How Insurgencies End

[William F. Owen]

The other interesting definition of insurgency comes from Mackinlay's recent book The Insurgent Archipelago, where he cites Phil Wilkerson's definition that the split between terrorism and insurgency is the nature of response required (police vs. military), not the group's aims or structure.

I have huge issues with Mackinlay's work in general, but Phil Wilkerson's differentiation is very useful, and largely, IMO , correct.

While the difference between a Civil War and an "Insurgency," is imperfect, I would note the scale and frequency of action does play its part. The Chinese Communists gained power in 1949 via conventional military action that ended the "Civil War."

BUT, the issue in A'Stan is to my mind, back the Karzai Govt against the the Taliban. We pick a side and we back it with all possible means.

[Dayuhan]

BUT, the issue in A'Stan is to my mind, back the Karzai Govt against the the Taliban. We pick a side and we back it with all possible means.

Pick a side, or create one?

May not make much difference, but I suspect that we're deceiving ourselves if we think that a "side" that we conjured up to advance our own interests is going to be perceived as anything other than an extension of our presence.

[William F. Owen]

Pick a side, or create one?

May not make much difference, but I suspect that we're deceiving ourselves if we think that a "side" that we conjured up to advance our own interests is going to be perceived as anything other than an extension of our presence.

Maybe. That's a policy decision. Policy decisions are political.
Given the current policy - support the Karzai Government, what are the options?

[Dayuhan]

Maybe. That's a policy decision. Policy decisions are political.
Given the current policy - support the Karzai Government, what are the options?

If our policy allows us only one option of questionable desirability, it may be time to reassess the policy.

If we must support the Karzai government, then we must, but let's not deceive ourselves about what we're doing. We're not picking a side in a pre-existing conflict. We entered Afghanistan to impose certain conditions on the governance of Afghanistan (primarily the absence of AQ), and we created the Karzai government in pursuit of that objective. To the extent that the Karzai government is a "side", it's our side. The fight is not between the Karzai government and the Taliban, with us intervening in support of the Taliban, it's between us and the Taliban, with us creating and holding up the Karzai government to put a local face on our attempt to achieve our own objectives.

[Bob's World]

From my perspective the number one goal must always be the attainment of a government that is perceived as legitimate in the eyes of the populace. This means understanding how a populace (and the populace of Afghanistan is a diverse one) sees legitimacy being bestowed.

Then "simply" enable that process taking place, and be willing to work with whatever form of government emerges.

This means working with Karzai today, but doing so in a manner so that he, his populace, and the world, clearly understand that our goal is a government viewed as legitimate and that we fully appreciate that a government as illegitimate as Mr. Karzai's (due to the Western Influence that created it)is a presumption that will be damn hard to overcome.

Too often external powers put their men in, and then commit themselves to keeping their men in, rather than committing themselves to producing legitimacy of government and developing a relationship with that government.

I stand on my point that the tried and true stratagem of installing and sustaining "friendly dictators" is obsolete in today's information age. These puppets simply cannot control their populaces anymore, and the trouble no longer confines itself to those foreign shores, but soon comes to the shores of the sponsor.

[William F. Owen]

From my perspective the number one goal must always be the attainment of a government that is perceived as legitimate in the eyes of the populace. This means understanding how a populace (and the populace of Afghanistan is a diverse one) sees legitimacy being bestowed.

...but that is purely an issue for the Policy makers. Legitimacy is an entirely political idea. The job of the military is to destroy anyone contesting that legitimacy via violence. Military action, cannot and should not have anything to do with bestowing "legitimacy." -
In US policy terms only elected officials have any legitimacy, so the "idea" is purely political. Killing those who disagree enforces the policy!

[Bob's World]

A sticky problem indeed...

First, of course, the only source that can "bestow legitimacy" to a government is the actual populace to be governed by the same. To reinforce, I said "enable" the establishment of a legitimate government.

I am enjoying very much working closely with MG Nick Carter, the Brit officer handpicked to lead the main effort here in the south of Afghanistan. The way "General Nick" describes the mission it is the "establishment of representative government and opportunity."

A couple hundred years ago others described it as "Government of, by and for the people" and the unalianable rights of "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness."

[Entropy]

Dahuyan,

Treating insurgency as a subset of civil war muddies the issue even further, because whatever the conflict in Afghanistan is, it is definitely not civil war.

I think that really depends on one's perspective. One could reasonably argue that Afghanistan has been in a constant state of civil war since 1979. So far no "government" has been able to "seal the deal" and, depending on where one sits, these "governments" could be considered powerful factions in that civil war. Additionally, consider that every "government" since 1979 was sustained by significant foreign support, including the current government. Does foreign intervention to elevate one faction above others constitute an end to a civil war - or do these foreign interventions simply prolong it?