Your final clause is absolutely correct. However, I wish I was more convinced that "leadership" was beginning to recognize that; more importantly that they would do something about it...The really sad thing about that statement is that many realized that -- variously -- before, during and after Viet Nam. That realization, however got buried for the sake of political expediency and a major misreading of goat entrails.It is not that war or warfare is changing, it is that we are slowly coming to realize that this is far more Military Support to Civil Authorities for a very violent Civil Emergency than it is warfare. Our ROE and Tactical Directives are slowly working us around to the back door on this realization, as we are hard set to be macho warfighters in name, but realizing that macho appoaches simply don't fit.
We really need to avoid repeating that mistake.We're both correct -- and thus, we risk creating a creature that is neither an effective warfighter or a competent MSCA provider.Were not being overly wussified warfighters, as Ken discussess; instead we are being overly machofied MSCA providers.
What will hopefully be realized is that both those functions are required and the key to successful employment of the Armed Forces in each role is designing a force that has structures and organizations that are trained and equipped to do both. That is not impossible, it is not even particularly difficult or overly expensive.
What is difficult is getting senior policy makers to agree to a course and then getting our political masters educated about capabilities.
And developing in both the above the will required for the proper use of the correct amount force at the right time......Yes...Once we properly categorize the nature of our engagement, the logic of the tactical directives begins to fall in place as well.
Bookmarks