The future with Karzai: a debate (merged thread with new title)

[slapout9]

We really picked a winner with Karzai, he wants to join the Talaban and also uses drugs, might be a little crazy to. Link to interview on MSNBC.

http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/21134540...92324#36192324

[Schmedlap]

Apparently, al-Qaeda isn't very enthusiastic about this: LINK

[omarali50]

Maybe the US is actually ready to leave (and some good men are to be sacrificed to make it look respectable)? and ISI certainly thinks it is going to get the contract when the US leaves. Since Karzai doesnt want to be swinging from a lamppost with cigarettes and dollar bills stuffed into his mouth, so his unhinged behavior has a reason....
SO what do the experts say: what is the US objective now that "victory and democracy" are off the table? A cynic would think the US should aim for a well balanced civil war that keeps Russia, China, India, Pakistan and Iran busy for decades, but with the US you never know. The administration may actually be aiming for something more idealistic.

[Sylvan]

What is the desired End state in Afghanistan?
Taliban removed from power. CHECK!
Stable Afghanistan government capable of handling current external and internal threats. CHECK!
Removal of all Taliban everywhere on God's green earth to 6 sigma certainty.
Not there yet.

I would argue that the first two are the only legitimate ones out there and we are done.

The ANSF is manned, equipped and trained to deal with anything the Taliban can throw at them. That they refuse to do so is a different issue.

If foreign soverign threats are a concern, thats why God invented treaties SoCATO (South Central Asia Treaty Organization) Rolls off the tongue, doesn't it.
War's over boys.
We won.

[Steve the Planner]

Despite the commotion, I was very pleased with the emerging solutions today.

Two weeks ago, Bing West gave a very clear and cogent report on the Marjah operation, ending with the routine warning that it all depends on the ability of the Afghans to step up for the later Hold, and Build phases.

In the succeeding weeks, President Obama stopped by to reportedly pressure President Karzai to get his act together. We all heard the responses, ranging from Karzai's claimed threat to join the Taliban, and Galbraith's belief that Karzai is literally smoking something.

Out of all that comes a more contextual recommendation from West in today's NYT: How to Save Afghanistan From Karzai. Link:http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/07/op...ml?ref=opinion

Bottom Line, in my read of it, was the recommendation that Karzai be bypassed, especially by US dollars, and that the mission be right-sized to a realistic one of clear, hold, turn over. Turn over to who? The Afghan military? Turn over what? Responsibility for policing and governance?

What about the locals? Work with the ones that will work with us. Leave the ones that are puppets of Kabul.

He recognizes the risk of turning Afghanistan into a military dictatorship, but points to examples (Philipines, South Korea) where that worked out OK. Bottom line, though is that it is for Afghans (not the US) to make their governments work, and not for us to prop up bad ones.

A simple op-ed, but loaded with meaning and realities. Defining a workable military mission. Defining a credible and actionable answer to Amb. Eikenberry's framing of Karzai as an unreliable partner.

I assume that implicit in West's next steps is neither a "Yankee Go Home" mission ender, nor an end to substantial US civilian stabilization/reconstruction. (Although a lot of Joe Biden's camp will here this as familiar).

But the bottom-line is nuts-and-bolts practical, deeply connected to reality, and, refreshingly, an answer that does not raise more questions than it answers.

[Sylvan]

The ANA is absolutely the wrong vehicle.
It is Tajik dominated.
If you want to infuriate the Pashtoon majority (plurality), put the ANA in charge.
MOI with ANP would be more accepted.
The problem is, we shoved a crap constitution down their throat which gives the president disproportianate power, especially in light of the traditional decentralized nature of Afghan society.
The solution is we tell Karzai, "Resign or we (and our money) leave in 6 months." If he resigns, great. If he doesn't, great. Just be prepared to be back in 5 more years. At this point, Karzai is more harm than good. Especially with AWK screwing things up.

[davidbfpo]

There are those here in the UK who state - quietly - that Karzai is the only option and a far larger group who'd prefer the question was not even asked. It is sometimes bewildering to see how the fundamental issues of our role in Afghanistan are pushed aside for the tactics.

I would expect the 'establishment' would swiftly change its "tune" if the USA announced, or quietly undermined him, that Karzai was an obstacle.

From my "armchair" Karzai is not the only option, especially when you realise the power of a nation-state based in Kabul is actually very limited.

IMHO we should not overlook the domestic impact of Karzai's recent apparent statements, his attitude will harden the majority here who oppose the UK involvement and could swing others.

[GreenIdeal]

Bing's article was refreshing, and a good perspective on how Marjah may provide examples for a "bottom up" approach. I do feel it's worth taking a step back from the "ditch Karzai now" argument and try understand why he made his comments earlier in the week. Was it part of a hidden agenda for reconciliation? What was the context of those statements? Was he being intentionally inflammatory to evoke a western response? What was said to him prior to those statements? I believe it was in a closed door meeting, and he was quoted by the Nangahar provincial representative, which also may be laden with rhetoric. Despite Karzai's clear toleration for corruption (hello! his brother is a major narco/terrorist facilitator), he is no fool. He's survived because he's a politically motivated opportunist. He knows how to build alliances and utilize coercion. Is he worth our continued support? Probably not. Is he worth addressing and negotiating with? Sure.

The point in asking these questions is to try and understand Karzai's actions over the last week without making the typical over-reactive assertions. Karzai is playing a dangerous game, and the NATO nations should react accordingly, which is to say they should call his bluff. However, before acting, they should attempt to reach out and understand the logic behind his statements from his perspective before moving on and cutting him out of the picture entirely.

[Steve the Planner]

Green:

From what I read lately, Karzai's primary focus is to prepare for the time after the US backs off in 2011. Playing to his popular base, plus against the threats to his power base (anti-corruption).

We may be the strongest tribe at the moment, but we offer him no future.

The funny part was his comment about joining the Taliban. Immediately, the Taliban's well-oiled press machine responded that they could accept him, but only after judging him for bringing foreign troops into Afghanistan.

That sounds like Salem Witch Trials. Wrap him in rocks, drop him into a lake. If he is innocent, he will float upward.

His back is up against a lot of walls. What to do?

If I was him, maybe I would be taking drugs, too.

PS: As much as anything, West's flyer (coming after his trip to Marjah with all the big boys) might, in the end, prove to have been a trial balloon to get his undivided attention. It really is a big game.

PPS: As Saddam was swinging, Quadafi reminded his Arab brethren that this fate often awaits those leaders who dance with us. Was he right? Is that what Karzai is focusing on?

[slapout9]

From my "armchair" Karzai is not the only option, especially when you realise the power of a nation-state based in Kabul is actually very limited.

I agree, we could do better.

[slapout9]

Link to Washington Post article (from SWJ Blog) by Peter Galbraith (worlds greatest living expert on Good Government and Brother of the worlds greatest living Economist James Galbraith) comments on what to do in A'stan since we don't have a legitimate ally with Karzai.


http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn...d=opinionsbox1

[Steve the Planner]

Sylvan:

I don't doubt that there would be a lot of internal unhappiness to be resolved by Afghans under a "Make the Afghans solve their own problems" approach.

They have a Popalzai in Office in Kabul, and another as shadow governor in Kandahar. How is that working out for them?

I don't mean to be flippant, but there is a point at which either they own us, and we own their problems----or they own their own problems and rapidly engage in solving them.

There are no solutions to Afghanistan's internal political/civilian governance problems to which our military can be a deciding factor, and, as the scorecard shows, few remaining US critical problems left unresolved.

West's proposal was that we work with the local folks who will work with us, and leave the rest to talk among themselves (but without US assistance or financial aid).

Personally, I witnessed to many foolish endeavors in Iraq with US taxpayer dollars literally flushed down a toilet by well-meaning but misguided efforts to intervene in Iraqi domestic problems.

Last week, Salah ad Din's Deputy Governor was interviewed about the Iraqi elections, and I remembered his very cogent explanation of why Iraq did not need US built schools (if they wanted them, they would have built them themselves, at much less cost and much better quality). Instead, what he really wanted was a civilian airport, the final construction contract for which was just let (to an American contractor): a completely Iraqi funded project.

Certainly, Afghanistan lacks the resources of Iraq, but that does not mean that we do them favors by bringing US projects to insulate them from the political/governance problems of their own country.

Reading these reports of soldiers being directed to wandering through Afghan villages like lonely Santa Clauses (Need any wells? How about a couple of schools?) under the Clear-Hold-Bribe strategy is just not going to produce significant results consistent with US timetables.

Between William Polk's very good article in The Nation on the futility of such efforts, and the London Conference report on essentially the same matters and conclusions, it seems like a good time to put down a different kind of gauntlet. Tough love or otherwise.

My opinion.

[Dayuhan]

Two weeks ago, Bing West gave a very clear and cogent report on the Marjah operation, ending with the routine warning that it all depends on the ability of the Afghans to step up for the later Hold, and Build phases...

...Bottom Line, in my read of it, was the recommendation that Karzai be bypassed, especially by US dollars, and that the mission be right-sized to a realistic one of clear, hold, turn over. Turn over to who? The Afghan military? Turn over what? Responsibility for policing and governance?

What about the locals? Work with the ones that will work with us. Leave the ones that are puppets of Kabul.

Wouldn't that set up a tripolar Afghanistan? The Taliban and their local officials, Karzai and his local officials, us and our local officials? Sounds a prescription for chaos and madness.

It is interesting to note that Karzai and his cronies are finally being openly recognized as a large part of the problem... not that this is news to anyone who's been paying attention, but we're seeing a much more general acceptance of that particular elephant in the drawing room. It will be interesting to see if we pin the blame for dysfunction exclusively on Karzai and his crowd, or if we will accept that a large part of the problem is the system that bought Karzai to power, which was largely created by the intervening powers - which would put more of the responsibility on poor decisions on our side.

I have a hard time seeing how an effort to circumvent Karzai while leaving him in office is going to accomplish much. We coukd of course go back to the 70s, back a coup, and try to get a compliant general installed, but this hasn't produced entirely positive results in the past.

The idea of withdrawing, letting Karzai fall, and either dealing with whoever steps in (if it's not the Taliban) or going back in, removing the Taliban again, and starting over seems impossibly ass-backwards, but none of the alternatives sound much better. We do manage to work ourselves into some freakishly weird positions.

He recognizes the risk of turning Afghanistan into a military dictatorship, but points to examples (Philipines, South Korea) where that worked out OK. Bottom line, though is that it is for Afghans (not the US) to make their governments work, and not for us to prop up bad ones.

The invocation of the Philippine experience is of questionable relevance; the situations are hardly analogous and West's account is historically inaccurate. (A turf-driven digression, I admit.)

[Steve the Planner]

Dahayun:

I was looking forward to your comments (especially about the Phillipines).

Try to unscramble the muddle between Karzai and what increasingly is viewed by him as a block (Holbrooke/Galbraith/ISI/Taliban- ex Baradar), and it lloks like we could not be any more "in your face" to him than we are.

Iran sure looks like a close-by refuge in case things turn the way of Kyrgystan. Better off there than hanging around off a lamppost.

My guess is that the whole thing, like Iraq's election negotiations, is a game in progress, with no certain or predicatable outcomes.

On the other hand, pressing against Karzai may initially trigger his worries, but, on the other hand, trigger the worries of those who rely on, or would like to get, US and International assistance. The point of many of his powerful supporters, and opponents alike, was to get access to the trough we keep filling. If the US had the moxy to credibly threaten that trough, internal politics would have to come into play like never before.

How does anyone react if it were a credible potential that Karzai was no longer a path to the trough, and directly threatens future access for those not yet feeding?

BBC News goes everywhere, and the events in Kyrgystan, are all in the same neighborhood/sphere. All manner of things can occur when pressure builds.

The question is: If we stand like patsies while being openly dissed by him, there is no reason for anybody to do anything different. Status Quo is not a viable solution for us either.

In my mind, Galbraith and Holbrooke are abundantly signaling that a window is closing, and he isn't at it. To me. West's article was a "put" in the military game, as well as a further play to mobilize political support for US efforts.

If all that doesn't trigger a response, then another hand will be dealt. I doubt that any hand would ever include full-US withdrawal, but if Holbrooke and ISI are together and can limit/control the Taliban to meet minimum US objectives, it would not be the first time that we have substantially turned on our heel.

I just wonder whether all these folks are bluff (our side included), and the game will go on unchanged for a very long time. Something about having balls, or cutting the Gordian Knot that requires at least one party to actually do something significantly different. Haven't seen that yet.

On the other hand, if you start seeing serious experts like Dr. Cordesman come back from the current grand tour with serious change recommendations, US domestic politics could rapidly shift one way or another.

My three cents.

[Dayuhan]

I was looking forward to your comments (especially about the Phillipines).

One absolute guaranteed way to get a rise out of me is to claim that Reagan's withdrawal of support was responsible for the fall of Marcos. A bit Pavlovian, yes, but I guess most of us have a hot button, or two or ten.

If all that doesn't trigger a response, then another hand will be dealt. I doubt that any hand would ever include full-US withdrawal, but if Holbrooke and ISI are together and can limit/control the Taliban to meet minimum US objectives, it would not be the first time that we have substantially turned on our heel.

I just wonder whether all these folks are bluff (our side included), and the game will go on unchanged for a very long time. Something about having balls, or cutting the Gordian Knot that requires at least one party to actually do something significantly different. Haven't seen that yet.

I really wonder what that other hand is going to be. We had a window, with the obviously fraudulent election, but we seem to have passed it up, and windows don't stay open forever. If we set up a system, we accept the results of an election, and then we turn around and pull it all down because we don't like what came out of what we did... have to cringe at that, looks a bit of a debacle on the PR side.

Maybe someone's got a creative idea... I hope so, and I hope (without much confidence) that we can pull it off. I'm not betting on significant reform from Karzai with any amount of pressure; I just don't think he has the capacity.

[William F. Owen]

Sorry, I'm confused. Let me see if I understand.

The US put Karzai in place then ensured he got "elected?" - Roger so far?
The US is in Afghanistan with the permission of Karzai? - Correct?

.... so what is it about the strategy or the policy is it that has caused Karzai to threaten to join the Taliban?