Re-structuring the BCT

[Eden]

Too much time, effort and resources has been spent under the umbrella of recon = unit. Recon is a MISSION, NOT a Unit! Any/all maneuver combat units (including most types of combat support units) should be able to conduct platoon/company level recon (Route, Area, Zone).

The real question is whether the BCT needs a 'cavalry' capability vice a 'recon' capability. That is, the ability to perform the other missions associated with cavalry (guard/screen/delay, etc). Traditionally the answer has been no, with cavalry capabilities located at the division level, but with the impending death of the division, one wonders just where we will put our cavalry and what level of command will have control over it.

And, yes, theoretically, any maneuver element can also perform 'cavalry' missions...but theoretically any unit can serve as infantry. My professional experience indicates that having a unit dedicated to reconnaissance results in better reconnaissance at every level. The only valid debate is how heavy and lethal your cavalry should be, and that has gone unreolved since the days of Stuarts and Greyhounds.

Time spent discussing reconnaissance is never wasted.

[TAH]

BLUF
In addition to conducting the full range of Combat (attack, defend, delay) and Security (Screen, guard cover) missions, Cavalry units are capable of conducting effective all three reconnaissance missions (Route, aone, area).

Our current Recon Sqdrons are only effective in conducting surveillance (watching and listening) and very limited "active recon" (most often limited to screening) against weak or passive opponents. With augmentation is the phase that is often thrown about to allow/enable the ARS to do other things/tasks/missions. Read, Rob Peter to pay Paul.

What makes the current set of Recon Squadrons so bad is their lack of organic capablity to develope the situation while in contact (read fight for information). Against a determined opponent, they will bump up against the front edge of his security force/zone and call for the commitment of the Main Body. Fine if that call does not come too early.

This is situation is made worse because both the division and corps are "out of the Cav business". No division or corps level units (other then a BCT) to fight for information and develop the situation prior to commiting the main body. No unit (other then a BCT) available for economy-of-force or deception missions. Taking any unit away from a BCT to preform these tasks/missions "breaks" that BCT.

BCTs need Fully Mission cabable Cavalry Squadrons to enable them to develop situations while the rest of the BCT is out of contact and commit the BCT at the time/place of the CDR's choosing vice the enemy's.

[Ken White]

BCTs need Fully Mission cabable Cavalry Squadrons to enable them to develop situations while the rest of the BCT is out of contact and commit the BCT at the time/place of the CDR's choosing vice the enemy's.

Armored (Heavy), Infantry (Light) and Airborne Infantry (Light) Bdes need a Cav Sqn plus a third maneuver Bn. What's also needed are true Armored Cavalry Regiments (NOT Stryker units).

If we're going to have a total of an arbitrary (on affordability grounds) 60 Bdes, AC/RC, the IMO we should aim for:

10/20 Armored or Heavy
10/5 Infantry or Light
5/5 ACR
5/0 Abn Inf (aka Light)

The design of the Bns that comprise those Brigades is largely totally immaterial as long as they are anywhere near current or historic US norms and allow Commanders to rapidly tailor AND constantly adjust their force for METT-TC parameters *. Forcing them to do so would be even better until we improve our training...

If we temporarily have more Bdes, plus up the Infantry and ACRs only on a 1/1 ratio. For the Stryker fans, three to five of the Armored or Heavy Bdes could be Strykerized if one insists. While the stryker has merit, it is not adequately survivable of maneuverable for MCO. The 'medium ' role should be filled by the TRACK vehicle mounted ACRs, one of the best economy of force designs yet to appear. I'd personally go for more ACRs but the Inf / Armor communities would then squabble.

The Cav Sqn and ACR -- particularly the 1945-70 variants were the only organizations that offered true combined arms training to all members and young Cav LTs were versatile and flexible Dudes who could and would delegate...

For those who say Airborne units are unnecessary and obsolete, I totally agree BUT we have not developed, deliberately or inadvertently, the capability of otherwise moving and inserting a Bn or larger sized force 10,000 or so miles and getting it on the ground, a useful strategic capability. Until we do, that capability is better maintained than discarded. I'm aware of the traffic bump jokes. I'm equally aware of the damage LGOP (LINK) can wreak on Armor. The last three lines of the Rules are particularly to be noted. With perhaps emphasis on lines 5 and 8...

I'm also aware of the capabilities and limitation of Armor units in the Guard. METT-TC...

* As the Actress said to the Bishop, it's not really what you have, it's how you use it...

[Tukhachevskii]

I've been wondering about this for a while and thought I'd keep it to myself (you know, so as not to appear too idiotic). Anyway, I thought I'd ask the wsie...why no more motorcycles in the recon sqns? IIRC the M3 was supposed to be able to carry a motorcycle.

[reed11b]

What I fail to understand, is how the request for re-enforced or strengthened brigades led us to an Army of understrength brigades. This almost insured the need for a Div type level of command. Oh, that's why.
Also KW, I agree with your number for brigades, but I would switch your RC light and armored numbers. Maintaining armored vehicles is nearly as expensive in RC units as it is in AC units. Infantry however.....
Reed

[Ken White]

Tukhachevskii:

Anyway, I thought I'd ask the wsie...why no more motorcycles in the recon sqns? IIRC the M3 was supposed to be able to carry a motorcycle.

Accident rate, training time and a not fully capable heavy fuel engine plus METT-TC -- no real need at this time.

Reed11B:

...Maintaining armored vehicles is nearly as expensive in RC units as it is in AC units. Infantry however.....

Maybe even more expensive in some respects but the real issue is current needs versus a true Strategic Reserve for future problems that may need more than walking Infantry -- who can really better cope with today's problems (and who can use non-standard vehicles without degrading critical armor vehicle handling skills)...

Plus it'll deter call ups for dumb wars (I'd really opt for just five AC Heavies + 25 RC and 15 AC Inf + 0 RC but that'd never fly politically...).

Plus you can put all that Armor out west where it can use big ranges and not have so many maneuver constraints. Eastern armor units have to severely degrade training due to range and maneuver enviro concerns.

Plus it gives the affected States more vehicles (wheeled, GP) for State missions.

Plus, as I love to tell the Armor folks, it's harder to train good infantrymen than it is to train good Armor crewmen.

[SJPONeill]

Tukhachevskii:Accident rate, training time and a not fully capable heavy fuel engine plus METT-TC -- no real need at this time.

Accident rates and training item go together but the training time and time to maintain m/c skillsets is not onerous and probably less so if the capability fills a useful niche.

I think that the engine/fuel issue has been resolved although the weight is an issue for what might be more of a recon than a mobility platform...off-topic but i'd be keen to hear from anyone who had experience mounting m/c on vehicles for us when required as opposed to the outrider approach...

[TAH]

Armored (Heavy), Infantry (Light) and Airborne Infantry (Light) Bdes need a Cav Sqn plus a third maneuver Bn. What's also needed are true Armored Cavalry Regiments (NOT Stryker units).

If we're going to have a total of an arbitrary (on affordability grounds) 60 Bdes, AC/RC, the IMO we should aim for:

10/20 Armored or Heavy
10/5 Infantry or Light
5/5 ACR
5/0 Abn Inf (aka Light)

The design of the Bns that comprise those Brigades is largely totally immaterial as long as they are anywhere near current or historic US norms and allow Commanders to rapidly tailor AND constantly adjust their force for METT-TC parameters *. Forcing them to do so would be even better until we improve our training...

If we temporarily have more Bdes, plus up the Infantry and ACRs only on a 1/1 ratio. For the Stryker fans, three to five of the Armored or Heavy Bdes could be Strykerized if one insists. While the stryker has merit, it is not adequately survivable of maneuverable for MCO. The 'medium ' role should be filled by the TRACK vehicle mounted ACRs, one of the best economy of force designs yet to appear. I'd personally go for more ACRs but the Inf / Armor communities would then squabble.

The Cav Sqn and ACR -- particularly the 1945-70 variants were the only organizations that offered true combined arms training to all members and young Cav LTs were versatile and flexible Dudes who could and would delegate...

For those who say Airborne units are unnecessary and obsolete, I totally agree BUT we have not developed, deliberately or inadvertently, the capability of otherwise moving and inserting a Bn or larger sized force 10,000 or so miles and getting it on the ground, a useful strategic capability. Until we do, that capability is better maintained than discarded. I'm aware of the traffic bump jokes. I'm equally aware of the damage LGOP (LINK) can wreak on Armor. The last three lines of the Rules are particularly to be noted. With perhaps emphasis on lines 5 and 8...

A better mix AC to RC is 36 AC to 20 RC support their respective deployment cycles of 1 by 3 for AC and 1 by 5 for RC.

HBCT 12 AC 5 RC
IBCT 12 AC 10 RC
SCR 6 AC 5 RC
IBCT (ABN) 6 AC 0 RC


A re-org'ed SBCT could become a Stryker Cavalry Regiment (SCR) of three squadron.

Each Squadron has:
three Stryker Cav Troops converted from Stryker Infantry Companies
2 platoons of 6 RVs + 2 platoons of 3 MGS + 2 120mm SP Mortars
one Stryker Infantry Company (Stryker Dragoon Troop)
one Heavy Troop (Tank Company of 10-14 tanks)

Provides scouts in lightly armed/armored platforms (RVs) supported by light armor (MGS) backed-up with infantry (Dagoons) and tanks (heavy troop).

Still lacks right amount of Arty and any aviation. Still working the math on those

Three companies of 30-42 tanks will require 135 to 195 additional soldiers per SCR, might be able to get some from a re-org'ed Support Squadron.

Using Strykers as the base vehicle reduces the SCT over-all weight and support footprints. Fewer fuel trucks, fewer mechanics, fewer/lighter parts etc.

I'm not emotional about the whole wheel versus track thing but would be interested in swapping some/all of the Stryker RVs with Canadian Coyotes or Aussie ASLAVs with 25mm with thermal but no ATGM (guys in the back are carrying Javalins).

[SJPONeill]

I'm not emotional about the whole wheel versus track thing but would be interested in swapping some/all of the Stryker RVs with Canadian Coyotes or Aussie ASLAVs with 25mm with thermal but no ATGM (guys in the back are carrying Javalins).

Might be better off going for LAVIII over ASLAV as its chassis is essentially the same as Stryker so you have better commonality of parts, training, maintenance etc...ASLAV is based on the smaller LAV-25 but is amphibious if that was a useful addition to organic capability...

[TAH]

Might be better off going for LAVIII over ASLAV as its chassis is essentially the same as Stryker so you have better commonality of parts, training, maintenance etc...ASLAV is based on the smaller LAV-25 but is amphibious if that was a useful addition to organic capability...

My Bad:

Commonality is best.

The "Iron Mountain" that has to deploy to support the "tip of the Spear" needs to be as small as possible. Common parts help.

[Ken White]

A better mix AC to RC is 36 AC to 20 RC support their respective deployment cycles of 1 by 3 for AC and 1 by 5 for RC.

HBCT 12 AC 5 RC
IBCT 12 AC 10 RC
SCR 6 AC 5 RC
IBCT (ABN) 6 AC 0 RC

Don't agree with designing a total force for what is now occurring and may not be in two to five years -- it'll take six to eight years to get ANY major reorganization embedded in both components. I also think the USAR should still have combat units but that's another thread. I also think the strategic reserve (small 'r') should be at least the size of the AC. Design a force base on 15 to20 years out, not today. It takes that long, in peacetime, to get the force up and operational.

A re-org'ed SBCT could become a Stryker Cavalry Regiment (SCR) of three squadron...

You can do that; someone probably will -- after all, some squirrel wanted to put Strykers on Oahu.

Part of the 'rationale' for that was that they would be good in the jungle. Obviously, that person hadn't spent much time in anyone's jungle...

Provides scouts in lightly armed/armored platforms (RVs) supported by light armor (MGS) backed-up with infantry (Dagoons) and tanks (heavy troop).

The Stryker will be with us for a while but it was IMO a poor purchase decision. It is not terribly mobile (12.50x20 tires???) and is inadequate for heavy combat. It's okay if you cannot afford something better -- we can.

I do agree with Scouts being lightly armed and armor for them is okay provided is does not constrain vehicle mobility and agility. The old 1/4 ton was a good Scout vehicle, you could get it most anywhere and it wasn't armored so it kept the Scouts honest, they didn't take dumb chances 'cause they were Armored (HMMWV is too big).

Using Strykers as the base vehicle reduces the SCT over-all weight and support footprints. Fewer fuel trucks, fewer mechanics, fewer/lighter parts etc.

Brings to mind the old quote "You get what you pay for..." And you always pay, one way or another.

I'm not emotional about the whole wheel versus track thing but would be interested in swapping some/all of the Stryker RVs with Canadian Coyotes or Aussie ASLAVs with 25mm with thermal but no ATGM (guys in the back are carrying Javalins).

I get emotional about it because I don't want to see people killed unnecessarily. Wheeled Armored Vehicles are either immobile (MRAPS) or easy targets (Strykers, Armored HMMWVs and such). Agility saves lives, armor can also do that but it takes tracks to move it in combat.

I'm not a 25mm fan, nor of ATGM mounted on lightly armored vehicles (I include the Bradley in that); it tends to make people think they have a light tank and often to act accordingly. The .50 Cal is adequate for any infantry carrier.

Armor and excessive armament are dangerous, the Armor can make troops develop Cocoonitis, overweaponing can make 'em think they're unstoppable. A few days heavy combat will cure that but you'll kill a lot of folks needlessly in the interim.

[B.Smitty]

The Stryker will be with us for a while but it was IMO a poor purchase decision. It is not terribly mobile (12.50x20 tires???) and is inadequate for heavy combat. It's okay if you cannot afford something better -- we can.

At the time, what would've been better? It was supposed to be an "interim", medium-weight vehicle. Everything would've been a compromise. Anything much heavier would push it into Bradley territory. FCS was supposed to be the objective system.

The C-130 restriction was misplaced. But, IMHO, Stryker is a reasonable balance. Better than an armored HMMWV, but not a Bradley.

[Ken White]

At the time, what would've been better? It was supposed to be an "interim", medium-weight vehicle. Everything would've been a compromise. Anything much heavier would push it into Bradley territory. FCS was supposed to be the objective system.

IMO, nothing would've been better. Literally.

What is the war fighting rationale for the Stryker and its cousins?

Essentially that they are cheaper, cheaper to operate (that old "you get what you pay for" thing again...) and are lighter, thus more transportable by air. Well maybe...

The C-130 restriction was misplaced. But, IMHO, Stryker is a reasonable balance. Better than an armored HMMWV, but not a Bradley.

Most anything is better than an Armored HMMWV and I'm not a Bradley fan either -- it too was and is a compromise. All compromises are just that, effectiveness compromised for something else. We make too many politically oriented and acceptable purchases and both those vehicles -- and MRAPs -- are examples of that.

The basic problem with the Stryker and most wheeled combat vehicles (those that are truly agile being the exceptions) is that they cannot operate in the face of a reasonably competent, moderately well armed opponent. They are a peace time, look tough piece of equipment. They are doing good work in the current fights but they aren't really suitable for contested entries or sustained hard combat.

Stryker's have fans, as do ASLAVs, Coyotes and similar vehicles. All are compromise vehicles; none are really survivable in heavy combat. Many say that's not a problem, we are unlikely to have such combat in the near term. I agree we are unlikely to have to do that, I do not agree that adopting lightly armored, marginally cross country mobile vehicles is acceptable in the interim. That for a variety of reasons including training (of all concerned...). Add in the procurement cycle and yet again we could -- hopefully won't but could -- enter another major war with an inadequate vehicle like the M2/M3 tanks in WW II or the M4A3E8s in Korea. Not really good planning. Not that anyone at DA is concerned with my opinion -- and I know that many disagree with me and that's okay.

[TAH]

Don't agree with designing a total force for what is now occurring and may not be in two to five years -- it'll take six to eight years to get ANY major reorganization embedded in both components. I also think the USAR should still have combat units but that's another thread. I also think the strategic reserve (small 'r') should be at least the size of the AC. Design a force base on 15 to20 years out, not today. It takes that long, in peacetime, to get the force up and operational.You can do that; someone probably will -- after all, some squirrel wanted to put Strykers on Oahu.

Part of the 'rationale' for that was that they would be good in the jungle. Obviously, that person hadn't spent much time in anyone's jungle...The Stryker will be with us for a while but it was IMO a poor purchase decision. It is not terribly mobile (12.50x20 tires???) and is inadequate for heavy combat. It's okay if you cannot afford something better -- we can.

I do agree with Scouts being lightly armed and armor for them is okay provided is does not constrain vehicle mobility and agility. The old 1/4 ton was a good Scout vehicle, you could get it most anywhere and it wasn't armored so it kept the Scouts honest, they didn't take dumb chances 'cause they were Armored (HMMWV is too big).Brings to mind the old quote "You get what you pay for..." And you always pay, one way or another.I get emotional about it because I don't want to see people killed unnecessarily. Wheeled Armored Vehicles are either immobile (MRAPS) or easy targets (Strykers, Armored HMMWVs and such). Agility saves lives, armor can also do that but it takes tracks to move it in combat.

I'm not a 25mm fan, nor of ATGM mounted on lightly armored vehicles (I include the Bradley in that); it tends to make people think they have a light tank and often to act accordingly. The .50 Cal is adequate for any infantry carrier.

Armor and excessive armament are dangerous, the Armor can make troops develop Cocoonitis, overweaponing can make 'em think they're unstoppable. A few days heavy combat will cure that but you'll kill a lot of folks needlessly in the interim.

Styker = bad
Bradley = bad
HMMWV = bad
MRAP = bad
Jeeps = Good

As a serving member of the RC, we have made the shift as an institution from Strategic Reserve to Operational Force (on a rotating basis). There are issues, but they are not tactical or technical, they are administrative.

A 50/50 spilt is possible but Make the Math work for you.

AC rotates on a 1 by 3 cycle. RC is using 1 by 5. So each sides number should be divisible by those numbers.