How Insurgencies End

[William F. Owen]

This is an unnecessary simplification, IMO. Obviously there were (many) soldiers out there who failed to use language and concepts with rigor prior to the 1930s.

....and allow me to reply!

Yes, there failures of thought prior to the 1930s, but based on the evidence to hand in terms of the written record, the language was generally simple, coherent and useful. They were far from perfect BUT they were much better than today's.

Some of what was written in the UK's 1909 Field Service Regulations, was utter rubbish, but it was simply and clearly written rubbish. It was not the arch-twaddle you find in "FM3 Design" for example.

[Ken White]

I agree with Steve Blair's post, particularly with his last paragraph. However, Wilf has a very valid point IMO in respect to military writing. After the 17th Centuryt it consistentlv became more concisely and directly oriented. Mellifluous prose gradually disappeared. Most writing during and immediately after WW I was an indicator of a trend reversal. Since WW II, it has gotten far worse each decade and now we;'re producing 300 page FIELD manuals that say little. Illustrations which can help, are part of that. So are arcane charts and 'matrices' that are not helpful.

So, IMO, you're both right (send checks to P,O Box 479... ).

[Steve Blair]

One thing I would point out, at least with respect to U.S. military writing, is that much of what was done officially between 1800 and 1900 was concerned with what was then called "tactics" but what we would now most likely call drill. There wasn't much official writing concerning military theory (aside from fortification theory, which could get pretty bloody exotic), and you really didn't see much of that until the expansions that took place in the build-up to World War I.

Why the change? There are, I think, a number of reasons. One may lie in the breakup of more or less static regiments and the increased reliance on a conscript army in time of war. It was then that you saw the confusing and jumbled field manuals (which oddly enough resemble some of the privately-published products pushed on unsuspecting State Volunteer units during the Civil War). And a great deal of the older stuff could be considered "arch-twaddle." Theory wasn't in vogue, and there was often some suspicion attached to an officer who wrote (again, I'm talking about the U.S. here in the period before World War I).

I would as an aside wonder how much the influence of the "business school" movement in the 1950s had to do with the twaddle that shows up in our manuals?

And now back to your regularly-scheduled thread....

[Outlaw 7]

This is actually a very interesting question for the simply reason if one asks the question when does an insurgency end one must equally ask--what is the exact ecosystem of the insurgency look like and or what is even the ecology of an insurgency.

All of the current intel analysis focuses on people, places, and things---not on how does the ecosystem function, hows does it communicate, what happens when it splits or a top leader is killed, how does it respond to the local population it survives in---all extremely valid questions.

This blog has totally ignored the the ecological based research released in Dec 2009 in Nature which actually would answer the question-when will it end as it would tell you how it even began and describe it's actual ecosystem.

Out of the article "How will it end?

From 'How Insurgencies End'

Government victories often cause the insurgency to splinter, leaving behind
small elements of irredeemables that may or may not represent an ongoing
threat. Tracking these splinter groups can provide tremendous
insight into the nature of the insurgency ending. We noted that, when the
government is winning and the insurgency is in its "tail" phase, often a
small group of insurgents splinters away from the cadre or leader-

In some cases, this splinter element is an irredeemable fringe unwilling to
negotiate or enter into an amnesty program. In others, the splinter is
formed from an irredeemable core leadership element. In both cases, the
splinter groups are intent on continuing the struggle against the government
in one form or another. They may
try to sustain or reignite the insurgency immediately, or they may be
willing to hibernate until they see an opportunity to reemerge.
Counterinsurgents should be able to tell a great deal about their long-term
prospects by observing how the general populace perceives this splinter
group.

This statement above begs the question from an ecology perspective, how do you track 'splinter groups' - are these a sign of weakening insurgency, or as a sign of evolution?

This was answered in the research:
Redistribute: When a group is broken the components are redistributed amongst the other groups in the system. The redistribution is biased towards the most successful remaining groups.

To understand the concept of ecology based research the following must be understood:
Ecology of an Insurgency:

The scientific study of the way that living “organisms” in this case “organism” is defined as an insurgency cell, group, or organization interact with their environment and predators (the counter insurgent).


Ecosystem of an Insurgency:

An insurgent ecosystem is a system whose members (members defined as being either an insurgent group or groups) benefit from each other's participation via symbiotic (mutually beneficial and self-sustaining) relationships.

The main goal of an insurgency ecosystem is to generate common ventures. It forms when many small and potentially diverse (origin, tribe, religious belief, etc.) insurgent groups join together to fight a common predator (the counter-insurgent or state).

Insurgent ecosystems attract and retain members (groups) due to network effects:

• The benefits of the ecosystem (shared ventures) are so great that groups won’t leave it (although temporary departures to avoid targeted pressure from counter-insurgents are possible).
• The ecosystem’s features (i.e. immediate access to shared resources) make it easy for new groups to form and participate.
• The growth of the ecosystem results in an exponential increase in benefits (i.e. more segmentation and specialization) for all of the member groups. IE Attacks by one group creates opportunities for other groups. The buying of resources (ie small arms, explosives) creates a market for groups to sell into and makes it easier for other groups to get access to the resources.
• An ecosystem can have groups directly fighting each other through direct battles - but it can also have indirect fighting (or competition) between groups for access to resources (people, money, strategy etc).


Once an ecosystem is established in a particular region/area, it becomes very difficult for the counter insurgent to eliminate it. The presence of multiple groups means that the counter insurgent must divide its efforts. Operationally, a focus on one group leaves other groups to operate freely and success against one group yields very little overall benefit. Removing leadership does not mean that the group will cease to exist. The leadership may be replaced by other parts from the same group or other groups. Or a new group will move into the space left open by old group. Strategically, the diversity of the groups in the ecosystem (different reasons for fighting) means that it isn’t possible to address a single set of issues or grievances at the national level that would reverse the insurgency (via negotiated settlement, repatriation, etc.).

So the answer to the question "when will it end" ---it will end WHEN the insurgent wants it to end based on his view of his own ecosystem.

It is up to the counter-insurgent to "shape that ecosystem" to the degree that the group in that ecosystem has no other option than to disengage.

[MikeF]

This blog has totally ignored the the ecological based research released in Dec 2009 in Nature which actually would answer the question-when will it end as it would tell you how it even began and describe it's actual ecosystem.

Outlaw7,

SWJ and SWC have discussed the conflict ecosystem throughout many threads and articles over the last couple of years. Specifically, one can look at Dr. David Kilcullen's Conflict Ecosystem as one that many of us can agree or at least relate to.

I haven't read or seen the Nature article that you are referencing. If you have a chance, please include a link so that I can check it out.

Thanks,

Mike

[Rex Brynen]

Outlaw7,

SWJ and SWC have discussed the conflict ecosystem throughout many threads and articles over the last couple of years. Specifically, one can look at Dr. David Kilcullen's Conflict Ecosystem as one that many of us can agree or at least relate to.

I haven't read or seen the Nature article that you are referencing. If you have a chance, please include a link so that I can check it out.

Thanks,

Mike

This is the article: Juan Camilo Bohorquez, Sean Gourley, Alexander R. Dixon, Michael Spagat, & Neil F. Johnson, "Common ecology quantifies human insurgency," Nature 462, 911-914 (17 December 2009). (subscriptions required)

• You'll find Gourley's TED talk based on some of the findings here.
  
• You'll find a strong methodological critique of the work by Drew Conway, Thomas Zeitzoff, and Joshua Fouston at Registan.net here.

Frankly, I find the research both methodologically flawed and unimpressive, especially in that it imputes a measure of insurgent fragmentation from a mathematical formula based on the nature of attacks, rather than from any actual measure of insurgent fragmentation. From a policy or intel point of view, I don't think it's that useful at all.

[Outlaw 7]

Rex:
your response is interesting in that while you named four or five individuals who differed with the research-- outside of Drew Conway absolutely none are quantum physics types. What is interesting outside of the initial coverage with their research release being mentioned in about 10-15 articles, magazines, blogs in the various Social Sciences --outside of the 4 or 5 who differed there was a surprising lack of critique from others-in fact a number of Harvard types were impressed with the research and indicated that it opened new areas of research. Lately in one major Sociology blog the 15 characteristics of an insurgency have been relisted and there was indications of renewed interest in those characteristics.

You failed to mention that as far as I and probably you know there has been no other research project in this area that went over six years in length, covering 56,000 inputs on 11 different insurgencies---and even Drew had to admit that it was time to move in the direction the research was moving in and he in some aspects was debating the math not the direction being taken. So while some have differed with the results no one seems willing to explain the results themselves.

If one looks at the history of intelligence-- we started initially with hand jammed link analysis and matrixes, then with the computer age we moved to the link analysis tools-Analyst Notebook, Palantir, and Axis Pro, then when that was not providing answers we moved on to the Carnegie Mellon tool ORA for now the "hot buzz word-social network analysis". So do you honestly think the progressive development/evolution of new ideas/tool has stopped with the ORA tool---I beg to differ.

What you fail to mention is that social network analysis is really only a 1D slice of an ecosystem. So what does one want to use to see the rest of the ecosystem? The next logical progression is in empirically based ecology focused research of the insurgency---but where are the tools as I see nothing out there or do you know of any? How is in fact SNA going to tell you what the communication paths are, how the communications are flowing internally, how are IO/rumors impacting the individual/group, just what are the results of particluar cause and effect scenarios, what is the third degree level of impact going to be, etc.

I also challenge you that the definitions I use in ecology of and ecosystem of an insurgency are in fact not the same as the authors you mention are using as I doubt that any of the authors you mention are in fact using the 15 characteristics as defined in the released research. If in fact they are using the same definition and are referring to the 15 characteristics then I stand corrected, but I will not stand corrected as they are not using them---to use them would to a degree accept the premise of "open source warfare". Which we all know has been "cussed, discussed and found wanting" in comments in this blog a number of years ago, but stangely more and more of the terms are finding their way back into comments by senior leadship and in recent articles ie DoDBUZZ.

AND you seem to avoid answering the initial paragraphs I provided from the RAND article concerning splitter groups and how they will react---using the research the answers are clear--when using a SNA tool I am not sure what you answer would be.

Again this is all about intelligence and to argue my comments concerning the research were not begs the question of just how much did you understand the recent Gen. Flynn article which requires some reading between the lines.

Just a side comment--when looking at the ecosystem of an insurgency what strikes one as the most active element in that system?---the attacks--it has been always about the attacks---the attack if empirically analyzed provides some of the deepest info on the actual organization--but hey who wants to do that as there are not many tools for the intel analyst to use to reverse engineer the attack right? Think about it.

By your initial remarks on the methodology/math I am assuming that you have a degree in quantum physics and have a long number of years in the field?

[Steve the Planner]

In outlaw speak, conflicts are not closed systems.

The so-called "splinter groups" may, in fact, be the main opposition. They just no longer reside in the battlespace, but substantially drive and direct it.

Where do you begin and end measuring a system, let alone determine how it really ends?

The big tribe chief puts its big ass on the chair and everybody else scatters waiting for him to choke on a hot dog, and they are back in the chair in 24 hours.

Not any different from the old crows at Nightwatch realize. There is not even a measurement, for example, of what comprises "corruption" in many places in Afghanistan. If "business as usual is: we get in charge, we keep the spoils, corruption is: we get in charge, and don't keep the spoils.

What is the framework for all this whiz band quant analysis that has no actual quant foundation?

[Outlaw 7]

Steve:

Check this link from today:
http://www.latimes.com/news/nationwo...5.story?page=1

What I was indicating is can social network analysis give troops on the ground the necessary answers on the items identified below taken out of this article---my answer is no---so if the standard military wide link analysis tools, and social network analysis tools cannot do it as well then maybe it is time to really look at quantum analysis ecology focused approach especially research that can provide answers to understand a way forward with this particular sentence taken from the article.

The assessment also reported "fissures" among insurgent groups, particularly at the local level. As a result, insurgents often have difficulty coordinating their operations. Soc if ial network analysis cannot tell you how to exploit the fissues---for that matter it cannot even tell you the fissures--and social network analysis can not defintiely tell you engage with a plan what will be the outcome of that plan.

1. The insurgency has easy access to fighters, small arms and explosives for roadside bombs, the report notes, giving fighters a "robust means" to sustain military operations.

2. "A ready supply of recruits is drawn from the frustrated population, where insurgents exploit poverty, tribal friction, and lack of governance to grow their ranks," the report said.

3. The report also notes that insurgents' tactics are increasing in sophistication and the militants have also become more able to achieve broader strategic effects with successful attacks. The Taliban continue to use threats and targeted killings to intimidate the Afghan population.

4. At the same time, Taliban shadow governments, which can include courts and basic social services, have strengthened, undermining the authority of the Afghan government, according to the report.

5. Taliban leaders also have undermined the credibility of the central Afghan government by leveling accusations of corruption -- many of them accurate -- against local and regional officials, the report said. Information operations and media campaigns are a particular strength, the report said.

These previous sentences go to the heart of my definition of ecology of and ecosystem of an insurgency--which from my previous blog response are not being used by any current author.

[MikeF]

Outlaw and others,

I would suggest that we take this most interesting debate on the open, organic nature of insurgency as a system to a new thread IOT allow the continuation of the meaningful discussion between Bob's World, Wilf, and Dayahun in this thread.

In outlaw speak, conflicts are not closed systems.

In the small wars community, this truth was confirmed some forty years ago after RAND's Leites and Wolfe closed system of an insurgency modeled after the observations of Vietnam. Dr. Gordon McCormick built off this model opening it up to a model of counter-insurgency which he labeled the Mystic Diamond. Dr. David Kilcullen expanded on these ideas to create his conflict eco-system.

In truth, all human interactions are open, poruous systems...In other words, no man is an island, and he is constantly constrained or encouraged by his culture, history, family, ethnicity, religion, etc...

And no, Outlaw7, I have no experience in quantum physics although I excelled in discrete dynamical systems prior to venturing into Economics with an emphasis in econometrics for whatever that's worth. I heart math I suppose .

[Dayuhan]

Surveys of insurgencies and models derived from the study of insurgencies (whether derived from quantitative or more subjective study) can be useful and interesting: they keep us alert to patterns and give an idea of what we might need to look for in any given case. If we assume that any given model or the conclusions of any given study will necessarily apply to any specific case, though, we set ourselves up for a world of misery. Every case is unique, and at the end of the day we need to study all that's available to study and then base decisions on the actual characteristics of the situation at hand. Using models and studies is smart. Relying on them to do our thinking for us is perhaps less so.

[jmm99]

Looking back to the ancients is not a fruitless endeavor. Take Callwell's Small Wars: Their principles and practice (the 1903 edition is available from Google Books as a pdf download), chap 1, p.1:

Small war is a term which has come largely into use of late years, and which it is somewhat difficult to define. Practically it may be said to include all campaigns other than those where both the opposing sides consist of regular troops. It comprises the expeditions against savages and semi-civilised races by disciplined soldiers, campaigns undertaken to suppress rebellious and guerilla warfare in all parts of the world where organized armies are struggling against opponents who will not meet them in the open field. It thus obviously covers operations very varying in their scope and in their conditions.

The expression " small war " has in reality no particular connection with the scale on which any campaign may be carried out; it is simply used to denote, in default of a better, operations of regular armies against irregular, or comparatively speaking irregular, forces.
....
[JMM note: In the text, a brief digression where Callwell suggests that the 1894 Sino-Japanese War might "almost be described as a small war" since the Japanese were a "highly trained, armed, organized, and disciplined army" and the Chinese forces "could not possibly be described as regular troops in the proper sense of the word".]
....
Small wars include the partisan warfare which usually arises when trained soldiers are employed in the quelling of sedition and of insurrections in civilized countries; they include campaigns of conquest when a Great Power adds the territory of barbarous races to its possessions; and they include punitive expeditions against tribes bordering upon distant colonies.

Both small wars and "big wars", are conflicts (violence between armed forces) which still fall into the broad category of "armed conflicts" legally. Another continuing legal concept viable from Callwell's time to our own is the distinction between regular forces (read generally as the armed forces of a nation-state) and irregular forces (read generally as the armed forces of a non-state actor) in legal terms.

Callwell does not deal with the "political struggle" (read that generally as civil affairs, but it goes well beyond that as viewed by Mao and Giap, including low intensity violence). Presumbly, he relied on British colonial administrators to handle that in cases where it was needed.

A few years back, John Sulllivan wrote a thesis with the long winded title, The Marine Corps’ Small Wars Manual and Colonel C.E. Callwell’s Small Wars - Relevant to the Twenty-First Century or Irrelevant Anachronisms? (in SWC library), where he summed several definitions (I've switched the order to put Callwell, the oldest of the four, first):

Appendix C – Small Wars & Other Associated Definitions

small wars

Small Wars – Small wars include all campaigns other than those where both the opposing sides consist of regular troops. Small wars cover operations varying in their scope and in their conditions. Small wars denote operations of regular armies against irregular, or comparatively speaking irregular, forces.[99][99] Callwell, Small Wars, 21.

Small Wars Manual - Small wars are operations undertaken under executive authority, wherein military force is combined with diplomatic pressure in the internal or external affairs of another state whose government is unstable, inadequate, or unsatisfactory for the preservation of life and of such interests as are determined by the foreign policy of our Nation.[98][98] U.S. Marine Corps, Small Wars Manual, 1940, 1-1.

military operations other than war (MOOTW)

DOD Dictionary of Military Terms - Operations that encompass the use of military capabilities across the range of military operations short of war. These military actions can be applied to complement any combination of the other instruments of national power and occur before, during, and after war.[100][100] http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/dod...a/m/index.html [JMM: no longer among the definitions "in force"]

low intensity conflict (LIC)

U.S. Army Field Manual 100-20 - a political-military confrontation between contending states or groups below conventional war and above the routine, peaceful competition among states. It frequently involves protracted struggles of competing principles and ideologies. Low-intensity conflict ranges from subversion to the use of the armed forces. It is waged by a combination of means, employing political, economic, informational, and military instruments. Low-intensity conflicts are often localized, generally in the Third World, but contain regional and global security implications.[101][101] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Low_intensity_conflict [JMM: definition in 1990]

The trend in these definitions emphasize the shift away from a purely military definition (in Callwell's Small Wars), to inclusion of diplomatic concerns and the military in support thereof (in the 1940 USMC Small Wars Manual), to military operations short of war ("to complement any combination of the other instruments of national power"), and to LIC where the conflict is expressly defined in terms of a "a political-military confrontation", which "is waged by a combination of means, employing political, economic, informational, and military instruments."

Those examples illustrate no shocking changes in military doctrine qua the "military struggle", but they do present an illustration of the progressive inclusion of aspects of the "political struggle" in US military doctrine.

Dayuhan presented an example of the "political struggle"; timely because of an article in Foreign Affairs, And Justice for All, citing a UN estimate that 4 billion people are ruled under corrupt crimiinal and civil justice systems:

The areas of the Philippines where communist influence remains significant are generally fairly remote, and are generally ruled under what are effectively feudal dynasties. Land reform or reparation are less the issues than the corrupt and abusive character of local governance, and the immunity from legal process enjoyed by the politically influential families. I actually think this could be resolved in most of the affected areas, with sufficient political will, and that the impact on the insurgency would be substantial.

Obviously Steve presents a problem that can only be solved via the "political struggle". So, who is tasked to come up with the solution on the counter-revolutionary side - military or civilians ? The insurgents, if good ole Coms, will present Peoples Courts as the answer (the Taliban, Taliban Courts).

Thus, What is to be done; and who should do it ?

Part of the answer to those questions depends on whether a pollitical solution is needed to end the insurgency. A political solution could be a negotiated settlement, but it could also be the political solution of the dominant party being forced down the other party's throat.

Regards

Mike

[GI Zhou]

Back to the original idea of the thread, I will hopefully discuss this with the leaders of an insurgent group that had a negotiated settlement with their government, some more broad questions other than at the tactical and operational level.

The RAND study was interesting because of what it left out, as much as what it used as examples. The early post-war period presumerably as many of the the participants are either dead or unable to be contacted. Interestingly what wasn't mentioned about the Viet Minh was the HUGE amount of assistance they got from the People's Republic of China including sanctuaries and the Chinese artillery division that ringed Dien Bien Phu.

I believed the study over looked certain issues especially about the Malayan Emergency and Confrontation. The book, in my opinion, tried to look at too many insurgencies, and should ahve concentrated on more geographical area and see the links between groups emanating from these countries whether they be political, tribal or external.

My thoughts anyway. Of course, political sensitive issues may be in the classified version.

[Dayuhan]

Definitions are a problem because we make them one. Particularly in the military where a focus on doctrine, and the poduction and employment of precise "terms of art" within the profession, promotes endless arguments when no firm, agreed-to-by-all definition exists. Look to the recent input here at SWJ by Daves Maxwell and Witty on UW. You'll never make everybody happy in defining such broad concepts as UW, COIN, Insurgency, etc.

I’ve no special interest in making everyone happy, I just wonder if we’re all talking about the same thing. Specifically (and in a vain attempt to get back on topic) I’m wondering how applicable the conclusions drawn by Rand from study of conflicts that are almost entirely intra-state, between a government and a portion of its populace, are to an inter-state conflict where one state seeks to impose conditions on the governance of another.

That's another way to say forced arbitration on non-cooperative actors. It is a values call by the US to say their behavior was unacceptable.

I suppose you could have called Saddam and the Taliban “non-cooperative actors”, though of course they had no special obligation to cooperate with us. How does “arbitration” come into it? We wanted them out, we tossed them out. All well and good, I won’t be shedding any tears for either, though I thought then and think now that Iraq was peripheral to the core goal and represented an unnecessary dilution of resources and attention. Justifiable, yes; desirable, I’m less sure. Either way, my point is simply that these are not intra-state conflicts and should not be treated as such.

And if you are correct, then you have to determine how to win and build consensus within the Philippine gov't to enact your plan. That seems to be the crux of the dillemma.

That is the crux of the dilemma, and the short answer is that we cannot win and build consensus within the Philippine gov’t. They’ll have to come ‘round to it on their own. I’m not holding my breath. Fortunately the NPA are as inept as the local feudal rulers and are unlikely to effectively exploit their opportunities.

Obviously Steve presents a problem that can only be solved via the "political struggle". So, who is tasked to come up with the solution on the counter-revolutionary side - military or civilians ? The insurgents, if good ole Coms, will present Peoples Courts as the answer (the Taliban, Taliban Courts).

Thus, What is to be done; and who should do it ?

The short version of the answer is that the law needs to be enforced and the Government needs to do it. An even shorter version might be to simply say that the government needs to govern.

My long version of the answer to that question is here:

http://muse.jhu.edu/login?uri=/journ...5.4rogers.html

Don't think full text is available online; in the unlikely event that anyone wants to see it, I can e-mail a pdf. PM me...

[William F. Owen]

The expression " small war " has in reality no particular connection with the scale on which any campaign may be carried out; it is simply used to denote, in default of a better, operations of regular armies against irregular, or comparatively speaking irregular, forces.

I do so love the old words..... Proper British Officer writing like a proper chap should. I submit this holds good, in terms of usefulness, even today.

[Bob's World]

To understand how insurgencies truly end, one must first understand how they truly begin.


My position is that that they are rooted in failures of governance to nurture real and perceived high-level human needs among their populace; which I call "Poor Governance" and define as follows:

“Poor Governance” is defined here as some combination of the following four causal perceptions among significant segments of the governed populace:

Illegitimacy – the current governance does not draw its legitimacy from a recognized source.

Injustice – the rule of law applied is not viewed as just.

Disrespect – certain individuals or groups are treated with less respect than others as a matter of status.

Hopelessness – the lack of a trusted and certain means for the governed to shape their governance.

Furthermore, I believe there are such diverse debate and positions as to the cause of Insurgency because of the equally primal human urge to blame one's shortcomings on someone else.

Once one stops blaming their neighbors and their populace for their problems, and starts looking real hard at themselves, one can begin to attain a clarity that is truly helpful to developing courses that are apt to lead to truly ending (vice merely suppressing) an insurgency.

Certainly your neighbors will take advantage of your shortcomings to advance their own agendas. Certainly members of your populace will take advantage of your shortcomings to advance their own agendas as well. But, if you had looked to and avoided those shortcoming , there would be little true opportunity among your populace to exploit to begin with.

We struggle with COIN, because good COIN requires governmental responsibility. And that, is a scarce commodity in every culture.

[William F. Owen]

To understand how insurgencies truly end, one must first understand how they truly begin.


My position is that that they are rooted in failures of governance to nurture real and perceived high-level human needs among their populace; which I call "Poor Governance" and define as follows:

Bob, I envy your idealism, but "Poor Governance" is one possible cause of an insurgency/rebellion, and its irrelevant to the application of military force to serve policy.

It could be that the folks in the "rebel held" areas are better off with a higher standard of living. So what? You still go in there and kill and capture the rebels regardless. You then re-assert Government authority by being the ONLY authority, as in the only men with guns walking about with guns.

Yes, the people may or may not have a legitimate beef. Go vote in some other guys. That is there only legitimate recourse.

[Bob's World]

Bob, I envy your idealism, but "Poor Governance" is one possible cause of an insurgency/rebellion, and its irrelevant to the application of military force to serve policy.

It could be that the folks in the "rebel held" areas are better off with a higher standard of living. So what? You still go in there and kill and capture the rebels regardless. You then re-assert Government authority by being the ONLY authority, as in the only men with guns walking about with guns.

Yes, the people may or may not have a legitimate beef. Go vote in some other guys. That is there only legitimate recourse.

I know it comes across as idealism, but the real goal of this work is to get down to the bare elemental factors at work in these situations.

So, turning to your example:

A portion of my country is now "rebel held" or in other words, the "offical governance" from the capital has been at least supplemented, and perhaps totally supplanted by a new "legitimate" government (recognized by the populace, who bestow legitimacy, but outside the law, so therefore unofficial)

What to do? Are the rebels the problem, or are they merely a symptom of the problem? The easy answer is blame the symptom and the populace, and go in as you recommend and punish the populace for daring to support alternative governance; and eradicate the rebel force and its leadership. Ignore any failures of governance, and get on with your old ways. I have merely reset the conditions of failure with such an approach.

I probably will need to go in and deal with the symptoms, often quite harshly. My point is that you must also go in and engage your populace, understand their perceptions, and address those concerns as well if you want to have any hope of an enduring solution.


In Afghanistan most of the populace would prefer not to be under Taliban rule. That is a fact. It is also a fact that the majority of that same populace believes that they receive greater JUSTICE from the shadow Taliban legal system than they do from the Offical GIROA legal system. To disempower the Taliban GIROA must address the perceptions of poor governance; and that has very little to do with the multi-Billion dollar programs of services that the west is providing. You cannot buy your way out of an insurgency. Sometimes you must fight, but alway you must address the four causal perceptions I lay out above.

We are being led down a path of "Development-based COIN" by what Mr. Einstein would likely label "Intelligent fools." A separate group fitting that same description would have us go down a "War-based COIN" path.

I simply believe that an alternative path is more likely to produce the effects we seek.

[Steve the Planner]

Sorry for catching up late.

I was busy doing my regular civilian role unraveling local governance failures and financial misdeeds, and unlawful conduct----in US local governments.

The current project just involves millions of dollars of taxes "misspent." Much better than one project I worked on in the mid-80s where I had to move my family into a doorman apartment building.

Governmental responsibility, and good governance is not an end-state, but a continuous conceptual goal, always a work in progress. No project I ever worked on deceived me into the delusional thought that just this one will bring world peace and perfect government, never did, never will. Serious belief in democracy means an understanding of the importance to continue to pursue the goal (Chasing the flame), but doesn't mean you are every going to actually achieve it.

What Bob is talking about is whether one has faith that extreme grievances can be addressed through some venue. Right now, in many areas, the alternative is not the national, provincial structure, and many Afghans do not have faith that that government is either legitimate or responsive to their concerns.

In many areas, too, voting and elections, are not a legitimate path to acceptance or consensus (Duh!). So what is to be done? (by them)

Tom Ricks has been very judicious about Iraq's current election imbroglio, and I really appreciate it. Iraq has had some level of regional and inter-regional conflicts for hundreds of years, and will always have them. If "voting" and provincial governance was a great path to Nirvana, Iraqis would have attained enlightenment centuries ago.

Instead, good governance and stability there was, and probably always will be, hard to establish and harder to maintain. Our passing through did not change that fundamental in Iraq. They will always have a tough row to how. Facts of life. And it will be so 50 and 100 years from now, whether we have any engagement or not.

Can we improve their row? Sure, and in lots of ways, especially technical assistance and quiet and persistent efforts. Strategic patience, as Amb. Crocker says.

Afghanistan is more so. What Kool Aid creates instant, enduring governance in Afghanistan? Some things are just hard.

After WWII, my Dad was part of the Brits' "Great White Fleet" cruise, and wanted to go through the Khyber Pass during a layover, but could go because it was too dangerous. Every couple of years, he would think about it (especially when he was traveling in the region), but never found a "sweet spot"----in 60 years.

Let's not delude ourselves that because someone can make a Powerpoint, the boxes shown can actually be accomplished.

Public policy types, planners, and organizational analysts started working on systems dynamics models a long time ago, but only as guides and analytical devices. They are not "manuals" and construction diagrams. Life doesn't work like that.