How Insurgencies End

[Bob's World]

To understand how insurgencies truly end, one must first understand how they truly begin.


My position is that that they are rooted in failures of governance to nurture real and perceived high-level human needs among their populace; which I call "Poor Governance" and define as follows:

“Poor Governance” is defined here as some combination of the following four causal perceptions among significant segments of the governed populace:

Illegitimacy – the current governance does not draw its legitimacy from a recognized source.

Injustice – the rule of law applied is not viewed as just.

Disrespect – certain individuals or groups are treated with less respect than others as a matter of status.

Hopelessness – the lack of a trusted and certain means for the governed to shape their governance.

Furthermore, I believe there are such diverse debate and positions as to the cause of Insurgency because of the equally primal human urge to blame one's shortcomings on someone else.

Once one stops blaming their neighbors and their populace for their problems, and starts looking real hard at themselves, one can begin to attain a clarity that is truly helpful to developing courses that are apt to lead to truly ending (vice merely suppressing) an insurgency.

Certainly your neighbors will take advantage of your shortcomings to advance their own agendas. Certainly members of your populace will take advantage of your shortcomings to advance their own agendas as well. But, if you had looked to and avoided those shortcoming , there would be little true opportunity among your populace to exploit to begin with.

We struggle with COIN, because good COIN requires governmental responsibility. And that, is a scarce commodity in every culture.

[William F. Owen]

To understand how insurgencies truly end, one must first understand how they truly begin.


My position is that that they are rooted in failures of governance to nurture real and perceived high-level human needs among their populace; which I call "Poor Governance" and define as follows:

Bob, I envy your idealism, but "Poor Governance" is one possible cause of an insurgency/rebellion, and its irrelevant to the application of military force to serve policy.

It could be that the folks in the "rebel held" areas are better off with a higher standard of living. So what? You still go in there and kill and capture the rebels regardless. You then re-assert Government authority by being the ONLY authority, as in the only men with guns walking about with guns.

Yes, the people may or may not have a legitimate beef. Go vote in some other guys. That is there only legitimate recourse.

[Bob's World]

Bob, I envy your idealism, but "Poor Governance" is one possible cause of an insurgency/rebellion, and its irrelevant to the application of military force to serve policy.

It could be that the folks in the "rebel held" areas are better off with a higher standard of living. So what? You still go in there and kill and capture the rebels regardless. You then re-assert Government authority by being the ONLY authority, as in the only men with guns walking about with guns.

Yes, the people may or may not have a legitimate beef. Go vote in some other guys. That is there only legitimate recourse.

I know it comes across as idealism, but the real goal of this work is to get down to the bare elemental factors at work in these situations.

So, turning to your example:

A portion of my country is now "rebel held" or in other words, the "offical governance" from the capital has been at least supplemented, and perhaps totally supplanted by a new "legitimate" government (recognized by the populace, who bestow legitimacy, but outside the law, so therefore unofficial)

What to do? Are the rebels the problem, or are they merely a symptom of the problem? The easy answer is blame the symptom and the populace, and go in as you recommend and punish the populace for daring to support alternative governance; and eradicate the rebel force and its leadership. Ignore any failures of governance, and get on with your old ways. I have merely reset the conditions of failure with such an approach.

I probably will need to go in and deal with the symptoms, often quite harshly. My point is that you must also go in and engage your populace, understand their perceptions, and address those concerns as well if you want to have any hope of an enduring solution.


In Afghanistan most of the populace would prefer not to be under Taliban rule. That is a fact. It is also a fact that the majority of that same populace believes that they receive greater JUSTICE from the shadow Taliban legal system than they do from the Offical GIROA legal system. To disempower the Taliban GIROA must address the perceptions of poor governance; and that has very little to do with the multi-Billion dollar programs of services that the west is providing. You cannot buy your way out of an insurgency. Sometimes you must fight, but alway you must address the four causal perceptions I lay out above.

We are being led down a path of "Development-based COIN" by what Mr. Einstein would likely label "Intelligent fools." A separate group fitting that same description would have us go down a "War-based COIN" path.

I simply believe that an alternative path is more likely to produce the effects we seek.

[William F. Owen]

A portion of my country is now "rebel held" or in other words, the "offical governance" from the capital has been at least supplemented, and perhaps totally supplanted by a new "legitimate" government (recognized by the populace, who bestow legitimacy, but outside the law, so therefore unofficial)

What to do?

Kill off the competing Government. That is your job.

The easy answer is blame the symptom and the populace, and go in as you recommend and punish the populace for daring to support alternative governance; and eradicate the rebel force and its leadership. Ignore any failures of governance, and get on with your old ways. I have merely reset the conditions of failure with such an approach.

You DO NOT punish the populace. You used armed force against armed force. You kill and capture the enemy's armed force and leave the populace alone. You then re-establish control and authority, and IF YOU WANT, seek to resolve the political issues at the heart of the conflict.

In Afghanistan most of the populace would prefer not to be under Taliban rule. That is a fact. It is also a fact that the majority of that same populace believes that they receive greater JUSTICE from the shadow Taliban legal system than they do from the Offical GIROA legal system.

Sorry, but if folks believe they get greater justice from th Taliban, they they ARE UNDER TALIBAN rule as they defer to the Taliban as the arbiters of justice. That is how they become the de-facto power.

A separate group fitting that same description would have us go down a "War-based COIN" path.

I concur. That is why I subscribe to the "Kill the enemy - and only the enemy" approach to Irregular Warfare.

[Bob's World]

Ahhh, but this is Insurgency, not warfare. The "Armed Force" is your own damn populace. There is no way to attack the insurgent without inturn attacking the populace anymore than you can attack a cancer without attacking body it is growing within.

As to "greater justice" it is relative. They receive NO justice from the non-existent GIROA system. But remember, the applicaiton of Rule of Law that is not perceived as just is best called "Tyranny."

Taliban justice is harsh, but it is equally harsh and more readily available. So as I said, it is widely perceived as more just than what GIROA offers.

So, WILF, next time your foot acts up, kill your foot, and only your foot, and see how the rest of your body feels about that. :-)

[William F. Owen]

Ahhh, but this is Insurgency, not warfare.

Huh?? So it's not War or warfare? It's not the re-distribution of political power or the setting forth of policy by other means? Mao, Bin Laden, Che, Yasser Arafat, Lenin and Trotsky ( and me) all strongly disagree.
Insurgency is most definitely warfare, and gets won the same way.

The "Armed Force" is your own damn populace. There is no way to attack the insurgent without inturn attacking the populace anymore than you can attack a cancer without attacking body it is growing within.

Huh?? That's just not true.
If they reject your authority, by use of arms, they are "fair game" - and not "your" population. It's been done successfully, and it works.
Very happy to use surgery on cancer.

It's "The trinity". Armed Force, People and Leadership. IRA supporters were not the IRA Armed Wing. While occasionally they were the same people, they became subject to military force when carrying arms. Same as of almost every Irregular Force I can think of.

So, WILF, next time your foot acts up, kill your foot, and only your foot, and see how the rest of your body feels about that. :-)

If it had gangrene or cancer, I would, and my body doesn't do politics - well mostly....

[Bob's World]

Yes, there is indeed a time when one must act inextremeis to brutally attack one's own political body. A gangrene foot. The American Civil War.

But every single case of insurgency does not rise to this level. In fact, very few do. Usually it is a relatively small band of militants supported by a much larger segement of the populace that is experiencing conditions of poor governance, so is susceptible to the insurgent's message and supportive to some degree of their cause.

Before you go to the scalpel and bone saw as your first COA (or your political equivalent, the military) I simply suggest that 8-9 times out of 10 the situaiton can best be resolved by making one's main effort addressing the conditions of poor governance; and the supporting effort either reconciling or rounding up those who refuse to submit to good governance.

As an American we recognize it as both a Duty and a Right for the populace to rise up in insurgency when confronted with poor governance. But I see this as an inextremis COA for the populace as well. So did Thomas Jefferson when he wrote the Declaration of Independence. He did not mean if your mail is slow, or your taxes high, or your electrical power is sketchy. He meant big, human dynamic issues like Legitimacy, Justice, Respect and Hope.

And for Dayuhan, yes, we get it. The US conducted UW and threw out the illegitimate government the Pakistanis installed and installed the illegitimate Karzai government. That is history. It also creates a presumption of Illegitimacy for the Karzai government that is VERY difficult to overcome. Voting has not made a dent in overcoming that presumption.

Mr. K is pushing for a big "Peace Jirga" and making all kinds of public statements and positions to try to create a perception of legitimacy. I wish him well in that endeavor, because it, more than any military action by the coalition, is the key to strategic success in Afghanistan.

[Dayuhan]

If they reject your authority, by use of arms, they are "fair game" - and not "your" population. It's been done successfully, and it works.

Are you suggesting that all citizens, everywhere, have an absolute obligation to submit to authority at all times, no matter how capricious and abusive that authority may be?

If people are rejecting authority through the use of arms, they probably have some reason for doing so: it's not the sort of thing one does casually or on a whim. Isn't it at least worth looking into the possibility of removing that reason, thereby resolving the conflict without the need to declare anyone fair game?

[Dayuhan]

A portion of my country is now "rebel held" or in other words, the "offical governance" from the capital has been at least supplemented, and perhaps totally supplanted by a new "legitimate" government (recognized by the populace, who bestow legitimacy, but outside the law, so therefore unofficial)

Just because an area is "rebel held" doesn't mean the populace recognizes or approves of rebel control. They might just be more afraid of the rebels than of the government. More likely than not the populace is divided, with some supporting the Government but afraid to say so, others supporting the rebels, and others (likely a majority) just trying to keep their heads down and avoid getting messed up.

In Afghanistan most of the populace would prefer not to be under Taliban rule. That is a fact. It is also a fact that the majority of that same populace believes that they receive greater JUSTICE from the shadow Taliban legal system than they do from the Offical GIROA legal system. To disempower the Taliban GIROA must address the perceptions of poor governance; and that has very little to do with the multi-Billion dollar programs of services that the west is providing. You cannot buy your way out of an insurgency. Sometimes you must fight, but alway you must address the four causal perceptions I lay out above.

I have to wonder who's the "you" in that picture. Also, as in so much of the discourse I read on Afghansitan, if I didn't know better I would walk away with the impression that the GIROA was a pre-existing entity and that we intervened to help it manage an insurgency. That's not the case, something we forget at our peril. I doubt very much that the failings of the GIROA are the core issue in this fight: the core issue is us, our presence, our attempt to impose conditions on Afghhan governance, and the reality that the GIROA is, for better or worse, our creation.

It was recently said somewhere on SWJ (I think on this thread, not sure) that the days when we can simply install a dictator and be done with it are done. I agree, those days are gone and well gone. I suspect that we're in the process of discovering that we can't "install" a democracy either, and that our problems with installing dictators didn't happen only because we were installing dictators, but because it's not always possible for one state to install a government of any sort for another.

[Steve the Planner]

Sorry for catching up late.

I was busy doing my regular civilian role unraveling local governance failures and financial misdeeds, and unlawful conduct----in US local governments.

The current project just involves millions of dollars of taxes "misspent." Much better than one project I worked on in the mid-80s where I had to move my family into a doorman apartment building.

Governmental responsibility, and good governance is not an end-state, but a continuous conceptual goal, always a work in progress. No project I ever worked on deceived me into the delusional thought that just this one will bring world peace and perfect government, never did, never will. Serious belief in democracy means an understanding of the importance to continue to pursue the goal (Chasing the flame), but doesn't mean you are every going to actually achieve it.

What Bob is talking about is whether one has faith that extreme grievances can be addressed through some venue. Right now, in many areas, the alternative is not the national, provincial structure, and many Afghans do not have faith that that government is either legitimate or responsive to their concerns.

In many areas, too, voting and elections, are not a legitimate path to acceptance or consensus (Duh!). So what is to be done? (by them)

Tom Ricks has been very judicious about Iraq's current election imbroglio, and I really appreciate it. Iraq has had some level of regional and inter-regional conflicts for hundreds of years, and will always have them. If "voting" and provincial governance was a great path to Nirvana, Iraqis would have attained enlightenment centuries ago.

Instead, good governance and stability there was, and probably always will be, hard to establish and harder to maintain. Our passing through did not change that fundamental in Iraq. They will always have a tough row to how. Facts of life. And it will be so 50 and 100 years from now, whether we have any engagement or not.

Can we improve their row? Sure, and in lots of ways, especially technical assistance and quiet and persistent efforts. Strategic patience, as Amb. Crocker says.

Afghanistan is more so. What Kool Aid creates instant, enduring governance in Afghanistan? Some things are just hard.

After WWII, my Dad was part of the Brits' "Great White Fleet" cruise, and wanted to go through the Khyber Pass during a layover, but could go because it was too dangerous. Every couple of years, he would think about it (especially when he was traveling in the region), but never found a "sweet spot"----in 60 years.

Let's not delude ourselves that because someone can make a Powerpoint, the boxes shown can actually be accomplished.

Public policy types, planners, and organizational analysts started working on systems dynamics models a long time ago, but only as guides and analytical devices. They are not "manuals" and construction diagrams. Life doesn't work like that.

[MikeF]

SGovernmental responsibility, and good governance is not an end-state, but a continuous conceptual goal, always a work in progress.

Bingo. Even the United States is merely an idea, a great practical experiment in government and self-determination. My own definition of insurgency is equally as relaxed and broad whereas I don't believe the insurgency ever actually ends, they just fade away for a bit back to a phase zero. Using the example of the US Civil War, I believe those grievances began the day we first introduced slaves onto the continent, and those ideas persist today. A perpetual ebb and flow that sometimes rises in armed conflict.

From BW

Once one stops blaming their neighbors and their populace for their problems, and starts looking real hard at themselves, one can begin to attain a clarity that is truly helpful to developing courses that are apt to lead to truly ending (vice merely suppressing) an insurgency.

This holds true for the government AND the rebel. It is not a one-sided issue. MLK put it another way,

In any nonviolent campaign there are four basic steps: collection of the facts to determine whether injustices exist; negotiation; self purification; and direct action.

Let's take the case of a disfunctional marraige. In this example, the husband (gov't) is a man of high moral conviction and good standing in the community. He loves his family and lives a good life. Conversely, his wife (rebel) is prone to infidelity, careless with the family savings, and perpetually drunk. In holding to his religious beliefs, the man seeks counsel at his mosque from Imam BW. The strict imam tells him to seek purification of his own sins. Allah must be punishing him for a reason. The Good Book is clear that once a man and woman join in union, they are one body. The man persists for ten years loving his broken wife and seeking purification in the eyes of Allah. Eventually, the imam concedes that there are times, when all else has failed, that Allah allows for divorce. The point is it is not always bad governance to blame.

A justified insurgency could be when the roles are reversed.

[Steve the Planner]

I think there is a disproportionate tendency to oversimplify a critical factor---mobility.

Voting with feet is how we fled those tyrants in Europe. If you are an Afghan, whether fleeing corruption, local internal issues, genuine and justifiable fear of both opponents playing war games in their ancestral family plot, or just to commune with allies and supporters, there simply is no defined us v. them, nor any constraint on voting by feed.

OK. You are the baddest tribe at the moment. And during and after you, I have to deal with the other guys. What if I just step next door (Iran, 1 million IDPs; Pakistan, 1.5 - 2 million IDPs), and come back to fight now and again, or another day. Just like Iraqis did to avoid, but continue to oppose Sadaam, and Khomeni did to oppose the Shah.

That's what you are really dealing with here, and not some defined 1860's rebel miscreant pushed to the shores of the Mississippi Delta to be "mopped up" at the end of conflict.

This is the 21st Century and even poor destitute Afghans can just go next door, or contact cousins in London, Paris, Frankfurt or Baltimore (Karzai family's Helmand Restaurant on Charles Street).

Putting real life into play, and the reality that folks are not bounded in these places (either friend or foe), why apply anachronistic assumptions that we know just don't fit.

Insurgents, like IDPs, seldom get their passports stamped. The world is a big slippery place. In that real world, was strategy will effectively bring conflict back to stage zero?

Don't get me wrong. I love all the boy toys (from my old tank to MRAPs and Blackhawks), they just don't seem to be getting the job done. They do make a big bang, though.

In Iraq, SF, especially during the surge, was surgical and EFFECTIVE. The evidence and the circumstance appears to be different in Afghanistan.

[William F. Owen]

I think there is a disproportionate tendency to oversimplify a critical factor---mobility.

........

Sorry Steve, you've lost me. What am I missing here?