Fallujah

[Jedburgh]

From Field Artillery: Second Battle of Fallujah - Urban Operations in a New Kind of War

As Commanding General of I MEF, LtGen Sattler commanded the joint and coalition forces at the second Battle of Fallujah in Iraq from 8 to 20 November 2004. Fallujah is about 40 kilometers west of Baghdad on the Euphrates River and has a civilian population of about 250,000—only an estimated 1,500 of whom remained in the city during the battle. The battle was fought by a force of about 15,000, including US Marine, Army, Air Force and Navy units plus British and Iraqi units. The main force swept through the city from north to south down corridors. The forces cordoned the city and searched door-to-door, clearing buildings and engaging the enemy in the streets. This battle was reputedly the most fierce urban fighting for the Marines since the Battle of Hue City in Vietnam in 1968.

[SWJED]

EDITED 1/26/07...The link below no longer works for a .pdf file, but the text of the AAR can still be found here: http://www.military.com/forums/0,15240,79595,00.html

Undated Marine Corps Times article - Lessons Learned: Infantry Squad Tactics in Military Operations in Urban Terrain During Operation Phantom Fury in Fallujah, Iraq by Sgt. Catagnus, Jr. Earl. J., Cpl. Edison, Brad. Z., LCpl. Keeling, James. D., and LCpl. Moon, David. A., USMC.

SWJ / SWC Note: Great AAR by some outstanding Devil Dogs. I was hoping to find it posted on the Internet as I had seen it many times before but not in open-source or on a non-subscription site. Just ran across it today...

Historically speaking, military operations in urban terrain (MOUT) have created casualty figures that are extraordinary compared to similar operations conducted in different types of environments. The casualties in MOUT present a significant challenge to small unit leaders. Casualties hit Marine infantry squads and fire teams extremely hard because generally speaking they were already under the table of organization (T/O) standards. Some squads in 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines (3/5) commenced the assault on the Jolan with only six Marines. It is the small unit leaders’ duty to accomplish the mission with the least amount of casualties possible. In order for small unit leaders to complete the above task they need tactics and techniques that will prevent casualties.

Section 1 of the Scout/Sniper Platoon has attacked and cleared buildings with all the line companies in 3/5. The authors have observed nearly all the squads in the battalion and have “rolled in the stack” with many of them. This is an experience which few in the battalion have. Knowing this, the authors believe it is their duty to consolidate their observations, produce a comprehensive evaluation of squad tactics and techniques, and pass it onto the squad leaders. The authors’ intent is to give the squad leaders options in combat. It is by no means a “bible,” but it is a guideline. One squad or another has proved all the tactics and techniques in combat. Section 1 does not take any credit for the information contained within. The information was learned through the blood of the infantry squads in 3/5.

The entire evaluation has one underlying theme: Accomplish the mission with the least amount of casualties possible...