Afghanistan RFI

[Bob's World]

Well there is AQ the organization, which I believe was primarily invigorated by the Saudi's rejecting Bin Laden's offer to protect them from Iraq in favor of allowing the US to come in with a large military presence to defend Saudi Arabia and Liberate Kuwait,

Then there is the broad base of support to AQ from popualces across Muslim dominated countries, primarily in country's that have been heavily manipulated and controlled at the governance level by the West; or have heavily relied on the West to stay in power often rather manipulating it rather than being manipulated themselves.

[Steve the Planner]

Bob: Right, the mission is defined by conditions which cannot produce success without changes to the underlying constitution.

Governance, for most folks and most circumstances, is not a national affair, but a local delivery/control/representation structure. Sub-national governance is the most complex, intricate and ever-evolving "war by another means" as states, counties, municipalities continuously "manage" inherent conflicts within a web of competitive budgets, interlocking governmental "authorities," all aimed at delivering a service down to users.

Nice to believe that "big gov" is the "big deal," but, under most circumstances, it is the tail trying to wag the dog. US democracy is delivered by a city or county maintenance truck, fireman, or processing clerk--all based on inherently unique systems of evolved local processes, authorities, and inter-relationships.

When "big gov," ala Iraq and Afghanistan, fools around with restructuring a country without any actual clue as to sub-governance, how sub-governance is and has to be arranged to function, and the way things work, you have these inevitable problems.

Iraq's constitution, TAL and present, are amazing documents for a sub-governance person. It is all about stock markets and crap related to US big gov issues. Once dissembling the national authority, it merely directs, as to local laws, that things will be as they were.

Nobody in charge actually knew what that meant even five years later, and the disconnects and confusions are still playing out.

In 2008, UN constitutional law folks went through many of the "enactments" which Sadaam would routinely send down to his "representative" bodies for ratification. One paper in a confused and ill-considered constitution, every one would be applicable.

What should have occurred, after removing a brutal dictator, was a "role back" of every category of abuse to pre-dictator status. But nobody on our side knew what that would be either. Oh, the problems that arise when our starship lands on alien planets.

Back to Afghanistan, once again, we created a nation, but it is not one that works, or that could work in that country. All because of the sub-governance structural and administrative sphere (local governance).

As Bob points out, those are the rules. Unless something changes, we are lost in a dysfunctional system which we are constantly trying to subvert.

One thing we do know: The problems are not addressed in the current system, raising the questions: Are the system defects actually a substantial basis for legitimate opposition/conflict? Will the defects, if unaddressed, preclude stability, end of conflict, regardless of any interim efforts?

[Schmedlap]

For Schmedlap, I would cautions strongly about over-riding local systems in order to ensure outcomes we desire.

That is essentially my position as well. The entire experiment with the Karzai regime seems to be an exercise in forcing something upon the rural communities that they do not want and will continue to resist, regardless of how good the ANSF gets, how much poppy we eradicate, and how many schools we build.

[Entropy]

Possibly slightly off topic... but the reign of Mohammed Zahir Shah is often cited as evidence that centralized Government can work in Afghanistan. I've long wondered how centralized that Government really was, in terms of practical day to day control over local affairs. If anyone knows of any good material describing the actual (as opposed to structural/theoretical) relationship between central and local governments in the Zahir Shah period, I'd be interested in looking. Of course I realize that the period in question was extended and saw considerable evolution and change, but it remains an interesting question, even if there's no short simple answer.

There was no control over local affairs. Briefly, here's what Louis Dupree wrote 40 years ago in "Afghanistan":

The recent history of Afghanistan reveals the story of a piece of real estate trying to become a nation-state, its external patterns uncontrollably linked with those of the two great imperialist powers in the region [Russia and Britian]. More important than the drawing of boundaries was Afghanistan's internal integration, hampered by a plethora of independent and semi-independent ethnic and linguistic units.

Therefore, Afghanistan discovered that the most important elements in the creation of a national consciousness are the attitudes of the people, for a nation-state must evolve as a state of mind as well as a geographic entity. The essence of the modern nation-state involves a reciprocal set of recognizable, definable, functioning rights and obligations between the government and the governed. All twentieth-century nations, including Afghanistan and the United States, still strive, in varying ways, to achieve this ideal, although in Afghanistan, as in most of the developing world, many social, political, and economic rights and obligations occur within kinship-oriented, not government-oriented, institutions.

BTW, the book is in print again, so if you want a copy, you can get it for about a third of what I paid....

Also, this may be of interest for a number of reasons, not least of which it contains more relevant quotes from Dupree.

I've been thumbing through "Afghanistan" again recently and the sense I get from this 4-decade old seminal work is that Afghanistan, on a fundamental level, hasn't changed all that much. Bob's World is right about the Constitution and the over-centralization of power it promotes is probably the most serious obstacle to any kind of central governance.

[Dayuhan]

There was no control over local affairs.

That's pretty much what I expected.

Bob's World is right about the Constitution and the over-centralization of power it promotes is probably the most serious obstacle to any kind of central governance.

Sounds right to me as well, though I'd suggest that it's not only an obstacle to central governance but to any kind of functional governance... which need not be and probably should not be central.

We made our bed and now we get to lie in it; I've no idea how we're going to work our way out of this one.

[Schmedlap]

Afghanistan got new Constitutions in 1923, 1931, 1964, 1977, 1980, 1987, 1990, a proposed one in 1992, and then the recent one in 2004. I'd say that Afghanistan is about due for a new Constitution. Given how crappy the current one is and given how often new ones are promulgated, one would think it is somewhat doable.

On that note, I think the COIN-mania has gone a bit too far, but there is an article in a 2008 issue of the Harvard Law Review titled "Counterinsurgency and Constitutional Design" (121 Harv. L. Rev. 1622 for those of you with access). It cites many of the sources of emulation and saints of the COIN faith - Kilcullen, Galula, 3-24, Petraeus, Nagl, Sepp, Barno - and even cites McCulloch v. Maryland to keep it legal.

[Steve the Planner]

Tracking back a few centuries, my understanding of the ancient empires in which Afghanistan's territory was actually a part, I think of them in terms of I'll pretend to be in your empire if you don't bother me, and I get something out of it---maybe that's the local leaders getting payments, or more lucrative trade routes (same as today), or I get access to markets/goods I need.

If anybody wants to pretend they are a part of their empire, there is always something that has to be worked out.

I just finished reading the new Exum Report for CNAS---somehow it always comes back to---its not military, it is political, so the US really needs to ramp up the billions, send tons of civilians, and transform the country. Alway military think tank guys with no clue what they are actually talking about, and no domestic, economic will/support for it.

I did, however, appreciate the marked shift from "lets do CERP," to the realization that our money is creating a lot of the instability and obstacles we face. Why not just all sit down and pass crack pipes amongst each other while playing russian roulette. Whether you win or lose, you lose.

Given the real resources and commitments, what is the best strategy to accomplish realistic US goals? The practical demands, resources and time needed to "create" a new Afghanistan are different orders of magnitude than the $53 billion used to stabilize/minimally reconstruct Iraq. They are two completely different problems.

Forget the clear hold bribe that worked in Iraq, and the billions in payola washing through Kabul, and get them focused on taking control of their country with their resources. (No it will not have a school building in every community, and health clinics will be far between, but it is theirs and sustainable.

What if we took over and really ran things badly? Would that help to promote indigenous efforts to run themselves better? Why does everything have to end, not in teacups, but in mega-NGO contracts, and projects?

COIN is not a strategy, it is a tactic or technique to be applied when and where it can work, and our resources can be aligned to a successful outcome. If COIN is the only answer to Afghanistan (which it is not), then let's find a real strategy that macthexs the problem.

[Schmedlap]

I just finished reading the new Exum Report for CNAS---somehow it always comes back to---its not military, it is political, so the US really needs to ramp up the billions, send tons of civilians, and transform the country. Alway military think tank guys with no clue what they are actually talking about, and no domestic, economic will/support for it.

I just read that today, too, and agree with your assessment.

COIN is not a strategy, it is a tactic or technique to be applied when and where it can work, and our resources can be aligned to a successful outcome. If COIN is the only answer to Afghanistan (which it is not), then let's find a real strategy that macthexs the problem.

You know, his blog quoted a passage from some article (about his "report") that stated...

"'Good counterinsurgency tactics and operations cannot, in and of themselves, win a campaign,' according to the report being released Thursday."

When I read that, I first thought, "holy crap, they're waking up." Nope. Reading on, Exum drops this whopper...

Last fall, I sat down with LTG (Ret.) David Barno and asked him what he thought was missing from our research on Afghanistan. He said that while we had done a good job talking about counterinsurgency at the tactical and operational levels, we had not tackled counterinsurgency at the strategic and political levels.

W.T.F.? Oh yeah, the strategic and political things. Did we forget about that? I mean, did Colonel Gentile not nail this problem a few months ago when he pointed out that our COIN fetish is a bunch of tactics that are driving strategy? This is the smoking gun.

[Steve the Planner]

PS

The real clock ticking in Afghanistan is the national election cycle. This problem will be well on the way to success before then, or it will be remarkably transformed by a relentless domestic problem---budgets.

For those of you who remember domestic budget cycles (adopted in June for FY2011, 12), there is serious emerging crisis, patched over last year by stimulus grants.

When the locals start screaming for help, and there is no more borrowing capacity without inflation, a new hand will be dealt. We will begin to see the domestic state and local budget cards in June of this year, and June of next.Then we have to watch how the deck is shuffled, dealt and played.

Going in to Afghanistan was a serious endeavor. Suppressing OBL/ Taliban was real. Creating a new Afghanistan (or improving our relationship with Karzai, etc., as Exum suggests) is the smoke coming out of a hash pipe.

[Steve the Planner]

Schmedlap:

We cross-posted that last one.

Really. They need a better quality of advisers. If it is not a military problem, find somebody who is not military to answer it.

My fingers are crossed that in then next review, the White House will ask the same unanswered questions from last year, and start to realize how very wide the chasm is between problem, tools, and solution paths (currently being employed) and, with a relentless eye on the election clock, finally say: Let's get real, here.

What are we trying to achieve and how can we really achieve it.

[Bob's World]

I haven't seen the Harvard piece; but I will lend my vote that the greatest COIN tool in the US is not the military nor the state department, but is our Constitution. But most of us really don't appreciate that fact, and even fewer still appreciate why this position is likely true.

In 1976, my 8th grade civics teacher (who as a member of the 82nd Airborne made the jump on Normandy) taught as about how the Judiciary, Legislative and Executive Brranchs are designed to complement, counter, and balance each other. But it has only been in recent years that I really have come to appreciate "the fourth Branch" (hmmm, there is a book, or at least an article in that) of the populace. Today many 8th grade civics teachers probably think Desert Storm was "The Big One."

It was the Bill of Rights that really empowered The Fourth Branch. Amendments one and two ensured we could preserve access to the truth and the ability to think and believe what we individually want to think and believe, not what the government wants us to collectively think and believe; and that the governement would never forget that the people are both informed and armed, and not for the other three branches to get together and impose their will upon us.

The rest of the Bill primarily identified some specific and recent abuses of such power and prohibited them specifically as they were known to drive a populace to insurgency; closing with a couple of catch-alls to keep crafty lawyers in check from circumventing the intent of the bill.

The Fourth Branch will express itself. A good constitution will determine the frequency and legality of that expression. Keep it between the lines, so to speak.

A bad constituion forces The Fourth Branch to act out illegally; most often, violently, to voice their rights to good governance.

[Steve the Planner]

Bob:

You puncuate the accidental, divine, or historical collection of facts and circumstances that led to the creation of a viable USA---many of which are, in fact, outside the system and structure of governance. Some of the many peices:

=A common british heritage of constitutional law, writs and rights of the people;

=A population that was generally consistent in language, culture and essential religious positions;

=A common challenge/opportunity (facing a great and dangerous continent chock full of unexploited opportunities);

=Contact with indigenous populations w. organizational systems adapted for life on the big continent; and,

=And a tradition of information-sharing rapidly expanding due to the printing press and news systems (pamphleteers, Franklin's postal routes).

Even with all of that, our constitution had to be strong and resilient enough to survive and adapt to: civil wars, massive corruption, major economic failures (growing pains) that took at least 150 years to survive to a modern era that later encompasses waives of immigrants and industrialization.

What lessons do we take from this about the complexity of trying to turn Afghanistan into something like us? First, it is a chance collection of facts, resources and cultural heritage not really applicable there. Second, it is internally created, and not imposed from outside. Third, it takes generations, and so many external supporting factors that it could not come in a box, or be pushed of the ramp of a truck or helo.

[Bob's World]

Simple, flexible, designed by and for the populace that will be governed by it; and designed to keep individuals, organizations or government itself from being able to abuse power to subjugate others. And also designed preserve the four causal perceptions of Good Governance: Respect, Justice, Legitimacy and Hope; for everyone.

Our role should be one of mentoring rather than directing, and if the government insists on adopting something outrageous to simply say "good luck with that" and leave them to their devises. If we are too much the "big brother", when it goes bad or is tested, and it will be tested, it will be blamed on us.

I just don't know how you can get to Legitimacy and Hope with the current Afghan Constitution, even in the near-term, yet alone over time. I'd advice the "good luck with that" approach as the best bet for the coalition; or at least have that conversation and be willing to play that card.

[Steve the Planner]

PS:

What history, structure and opportunities do Afghans have that are different from ours, and define the what can and should happen there in a nation and organizational sense?

Consensus based formal and informal systems across a resource-limited and geographically distinct and disaggregate environment.

Very different, and very limited in producing a modern high-performing, service-intensive nation state.

Build a school? Great. Funded by foreign aid? Sure. (that's eating fish, not teaching to fish)

Build a self-sustaining national system of public schools for universal and compulsory K-12 education for 12-14 million students? With armies of supporting bureaucracies, teachers (400,000), textbooks, and facilities maintenance.) Impossible without a structure and system to sustain it. Taxes, accounting, logistics, distribution of authority, decision-making. Many internal languages, religions, historical and cultural narratives.

That's a multi-billion dollar intergenerational effort predicated on an effective national political, economic and governance system that has never existed in Afghanistan, to date.

Things can be done there, but only within the limits of what is possible.

[Schmedlap]

I just don't know how you can get to Legitimacy and Hope with the current Afghan Constitution, even in the near-term, yet alone over time. I'd advice the "good luck with that" approach as the best bet for the coalition; or at least have that conversation and be willing to play that card.

I'm curious if anyone knows what kind of constitution Afghanistan has. For example, in France there is a saying (not sure if this translates exactly) that the law is a screen. Once a law is promulgated, its constitutionality cannot be challenged because its passage is the implementation of the will of the people, expressed through the parliament. Our own Constitution contains rights and powers that aren't even articulated (for example the "right to privacy" that is unmentioned but apparently exists under a "prenumbra") and "implied powers" of Congress that are pretty broad.

In Afghanistan, if a law is passed that defies the constitution, but goes unchallenged, and is in accord with Islam (at least Hanafi fiqh), then would this really be problematic? If the government took some actions not explicitly laid out in the constitution, but were "necessary" then is this unconstitutional?

Building upon the second question... while I understand that the 2004 constitution provides for a hierarchy of provincial/district/other bodies, I'm curious if this necessarily means that there cannot be parallel, unofficial structures relied upon until those state agencies mature. Okay, we need to establish a provincial office and district offices. So what? Why can't we also establish district jirgas, if the people prefer that, and provincial jirgas, if the people want that as well? Similarly, if courts in a rural area are inaccessible or suffer from lack of legitimacy, then what's wrong with using a court of sharia or a mediator as screening mechanism? If the court of sharia or mediator works out - great. Or, if the parties are not satisfied then they bring their case to the state court - voluntarily - thus bolstering the legitimacy of the state court and not creating an impression of the state forcing itself upon the community.

I've read lots of comments, here and on other sites, about the apparent straightjacket that the constitution places us in. But I wonder if this is a straightjacket that we can't break free from - or a wet paper bag that we're not struggling against.

[Dayuhan]

Our role should be one of mentoring rather than directing, and if the government insists on adopting something outrageous to simply say "good luck with that" and leave them to their devises.

The only problem with this formulation is that it overlooks the reason why we're there in the first place. We didn't go to Afghanistan to mentor the Afghans on governance: if governance were the issue we'd never have gone near the place. We went there to deny sanctuary to AQ, and if we "leave them to their own devices" at this stage we will compromise that goal, or more likely surrender it.

We have a dog in this hunt; that's why we're there. That reality limits our options, but it's still reality.

[Steve the Planner]

Dahayun: Right. We have a dog in the hunt.

In the US, the saying goes (ala Oil Spills): I doesn't matter what law is adopted; it depends on how (and if) it is implemented.

Discussing al lot of this stuff is almost and academic one absent any viable implementation structures or capacity. What difference does it make what type of sub-national structure, if: (1) there isn't much effective juice in any; and (2) the leaders are appointed by the national government (not locals). Same with justice/security structures, and property and individual rights.

As much as anything, we may actually be intentionally disrupting much of what we gripe about. Absent national appointments of local administrators, there is "no telling" who might get appointed or whether we could control it, so there are tons of mixed messages across ours and there systems.

In Iraq in 2008, the US ground-reconstructors were desperate to get cash flowing in the provinces, while IMF was desperate to restrict cash (money supply) due to inflation concerns. Two conflicting views; both correct in their spheres; each workingagainst the other. Sounds familiar, no?

[Bob's World]

The only problem with this formulation is that it overlooks the reason why we're there in the first place. We didn't go to Afghanistan to mentor the Afghans on governance: if governance were the issue we'd never have gone near the place. We went there to deny sanctuary to AQ, and if we "leave them to their own devices" at this stage we will compromise that goal, or more likely surrender it.

We have a dog in this hunt; that's why we're there. That reality limits our options, but it's still reality.

But of course, it is not.

We did not go to Afghanistan to "deny sanctuary" any more than we went to Iraq to "deny WMD."

We went to Afghanistan to bring revenge and destruction down on the head of one Mr. B. Laden and his AQ organization in response to their attacks against the U.S. on 9/11; and also to disrupt, deter, dissuade the same from attempting that sh#* again. Period.

Did they use Afghanistan as a friendly base for training, etc? Certainly. But they also use safe houses in a dozen friendly countries and the U.S. itself as equally effective sanctuary.

There has been horrible mission creep in Afghanistan. We did not describe our origianal operations for what they really were; and then did not describe our subequent operations for what they really were (using Afghanistan as a convenient base of operaitons for continuing our vendetta against AQ, while we paid little attention to how Afghanistan and its people were doing in there transition from the TB to a new governance we delivered); then when that started to snowball, shifting to "COIN" (actually FID to support Afghan COIN) to keep our long ignored base of operations (Sanctuary?) from unraveling beneath us.

At the policy level we:
1. Rarely say what we really mean when we do something big;
2. Don't understand the essence of Insurgency and what is really important, and what is merely a symptom of larger problems/issues; so have tended to focus on symptoms, but only where we can link them to groups or states that we have pre-existing issues with; and
3. Have taken an approach to the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and those before and after as being totally and completely things that must be fixed by changes in behavior by everyone else in the world except the U.S. (i.e., victim mentality)

Not exactly a recipe for success. But that's just one man's opinion.

I believe that the word of General Roberts, commander of the second British debacle in Afghanistan following his return to England in 1880 are informative (He led the relief party down from Kabul that won a decisive victory at Kandahar following a crushing defeat to forces under the command of Gerneral Burrows at Maiwand; then led the remnants of the Army back into India):

"We have nothing to fear from Afghanistan, and the best thing to do is to leave it as much as possible to itself. It may not be very flattering to our 'amour propre', but I feel sure I am right when I say tha the less the Afghans see of us the less they will dislike us. Should Russia in future years attempt to conquer Afghanistan, or invade India through it, we should have a better chance of attaching the Afghans to our interest if we avoid all interference with them in the meantime."

[Schmedlap]

Building upon the hunting dog meme, I'm reminded of the wise words of my old CSM when he was berating one of his NCOs...

Sergeant, that dog ain't gonna hunt! Heck, that dog don't even have any legs! You know what a dog with no legs does? Nothing! He ain't got no legs!!

We do have a dog in the fight. But a dog with no legs might be a better metaphor.

[Dayuhan]

We did not go to Afghanistan to "deny sanctuary" any more than we went to Iraq to "deny WMD."

We went to Afghanistan to bring revenge and destruction down on the head of one Mr. B. Laden and his AQ organization in response to their attacks against the U.S. on 9/11; and also to disrupt, deter, dissuade the same from attempting that sh#* again. Period.

Did they use Afghanistan as a friendly base for training, etc? Certainly. But they also use safe houses in a dozen friendly countries and the U.S. itself as equally effective sanctuary.

Certainly Afghanistan wasn't the only sanctuary, but it's the one OBL et al were using. There's a reason for that: there are levels of sanctuary, and a protective state provides a level of sanctuary that you just don't get in a European safe house, or anywhere else.

In any event, revenge, destruction, disruption, deterrence, and dissuasion were more or less what I meant when I spoke of denying sanctuary, so we don't really disagree there. We wanted to get them out of there and make sure they didn't come back, and presumably we still want that. That makes it difficult to walk away from Afghanistan if the government we started doesn't live up to our expectations, because if we do we surrender that objective. The Taliban come back, AQ come back with them, and very likely sooner or later we do it all over again.

At the policy level we:
1. Rarely say what we really mean when we do something big;
2. Don't understand the essence of Insurgency and what is really important, and what is merely a symptom of larger problems/issues; so have tended to focus on symptoms, but only where we can link them to groups or states that we have pre-existing issues with; and
3. Have taken an approach to the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and those before and after as being totally and completely things that must be fixed by changes in behavior by everyone else in the world except the U.S. (i.e., victim mentality)

I'm not sure "the essence of insurgency" really made much difference: we didn't have an insurgency problem until we created one by occupying nations and trying to define the terms of their governance. Of course if we'd understood insurgency better we might not have done that, so in some ways we don't disagree there either.

I suspect, again, that you are assuming that 9/11 and the rise of AQ's jihad against the west was a consequence of American policy, and again I am not convinced that this is the case. Once the Soviets were out of Afghanistan OBL needed someone to hate, and given the realities of world power, who else was there? He'd have come after us regardless, because he had to come after someone and there was nobody else.

I'd love to agree with General Roberts, and I would certainly prefer to avoid all interference in Afghan affairs. There is a salient difference, though: we do have something to fear from Afghanistan. People determined to make war on us have used Afghanistan as a base in the past, and if given the opportunity they will do so again in the future. That's why we're there.