The Dumbness of Oneness

[SJPONeill]

Comes from Wavell's "The Good Soldier" - another forgotten infantry classic, and was quoted in the Times newspaper in 1949, IIRC.

Thanks, Wilf...reading that quote and the two in the original post, and noting the era all three hail from, I wonder if commanders back then had a far better handle on combined than a. we credit them for, and b. we do now before we tried to make all the BOS' equal in someone's eyes...?

[William F. Owen]

I wonder if commanders back then had a far better handle on combined than a. we credit them for, and b. we do now before we tried to make all the BOS' equal in someone's eyes...?

I have massive respect for the skill of 1945/6 and 1918/19 British and Commonwealth Armies. They were simply good at what they did based on experience. We cease studying them at our peril.

[SJPONeill]

I have massive respect for the skill of 1945/6 and 1918/19 British and Commonwealth Armies. They were simply good at what they did based on experience. We cease studying them at our peril.

I expect that there was a large element of natural selection in both wars that saw, in most cases, the cream rise to the top. Certainly we saw this in 2NZEF after Greece, Crete and the early days int eh Western Desert where legacy appointments from WW1 and others who generally didn't cut it were shuftied off to the side in favour of commanders who were proving themselves in their take on a 'new war'.

Since WW2, we have had many opportunities to develop extremely good tactical leaders and commanders, but few if any to truly develop operational and strategic commanders. I'm starting to think that the likes of Schwartzkopf and Petraeus are exceptions that prove the general rule and that we have swung the pendulum way too far to one side trying to make a simple 2 + 2 = 4 science out of what has always been a complex art form. This woolly science-based thinking, with its efficiency driven focus, is what gets us into rationalised policies like SFC (thanks, Seth) at the expense of effectiveness.

[Firn]

I expect that there was a large element of natural selection in both wars that saw, in most cases, the cream rise to the top.
.

or dies.

This is all very much 90s thinking from an era dominated by management graduates encouraged by the myth that logistics won DESERT STORM. in 2000 a MAJ Morris wrote a great paper on flying columns and he makes a couple of comments regarding this arrogance of logisticians, who in the final analysis are just one of a number of supporting acts to operations...

About the G6 howitzer and choice to go wheels of the SADF.

A choice had to be made as to whether wheels or tracks would be used. Wheels were opted for, due to strategic implications for the following reasons: Wheels were preferable for the long distances which were encountered by the SADF between bases, during operations and when travelling from South Africa to South West Africa. These distances had to be covered in the shortest possible time and a tracked vehicle would require tank transporters while a wheeled vehicle could simply fall in with a convoy. Wheels required less maintenance than did tracks and maintenance was less complicated. Wheeled vehicles also used less fuel, a most important factor when it was considered that operational distances could be 1 000 km.(30)

... from the paper

The 20 Brigade operated at the end of a long and tenuous supply line. Moving fuel,ammunition, food, parts, and casualties from SADF bases in Namibia to the fighting zoneproved a significant challenge. It was approximately two hundred miles from Rundu, the major staging base south of the border, to the area of operations around Cuito Cuanavale. From there it was another hundred miles northwest to the battlefields near Cuito Cuanavale. No developed roads or convenient rivers provided easy access to the combat zone. Supplies moved in trucks via primitive paths through the bush or were flown in via transport aircraft to the strip at Mavinga, which served as an intermediate forward
operating base (FOB).101

The dense vegetation and rough ground in the theater took a surprisingly heavy toll
on the fuel consumption of the brigade's vehicles. Diesel usage rates for cross-country
movement proved much higher than expected for off-road travel. Keeping the several
hundred SADF vehicles full of gas was a constant worry; at times the columns had to be
withdrawn from combat prematurely or redistribute gasoline within the battle groups to
reach the refueling points. Fuel moved by air and ground to Mavinga, from there tanker
trucks shuttled back and forth to the front. On previous external operations SADF mobile
columns often resupplied their helicopters with fuel; the tanks of the Ratels and supply
lorries provided a sort of mobile FARP for the aviation element. During Modular helo
operations were limited by the air threat to night time casualty evacuation, so ground
based fuel for wide ranging C2, air assault, and fire support helicopters wasn't
necessary.102

So fuel efficiency and standardization of the fuel can be (of course) a huge issue. One additional small arms ammunition is (also of course) far far less problematic.


Firn

[JMA]

The dense vegetation and rough ground in the theater took a surprisingly heavy toll on the fuel consumption of the brigade's vehicles. Diesel usage rates for cross-country movement proved much higher than expected for off-road travel. Keeping the several hundred SADF vehicles full of gas was a constant worry; at times the columns had to be withdrawn from combat prematurely or redistribute gasoline within the battle groups to
reach the refueling points. Fuel moved by air and ground to Mavinga, from there tanker trucks shuttled back and forth to the front. On previous external operations SADF mobile columns often resupplied their helicopters with fuel; the tanks of the Ratels and supply lorries provided a sort of mobile FARP for the aviation element. During Modular helo operations were limited by the air threat to night time casualty evacuation, so ground based fuel for wide ranging C2, air assault, and fire support helicopters wasn't necessary.

The US would have handled the logistics of this with a breeze (in my opinion).

One needs to look towards the competence of the staff officers and logistics units before reading too much into all this.

[SJPONeill]

The US would have handled the logistics of this with a breeze (in my opinion).

One needs to look towards the competence of the staff officers and logistics units before reading too much into all this.

If MODULAR had been a US operation, there would have been no air threat for a start - the USAF, USN and the Marines would have dealt to the Angolan Air Force in detail on Day One. But few if any other nations have the sheer combat power to inflict control totally over an AO in a conventional conflict (as opposed to PSO or irregular war) the way the US does. I guess that kind of makes it a moot point as even the Brits, French or Germans would have had to overcome the same issues that faced the SADF for MODULAR.

The unchallenged combat and logistics power of the US is another reason to question the Single Fuel Concept as it simply doesn't need to do it and can actually afford, more than anyone else, to operate specific niche systems for even greater effectiveness. But instead it seems that it is the smaller forces that would ironically benefit more from a SFC in the long term, that are overcoming the issues inherent in multiple FOL and basically just getting on with the job...

[Ken White]

The quibble is solely on Schwartzkopf. He did okay but not great -- and he did okay mostly because a few subordinates including Cal Waller, a couple of smart Colonels and yes, Tommy Franks, saved him from himself. Colin Powell had to virtually force that to happen...

That said, I totally agree with your hypotheses. We do tend to overdo the 'oneness' bit. In the old US Army it was GP -- General Purpose -- and it was and is overdone.

I'm firmly convinced that attempts to make battle command and tactical decision making a 'check the box, matrix driven, quasi scientific exercise is not only flawed but is in fact downright dangerous.

Combat is an art, pure and simple. Some attempts to codify aspects to assist those who are competent artists (as opposed to the few great ones...) and to determine who possesses the basic talent are necessary. However, it is not necessary simply so anyone can perform the functions to achieve some mythical plateau of egalitarianism to attempt to convert the art into a science. Unnecessary and inimical to force survival, mission accomplishment or goal attainment.

That gets people killed unnecessarily. As you say, there was an element of natural selection in both major wars and it was highly beneficial at all levels from Private through Flag Officer to President or Prime Minister. We cannot totally replicate that in peace time but we can certainly do a far better job than we are doing (that applies to the US but I suspect elsewhere as well).

Wilf is correct on the very good at what they did comment. That too cannot be completely copied lacking all the trauma -- but we can do a much more competent job of producing combat soldiers and leaders than we are at present...

[William F. Owen]

I'm firmly convinced that attempts to make battle command and tactical decision making a 'check the box, matrix driven, quasi scientific exercise is not only flawed but is in fact downright dangerous.

Combat is an art, pure and simple. Some attempts to codify aspects to assist those who are competent artists (as opposed to the few great ones...) and to determine who possesses the basic talent are necessary.

Concur 100%. Personally I believe that useful codification is very useful, but context is everything and yes it does require skill.

Vauban codified siege craft and fortification, -which was good - but I bet a good many Commanders still managed to screw it up

.... and maybe Ken saw them do it?