The Dumbness of Oneness

[JMA]

The dense vegetation and rough ground in the theater took a surprisingly heavy toll on the fuel consumption of the brigade's vehicles. Diesel usage rates for cross-country movement proved much higher than expected for off-road travel. Keeping the several hundred SADF vehicles full of gas was a constant worry; at times the columns had to be withdrawn from combat prematurely or redistribute gasoline within the battle groups to
reach the refueling points. Fuel moved by air and ground to Mavinga, from there tanker trucks shuttled back and forth to the front. On previous external operations SADF mobile columns often resupplied their helicopters with fuel; the tanks of the Ratels and supply lorries provided a sort of mobile FARP for the aviation element. During Modular helo operations were limited by the air threat to night time casualty evacuation, so ground based fuel for wide ranging C2, air assault, and fire support helicopters wasn't necessary.

The US would have handled the logistics of this with a breeze (in my opinion).

One needs to look towards the competence of the staff officers and logistics units before reading too much into all this.

[SJPONeill]

The US would have handled the logistics of this with a breeze (in my opinion).

One needs to look towards the competence of the staff officers and logistics units before reading too much into all this.

If MODULAR had been a US operation, there would have been no air threat for a start - the USAF, USN and the Marines would have dealt to the Angolan Air Force in detail on Day One. But few if any other nations have the sheer combat power to inflict control totally over an AO in a conventional conflict (as opposed to PSO or irregular war) the way the US does. I guess that kind of makes it a moot point as even the Brits, French or Germans would have had to overcome the same issues that faced the SADF for MODULAR.

The unchallenged combat and logistics power of the US is another reason to question the Single Fuel Concept as it simply doesn't need to do it and can actually afford, more than anyone else, to operate specific niche systems for even greater effectiveness. But instead it seems that it is the smaller forces that would ironically benefit more from a SFC in the long term, that are overcoming the issues inherent in multiple FOL and basically just getting on with the job...

[J Wolfsberger]

Comes from Wavell's "The Good Soldier" - another forgotten infantry classic, and was quoted in the Times newspaper in 1949, IIRC.

Thanks, also, from me, Wilf. I've long thought that the best BE Generals in NA were such as Wavell, Auchinleck and O'Conner (and not the individual who seems to have grabbed all the attention). I didn't know about this title, and now I'll have to get it.

[SJPONeill]

I was just sorting through my Facebook links today and came across this article - I think it offers some more insights into other forms of oneness and the financial/business bottom line motivators that drove this philosophy...

But beyond that, these people see only money. They measure the worth of a society solely in terms of GDP. As a result, they are utterly blind to our real achievements, and place no value on them.

[mikefx]

A technical point-

- re: one fuel - Diesel motorcycles are in production and use. I suspect that if you can make a diesel motorcycle, other small diesels are not to challenging, technologically. Given the tremendous logistical simplification from a single fuel, I think you're on shaky ground with this point.

The HDT diesel motorcycle is up around 300kg/650lb, used as a convoy outrider, base transportation etc.

My company has tested our 57kg/125lb gasoline motorcycles with the NZ Army (Infantry and SAS) and had a request for quotation from the US Army.

Applications: recon, special operations, mobility over tight, broken terrain and obstacles, transportability on mother vehicles.

Unfortunately it is impossible to reduce the size/weight of a diesel engine to anything much less than the HDT scale.

So the choice is simple given the current and foreseeable technology: allow for alternative fuels to gain additional capabilities, or go without.