THAT is the problem! Why are "Insurgencies" any different from any other form of conflict? It's moronic to assume that there is some distinct form of conflict, called an "insurgency" that some how is "different" from other forms of conflict.Originally Posted by Dayuhan
Welcome to the wooly thinking that created FM3-24 and all the other "Insurgency" fiascos.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Part of the problem is that we seem to lack a functioning definition of what an insurgency is. If, for example, we define an insurgency as a populace or portion thereof fighting against is own government, we can point out some distinct features and some distinct possibilities, as such:
- People who fight their own government generally do so for reasons
- Sometimes those reasons are valid and understandable
- If the government can be convinced or compelled to resolve those reasons, it may be possible to end the insurgency without the need to go out and kill, destroy, and maim until the will of the insurgents is broken.
In short, insurgencies often happen because a government sucks, and in these case the easiest way to resolve the insurgency is not to kill all the insurgents but to improve the government.
I think these conclusions are perfectly valid. I know they can work, because I've seen them work. Unfortunately, I don't think they apply to Afghanistan, because that fight isn't about a populace or portion thereof fighting against is own government, it's about a portion of a populace fighting against an occupying foreign power.
I do not agree. The whole problem is that we seek a definition of insurgency, to save anyone actually having to to think.
The root cause of the all the problems is a desire to believe that there is something called "insurgency" that is distinct and definable.
As we now the equally nonsensical idea of "Hybrid threats" it seems that there is no thinking behind any of this.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
If we're going to use the term we need to define it. The term seems pretty well entrenched, so something approaching a consensus definition might be useful.
Whatever we choose to call them, intra-state conflicts where a portion of a populace fights its own government seem distinct enough to warrant special study of the problems and opportunities associated with them, which are not necessarily shared with inter-state conflicts.
Agreed
Call them "Small Wars" or "Irregular Warfare." I'm very happy with Revolts and Rebellions. There have been at least as many revolts and rebellions as Wars between nations, peoples, and/or societies, so none of this is new except for the silly language.Whatever we choose to call them, intra-state conflicts where a portion of a populace fights its own government seem distinct enough to warrant special study of the problems and opportunities associated with them, which are not necessarily shared with inter-state conflicts.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Revolts and Rebellions are excellent terms for what they describe. "Small War" or "Irregular Warfare" are a bit broader... the conflict in Afghanistan, for example, could be called "Irregular Warfare" (given the number of troops currently committed I'm not sure it deserves to be called "small"), but it is certainly not a revolt or a rebellion.
To some extent the issues are semantic, but not entirely: when you call a thing something it's not, that conditions perception and response.
As far as the Rand study goes, it's interesting and I'm sure useful in many ways, but I'm not sure its conclusions can be easily applied to Afghanistan. I also do not quite understand how anyone can produce a 270 page academic monograph analyzing insurgencies that does not present a definition of insurgency right up front.
I will offer to this thread on "how insurgencies end" that if it erupts into violence again within 20 years in that same popualce, that the previous insurgency was merely suppressed, most likely through brute force, but that the underlying causal factors.
Too often militaries and governments slap themselves on the back and chalk a "W" up in the history book, when in fact all they did was beat the populace into submission.
So, in my book, the end of violence is not the end of insurgency, it is the resolution of the failures of governance that is causing the populace to revolt, along with the end of violence that ends an insurgency.
Robert C. Jones
Intellectus Supra Scientia
(Understanding is more important than Knowledge)
"The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)
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