Just because it is new to some in the US does not make it new. War cannot change. Warfare is changing very slowly and in no way we cannot comprehend.Originally Posted by Ranger94
The failure of leadership is to recognise and explicitly state the above.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Warning: Personal Opinion Ahead
I'll agree with WILF as to his statement above, but then drive him to an immediate reply with my follow-on comment:
The nature of war indeed does not change quickly, though TTPs adjust continually to technologies, METT-T, etc. HOWEVER; what I see here is that perhaps leadership is coming to recognize that looking at intervention in the insurgency of some foreign country as warfare is to put it in the wrong category to begin with.
It is not that war or warfare is changing, it is that we are slowly coming to realize that this is far more Military Support to Civil Authorities for a very violent Civil Emergency than it is warfare. Our ROE and Tactical Directives are slowly working us around to the back door on this realization, as we are hard set to be macho warfighters in name, but realizing that macho appoaches simply don't fit.
Were not being overly wussified warfighters, as Ken discussess; instead we are being overly machofied MSCA providers.
Once we properly categorize the nature of our engagement, the logic of the tactical directives begins to fall in place as well.
Okay, WILF, fire away...
Robert C. Jones
Intellectus Supra Scientia
(Understanding is more important than Knowledge)
"The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)
Dammed decent of you Sir! Don't mind if I do. Rude not to!Okay, WILF, fire away...
The Army is an armed force. It uses armed force against armed force. It cannot do anything else well, apart from to kill or threaten to kill. Thus it uses these things to defeat the armed element of an insurgency. ALL else is Politics.
Are we violently agreeing?
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Wilf's busy. If I may...
Your final clause is absolutely correct. However, I wish I was more convinced that "leadership" was beginning to recognize that; more importantly that they would do something about it...The really sad thing about that statement is that many realized that -- variously -- before, during and after Viet Nam. That realization, however got buried for the sake of political expediency and a major misreading of goat entrails.It is not that war or warfare is changing, it is that we are slowly coming to realize that this is far more Military Support to Civil Authorities for a very violent Civil Emergency than it is warfare. Our ROE and Tactical Directives are slowly working us around to the back door on this realization, as we are hard set to be macho warfighters in name, but realizing that macho appoaches simply don't fit.
We really need to avoid repeating that mistake.We're both correct -- and thus, we risk creating a creature that is neither an effective warfighter or a competent MSCA provider.Were not being overly wussified warfighters, as Ken discussess; instead we are being overly machofied MSCA providers.
What will hopefully be realized is that both those functions are required and the key to successful employment of the Armed Forces in each role is designing a force that has structures and organizations that are trained and equipped to do both. That is not impossible, it is not even particularly difficult or overly expensive.
What is difficult is getting senior policy makers to agree to a course and then getting our political masters educated about capabilities.
And developing in both the above the will required for the proper use of the correct amount force at the right time......Yes...Once we properly categorize the nature of our engagement, the logic of the tactical directives begins to fall in place as well.
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