Okay, if a long standing conflict (centuries) for overall power between several competing factions (Tajiks, Uzbeks, Pashtun groups, Taliban, etc.) isn't a version of civil war than what is? It's certainly the case 1989-2001.Originally Posted by Dayuhan
You think that if ISAF withdrew the insurgency would end?
The other interesting definition of insurgency comes from Mackinlay's recent book The Insurgent Archipelago, where he cites Phil Wilkerson's definition that the split between terrorism and insurgency is the nature of response required (police vs. military), not the group's aims or structure.
I have huge issues with Mackinlay's work in general, but Phil Wilkerson's differentiation is very useful, and largely, IMO , correct.
While the difference between a Civil War and an "Insurgency," is imperfect, I would note the scale and frequency of action does play its part. The Chinese Communists gained power in 1949 via conventional military action that ended the "Civil War."
BUT, the issue in A'Stan is to my mind, back the Karzai Govt against the the Taliban. We pick a side and we back it with all possible means.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Pick a side, or create one?
May not make much difference, but I suspect that we're deceiving ourselves if we think that a "side" that we conjured up to advance our own interests is going to be perceived as anything other than an extension of our presence.
Maybe. That's a policy decision. Policy decisions are political.
Given the current policy - support the Karzai Government, what are the options?
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
If our policy allows us only one option of questionable desirability, it may be time to reassess the policy.
If we must support the Karzai government, then we must, but let's not deceive ourselves about what we're doing. We're not picking a side in a pre-existing conflict. We entered Afghanistan to impose certain conditions on the governance of Afghanistan (primarily the absence of AQ), and we created the Karzai government in pursuit of that objective. To the extent that the Karzai government is a "side", it's our side. The fight is not between the Karzai government and the Taliban, with us intervening in support of the Taliban, it's between us and the Taliban, with us creating and holding up the Karzai government to put a local face on our attempt to achieve our own objectives.
From my perspective the number one goal must always be the attainment of a government that is perceived as legitimate in the eyes of the populace. This means understanding how a populace (and the populace of Afghanistan is a diverse one) sees legitimacy being bestowed.
Then "simply" enable that process taking place, and be willing to work with whatever form of government emerges.
This means working with Karzai today, but doing so in a manner so that he, his populace, and the world, clearly understand that our goal is a government viewed as legitimate and that we fully appreciate that a government as illegitimate as Mr. Karzai's (due to the Western Influence that created it)is a presumption that will be damn hard to overcome.
Too often external powers put their men in, and then commit themselves to keeping their men in, rather than committing themselves to producing legitimacy of government and developing a relationship with that government.
I stand on my point that the tried and true stratagem of installing and sustaining "friendly dictators" is obsolete in today's information age. These puppets simply cannot control their populaces anymore, and the trouble no longer confines itself to those foreign shores, but soon comes to the shores of the sponsor.
Robert C. Jones
Intellectus Supra Scientia
(Understanding is more important than Knowledge)
"The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)
Dahuyan,
I think that really depends on one's perspective. One could reasonably argue that Afghanistan has been in a constant state of civil war since 1979. So far no "government" has been able to "seal the deal" and, depending on where one sits, these "governments" could be considered powerful factions in that civil war. Additionally, consider that every "government" since 1979 was sustained by significant foreign support, including the current government. Does foreign intervention to elevate one faction above others constitute an end to a civil war - or do these foreign interventions simply prolong it?Treating insurgency as a subset of civil war muddies the issue even further, because whatever the conflict in Afghanistan is, it is definitely not civil war.
Supporting "time-limited, scope limited military actions" for 20 years.
There was a civil war before 2001, and there would almost certainly be another if ISAF withdrew. Once the existing Government fell (probably not long) it would no longer be an insurgency, as an insurgency requires a government.
I don't see how ISAF vs Taliban can be called civil war, since ISAF is an external force pursuing its own objectives.
I'm not sure how useful a distinction between terrorism and insurgency is. Terrorism is a tactic; it can be used by an insurgent, by a counter-insurgent, or in pursuit of inter-state objectives that have nothing to do with insurgency.
Last edited by Dayuhan; 04-26-2010 at 04:32 AM.
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