Split up the CIA- It's become a bloated bureaucracy of little use

[MikeF]

H/T Dave Maxwell

Split Up The CIA: It's become a bloated bureaucracy of little use
By Jack Kelly

How close is Iran to obtaining an atomic bomb? How likely are its leaders to use the bomb once they have obtained it?

Could the mullahs be toppled by a popular revolt? How would the people of Iran react if the United States or Israel were to attack Iran's nuclear sites? Would the reaction be different if the United States or Israel launched a decapitating strike at the government instead?

The safety of our republic depends on obtaining accurate, timely answers to questions like these. That's why "The Human Factor: Inside the CIA's Dysfunctional Intelligence Culture," by "Ishmael Jones," now available in paperback, may be the most important book you read this year.

"Ishmael Jones" is the nom de guerre of a man who spent 15 years overseas as a covert CIA officer focusing on human sources with access to intelligence on terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. So when "Ishmael" says our early warning system is badly broken, we should pay attention.

The CIA has become a bloated bureaucracy where senior bureaucrats are more interested in protecting their jobs than in gathering intelligence. A sign of how bad things are is that more than 90 percent of all CIA employees work within the United States. This is curious for an organization whose purpose is to collect foreign intelligence.

[Steve the Planner]

Mike:

Lotta courage in pointing out the obvious---the emperor has no clothes.

Last night I saw pics of one the Tikriti "shepards " I was introduced to in Iraq---all those former Iraqi fighter pilots, jet engine mechanics and engineers living in little "farms" south of Spiecher. Mixed in with folks that just did not fit the image of an Iraqi small farmer.

When introduced to Abu Al Masri, nobody would tell his name, and he didn't say. So I kept asking the intel guys: Who was that guy?

They had no idea. Then I saw the pic.

So, one report was that it was an intel coup. Next, it was an accidental explosion of their bomb factory which then triggered a counter-battery response. Dead, yes. Definitely deserved it. Sounds like the whole intel coup thing was overblown on all sides.

Self-identification by blowing yourself up first, after living for eight years unnoticed amongst the flock, supports the emperors clothes theory.

[davidbfpo]

SWC has a previous thread on Ishmael Jones book (from 2008): http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=5832 Which has fifty posts and 10k views. On a quick glimpse we may have debated the issues there; I may get time to review the thread later and move the new posts there.

[Rex Brynen]

How close is Iran to obtaining an atomic bomb? How likely are its leaders to use the bomb once they have obtained it?

Could the mullahs be toppled by a popular revolt? How would the people of Iran react if the United States or Israel were to attack Iran's nuclear sites? Would the reaction be different if the United States or Israel launched a decapitating strike at the government instead?

Actually, on most of these, I would say the CIA's analytical output is probably pretty good.

What decision-makers may choose to do with it--or whether the intelligence community's conclusions accord with those of commentators--is, of course, another issue.

[Van]

He still misses the bigger point; the CIA's direct action capability is a clear violation of the Constitution, specifically the seperation of powers.

The CIA's DA capacity gives the President the power to direct acts of war to be commited without a declaration of war from Congress, or Congress' approval.

The CIA's intelligence collection capability is redundant to the DoD's, and again lacks the stringent oversight of Congress, thereby inviting abuses.

The CIA's only legitimate role is as an analytical organization for the President. The biggest problem with that is their smug and close-minded view of analysis and their over emphasis on academic credentials (based on my reading of Analyzing Intelligence: Origins, Obstacles, and Innovations, other books by CIA analysts, and open source articles). They still turn out good products despite this, but could definately stand some streamlining.

As a concerned citizen though, the financial waste is disturbing, but no where near as disturbing as the utterly unconstitutional aspects of the CIA. It's right that the President has an analytical organization that doesn't answer to anyone else, but the collection capability is redundant, and the DA capability is a violation of the seperation of powers and potentially a threat to the republic.

[jmm99]

What is your argument and legal authoriities for this proposition:

from Van
He still misses the bigger point; the CIA's direct action capability is a clear violation of the Constitution, specifically the seperation of powers.

If a separate agency were created for the sole purpose of conducting DA operations, would you present the same objection(s) ?

Regards

Mike

[Van]

What is your argument and legal authoriities for this proposition:

from Van
He still misses the bigger point; the CIA's direct action capability is a clear violation of the Constitution, specifically the seperation of powers.

If a separate agency were created for the sole purpose of conducting DA operations, would you present the same objection(s) ?

Article 1, section 8 of the Constitution -

The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States;

...

To define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations;

To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water;

To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years;

To provide and maintain a Navy;

Even if you try to justify DA as "letters of Marque" (now abolished under international law), or "Captures on Land and Water", the authority to order these things is reserved for Congress, unless they pass an explicit delegation of authority to the President (like the management of the strategic arsenal). To have the standing capacity to direct clandestine DA without Congressional authority or oversight makes a mockery of the seperation of powers, and is unconstitutional.

If that agency gave the President the power to order acts of war to be commited without a declaration of war from Congress, or Congress' approval, yes, I certainly would. Under the Constitution, the government's power is carefully balanced between three branches. To give the Executive branch this degree of power in international affairs runs the risk of the President drawing the country into war without Legislature having an opportunity to assess the situation.

[Dayuhan]

My own concern with the CIA's operational capacity is less with the legalities (which I've not the expertise to assess) than with the potential interference with the core intelligence gathering mission. Covert ops are sexier than intelligence gathering, and tend to draw more than their appropriate share of institutional resources and attention. An agency with an operational capacity is going to want to use it, and will tend to slant information to support that desire. Once operations are carried out there's an incentive to distort information to show success or cover up failure. In each case, the quality and independence of the information gathering effort that forms the core function of the agency can be compromised.

I'd personally rather see the CI focused purely on gathering, analyzing, and disseminating information, and leave the black helicopter stuff to the military.

There's also the issue of turf wars and institutional rivalries among CIA, State, DEA, etc and ad nauseam, both in DC and in the operational environments. Doesn't help...

[Ken White]

He still misses the bigger point; the CIA's direct action capability is a clear violation of the Constitution, specifically the seperation of powers.

The CIA's DA capacity gives the President the power to direct acts of war to be commited without a declaration of war from Congress, or Congress' approval.

You probably should refer to the National Security Act of 1947 and its 1949 Amendment with which Congress authorized the CIA (as well as DoD) to do direct action, support insurgent forces, foment hate and discontent, etc. etc.

See also the War Powers Act 1973. There are also several PDMs and Executive orders, tacitly approved by senior congressional leaders for specifics -- so Congress in fact (and, actually, of necessity) authorized the President to do warlike things and inform Congress after the fact -- Congress can then either fund it or not.

And no, I'm not a lawyer but anyone who's been in the services a day or two should be familiar with those (among others).

I'm inclined to agree with Dayuhan, the intel gathering, the analysis and any US covert or clandestine DA should be three separate organizations (ideally two of each type, competition is healthy). Still needs to be committed with executive authority...

[jmm99]

Unfortunately (), I'm not a disciple of John Yoo's view of virtually unrestricted Presidential Power; so, I can't present that position with any sort of credibility - however, it is attached as a pdf file.

That being said, both Executive "War Powers" and Legislative "War Powers" exist in what I'd consider a balanced view of the Constitution, based on an original understanding approach to that document. Van's viewpoint, as it is stated (without any exception):

If that agency gave the President the power to order acts of war to be commited without a declaration of war from Congress, or Congress' approval, yes, I certainly would. Under the Constitution, the government's power is carefully balanced between three branches. To give the Executive branch this degree of power in international affairs runs the risk of the President drawing the country into war without Legislature having an opportunity to assess the situation.

would prohibit the President from responding to an attack overseas or on CONUS without specific Congressional action. Another area where the Executive (based on over two centuries of history) has some discretion (at least short-term) is Presidential use of military resources in assistence to diplomacy (clearly an Executive branch function).

An exercise in defining the boundaries of the constitutional Executive "War Powers" and Legislative "War Powers" would involve recourse to the present War Powers Act of 1973 (Pub.L. 93-148), aka the War Powers Resolution; and hammering out all of the constitutional issues with that piece of work.

The two branches of government are at their strongest when they work together. I lean to getting Congressional approval to enter into an armed conflict, except under emergency circumstances; but Congress has not been reluctant to abdicate its measure of control as exemplified by the AUMFs for Vietnam, Iraq I & II and Astan. If Congressional action (or maybe better, inaction) from Korea (where it was not polled at all) up to the present is taken as evidence of how strong Congress believes its "War Powers" are, one would be hard pressed to find that Congress believes it has a veto over Presidential actions, much less a superior power to declare war or authorize entry into an armed conflict.

Regards

Mike

[bourbon]

The CIA's intelligence collection capability is redundant to the DoD's

I recently read Beyond Repair: The Decline and Fall of the CIA, by Charles Faddis, a former Army officer who recently retired from 20 years as a case officer at CIA. As the title suggests, he is immensely critical of CIA and argues it needs to be replaced.

That said he makes several points about this issue:

• CIA recruits case officers for the necessary skills to specifically conduct strategic-level foreign intelligence operations. The military recruits officers and enlisted personnel to perform a host of other tasks, and then they take some of those individuals and then will try to make them into case officers.

• CIA case officers spend their whole careers running agents; his military counterpart is likely to only spend a few years involved in running agents. There is only so much you can learn in training – the real education is in the field.

• The average CIA case office is going to run more operations and make more recruitments in a single than his military counterpart will in his career.

• While Defense HUMINT is structurally built to conduct offensive foreign intelligence, outfits that have recently been encroaching onto this turf like NCIS and AFOSI are not.

• As risk averse as CIA has become it is infinitely more flexible and agile than anything in the military command structure.

As such, he argues the capability of CIA is significantly greater than military organization’s when it comes to the collection of foreign intelligence.

Faddis argues that the failure of senior CIA management to admit the full scope of its internal problems has caused the military to write off CIA and develop duplicate capabilities. This he says, is a bad idea from a financial efficiency and operational perspective; the end result being a massive military HUMINT apparatus that while well trained and equipped, will be lumbering and lacking the flexibility and subtlety necessary for intelligence operations.

[Seabee]

I may be totally wrong here, but not so long ago I read that CIA workers were allowed to freelance on their own time.

Now, i assume you are not a CIA guy or girl in the day and freelancing by managing a Burger King at night... I assume you have a 2nd job in the intel field.

Mentioned were offshore jobs, sometimes on retainers from foreign govts, and companys.

If this is true, it seems to be the biggest "conflict of interest" that I can imagine. How does a CIA guy doing business for a seedy Russian clan NOT take advantage of contacts and info he has from his day job?

Best
Chris

[bourbon]

If this is true, it seems to be the biggest "conflict of interest" that I can imagine. How does a CIA guy doing business for a seedy Russian clan NOT take advantage of contacts and info he has from his day job?

There is a vetting process and permission is granted on a case-by-case basis. It must be disclosed who they are going to moonlight for, and what they are going to do there. By the published account it is only people working in deception detection, and there was only one company they were working for.