The future with Karzai: a debate (merged thread with new title)

[davidbfpo]

This BBC report 'Italians held over Afghanistan 'assassination plot' alleging Italian NGO staff involvement in a plot to kill the Helmand governor is not good news and rather fits in with the Karzai narrative:

Three Italian medical workers are among nine men arrested in Afghanistan in connection with an alleged plot to kill a provincial governor, officials say. The detentions came after suicide bomb vests and weapons were discovered at a hospital run by a Milan-based charity in Lashkar Gah, the capital of Helmand.

Link:http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/mid...st/8613801.stm

[slapout9]

Peter Galbraith was interviewed on Farid Zakari this morning. It is not on You tube yet so I can't post it, but it was a most interesting interview. It will replay again later in the day on MSNBC watch it if you get a chance. Ooops!!! it is CNN not MSNBC!!!!

[Steve the Planner]

Slap:

I'll keep looking for it.

Zakaria's April 9 interview is on the CNN site.

In his opinion, the US is going the wrong way with Karzai.

In his opinon, Karzai is the only way forward, and, therefore, we must continue to support and praise him.

To me, that is just so much Washington Talking Head foolishness about national pols preening with other national pols (until the next national pol comes in- The King is Dead, Long Live the King).

If, as he argues, the US has become so desperately strapped to Karzai (as is, and with full and glowing US support), we might as well abandon the mission today.It would be pointless if Afghanistan cannot change.

Instead, he overlooks so many fundamental alternatives and strategies, the core of which are the Afghan people themselves. What if they want to do something different, either at the local, regional or national level, or apart from Karzai's way?

One point he makes is that Afghanistan's leader must be Pashtun, and therefore, must be Karzai. Implicit in that statement is, I assume, that force of arms must be used to impose Karzai/Pashtun solutions on the non-Pashtuns.

Taken to reasonable conclusions, there will come a point when the concept of Afghanistan as anation will inevitably be abandoned by non-Pashtuns simply to escape Karzai, and the likelihood of further Pashtun oppression and ineffectiveness. Many parts of Afghanistan are very different, and moving forward on separate trajectories.

The reality is that, to the extent Afghanistan does function, it is by complex systems of competition and consensus at many different levels, and by many different groups, leaders and individuals. This is no different than many other places in the world that combine/recombine, aggregate/disaggregate, affiliate/unaffiliate

If, as Zakaria suggests, it is Karzai or the highway, he negates the possibility of those actual successful processes developing (or muddling through) to an alternative future. This is substantially inconsistent with Afghanistan's political history.

He greatly misunderstands the natural course of history and events.

Sometimes, his comments are insightful. Sometimes, they are just bizarre.

[Sylvan]

Slap:

One point he makes is that Afghanistan's leader must be Pashtun, and therefore, must be Karzai. Implicit in that statement is, I assume, that force of arms must be used to impose Karzai/Pashtun solutions on the non-Pashtuns.

.

His logic is flawed.
In order to win in Afghanistan, we must win the Pashtoon population. This is a fact.
To win the pashtoon population, you don't need (IMHO) a Pashtoon president. You need a government that respects and protects Pashtoon culture and local leaders. A Dostum doesn't work, but a Massoud might. Karzai certainly doesn't do it. His gubenatorial (sp?) appointments have been heavy handed and counter productive. Regardless, Karzai is not a popular leader among the majority of Pashtoons and is especially disliked in Kandahar City. That we focus so much on Helmand and ignore Kandahar (we will see if we are serious about fixing that situation soon) is one of our many blunders.

As noted earlier, we missed our opportunity to start fresh after the elections. Although I believe installing Abdullah ^2 would have worked against us in the South.

However, the bottom line the longer Karzai remains in power the worse the situation is going to become in the South unless he quickly changes course in many areas.
Foremost is reigning in his little brother.
Allowing Governors to be if not popularly elected, at least popular vetted at a Shura or Jirga.
Release control of Provincial Police to Provincial Governors. Maintain control of ANCOP only at MOI level.
Replace Tajik dominated leadership in the ANA in 205 corps to Pashtoon leadership.
Eating a bullet (OK, wishful thinking)

[Firn]

Sorry, I forgot to provide the links. The quotes come all from the Corriere della Sera

Not surprisingly exponents of the left say they are behind Emergency. Il monde é paese, the world is a village, as the Italian saying goes.


Firn

[Steve the Planner]

So, the Lords of Kabul, Jalalabad, and Kandahar may be Pashtun, but, by their actions, do not engender support of the Pashtun people under their watch (thumb).

Thus, inside their sphere is oligarchy and fealty, and outside their immediate sphere are their opponents.

We are somewhere in the middle of that mess, fueling the oligarchy while denouncing it, and opposing the opponents without addressing the cause of their opposition.

A bit of a sticky wicket?

I was reading a recent interview with Dr. Abdullah who indicated that he could have, by saying yes to a few phone calls, have brought down Karzai, but, in doing so would have (1) caused huge danger/destabilization, and (2) worked outside the parliamentary process that, in his belief, is the thing that Afghans take pride in having restored---he would not become what he opposed.

That kind of hard-learned humility (maybe much from recent losses) demonstrates that he (and many others) could fairly lead all the people (no loss of face for Pashtuns). Question is how does a transition/trainsformation occur?

Behind that interview, also, was Abdullah's concern about Karzai's continual efforts to dismantle civilian structure (Election Commission, etc.). So the question of timeliness is in play---Can a change take place before even further damage is done?

[Sylvan]

So, the Lords of Kabul, Jalalabad, and Kandahar may be Pashtun, but, by their actions, do not engender support of the Pashtun people under their watch (thumb).

Thus, inside their sphere is oligarchy and fealty, and outside their immediate sphere are their opponents.

We are somewhere in the middle of that mess, fueling the oligarchy while denouncing it, and opposing the opponents without addressing the cause of their opposition.

A bit of a sticky wicket?

I was reading a recent interview with Dr. Abdullah who indicated that he could have, by saying yes to a few phone calls, have brought down Karzai, but, in doing so would have (1) caused huge danger/destabilization, and (2) worked outside the parliamentary process that, in his belief, is the thing that Afghans take pride in having restored---he would not become what he opposed.

That kind of hard-learned humility (maybe much from recent losses) demonstrates that he (and many others) could fairly lead all the people (no loss of face for Pashtuns). Question is how does a transition/trainsformation occur?

Behind that interview, also, was Abdullah's concern about Karzai's continual efforts to dismantle civilian structure (Election Commission, etc.). So the question of timeliness is in play---Can a change take place before even further damage is done?

To answer your last question first, Yes. However it will be much more messy now than it could have been immediately following the election fiasco.
Simply put; Karzai has to believe he is expendable to American needs. Doesn't mean he has to leave, but he must think that we will dump him in 30 seconds. Whether this should be done publically or privately is a good debate to have. I believe publically would better serve our purposes, but I doubt the more diplomatic types among us would agree.
Karzai behaves like a spoiled child because he is. Since Daddy pays the bills, daddy should make the rules. Obama's perception as weak in the muslim world is being magnified in Afghanistan. The more he grovels, the more Karzai is going to publically humiliate our country and destablize his own.

Dr. Abdullah failed in one regard in his analysis. The parlimentary process is destroyed in Afghanistan. It is merely a facade in front of a poorly built and neglected foundation.
He should have fought, and we should have supported him. Another foreign policy failure of this adminstration.
Karzai must be brought to heel for the sake of both the United States (and ISAF) and Afghanistan.
We bought a flawed product for the best of reasons, stop throwing good money after bad.

[Steve the Planner]

I suspect the answer is the regular subterfuge.

Public pronouncements of our support, but continued efforts to divert things around him and others, and to those that are supportive (per West's article).

The more noise in support, the less dollars in reality.

I think Dr. Abdullah's comments have to be read in his, and not out context.

His Dad was a Senator, he grew up with a great reverence for the parlimentary institutions, and a deep and long struggle to re-establish it. We get lots of dope and speculation on positions and interests in the South and East, but not much perspective on the other folks (the ones that are not threats).

He is reported to be a US favorite, but I don't think he wants to go in as a US lackey under any circumstance, nor be one. In reality, he may be a lot harder, for example, on civilian deaths than Karzai, and much more directive of US/Int'l Aid, presently running everywhere but in a straight line.

I find his genuine interest to be legit. He does not want to be put in office by the Americans, and especially not in violation of the Constitution. Down the road, his position may be much more important to him and Afghanistan, and that's where his head and heart is.

Personally, I believe that the integrity of the Afghan institutions are supported better if we do not pick, choose and kick-out. But, as you say, we really do control most of the money, and that does give the right to direct how it is spent---even with Abdullah or anyone.

Right now, it looks like a return to the Hall of Mirrors strategy. Lots of whispers and dodges---things said but not followed up with actions, and things done with saying.

Business as usual.

[davidbfpo]

This BBC report 'Italians held over Afghanistan 'assassination plot' alleging Italian NGO staff involvement in a plot to kill the Helmand governor is not good news and rather fits in with the Karzai narrative:

Link:http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/mid...st/8613801.stm

An update:

Emergency, the Milan-based charity, said on Sunday that the arrest of its workers on Saturday was an attempt by the Afghan government and Nato forces to silence a "troublesome witness" of the suffering of civilians in the country. "They want to get rid of a troublesome witness. Someone has organised this set-up because they want Emergency to leave Afghanistan," Gino Strada, the head of the charity, told reporters.

Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worl...-governor.html

[davidbfpo]

Hat tip to Leah Farrell for capturing this Indian article on Karzai:http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/i...ow/5781643.cms

Ends with:

Standing by the elected Karzai — no matter how cozy he becomes with Pakistan and the Kandahari Taliban — is the only way for India to affirm its status as a secure and truly powerful regional hegemon. Moreover, it is the only course of action that is consistent with the Indian democratic narrative. Standing in Karzai's way because Indian hawks are worried about Pakistani influence in Afghanistan would immeasurably short-sighted, because Pakistan's influence in Afghanistan is inevitable and organic. Besides, Karzai's ventality, corruption and incompetence should not be so strange for South Asians. Our South Asian politics is like this only. Karzai was, is, and will remain, one of our own.

Not a viewpoint I would endorse, but as others have noted before 'The Great Game' continues.

[Steve the Planner]

Isn't it funny?

In a dysfunctional system,if there is no positive solution or alternative, negative ones emerge.

Are they do-gooders frustrated by the circumstance, marks set up because they wouldn't pay someone, or are these just bullets being dug out of the wounds?

Sounds like this story will take a few weeks before anyone can actually know what it is about.

[Steve the Planner]

According to an LA Times report, President Karzai is (again) our close ally. Handshakes and press conferences all around.

http://www.latimes.com/news/nationwo...,1939741.story

So all that other stuff? (Never mind)

[slapout9]

Here is a little over a minute of the Peter Galbraith interview which is all I can find at this time, but there is a lot more to this interview somewhere in cyberspace.


http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H-jhxOHov7g

[Firn]

An update:

Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worl...-governor.html

Frankly we know so far very little about this story, but let me put it into the (Italian) context:

a) Emergency, headed by Gino Strada is NGO providing humanitarian assistance, in this case it runs the hospital in Laskhar Gah or in the least provides medical and technical support for it. It is left-leaning and seems to be proud to denounce the "military occupation" and crimes against humanity caused by the same military forces or of the "sort of government".

È la solita storia: Emergency in Afghanistan, e soprattutto in quella regione, è un testimone scomodo di quanto fanno le forze di occupazione e una specie di governo ai danni della popolazione» denuncia Gino Strada, fondatore dell'associazione. Non c'è un motivo concreto, se non il ruolo critico dell'attività umanitaria della ong e delle denunce quotidiane a difesa delle vittime, secondo Strada, all'origine delle accuse agli operatori arrestati.

b) They claim that they were picked on by the minions of the governor for this very reason.

c) The immediate reaction of the right-winged Italian was surprisingly tame, which could be explained by the political climate and/or some truth behind the accusations. The reaction of undersecretary Alfredo Mantica seems to be almost gleeful - "(the arrests) should make Gino Strada and his organisation reflect that as a humanitarian he makes a little too much politics". He hopes that the truth supports Strada, but he is a bit "perplexed".

Il governo italiano sembra tuttavia restio a sposare la tesi di Emergency. «Prego veramente da italiano che non ci sia nessun italiano che abbia direttamente o indirettamente compiuto atti di questo genere - ha detto il ministro degli Esteri, Franco Frattini, a Sky Tg24 -. Lo prego davvero di tutto cuore, perchè sarebbe una vergogna per Italia». E già prima il suo sottosegretario Alfredo Mantica non aveva avuto parole incoraggianti: gli arresti devono «far riflettere Gino Strada e la sua organizzazione, che forse da umanitario fa un po' troppa politica», ha affermato. «Il governo italiano deve accertare la verità - ha aggiunto - e mi auguro che la verità dia ragione a Strada, ma ho delle perplessità». Mantica ha sottolineato che «è la seconda volta che Emergency finisce nel mirino delle autorità afghane», dopo il rapimento del giornalista di Repubblica, Daniele Mastrogiacomo.

d) The spokesman of the governor seems to paddle back concerning the accusations against the Italians and speaks of some misunderstanding.

Times di Londra mi ha citato in modo sbagliato, soprattutto per il riferimento di un legame fra gli italiani e Al Qaeda e oggi ha chiesto scusa - ha precisato il portavoce del governo di Helmand, Daud Ahmadi -. Tutto quello che ho da dire è quello che ho dichiarato il primo giorno e non aggiungo altro perché le indagini sono ancora in corso».

e) The Italian government still does not openly support the arrested Italians. The minister of defense la Russa says that Strada should "avoid accusing the Afghan government, suspecting a NATO plot and drawing in the Italian government". He considers (Taliban) infiltrators a possibility which can not be ruled out.

Defending himself against accusation that the government fails to protect the Italians he asks how many "exponents of the left have we rescued in the conflicts?"

Gino Strada a essere più prudente e «evitare di accusare il governo afghano, di gridare al complotto della Nato e di tirare dentro il governo italiano».
Sarebbe più saggio se «prendesse le distanze dai suoi collaboratori, perché può sempre succedere di avere accanto, inconsapevolmente, degli infiltrati» afferma il ministro in un'intervista a La Stampa, nella quale paragona il caso che ha scosso Emergency a quello di altri «infiltrati», come le Br con il Pci o i Nar con l'Msi. Per il ministro, in ogni caso, «la storia del complotto non sta in piedi». «Se le autorità afghane - afferma - avessero fatto un imbroglio contro Emergency ci saremmo arrabbiati anche se il loro orientamento politico è noto a tutti. Quanti esponenti di sinistra abbiamo salvato negli scenari di guerra?». Se venisse accertata la colpevolezza degli operatori italiani, per La Russa, «il danno per l'Italia militarmente impegnata in Afghanistan sarebbe gravissimo».

Opinion:

I won't rule out that this hospital was chosen by the Taliban to blow up the governor, as it could be a good setting to do so. Infiltrators and smugglers might have been used to bring the needed material into the hospital before it gets watched and closed off by the bodyguards. Strada does not rule out this possibility, put he puts the guns down to foul play by the Afghan government. Anyway it was clear that there is not love lost between Emergency and the Afghan government and the Italian one.

«Se qualcuno di noi volesse introdurre una pistola in un qualsiasi ospedale italiano lo potrebbe fare in dieci minuti. C'è sempre la possibilità di corrompere qualcuno e che qualcuno la depositi al momento della perquisizione». Ma, ha aggiunto, in ogni ospedale di Emergency ci sono cartelli con scritto «Niente armi».

There are IMHO two realistic possibilities:

a) The security forces acted on the legitimate concern and used this opportunity to lash out at Emergency,

b) The Afghan political forces made it up.

An active involvement of this Italians would be very surprising and very grave, but it seems to be the least likely explanation.


Firn