large numbers can actually start to reap some real benefits. Skill however is still required, but it can be a lot more focussed and gained more easily.

[Tom Kratman]

The real point about any country wanting to "own tanks" or any relatively complicated peace of military technology is the flow down effects of cost. Any bunch of clowns can buy some tanks and drive them around.
Tanks are part of combined arms, which is still the most demanding form of land warfare on the plant both in terms of investment and skill.

The point being that if you take the automotive and high weight debt out of the combined arms equation, you still have some pretty good capability, where even just large numbers can actually start to reap some real benefits. Skill however is still required, but it can be a lot more focussed and gained more easily.

That's true and fair, but there is still a very broad range between an M-1, Bradley-mounted Infantry, and Palladin for fires system, on the one hand, and one with M-50s, infantry that ride atop the tanks (which has some advantages the best IFV can't quite match; also some disadvantages), with 160mm Soltam-Tampala mortars for fire support. The country that can't do the former might still be able to do the latter to good effect, and at a supportable cost.

Of course, in considerable part, Dayahun is right; these countries don't want the systems to use them, but to show them. Currently I'm having to dig, for example, into the Venezuelan Navy. Lots of tooth there, however indifferently maintained. And even a degree of amphibious capability. And subs. And patrol boats. All those are sexy, so they have to have them. But no mine sweepers. No mine sweepers in a country that absolutely must export oil through a very limited number of ports and some fairly narrow channels. If there's any UNREP (underway replenishment) capability, it's around the margins. They're not sexy. They make a poor show.

[William F. Owen]

That's true and fair, but there is still a very broad range between an M-1, Bradley-mounted Infantry, and Palladin for fires system, on the one hand, and one with M-50s, infantry that ride atop the tanks (which has some advantages the best IFV can't quite match; also some disadvantages), with 160mm Soltam-Tampala mortars for fire support. The country that can't do the former might still be able to do the latter to good effect, and at a supportable cost.

Well they may be able to do it well enough versus their regional competitor. The real issue is force employment. Combined Arms requires good planning and good command - two things a great many armies cannot do well. Good training costs money, and requires skill - which also costs money.

They're not sexy. They make a poor show.

....and we worry about these folks because? I know the Venezuelans have SS boats, - like the Iranians. I just really doubt they can use them well enough.

[Dayuhan]

Hmmm, actually, it's not a consequence of industrialization per se but, rather, a consequence of a certain type of industrialization that has been pushed for the past 80 years or so. It is quite possible to industrialize and have mass transport capabilities that do not rely on fleets of trucks: canal systems and rail systems being the two main alternatives...

...I'm not saying that all countries which get tanks will do this. All I am saying is that if they get tanks and try and do things most efficiently, they will have a number of social consequences that may not be optimal for security and stability.

Certainly it's possible to hypothesize a development model that does not rely on concrete roads, and with sufficient central direction (sufficient meaning a whole lot) one might even implement such a model. While the desire for military mobility in general (not only for tanks) has in many cases driven road construction programs, I'm not convinced that military considerations in general or tanks specifically have been the principal reason for the emergence of road/motor-based development paradigms.

To assess the social consequences of the decision to acquire tanks and the (frequently absent) decision to use them efficiently you'd hve to separate those consequences from those of a whole raft of other parallel factors, and I suspect that at the end of the day the causative role of the decision to acquire tanks would be fairly minor.

Why do we worry about Venezuela? Damned if I know.

Does anyone worry about Venezuela? I can't see why, at least in the military sense, and even in the political sphere poor Hugo seems more a minor irritant than a serious concern. Of course a spat with Colombia is not outside the realm of possibility and could be an awkward thing, if only for the potential impact on oil prices!

[tequila]

But when we, or Huntington, are talking about the ferocity, ruthlessness, bloodiness, and intractability of wars along cultural fault lines, we're not talking either politics or economics, but the way people look at each other, across cultures. And neither we nor they, at the bleeding edge, saw the other as quite human, and worthy of human consideration. And there, in both cause and effect, Huntington's model suits the Pacific War to a T.

But Huntington's model doesn't apply to how cultures and values can change across time or within institutions. Witness the enormous variance in military institutional culture in the Imperial Japanese Army between, for instance, the Russo-Japanese War and the Pacific War. The Japanese took enormous casualties in both wars, but the treatment of POWs taken by the IJA was almost completely reversed.

Also the treatment of Chinese civilians during the Boxer Rebellion (notably good, especially in comparison to the Western forces they fought alongside) by Japanese forces in 1900 versus the Japanese invasion post-1932 (perhaps exceeded only by the Germans in Eastern Europe) is also an example of how institutional culture can radically change in a very short amount of time.

[Tom Kratman]

But Huntington's model doesn't apply to how cultures and values can change across time or within institutions. Witness the enormous variance in military institutional culture in the Imperial Japanese Army between, for instance, the Russo-Japanese War and the Pacific War. The Japanese took enormous casualties in both wars, but the treatment of POWs taken by the IJA was almost completely reversed.

Also the treatment of Chinese civilians during the Boxer Rebellion (notably good, especially in comparison to the Western forces they fought alongside) by Japanese forces in 1900 versus the Japanese invasion post-1932 (perhaps exceeded only by the Germans in Eastern Europe) is also an example of how institutional culture can radically change in a very short amount of time.

It would apply less as cultures come to resemble each other, true. But if the important point is mere difference, and the extent to which that drives our tacit, more or less emotional view of what is fully human, then it wouldn't make a lot of difference, normally, as long as the change isn't toward greater similarity.

The Japanese are an interesting case, an extreme case, and perhaps a unique case. It's very hard to reconcile their more or less gallant conduct prior to and during the Russo-Japanese war with the way they acted from about 1932 onwards. It's possible that earlier they wished to seem more like the west, then, hence tried to be more like the west. It's also possible that the Great Depression changed them. It also seems to me possible that the coming death of Bushido, which Nitobe Inazo predicted, caused an extreme reaction to the point of the psychotic. Or it could be any combination of those or other factors.

It is, in any case, hard to explain the difference in conduct. This is made worse for us because there just isn't that much in English on the IJA, while there were limited instances of barbarous conduct from the IJN (oh, they killed prisoners, too, mind you) because, perhaps, there were less opportunities for the IJN.

[marct]

Hi Dayuhan,

Certainly it's possible to hypothesize a development model that does not rely on concrete roads, and with sufficient central direction (sufficient meaning a whole lot) one might even implement such a model. While the desire for military mobility in general (not only for tanks) has in many cases driven road construction programs, I'm not convinced that military considerations in general or tanks specifically have been the principal reason for the emergence of road/motor-based development paradigms.

Actually, I don't have to hypothesize it; it's how Britain, France, the US and most of Western Europe industrialized. The concrete road phenomenon is a result of post WW I development activities both internally and externally. If you wanted more modern examples, Singapore and Brunei offer different ones (variants on the old Port of Trade model using waterborne transport).

To assess the social consequences of the decision to acquire tanks and the (frequently absent) decision to use them efficiently you'd hve to separate those consequences from those of a whole raft of other parallel factors, and I suspect that at the end of the day the causative role of the decision to acquire tanks would be fairly minor.

Could be, although I'm not sure how much you could disaggregate them causally given that people often make decisions with minimal logic and multiple justifications (this, BTW, is why I tend to preffer the concept of "mutual arising" to that of "causality").

Cheers,

Marc

[Tom Kratman]

It is, perhaps, not insignificant that when Eisenhower announced our soon to be interstate system, it was as the "National Defense Highway System."

On the other hand, one can read too much into names. We have a "National Defense School Lunch Program" here, too. That's because tacking "National Defense" on (or "Patriot" for that matter) is a way of shutting down debate. "What? You oppose this thing with 'National Defense' on its label? You unpatriotic B#$^#%d!"

Minimal logic? Often no logic. Moreover, when someone tries to present a number of reasons for something, very often none of them have any place in the thing at all, but are just camouflage for some other underlying reason they just don't want to admit to. Kind of a pedestrian example of that: We had this female who had come back from Iraq on emergency leave. Every other day she came up with a different excuse not to go back - my mother's dying, I was sexually assaulted, I have this inexplicable pain...etc. I think there were nine such, in total; not unimpressive from a girl who really wasn't all that bright. Then she made a mistake, she brought her three year old son into the office, at which point it became self evident that _that_ was the real reason she didn't want to go back; she missed her _baby_.

As I pointed out to the SF colonel I was working for, as I handed him the open regulation on how to send her butt back to the war.

Hi Dayuhan,



Actually, I don't have to hypothesize it; it's how Britain, France, the US and most of Western Europe industrialized. The concrete road phenomenon is a result of post WW I development activities both internally and externally. If you wanted more modern examples, Singapore and Brunei offer different ones (variants on the old Port of Trade model using waterborne transport).



Could be, although I'm not sure how much you could disaggregate them causally given that people often make decisions with minimal logic and multiple justifications (this, BTW, is why I tend to preffer the concept of "mutual arising" to that of "causality").

Cheers,

Marc

[Dayuhan]

Actually, I don't have to hypothesize it; it's how Britain, France, the US and most of Western Europe industrialized. The concrete road phenomenon is a result of post WW I development activities both internally and externally. If you wanted more modern examples, Singapore and Brunei offer different ones (variants on the old Port of Trade model using waterborne transport).

Early industrialization in Britain, France, and the US was built around and shaped by the modes of transport that were available at that time. They didn't decide to eschew motors and roads because of the potential consequences; they used what they have. That mode is not likely to be repeated in places that have the road-and-motor option, unless geography supports it strongly, as in Singapore and Brunei, which also have most excellent roads and plenty of motors. Once upon a time industry developed along fall lines where shops could be powered by water wheels; this pattern is also not likely to evolve again!

Seems to me that the concrete road phenomenon was driven by the reduction of the internal combustion engine to a size that made small, independently mobile vehicles feasible. People use what's available to them, and convenience generally outweighs conscious policy.

Somewhere poor Colin is rolling his eyes and wondering where we took his thread!

[Tukhachevskii]

As Tom says, it's very complex, and a lot of the effects are 2nd, 3rd and 4th order in the "civilian" area. Roads in and of themselves shift transportation patterns which cause changes in population settlement (think about how the Interstates effected the US). They also cause shifts in production, consumption and employment patterns which may or may not destabilize an area.

[snipped]

One other effect of introducing tanks into a country is to shift the balance of power, increasing the importance of those who control them in relation to those who don't. [...] so the gathering of tanks may or may not serve to further destabilize a society.

As Tom said, it's complex....

Indeed, in the case of Yemen they got the Chinese to pay and construct their "national road" system. On the outskirts of the city there's even a "Chinese cemetary" built for the Chinese labourers who died during construction. In Sana'a the main overpass over Shari'a Zubayri (sp?) has a large chinese sign over it that I once jokingly commented says "made in china". As for shifting the balance of power that's one of the key "force multipliers" (if you will) that Salah can count on. The sheer ability to move forces by road to (for example) the North vastly improves his attempt to keep his state together yet alone attempt to develop it. Thought he relies upon 10,000+ tribal levies to help with the war he doesn't have to leave the war to them and thus by inserting federal forces can shape both parties actions to his ends (whatever those unfathomable things may be). Conversely, the road network peters out the farther east one gets as does the amount of central government control. They "control" the roads (just barely) and that's about all. Yet the fact they do control the roads means, even though they can't impose central authority, they can influence the tribes by controlling access to the road network (if nothing else, such as education, health services, etc.). Given the produce of the east (fish, Qat and other items) is largely consumed in the west that's a strong plus. Nonethelss, having roads upon which HETT and tanks can travel is ultimately nothing short of useless if you don't have the competent trained crews or forward based CSS units able to operate/maintain tanks effectively (of which Yemen doesn't really have many anyway). I was once meandering down Sharia' Hadha (one of the two main roads in the city) on my way to my local (at the time) Syrian schwarma store for a "sarookh" (Rocket!) when a (apprently) overloaded and barely road-worthy (wheezing, creaking and leaking) Soviet made tank transporter of 1950s vintage rumbled down the road carrying three (and the remains of a fourth) French manufactured AML-90/60 armoured cars each of which had what looked like multiple HMG and RPG strikes. Getting stuff up north may tip the scales in the Yemeni Gov.'s balance but they are useless once they get there (still, at least they can get them back again!!!).