Re-structuring the BCT

[Ken White]

The HMWWVs in your recon elements always intrigued me. What was the rationale (assuming there was one) for marrying them with BFVs rather than more BFVs or even MBTs?

General Purpose (GP -- precursor for the once ubiquitous 'Jeep') equipment rather than sensibly buying designed for purpose items.

The M3 Bradley was a political compromise purchased by the Armor and Cavalry folks to assure that the Infantry folks (who were buying the M2 Bradley) supported their buy of the M1 Tank. A part of the cost was cancellation of the XM8 Armored Gun system and of a dedicated Scout vehicle. The HMMWV is a lousy scout vehicle but is the standard, GP 'light' (???) wheeled vehicle.

IOW, there is no rationale. Both items were and are simply available and the best of many poor solutions given a refusal to buy dedicated equipment...

We do a lot of really dumb stuff.

We over-Armor our Recon elements because we do not have the patience to wait for effective, time consuming reconnaissance to be completed, we just load up on Armor and go out looking for trouble. Dumb...

We've identified a lack of effective Reconnaissance capability as a tactical and operational shortfall again and again -- we still haven't really fixed it, mostly because we're unwilling to buy dedicated equipment (or adequately train our people) and have impatient Staff Officers who are unwilling to wait for information...

[Fuchs]

We over-Armor our Recon elements because we do not have the patience to wait for effective, time consuming reconnaissance to be completed, we just load up on Armor and go out looking for trouble. Dumb...

We've identified a lack of effective Reconnaissance capability as a tactical and operational shortfall again and again -- we still haven't really fixed it, mostly because we're unwilling to buy dedicated equipment (or adequately train our people) and have impatient Staff Officers who are unwilling to wait for information...

This happens to be relevant to my interests.

(1) The U.S. idea of a cavalry mission (dedicated force for recce, security, vanguard, rearguard) makes sense, but the execution is strange.
- too many helicopters organic at too low level (apparently too much funds for helos!)
- design of a brigade-sized "Regiment" for a mission that should be done by dispersed battalions, if not companies
- either heavy tracked or 4wd light approach

Armour, combat, heavyness, speed - that's all fine for recce, counterrecce, security, advance guard, rear guard - but it's just part of the solution. A turbine-driven MBT in a cavalry force is a very strange choice, of course.
Mobility (especially road range and reliability of mobility-critical components) should be emphasized over protection and firepower. Their combat role should be more akin to fencing with a Rapier than to a Roman legionary's charge.

The light "stealth" approach is also fine, but it takes time as you mentioned, and should thus be an effort that's even more independent of the plans of the brigades (combat formations). The slow, light approach should cover areas, establish picket lines or observe places of special interest. The stealth recce should be in place long before a Bde intends to move into their direction - just in case.
This requires many small and enduring teams - LRS basically.

The idea that you send recce elements ahead is outdated. It stems from a time when the mobility was very different and many divisions were advancing shoulder-to-shoulder or in the undefended areas behind a penetrated front line. Nowadays you have your brigades with some spacing and need to know what's up in the gaps and ahead. Recce needs to cover huge areas, not merely tell what lies ahead on a few favourited routes. Field manuals come close to recognize this, but force structures don't.
We have too many support and combat troops and too few recce elements. keep in mind; killing is easy nowadays once you have a positive ID and coordinates (+ movement vector) about the enemy.

The brigades should really be the triremes in an ocean of recce troops who already drowned every foe who was too weak to swim; ready to ram with speed and force, if possible multiple vs one.


All the new lightly armored 4wd observation cars (such as Fennek, or HMMWV with LRAS) can do very little in my opinion. They're a terribly expensive solution for the stealth part and useless for the "combat for recce superiority" and "cavalry" mission. 8x8-based recce vehicles are even more questionable because of their size. Luchs is great for route recce, but the concept is simply too expensive.

[Ken White]

...The U.S. idea of a cavalry mission (dedicated force for recce, security, vanguard, rearguard) makes sense, but the execution is strange.

Mostly due to limited equipment choices.

too many helicopters organic at too low level (apparently too much funds for helos!)

In a sense, you're correct. Money to buy aircraft is in a different pot than that for ground vehicles...[/quote]design of a brigade-sized "Regiment" for a mission that should be done by dispersed battalions, if not companies.[/quote]More a tradition and cultural thing than a valid operational requirement. We give our branches too mush clout in structure decisions.

either heavy tracked or 4wd light approach

Again, an equipment available limitation.

I agree with your other points. Infanteer also provided a linked article and asked if I agreed with it -- actually, I do. Mostly due to this quote from that article:

"American military might is based largely on the ability to maintain an operational tempo that vastly exceeds that of an adversary. Operational commanders will not forfeit this enormous advantage to allow tactical units to fully develop the enemy situation."

I don't totally subscribe to that but it is firmly embedded in US military thought and is unlikely to change. That and our national lack of patience make ability to fight for information, on screens and such imperative.

The idea that you send recce elements ahead is outdated...Field manuals come close to recognize this, but force structures don't.
We have too many support and combat troops and too few recce elements. keep in mind; killing is easy nowadays once you have a positive ID and coordinates (+ movement vector) about the enemy.

The brigades should really be the triremes in an ocean of recce troops who already drowned every foe who was too weak to swim; ready to ram with speed and force, if possible multiple vs one.

Yes.

To reconcile the conflicting reconnaissance (and equipment) needs you cited, my preference is for Infantry Battalions to have Scout AND Reconnaissance platoons (light wheeled vehicles for light infantry, slightly modified infantry carrier for signature confusion for mechanized units where they exist), for combined Arms or Armor, Armored Cavalry Platoons with a light tracked scout section, a Tank section, an Infantry section and a Mortar section plus the PL.

BCTs / Bdes should have a Cavalry Troop with the same four functional units except as platoons and not sections. The separate Cavalry or Reconnaissance Squadrons / Battalions should consist of four such troops plus support. All these 'Cavalry' elements are flexibly reorganized to fit situational METT-TC considerations.

Equally obviously, all those organization -- and new ones tailored for the operations at hand -- should be modified to fit the overall situation, location and operational goal.

Cavalry or something like it, a reconnaissance oriented but emphatically combat capable element, is required. It has to be prepared to fight. The issue of 'stealthy' reconnaissance is provided for by LRS companies and elements where appropriate and formation reconnaissance units should be capable of some stealth but must be able to fight for information and be usable as economy of force elements.

My issue with equipment is simply that we should provide special purpose equipment rather than trying to economize in purchases and training by buying one size fits all -- it rarely does.

[Fuchs]

Recce/scouts/whatever tied to Bn/Rgt/Bde can only cover a small radius around those units/formations adequately. They cannot scout ahead in a two-hour-march radius before the HQ has decided on the direction of the march.

The availability of eyes and fists ahead is important - and any such lack reduces the mobile warfare proficiency (especially the agility of command and formations). Stumbling around blindly is no fun when the pinata is aiming a gun at you.

Recce attached to divisions was OK in WW2 when recce had top speed of 60-80 km/h, tanks of 40 and infantry on foot ... well, you get the point.
Recce hasn't this speed advantage any more. We've used all-motorised forces since 1940 (UK), 1944 (U.S.) or 1955 (Germany). We need a new concept for recce.

Let me emphasis the recce-shall-already-be-in-place-before-a-formation-knows-it-want-to-move-to-that-place point.
This becomes as impractical for individual formations just as city walls have become impractical for city garrisons with ever-larger artillery ranges. They gave way for front lines (a higher level effort) that provided all cities with a defensive line that was shorter than the sum of city walls of a single province.
Defensive lines are about circumference; 2*pi*r. The area to be covered by recce is about circular area; r*r*pi. It grows much faster.
If nothing else, geometry and history tell us that we have a defect with our force structure.

Recce should be a corps-level job today (this is unlikely to become visible in our smallish training exercises). The combat units and formations use vanguard, security elements and if need be they can feel for a short range with a recce team. This is the "keep eyes open" part of the job. The real recce should be a Corps thing and should provide ~90% of the non-combat info on the enemy.
We should give the Corps several Cavalry Regiments of several autonomous companies ("squadrons" if you want) each and a LRS Bn or Rgt.

One more year and I might be finished with a 50-200 pages effort that's in part built on this assertion of mine.

From said study:

I hope it didn't take that study to point out something so blindingly obvious!

Question: If you are advancing to contact, why do you need reconnaissance?

It's actually not that obvious, but rather depends on assumptions.

This point can actually lead to another discussion of manoeuvre à priori/command push vs. manoeuvre à posteriori/recon pull.
Recce ahead loses some importance if you use the latter.

There's also the thing whose name I always forget; attacking an enemy ASAP to catch him unread to fight. Military history suggests that this can work extremely fine if you use the right forces.
Actually, Rommel drove over a French division on a road with a fraction of his Panzer-Division (about a third of it; he lead the vanguard, Vorausabteilung) simply because said division was resting along a road and didn't expect attackers, being 30+ km behind the front that was penetrated only a few hours before.

The quote from the study was actually rather context (NTC) specific and probably only right in ~80% of all cases.
A weak recce ahead (that needs to be sent ahead because it's not already in place!) can sometimes provide more early warning to the enemy than to yourself and waste your time.

[Infanteer]

There's also the thing whose name I always forget; attacking an enemy ASAP to catch him unread to fight.

Spoiling attack?

[Fuchs]

Not quite. Something with pre-, but neither preemptive nor preventive.

[Tukhachevskii]

I think a large part of the problem is that the reconnaisance function/role tends to blur into the advance guard function/role which then confuses force design or, as in the case of Iraq, S/BCT recon elements are often used as a de-facto third manouvre element...so who's doing recon? Separating the two functions fully (stealth for the former and brawn for the latter) is probably going to the near impossible given actual rather than theoretical battle conditions and the fiscal and doctrinal problems of force design.

[Fuchs]

I think a large part of the problem is that the reconnaisance function/role tends to blur into the advance guard function/role which then confuses force design or, as in the case of Iraq, S/BCT recon elements are often used as a de-facto third manouvre element...so who's doing recon?

The "third manoeuvre element" thing is a consequence of designing cavalry as a de-facto brigade instead of as many small autonomous units (Coy).
That's one of the reasons why the ACR concept is strange.

German WW2 doctrine gave the fast division's recce detachment some combat tasks, too. They were only capable of small combat missions, though.
Standard doctrine was to send small teams of armoured cars ahead and to increase their density in areas of interest. Those armoured cars would avoid combat if possible.
The recce detachment was reinforced with a fast-moving infantry Bn (initially motorcycle troops), though. They were able to punch through screening lines or to grab an important hill or bridge if necessary. Organic artillery and AT guns helped them (they did later go for long 75mm cannons on lightly armoured AFV for both direct fire support and AT support).

That wasn't enough to be misunderstood as an additional manoeuvre element. It was enough for small combat missions (especially against unprepared opposition) and was often mis-used as emergency reserves in times of crisis (this happened to everybody in uniform, though - engineers and recce troops were merely the first to be called upon).

[swerve1]

Recce/scouts/whatever tied to Bn/Rgt/Bde can only cover a small radius around those units/formations adequately. They cannot scout ahead in a two-hour-march radius before the HQ has decided on the direction of the march.

The availability of eyes and fists ahead is important - and any such lack reduces the mobile warfare proficiency (especially the agility of command and formations). Stumbling around blindly is no fun when the pinata is aiming a gun at you.

Recce attached to divisions was OK in WW2 when recce had top speed of 60-80 km/h, tanks of 40 and infantry on foot ... well, you get the point.
Recce hasn't this speed advantage any more. We've used all-motorised forces since 1940 (UK), 1944 (U.S.) or 1955 (Germany). We need a new concept for recce.

Let me emphasis the recce-shall-already-be-in-place-before-a-formation-knows-it-want-to-move-to-that-place point.
This becomes as impractical for individual formations just as city walls have become impractical for city garrisons with ever-larger artillery ranges. They gave way for front lines (a higher level effort) that provided all cities with a defensive line that was shorter than the sum of city walls of a single province.
Defensive lines are about circumference; 2*pi*r. The area to be covered by recce is about circular area; r*r*pi. It grows much faster.
If nothing else, geometry and history tell us that we have a defect with our force structure.

Recce should be a corps-level job today (this is unlikely to become visible in our smallish training exercises). The combat units and formations use vanguard, security elements and if need be they can feel for a short range with a recce team. This is the "keep eyes open" part of the job. The real recce should be a Corps thing and should provide ~90% of the non-combat info on the enemy.
We should give the Corps several Cavalry Regiments of several autonomous companies ("squadrons" if you want) each and a LRS Bn or Rgt.

One more year and I might be finished with a 50-200 pages effort that's in part built on this assertion of mine.



It's actually not that obvious, but rather depends on assumptions.

This point can actually lead to another discussion of manoeuvre à priori/command push vs. manoeuvre à posteriori/recon pull.
Recce ahead loses some importance if you use the latter.

There's also the thing whose name I always forget; attacking an enemy ASAP to catch him unread to fight. Military history suggests that this can work extremely fine if you use the right forces.
Actually, Rommel drove over a French division on a road with a fraction of his Panzer-Division (about a third of it; he lead the vanguard, Vorausabteilung) simply because said division was resting along a road and didn't expect attackers, being 30+ km behind the front that was penetrated only a few hours before.

The quote from the study was actually rather context (NTC) specific and probably only right in ~80% of all cases.
A weak recce ahead (that needs to be sent ahead because it's not already in place!) can sometimes provide more early warning to the enemy than to yourself and waste your time.

I don't quite agree with your view of reconnaissance - recce. While precision fires will only become more common, making every scout with a radio much more lethal, I think future battlefields will still place a premium on recon forces at all echelons below corps. PGMs may not be a viable option in an area with sensitive infrastructure or civilians, weather may make delivery of PGMs impossible, and the mission make dictate a task other than 'destroy.' In these cases, scouts may need to maintain eyes on the target and battle handover to another unit. I think we also need to keep in mind the role of reconnaissance forces as an economy of force. The old model had a RGT (a US BDE) cover a corps, a SQDN cover a DIV, etc. In this context, the old forces were economies of force relative to their parent unit.

As a company commander in Iraq, I would routinely use a squad or fire team as a recon force; I found eyes forward to be valuable even at my low level. Reconnaissance at all levels can be decisive - same for counter-recon.

[Fuchs]

Your first disagreement is a misunderstnading. I separate the lareg area recce in armored cav squadrons and LRS. The LRS are meant for stealthy, slow work - especially observation.

The Cav would be agile, combat-worthy to some degree (against support/recce troops and against combat troops with the advantage of surprise/ambush) and fully capable of "maintain eyes on the target and battle handover to another unit. I think we also need to keep in mind the role of reconnaissance forces as an economy of force.".
I don't think that brigades need to be fully capable stand-alone forces, though. They should swim in an ocean of recce troops.

"As a company commander in Iraq, I would routinely use a squad or fire team as a recon force; I found eyes forward to be valuable even at my low level. Reconnaissance at all levels can be decisive - same for counter-recon."

Of course, but the timely recce effort of an infantry company in a major war has an effective radius that equals maybe ten minutes of driving (unless we talk about very, very open and featureless terrain).
I expect a degree of agility and I fear that enemies might have a degree of agility that necessitates an early warning more on the order of at least an hour for you'd otherwise be surprised when relatively unfit to fight.

again: "The real recce should be a Corps thing and should provide ~90% of the non-combat info on the enemy."

[GI Zhou]

A little off topic, but as you are talking reconnaisance, is a vehicle like the small and agile British Scimitar, able to defeat light armour and soft skin vehicles, a good reconnaissance vehicle on the battlefield. I ask this because the People's Liberation Army have at least trialled their ZDB03 airborne combat vehicle as a reconnaissance vehicle. Besides having a 30mm automatic cannon, it can squeeze four paratroopers with small arms only in a rear compartment.

[reed11b]

Of course, but the timely recce effort of an infantry company in a major war has an effective radius that equals maybe ten minutes of driving (unless we talk about very, very open and featureless terrain).
I expect a degree of agility and I fear that enemies might have a degree of agility that necessitates an early warning more on the order of at least an hour for you'd otherwise be surprised when relatively unfit to fight.

except that most light infantry has access to aviation and/or vehicular assets of some sort. Not sure what you are saying about LRS, and since I am a LRS scout, please clarify.
Reed

[Infanteer]

We over-Armor our Recon elements because we do not have the patience to wait for effective, time consuming reconnaissance to be completed, we just load up on Armor and go out looking for trouble. Dumb...

I take it you don't buy into these conclusions?

http://www.ausa.org/SiteCollectionDo...ers/LWP_53.pdf

[William F. Owen]

I take it you don't buy into these conclusions?

http://www.ausa.org/SiteCollectionDo...ers/LWP_53.pdf

From said study:

The first study, entitled Applying the National Training Center Experience: Tactical Reconnaissance, established ìa strong correlation between successful reconnaissance and successful offensive operations.î In fact, this correlation was so strong that Goldsmith argued that ìbeginning an attack . . . without appropriate intelligence is apt to lead to failure.î8

I hope it didn't take that study to point out something so blindingly obvious!

Question: If you are advancing to contact, why do you need reconnaissance?

[Infanteer]

From said study:

I hope it didn't take that study to point out something so blindingly obvious!

Good point.

Question: If you are advancing to contact, why do you need reconnaissance?

So you hit the bad guy at the right angle? Although in this sense, "the lead guys" are the reconnaissance.

[Tukhachevskii]

General Purpose (GP -- precursor for the once ubiquitous 'Jeep') equipment rather than sensibly buying designed for purpose items.

The M3 Bradley was a political compromise purchased by the Armor and Cavalry folks to assure that the Infantry folks (who were buying the M2 Bradley) supported their buy of the M1 Tank. A part of the cost was cancellation of the XM8 Armored Gun system and of a dedicated Scout vehicle. The HMMWV is a lousy scout vehicle but is the standard, GP 'light' (???) wheeled vehicle.

IOW, there is no rationale. Both items were and are simply available and the best of many poor solutions given a refusal to buy dedicated equipment...

We do a lot of really dumb stuff.

We over-Armor our Recon elements because we do not have the patience to wait for effective, time consuming reconnaissance to be completed, we just load up on Armor and go out looking for trouble. Dumb...

We've identified a lack of effective Reconnaissance capability as a tactical and operational shortfall again and again -- we still haven't really fixed it, mostly because we're unwilling to buy dedicated equipment (or adequately train our people) and have impatient Staff Officers who are unwilling to wait for information...

Now you mention it I remember that the scout and MICV were melded for cost savings; I always had a soft spot for the XM-808 "Twister" (doable, IMO, with todays composite, hybrid drive, digital technology), although the XM-800T was probably more suitable. I only asked because I know the Danish army scout platoon had two tanks (tank section) and a light vehicle section (2 VW I think) and a single mortar vehicle. Apparently, they did very well at NATO training meets combining stealth with survivability (based on the firepower and protection of the tanks). Anyone who knows about the travils of Britain's FRES programme (essentially jumping on the US "medium weight" Stryker bandwagon) knows that the British Gov have just chosen a 30tonne MICV (that's pushing the "medium wieght" bit, IMO); personally I would have liked to have seen the UK go with the TRACER programme (which see half way down the article). I think the German/Dutch Fennek is probably one of the better light recon platforms.