While the combat phase of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) reasserted American supremacy in a classic combined arms campaign on open terrain, success against the protracted insurgency in urban areas is more elusive. As a recent analysis argued, “The very success of American joint operations—and joint fires in particular—guarantee that a clever opponent will move into cities for protection.” While cautionary maxims oft-repeated since Sun Tzu’s time point to avoiding cities, the U.S. military must be prepared to defeat the urban adversary when war aims demand it. Military operations on urbanized terrain (MOUT) are not new phenomena, but some pundits bemoaned coalition readiness prior to Operation AL FAJR (OAF) (also known as Operation PHANTOM FURY) in Fallujah. Though neither sterile nor quick, OAF proved not to be the feared bloody quagmire that other armies historically faced. In the tradition of Hue City, coalition forces under the I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) successfully breached Fallujah’s defenses and seized the city, eliminating a key insurgent stronghold. Several key factors contributed to rapid tactical/operational victory—the virtual absence of civilians; effective MOUT doctrine, tactics, and command and control (C2); and adherence to the laws of war, especially regarding joint fires. Extant joint and Service doctrine discusses MOUT characteristics and caveats in detail; many apply to this article but are not restated here. A pithy description of the urban dilemma is that:
The enemy’s plan is simple and effective: lure American forces into terrain where Information Age knowledge, speed, and precision give way to the more traditional advantages of mass, will, patience, and the willingness to die.
An examination of the OAF experience sheds light on enduring MOUT principles and offers some preconditions for potential success...
Operation AL FAJR
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