WHAM in Afghanistan: a report on development aid in COIN ops

[davidbfpo]

Hat tip to Kings of War.

WHAM is shorthand for 'Winning ‘Hearts and Minds’ and the link below is to a report on a Wilton Park conference (a UK FCO conference venue) entitled 'Winning Hearts and Minds in Afghanistan: Assessing the effectiveness of development aid in COIN operations'.

The KoW author David Betz comments:

One of the most striking articles of faith in our campaign in Afghanistan specifically and COIN doctrine generally has been the notion that development aid wins hearts and minds.(Concludes) It makes plain that there is a fairly serious disjuncture between COIN doctrine and political reality.

David takes one paragraph from the report:

The research findings from Afghanistan highlight that many of the fundamental conflict drivers there are inherently political in nature, such as ethnic grievances and inter- and intra-tribal disputes. Indeed, many Afghans believe the main cause of insecurity to be their government, which is perceived to be massively corrupt, predatory and unjust. A COIN strategy premised on using aid to win the population over to such a negatively perceived government faces an uphill struggle, especially in a competitive environment where the Taliban are perceived by many to be more effective in addressing the people’s highest priority needs of security and access to justice. Without getting the ‘politics right’ both military and aid efforts are unlikely to achieve their desired effects.

Link:http://kingsofwar.org.uk/wp-content/...nal-Report.pdf

We have debated many of the issues raised in the title and substance on the ground, but this report is interesting in its own right. Partly due to the sponsors and venue.

[jcustis]

So turning this around could be better served by Reservists with small town political experience instead of development and aid backgrounds?...Not shocking, but this is an excellent find.

It comes on the eve of my deploy, but I hope to get through it in a day or two.

[Steve the Planner]

I know this is not being applied in the current realm of strategy but William R. Polk's recent article in The Nation speaks to the organic "governance" structure of Afghanistan---the road not travelled.

Actually, for me, and perhaps many on this site, it positively points to actual locally-appliable solutions that seem to be at odds with our confusing mumbo-jumbo about linking to, and supporting extension of a corrupt and predatory government down to the people.

Back to jirgas and shuras. (Start over)

Legitimation Crisis in Afghanistan

http://www.thenation.com/doc/20100419/polk/1

[Dayuhan]

Back to jirgas and shuras. (Start over)

If only we could just start over...

The Karzai government, like the proverbial elephant in the drawing room, exists. It will seek, with a vigor worthy of a better cause, to perpetuate its existence... in fact that's probably the only thing it will do with any vigor or any efficiency. It won't vanish in a puff of smoke just because we decide that setting it up wasn't such a great idea. It will do all in its power to derail any effort that might compromise its position or profitability.

It's a problem. If we could go back and start over, we'd have an easy solution, but unless DoD has a time machine hidden somewhere, that's not an option.

[Schmedlap]

If only we could just start over...

The Karzai government, like the proverbial elephant in the drawing room, exists. It will seek, with a vigor worthy of a better cause, to perpetuate its existence... in fact that's probably the only thing it will do with any vigor or any efficiency. It won't vanish in a puff of smoke just because we decide that setting it up wasn't such a great idea. It will do all in its power to derail any effort that might compromise its position or profitability.

Cheer up. It ain't so bad.

Most, if not all, of what you typed could be said about our own government in the US. Nothing but graft and corruption to keep elected officials and bureaucrats entrenched in power and/or assured of job security and prestige. The advantage in Afghanistan is that Karzai does not have the support of nearly as many well-funded and well-connected interest groups as our elected individuals do. I'd say Afghanistan is more workable because, in ISAF, we have a comparatively large, well-funded, and comparatively efficient organization to act as a check against him.

[Dayuhan]

Cheer up. It ain't so bad.

Most, if not all, of what you typed could be said about our own government in the US. Nothing but graft and corruption to keep elected officials and bureaucrats entrenched in power and/or assured of job security and prestige. The advantage in Afghanistan is that Karzai does not have the support of nearly as many well-funded and well-connected interest groups as our elected individuals do

I'm cheerful as can be... I can afford to be, I'm not in Afghanistan!

The US Government has its share of issues; all governments do. It functions, though, and Karzai's doesn't, a substantial difference. And while the blocs supporting, manipulating, and profiting from Karzai's presence may not be nearly as large on the absolute level as American interest groups, they carry a fair bit of weight in their own pond.

I'd say Afghanistan is more workable because, in ISAF, we have a comparatively large, well-funded, and comparatively efficient organization to act as a check against him.

Kinda sucks if ISAF has to divert its resources to the task of acting as a check on the Karzai government... don't they have a few other problems they're supposed to be managing?

I do get the feeling that in creating this government we spawned a bit of a monster, that it's more a part of the problem than a part of the solution, and that we've added a major obstacle to a process that already had more than its share of obstacles.

It probably is better than I think, though that's not saying much!