How Insurgencies End

[jmm99]

Looking back to the ancients is not a fruitless endeavor. Take Callwell's Small Wars: Their principles and practice (the 1903 edition is available from Google Books as a pdf download), chap 1, p.1:

Small war is a term which has come largely into use of late years, and which it is somewhat difficult to define. Practically it may be said to include all campaigns other than those where both the opposing sides consist of regular troops. It comprises the expeditions against savages and semi-civilised races by disciplined soldiers, campaigns undertaken to suppress rebellious and guerilla warfare in all parts of the world where organized armies are struggling against opponents who will not meet them in the open field. It thus obviously covers operations very varying in their scope and in their conditions.

The expression " small war " has in reality no particular connection with the scale on which any campaign may be carried out; it is simply used to denote, in default of a better, operations of regular armies against irregular, or comparatively speaking irregular, forces.
....
[JMM note: In the text, a brief digression where Callwell suggests that the 1894 Sino-Japanese War might "almost be described as a small war" since the Japanese were a "highly trained, armed, organized, and disciplined army" and the Chinese forces "could not possibly be described as regular troops in the proper sense of the word".]
....
Small wars include the partisan warfare which usually arises when trained soldiers are employed in the quelling of sedition and of insurrections in civilized countries; they include campaigns of conquest when a Great Power adds the territory of barbarous races to its possessions; and they include punitive expeditions against tribes bordering upon distant colonies.

Both small wars and "big wars", are conflicts (violence between armed forces) which still fall into the broad category of "armed conflicts" legally. Another continuing legal concept viable from Callwell's time to our own is the distinction between regular forces (read generally as the armed forces of a nation-state) and irregular forces (read generally as the armed forces of a non-state actor) in legal terms.

Callwell does not deal with the "political struggle" (read that generally as civil affairs, but it goes well beyond that as viewed by Mao and Giap, including low intensity violence). Presumbly, he relied on British colonial administrators to handle that in cases where it was needed.

A few years back, John Sulllivan wrote a thesis with the long winded title, The Marine Corps’ Small Wars Manual and Colonel C.E. Callwell’s Small Wars - Relevant to the Twenty-First Century or Irrelevant Anachronisms? (in SWC library), where he summed several definitions (I've switched the order to put Callwell, the oldest of the four, first):

Appendix C – Small Wars & Other Associated Definitions

small wars

Small Wars – Small wars include all campaigns other than those where both the opposing sides consist of regular troops. Small wars cover operations varying in their scope and in their conditions. Small wars denote operations of regular armies against irregular, or comparatively speaking irregular, forces.[99][99] Callwell, Small Wars, 21.

Small Wars Manual - Small wars are operations undertaken under executive authority, wherein military force is combined with diplomatic pressure in the internal or external affairs of another state whose government is unstable, inadequate, or unsatisfactory for the preservation of life and of such interests as are determined by the foreign policy of our Nation.[98][98] U.S. Marine Corps, Small Wars Manual, 1940, 1-1.

military operations other than war (MOOTW)

DOD Dictionary of Military Terms - Operations that encompass the use of military capabilities across the range of military operations short of war. These military actions can be applied to complement any combination of the other instruments of national power and occur before, during, and after war.[100][100] http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/dod...a/m/index.html [JMM: no longer among the definitions "in force"]

low intensity conflict (LIC)

U.S. Army Field Manual 100-20 - a political-military confrontation between contending states or groups below conventional war and above the routine, peaceful competition among states. It frequently involves protracted struggles of competing principles and ideologies. Low-intensity conflict ranges from subversion to the use of the armed forces. It is waged by a combination of means, employing political, economic, informational, and military instruments. Low-intensity conflicts are often localized, generally in the Third World, but contain regional and global security implications.[101][101] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Low_intensity_conflict [JMM: definition in 1990]

The trend in these definitions emphasize the shift away from a purely military definition (in Callwell's Small Wars), to inclusion of diplomatic concerns and the military in support thereof (in the 1940 USMC Small Wars Manual), to military operations short of war ("to complement any combination of the other instruments of national power"), and to LIC where the conflict is expressly defined in terms of a "a political-military confrontation", which "is waged by a combination of means, employing political, economic, informational, and military instruments."

Those examples illustrate no shocking changes in military doctrine qua the "military struggle", but they do present an illustration of the progressive inclusion of aspects of the "political struggle" in US military doctrine.

Dayuhan presented an example of the "political struggle"; timely because of an article in Foreign Affairs, And Justice for All, citing a UN estimate that 4 billion people are ruled under corrupt crimiinal and civil justice systems:

The areas of the Philippines where communist influence remains significant are generally fairly remote, and are generally ruled under what are effectively feudal dynasties. Land reform or reparation are less the issues than the corrupt and abusive character of local governance, and the immunity from legal process enjoyed by the politically influential families. I actually think this could be resolved in most of the affected areas, with sufficient political will, and that the impact on the insurgency would be substantial.

Obviously Steve presents a problem that can only be solved via the "political struggle". So, who is tasked to come up with the solution on the counter-revolutionary side - military or civilians ? The insurgents, if good ole Coms, will present Peoples Courts as the answer (the Taliban, Taliban Courts).

Thus, What is to be done; and who should do it ?

Part of the answer to those questions depends on whether a pollitical solution is needed to end the insurgency. A political solution could be a negotiated settlement, but it could also be the political solution of the dominant party being forced down the other party's throat.

Regards

Mike

[GI Zhou]

Back to the original idea of the thread, I will hopefully discuss this with the leaders of an insurgent group that had a negotiated settlement with their government, some more broad questions other than at the tactical and operational level.

The RAND study was interesting because of what it left out, as much as what it used as examples. The early post-war period presumerably as many of the the participants are either dead or unable to be contacted. Interestingly what wasn't mentioned about the Viet Minh was the HUGE amount of assistance they got from the People's Republic of China including sanctuaries and the Chinese artillery division that ringed Dien Bien Phu.

I believed the study over looked certain issues especially about the Malayan Emergency and Confrontation. The book, in my opinion, tried to look at too many insurgencies, and should ahve concentrated on more geographical area and see the links between groups emanating from these countries whether they be political, tribal or external.

My thoughts anyway. Of course, political sensitive issues may be in the classified version.

[Dayuhan]

Definitions are a problem because we make them one. Particularly in the military where a focus on doctrine, and the poduction and employment of precise "terms of art" within the profession, promotes endless arguments when no firm, agreed-to-by-all definition exists. Look to the recent input here at SWJ by Daves Maxwell and Witty on UW. You'll never make everybody happy in defining such broad concepts as UW, COIN, Insurgency, etc.

I’ve no special interest in making everyone happy, I just wonder if we’re all talking about the same thing. Specifically (and in a vain attempt to get back on topic) I’m wondering how applicable the conclusions drawn by Rand from study of conflicts that are almost entirely intra-state, between a government and a portion of its populace, are to an inter-state conflict where one state seeks to impose conditions on the governance of another.

That's another way to say forced arbitration on non-cooperative actors. It is a values call by the US to say their behavior was unacceptable.

I suppose you could have called Saddam and the Taliban “non-cooperative actors”, though of course they had no special obligation to cooperate with us. How does “arbitration” come into it? We wanted them out, we tossed them out. All well and good, I won’t be shedding any tears for either, though I thought then and think now that Iraq was peripheral to the core goal and represented an unnecessary dilution of resources and attention. Justifiable, yes; desirable, I’m less sure. Either way, my point is simply that these are not intra-state conflicts and should not be treated as such.

And if you are correct, then you have to determine how to win and build consensus within the Philippine gov't to enact your plan. That seems to be the crux of the dillemma.

That is the crux of the dilemma, and the short answer is that we cannot win and build consensus within the Philippine gov’t. They’ll have to come ‘round to it on their own. I’m not holding my breath. Fortunately the NPA are as inept as the local feudal rulers and are unlikely to effectively exploit their opportunities.

Obviously Steve presents a problem that can only be solved via the "political struggle". So, who is tasked to come up with the solution on the counter-revolutionary side - military or civilians ? The insurgents, if good ole Coms, will present Peoples Courts as the answer (the Taliban, Taliban Courts).

Thus, What is to be done; and who should do it ?

The short version of the answer is that the law needs to be enforced and the Government needs to do it. An even shorter version might be to simply say that the government needs to govern.

My long version of the answer to that question is here:

http://muse.jhu.edu/login?uri=/journ...5.4rogers.html

Don't think full text is available online; in the unlikely event that anyone wants to see it, I can e-mail a pdf. PM me...

[William F. Owen]

The expression " small war " has in reality no particular connection with the scale on which any campaign may be carried out; it is simply used to denote, in default of a better, operations of regular armies against irregular, or comparatively speaking irregular, forces.

I do so love the old words..... Proper British Officer writing like a proper chap should. I submit this holds good, in terms of usefulness, even today.

[Bob's World]

To understand how insurgencies truly end, one must first understand how they truly begin.


My position is that that they are rooted in failures of governance to nurture real and perceived high-level human needs among their populace; which I call "Poor Governance" and define as follows:

“Poor Governance” is defined here as some combination of the following four causal perceptions among significant segments of the governed populace:

Illegitimacy – the current governance does not draw its legitimacy from a recognized source.

Injustice – the rule of law applied is not viewed as just.

Disrespect – certain individuals or groups are treated with less respect than others as a matter of status.

Hopelessness – the lack of a trusted and certain means for the governed to shape their governance.

Furthermore, I believe there are such diverse debate and positions as to the cause of Insurgency because of the equally primal human urge to blame one's shortcomings on someone else.

Once one stops blaming their neighbors and their populace for their problems, and starts looking real hard at themselves, one can begin to attain a clarity that is truly helpful to developing courses that are apt to lead to truly ending (vice merely suppressing) an insurgency.

Certainly your neighbors will take advantage of your shortcomings to advance their own agendas. Certainly members of your populace will take advantage of your shortcomings to advance their own agendas as well. But, if you had looked to and avoided those shortcoming , there would be little true opportunity among your populace to exploit to begin with.

We struggle with COIN, because good COIN requires governmental responsibility. And that, is a scarce commodity in every culture.

[William F. Owen]

To understand how insurgencies truly end, one must first understand how they truly begin.


My position is that that they are rooted in failures of governance to nurture real and perceived high-level human needs among their populace; which I call "Poor Governance" and define as follows:

Bob, I envy your idealism, but "Poor Governance" is one possible cause of an insurgency/rebellion, and its irrelevant to the application of military force to serve policy.

It could be that the folks in the "rebel held" areas are better off with a higher standard of living. So what? You still go in there and kill and capture the rebels regardless. You then re-assert Government authority by being the ONLY authority, as in the only men with guns walking about with guns.

Yes, the people may or may not have a legitimate beef. Go vote in some other guys. That is there only legitimate recourse.

[Bob's World]

Bob, I envy your idealism, but "Poor Governance" is one possible cause of an insurgency/rebellion, and its irrelevant to the application of military force to serve policy.

It could be that the folks in the "rebel held" areas are better off with a higher standard of living. So what? You still go in there and kill and capture the rebels regardless. You then re-assert Government authority by being the ONLY authority, as in the only men with guns walking about with guns.

Yes, the people may or may not have a legitimate beef. Go vote in some other guys. That is there only legitimate recourse.

I know it comes across as idealism, but the real goal of this work is to get down to the bare elemental factors at work in these situations.

So, turning to your example:

A portion of my country is now "rebel held" or in other words, the "offical governance" from the capital has been at least supplemented, and perhaps totally supplanted by a new "legitimate" government (recognized by the populace, who bestow legitimacy, but outside the law, so therefore unofficial)

What to do? Are the rebels the problem, or are they merely a symptom of the problem? The easy answer is blame the symptom and the populace, and go in as you recommend and punish the populace for daring to support alternative governance; and eradicate the rebel force and its leadership. Ignore any failures of governance, and get on with your old ways. I have merely reset the conditions of failure with such an approach.

I probably will need to go in and deal with the symptoms, often quite harshly. My point is that you must also go in and engage your populace, understand their perceptions, and address those concerns as well if you want to have any hope of an enduring solution.


In Afghanistan most of the populace would prefer not to be under Taliban rule. That is a fact. It is also a fact that the majority of that same populace believes that they receive greater JUSTICE from the shadow Taliban legal system than they do from the Offical GIROA legal system. To disempower the Taliban GIROA must address the perceptions of poor governance; and that has very little to do with the multi-Billion dollar programs of services that the west is providing. You cannot buy your way out of an insurgency. Sometimes you must fight, but alway you must address the four causal perceptions I lay out above.

We are being led down a path of "Development-based COIN" by what Mr. Einstein would likely label "Intelligent fools." A separate group fitting that same description would have us go down a "War-based COIN" path.

I simply believe that an alternative path is more likely to produce the effects we seek.

[William F. Owen]

A portion of my country is now "rebel held" or in other words, the "offical governance" from the capital has been at least supplemented, and perhaps totally supplanted by a new "legitimate" government (recognized by the populace, who bestow legitimacy, but outside the law, so therefore unofficial)

What to do?

Kill off the competing Government. That is your job.

The easy answer is blame the symptom and the populace, and go in as you recommend and punish the populace for daring to support alternative governance; and eradicate the rebel force and its leadership. Ignore any failures of governance, and get on with your old ways. I have merely reset the conditions of failure with such an approach.

You DO NOT punish the populace. You used armed force against armed force. You kill and capture the enemy's armed force and leave the populace alone. You then re-establish control and authority, and IF YOU WANT, seek to resolve the political issues at the heart of the conflict.

In Afghanistan most of the populace would prefer not to be under Taliban rule. That is a fact. It is also a fact that the majority of that same populace believes that they receive greater JUSTICE from the shadow Taliban legal system than they do from the Offical GIROA legal system.

Sorry, but if folks believe they get greater justice from th Taliban, they they ARE UNDER TALIBAN rule as they defer to the Taliban as the arbiters of justice. That is how they become the de-facto power.

A separate group fitting that same description would have us go down a "War-based COIN" path.

I concur. That is why I subscribe to the "Kill the enemy - and only the enemy" approach to Irregular Warfare.

[Dayuhan]

A portion of my country is now "rebel held" or in other words, the "offical governance" from the capital has been at least supplemented, and perhaps totally supplanted by a new "legitimate" government (recognized by the populace, who bestow legitimacy, but outside the law, so therefore unofficial)

Just because an area is "rebel held" doesn't mean the populace recognizes or approves of rebel control. They might just be more afraid of the rebels than of the government. More likely than not the populace is divided, with some supporting the Government but afraid to say so, others supporting the rebels, and others (likely a majority) just trying to keep their heads down and avoid getting messed up.

In Afghanistan most of the populace would prefer not to be under Taliban rule. That is a fact. It is also a fact that the majority of that same populace believes that they receive greater JUSTICE from the shadow Taliban legal system than they do from the Offical GIROA legal system. To disempower the Taliban GIROA must address the perceptions of poor governance; and that has very little to do with the multi-Billion dollar programs of services that the west is providing. You cannot buy your way out of an insurgency. Sometimes you must fight, but alway you must address the four causal perceptions I lay out above.

I have to wonder who's the "you" in that picture. Also, as in so much of the discourse I read on Afghansitan, if I didn't know better I would walk away with the impression that the GIROA was a pre-existing entity and that we intervened to help it manage an insurgency. That's not the case, something we forget at our peril. I doubt very much that the failings of the GIROA are the core issue in this fight: the core issue is us, our presence, our attempt to impose conditions on Afghhan governance, and the reality that the GIROA is, for better or worse, our creation.

It was recently said somewhere on SWJ (I think on this thread, not sure) that the days when we can simply install a dictator and be done with it are done. I agree, those days are gone and well gone. I suspect that we're in the process of discovering that we can't "install" a democracy either, and that our problems with installing dictators didn't happen only because we were installing dictators, but because it's not always possible for one state to install a government of any sort for another.

[Steve the Planner]

Sorry for catching up late.

I was busy doing my regular civilian role unraveling local governance failures and financial misdeeds, and unlawful conduct----in US local governments.

The current project just involves millions of dollars of taxes "misspent." Much better than one project I worked on in the mid-80s where I had to move my family into a doorman apartment building.

Governmental responsibility, and good governance is not an end-state, but a continuous conceptual goal, always a work in progress. No project I ever worked on deceived me into the delusional thought that just this one will bring world peace and perfect government, never did, never will. Serious belief in democracy means an understanding of the importance to continue to pursue the goal (Chasing the flame), but doesn't mean you are every going to actually achieve it.

What Bob is talking about is whether one has faith that extreme grievances can be addressed through some venue. Right now, in many areas, the alternative is not the national, provincial structure, and many Afghans do not have faith that that government is either legitimate or responsive to their concerns.

In many areas, too, voting and elections, are not a legitimate path to acceptance or consensus (Duh!). So what is to be done? (by them)

Tom Ricks has been very judicious about Iraq's current election imbroglio, and I really appreciate it. Iraq has had some level of regional and inter-regional conflicts for hundreds of years, and will always have them. If "voting" and provincial governance was a great path to Nirvana, Iraqis would have attained enlightenment centuries ago.

Instead, good governance and stability there was, and probably always will be, hard to establish and harder to maintain. Our passing through did not change that fundamental in Iraq. They will always have a tough row to how. Facts of life. And it will be so 50 and 100 years from now, whether we have any engagement or not.

Can we improve their row? Sure, and in lots of ways, especially technical assistance and quiet and persistent efforts. Strategic patience, as Amb. Crocker says.

Afghanistan is more so. What Kool Aid creates instant, enduring governance in Afghanistan? Some things are just hard.

After WWII, my Dad was part of the Brits' "Great White Fleet" cruise, and wanted to go through the Khyber Pass during a layover, but could go because it was too dangerous. Every couple of years, he would think about it (especially when he was traveling in the region), but never found a "sweet spot"----in 60 years.

Let's not delude ourselves that because someone can make a Powerpoint, the boxes shown can actually be accomplished.

Public policy types, planners, and organizational analysts started working on systems dynamics models a long time ago, but only as guides and analytical devices. They are not "manuals" and construction diagrams. Life doesn't work like that.

[MikeF]

SGovernmental responsibility, and good governance is not an end-state, but a continuous conceptual goal, always a work in progress.

Bingo. Even the United States is merely an idea, a great practical experiment in government and self-determination. My own definition of insurgency is equally as relaxed and broad whereas I don't believe the insurgency ever actually ends, they just fade away for a bit back to a phase zero. Using the example of the US Civil War, I believe those grievances began the day we first introduced slaves onto the continent, and those ideas persist today. A perpetual ebb and flow that sometimes rises in armed conflict.

From BW

Once one stops blaming their neighbors and their populace for their problems, and starts looking real hard at themselves, one can begin to attain a clarity that is truly helpful to developing courses that are apt to lead to truly ending (vice merely suppressing) an insurgency.

This holds true for the government AND the rebel. It is not a one-sided issue. MLK put it another way,

In any nonviolent campaign there are four basic steps: collection of the facts to determine whether injustices exist; negotiation; self purification; and direct action.

Let's take the case of a disfunctional marraige. In this example, the husband (gov't) is a man of high moral conviction and good standing in the community. He loves his family and lives a good life. Conversely, his wife (rebel) is prone to infidelity, careless with the family savings, and perpetually drunk. In holding to his religious beliefs, the man seeks counsel at his mosque from Imam BW. The strict imam tells him to seek purification of his own sins. Allah must be punishing him for a reason. The Good Book is clear that once a man and woman join in union, they are one body. The man persists for ten years loving his broken wife and seeking purification in the eyes of Allah. Eventually, the imam concedes that there are times, when all else has failed, that Allah allows for divorce. The point is it is not always bad governance to blame.

A justified insurgency could be when the roles are reversed.