The military will always be the "capacity reserve" for government.
Have a flood? Call the military
Have a riot? Call the military
Have a forest fire? Call the military
Have a hurricane? Call the military
Have a poorly crafted concept that you can "Develop" and "Secure" your way to victory? Call the military.
The problem is not so much that the military is being used improperly, it is that we have crafted the improper solution to the problem. The end result will remain, "call the military."
Robert C. Jones
Intellectus Supra Scientia
(Understanding is more important than Knowledge)
"The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)
One trend that is observed in developing countries with protracted insurgencies is the standardized use of the military to police. In those cases, the military is not the "capacity reserve," but the main effort.Originally Posted by Bob's World
As some of the lessons of Colombia show us, maybe we should start increasing our efforts to assist and advice towards mentoring police and judicial reform instead of further strengthening the military apparatus.
This notion goes against the current belief that we should secure and stabilize first through the military.
The issue is not the things the military can do by virtue of being organised manpower. The issue is their contribution to strategy. Their contribution to strategy is the destruction of the enemies armed force, either actual or threatened.
Yes, you can use all the organised manpower to build schools, but that is not what militaries do in terms of setting conditions for political solutions.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
That is not really a true belief.
It is a primarily US (but secondarily most major or former major powers) approach engendered not by logic but by arcane and inappropriate budget processes which equate jobs/tasks/missions with money and thus encourage the rather more organized armed forces to seek all missions to the detriment of those who should be tasked...
It's sort of like the Schools -- do not build the capacity of your students by developing capability and insisting upon performance; rather, throw more money at the Administrators, Teachers and Facilities. Mostly because the former receive power and emoluments through enhancing the latter two...
Not speaking of Colombia specifically, as I don't know much about it, but...
In many areas police and judicial reform can provide an effective tool against early stage or lower intensity insurgency, and can also address some of the root causes of insurgency. Unfortunately, in many insurgency-plagued areas local elites see control of the police and judiciary, and the ability to use those institutions for personal gain, as essential to maintaining their own control. In these cases governing elites may not openly oppose efforts at reform, especially if those efforts are a condition for external support, but they are likely to derail and dilute reforms as much as they can.
This underscores a key problem in assisting COIN efforts in other countries. In many cases the governing elites oppose insurgency because it threatens their personal position, power, and prerogatives. If our proposed solution to the insurgency problem also threatens their personal position, power, and prerogatives, that solution is from their perspective completely pointless, and while they may make a show of going along with our ideas, they will be pursuing their own agendas with a lot more vigor at the same time.
SSI, 20 Jun 11: Resolving Insurgencies
nderstanding how insurgencies may be brought to a successful conclusion is vital to military strategists and policymakers. This study examines how past insurgencies have ended and how current ones may be resolved. Four ways in which insurgencies have ended are identified. Clear-cut victories for either the government or the insurgents occurred during the era of decolonization, but they seldom happen today. Recent insurgencies have often degenerated into criminal organizations that become committed to making money rather than fighting a revolution, or they evolve into terrorist groups capable of nothing more than sporadic violence. In a few cases, the threatened government has resolved the conflict by co-opting the insurgents. After achieving a strategic stalemate and persuading the belligerents that they have nothing to gain from continued fighting, these governments have drawn the insurgents into the legitimate political process through reform and concessions. The author concludes that such a co-option strategy offers the best hope of U.S. success in Afghanistan and in future counterinsurgency campaigns.
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